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Abstract 
The objective of this study  is to obtain an in-depth  understanding of the 
practical working of property tax administration in Jamaica.  It  highlights the 
major enforcement and compliance practices along with how the  invisible and 
underlying interactions of actors in the field  shape these practices.  It also 
explores those issues and circumstances  along with the existing patterns of 
interests which have contributed to the continued practice of the central 
administration  of the property tax.  The study also emphasizes struggles in the 
property tax field between the various players: the tax authority, the politicians, 
the developers, the local authorities,  the central government and the taxpayers 
and how each one  uses its capital1 to maintain or dominate its position within 
the property tax field.   
The findings  revealed that there were various tensions and struggles among 
the different players within property tax field  in Jamaica.  The players in the 
field used their ‘capitals’  to maintain, dominate and or attempt to make changes 
to the property tax rules. The findings suggest that some property tax 
enforcement practices were the means through which these tensions were 
manifested and resolved or on the other hand, the tax authority attempted to 
use the current practices as  hidden agendas to highlight those tensions in 
order to stand their ground or obliquely  suggest changes or even to 
demonstrate its tacit support of government policies. The  findings also suggest 
that the non-localization of the property tax may be due to varied political 
interests, mistrust in the local authorities and also the perception by some 
players that there’s  a lack of capital at the local level  to manage the tax. 
Finally,  taxpayers’  used their social, economic and cultural capital to resist  
enforcement and compliance efforts  cheating the government of much needed 
revenues 
Property tax although not an important national tax is a critical source of 
revenue for local communities globally. An increased understanding of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Capital	  here	  takes	  the	  Bourdieusian	  perspective.	  	  It	  is	  anything	  that	  has	  significance	  or	  is	  capable	  of	  
being	  influential,	  and	  includes	  all	  forms	  of	  power	  whether	  they	  be	  economic,	  material,	  cultural,	  social	  or	  
symbolic	  (See	  section	  3.5.3)	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working of the practices is beneficial and has implications for both taxpayers 
and policymakers.  The three research questions posed in my study address 
and highlight the main property tax enforcement strategies and how the tax 
authority and policymakers use their capital to shape these practices; the extent 
to which non-localization of the property tax within the Portmore Municipality is 
influenced by the political dispositions of the players in the field and thirdly the 
dimensions of property tax compliance and non-compliance in Jamaica.  The 
questions seek to demonstrate how the combination of the actions and 
interactions of tax administrators, taxpayers, politicians, developers, 
government bureaucrats reshape administrative  practices in the property tax 
field  which have implications for revenue generation and the provision of 
services.  
In keeping with the adoption of an interpretive  inductive approach, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with tax administrators, policymakers, councillors, 
mayors, taxpayers, members of civil society, a developer and a tax 
professional.  A theoretical framework is created which combines the major 
themes and theoretical concepts within three strands of literature: tax 
administration, fiscal decentralization, and Bourdieu’s  theory of practice.  The 
structure provides the explanatory lens through which the findings are 
presented and interpreted. 
The study contributes to the tax scholarship through an interpretive methodical 
approach which gives an additional perspective on property tax administration. 
It  answers the call for well-developed tax research dispelling the notion that tax 
research is adequately dealt with.  This study contributes to the tax literature by 
demonstrating that taxation isn’t  just a technical issue; that the legal framework 
and administrative framework don’t necessarily coincide with practice;  that tax 
practice is shaped by the actions and interactions of players in the field, making 
it a social construction; that players use their power to influence property tax 
practice and  that players actions are conditioned by their background. The 
study also contributes a conceptual framework for property tax practice. 
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Chapter	  1 
1.0	   Introduction	  
1.1	  	   Research	  questions	  
The objective of this study  is to obtain an in-depth  understanding of the 
practical working of property tax administration practice in Jamaica.  It  
highlights the major enforcement and compliance practices along with how the  
invisible and underlying interactions of actors in the field  shape these practices.  
It also explores those issues and circumstances  along with the existing 
patterns of interests which have contributed to the continued practice of the 
central administration  of the property tax.  The study also emphasises struggles 
in the property tax field between the various players: the tax authority, the 
politicians, the developers, the local authorities,  the central government and the 
taxpayers and how each one  uses its capital to maintain or dominate its 
position within the property tax field.   
Main research question: How do the dimensions of property tax: administration, 
politics and taxpayer compliance play out in practice?   
Research Question One: What are the main property tax enforcement practices 
and how  do the tax authority and policymakers use their capital to shape these 
practices?  
This question is concerned with giving an overview of the  main property tax 
enforcement practices, the strategies that are employed and why they are used.  
The question seeks to highlight how partial enforcement whether due to  
resource constraints (Lange 2002, Bird 2004), culture,  politics or the dynamics 
of the economic environment (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2006; Bahl 
2007; Tennant and Tennant 2007; Nerre 2008; Oats and Sadler 2011) 
compromises the tax authority’s ability to maintain the critical balance between 
evasion and compliance (Silvani 1992). In the circumstances tax administrators 
tasked with the responsibility of tax enforcement (Mansfield 1988, Gill 2000) fail 
in their efforts to maximize tax revenues collections(Bird 2004) which are 
needed to provide services to taxpayers within their communities and also in 
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their efforts to send the message that evasion is unacceptable.  The question 
also seeks to highlight how tax administrators and policymakers use their 
capital to maintain, dominate or enhance their position in the field with the field 
being used as a site of struggle. 
Research Question Two: To what extent is non-localization of the property tax 
in Portmore influenced  by the  political dispositions of players within the 
property tax field?  
This question explores the key issues that influence the non-localization of the 
property tax and the extent to which these issues are driven by political 
interests.  The question also explores whether policymakers treat tax 
decentralization as a key issue in the country’s decentralization policy (Bird and 
Slack 2002; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  It’s also concerned about the 
readiness of the legal and regulatory framework; and questions the legitimacy 
credibility and  ability of the local authority to manage based on the significant 
demands for managerial skills (Ellis, Kopyani and Lee 2006) under fiscal 
decentralization. The question also brings to the fore the level of distrust in the 
local authorities particularly in light of Jamaica’s history of partisan politics and 
at the same time raises issues  of adequacy of economic resources to fund 
localized authority. The question also seeks to highlight the point that fiscal 
decentralization can be used as a means to build a compliance tradition 
(Mikesell 2003, Rühling 2006) thereby increasing tax morale (Guth, Levati and 
Sausgrubber 2005) which would ultimately increase revenue flows. 
Research Question Three: What are the dimensions of property tax compliance 
and non-compliance  in Jamaica and how do taxpayers use their capital to 
influence compliance practices?  
This question investigates the main issues that influence property tax 
(non)compliance. The question explores those issues that motivate compliance 
both intrinsic and external (Kornhauser (2007).  The question highlights that 
taxpayers’ ‘tax ethics’ aren’t  necessarily influenced by economic opportunity 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Fisher, Wastick and Mark 1992, Taylor 2002) but 
also by other issues such as social norms (Traxler 2010), ethical beliefs (Alm, 
McClelland and Schultze 1992, Alm, McClelland and Schultze 1999, Jackson & 
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Milliron1986, Wenzel 2005b; Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008, 685) fiscal 
exchange,  interaction with government (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee 
and Torgler 2004, Alm and Torgler 2006) guilt, social stigma (Grasmick and 
Scott 1982, Taylor 2002) and cultural norms (Alm and Torgler 2006). The 
question also seeks to highlight how the lack of an institutional framework in 
relation to new developments and some land tenure  practices foster evasion. 
Finally, the question seeks to  provide insights into how some taxpayers use 
their available capital to evade tax.	  
1.2	  	   Background	  and	  motivation	  
Portmore, Jamaica’s Sunshine City (Reid 2009) sits on the southern coast in 
the parish of St. Catherine. Forty years ago it was established as a dormitory 
town to absorb the burgeoning population of the capitals city Kingston and 
Spanish Town. Dissatisfied with attention given by the  St. Catherine Parish 
Council, citizens lobbied for its autonomy.  History was created when it received  
municipality status in  2003 as the Portmore Municipal Council (PMC). Portmore 
is unique in that it’s  neither a capital town nor a parish  but  a part of a parish 
unlike the other municipality the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation  which 
consists  of two parishes and the other authorities which are capital towns.  
Portmore’s population of approximately 187,000 persons outstrips the 
population of all  parishes in Jamaica except Kingston, Manchester and St. 
Catherine of which it’s a part.2 Huge demands on the municipality  are made for 
improved social services such as garbage, street lighting and community 
beautification.  The  municipality’s response normally points to inadequate 
funds.  The social conditions in some areas (except the gated communities) are 
appalling but  ironically, the apparent standard of living  by and large of a large 
number of the residents in the community evidences  the ‘non-financial 
indicators of a structural gap’ (Bailey 2004, 204), confirms the municipality’s 
claim.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  http://balcostics.com/2012/10/19/jamaicas-­‐population-­‐census-­‐2011-­‐infographics/	  	  	  retrieved	  
September	  28,	  2014	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The municipality’s funding is mainly from own source revenues of which 
property tax accounts for 55% (PMC Budget 2008/093) supplemented by large 
transfers from central government. A former mayor believed that proeprty tax 
revenues can be increased through increased compliance4. Property tax is 
centrally managed, is  based on the site value system and is paid by owners, 
occupiers and mortgagors.     
Bird and Slack (2002) lauds the attractiveness of the property tax; its appeal as 
a local tax, it’s visibility  to taxpayers and  its  control falling under the authority 
of the local town, city or municipality.  Furthermore it’s argued that property  tax 
can improve local autonomy, increase responsibility and ‘it not only brings in 
revenues but it aids in institutional and social development which are good for 
governance and economic development’ (Bird and Slack 2006, 4,Sokoloff and 
Zolt 2005). It also determines  the nature  and quality of local services  offered,  
in that it “shapes the physical and social character of city-regions” (Bird and 
Slack 2007, 729).	   Bird, Slack and Tassonyi (2012, 224)  argue that it’s not 
“simply a law, but that it’s  a system comprising the relevant laws and 
regulations and how they are administered with its structure and operation  
reflecting the  larger political institutions as well as the particular interactions of 
the central and local government,   the creator’s ideologies  of  the economic 
and political outcomes of alternative property tax policies.’ 
Given the virtues of the property tax as a local tax: its  potential as a good 
revenue generator; an aid for social and economic development  (Bird and 
Slack 2006, 4,Sokoloff and Zolt 2005); its ability to bring about and shape the 
physical and social character of communities	   (Bird and Slack 2007, 729),   it’s 
nevertheless a  complex tax due to its features  of law, politics and that it’s a 
creation of people’s ideas (Bird, Slack and Tassonyi (2012, 224). In this regard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Figures	  have	  been	  taken	  from	  the	  Municipalities	  budget	  for	  financial	  year	  2008/09.	  
http://www.pmc.gov.jm/uploads/budgets_finances/PMC_Budget_2007-­‐08.pdf	  
	  
4	  This	  interviewee	  said	  he	  raised	  the	  compliance	  rate	  from	  37%	  to	  49%	  but	  believed	  that	  compliance	  
should	  not	  be	  less	  than	  90%.	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it’s important for all players in the field to have  an increased understanding of 
the property tax and its practices.   
My research interest stems initially from a personal interest  to obtain an in 
depth understanding of these issues in property tax practice in Jamaica and 
how the  tax may have contributed to the physical and social character of the 
Portmore community. My interests have since evolved to include the following: 
to make an empirical contribution to the  tax scholarship; to  contribute a 
conceptual framework with a theoretical lens to interpret the findings and 
fourthly for this study to inform policymakers, locally and globally. 
This empirical work along with its interpretation  provides an  in depth 
understanding and insights to policymakers of some of those  political, 
technical, administrative, resource and cultural  issues which influence 
enforcement, fiscal decentralization of the tax and its revenue generation.  The  
insights gained show how  political and social issues may have hindered the tax 
from being locally managed.  Finally, the study  establishes  the main 
dimensions of  property tax compliance deeply exploring those issues that may 
contribute to low property tax compliance which have dogged Jamaica and 
Portmore in particular, especially in light of the earning potential of a large 
section of the community.   Whilst other studies have been done on property tax 
in Jamaica (Sjoquist 2005; 2007; Cornia and Walters 2010) they speak mainly 
to technical issues and have not explored  the practices, nor the interactions of 
the players in the field.  
1.3	   Contextualizing	  the	  property	  tax	  	  within	  the	  social	  field	  
Jamaica a former British colony, is known for its rich cultural heritage: music, 
dance, art, food and for a warm friendly people (Seaga 2005), but also known 
for its lack of civic responsibility (Bahl and Wallace 2007). Jamaica’s culture is 
shaped by its Slavic history; post emancipation and post war events (Stone 
1992) on one hand and folk life, modern society and metropolitan influences 
(Seaga 2005) on the other hand (see 2.7). Jamaica’s two party system, a 
legacy of British politics carries two unique features: display of sectoral interests 
while in power and political clientelism (Edie 1989) which were confirmed in the 
findings in sections 6.4.5 and 6.5 respectively.  The country has a history of 
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violence (Lacey 1977, Chevannes, 1981, Chevannes 1994, 1-40; Smith 1984; 
Girvan 1999; Harriott 2003; McLean, Mendes and Wynter, 2013; 65; Oats, 
Sadler, Wynter 2014) and influences enforcement as reflected in section 5.3.2;  
social disorder,  public attitudes of contempt and fear (Goulbourne 1984) and  
mistrust  in government institutions and amongst people (Waller et al 2006) as 
reflected in the  findings in section 6.4.2.   
Landlessness and squatting have been issues on the Jamaica landscape since 
the abolition of slavery (section 2.7.1). Government’s land policy (National Land 
Policy 1996; USAID 2010) through the adverse possession rule is a popular 
route to obtain registered titles  but the findings suggest that the tax authority 
perceives that  citizens exploit this facility through ‘anancism’ (Seaga 2005) 
influencing their enforcement practices (see sections 5.3.2).  
The Medium Term Framework of Jamaica’s National Development Plan (2009-
12, 40) casts the Jamaican tax system as “…increasingly complex and 
cumbersome...’ According to the framework, ‘the most recent global 
assessment indicates that, ‘despite reforms, Jamaica has one of the worst tax 
systems in the world…’ (ibid).  Bahl and Wallace (2007) debate  that Jamaica’s 
tax administration is dogged with problems because of the “culture problem” – 
i.e. the “unwillingness of citizens to accept the idea that the payment of taxes is 
a civic responsibility6”(see section 7.2.1). Further findings, discussions and 
analyses of the dimensions of taxpayers’ (non)compliance are presented in 
Chapter 7. They further argue that the  tax administration rather than tackle the 
problem holistically tend to concentrate  on the taxes that are easier to collect.  
For example, they seemed not to enforce on large land barons because of the 
enforcement challenges (section 5.3.3). Consequently, compliant taxpayers feel 
they are overtaxed; giving rise to “horizontal and vertical equities” in the system 
with attendant revenue loss (Bahl and Wallace 2007).   
The tax administrative model is mixed and is organized along operational lines 
with a large taxpayer office. The  system is regulated by two main pieces of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5See	  (McLean,	  Mendes	  and	  Wynter	  2013,	  6	  note	  9)	  Essentials	  of	  Jamaican	  Taxation	  	  
6	  See	  (Bahl	  and	  Wallace	  2007,	  9-­‐10)	  Comprehensive	  tax	  reform,	  Public	  Finance	  Review.	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legislation: the Revenue Administration Act and the Tax Collection Act which 
are generic to all taxes including the property tax. Property tax is also governed 
by the Property Tax Act and other supporting legislation (see section 2.6.1).  
The findings suggest that the  legislation  has loopholes which are exploited by 
some taxpayers (section 7.4.5) and in some situations are archaic and 
inadequate as they are unreflective of the living arrangements especially in  
new developments like Portmore which makes it difficult to carryout 
enforcement activities  like the issuing of summonses as confirmed in the 
findings in paragraphs three & four of section 5.3.6.  
Jamaica’s tax system was ‘shaped’ (Mendes, McLean and Wynter, 2013) by 
Britain from years of  colonization and adjusted in recent years to reflect the 
thinking of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and in particular the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)7 through their association (Stewart 2008). 
The assignment of enforcement and compliance resources to any tax in 
Jamaica is determined by its contribution to national revenues  and is  usually 
reflective of the prevailing arrangements with the IMF. Property tax though an 
insignificant national revenue contributor is an important source of revenue for 
local authorities (Bird and Slack 2006; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011; 
Bird, Slack,  Tassonyi 2012), thus as the findings suggest enforcement and 
compliance are challenged by inadequate resources which are conditioned by 
the fiscal policy/tax policy driven by the IMF (section 5.2.3).   
Property tax is a legacy of British colonization, introduced in 1806 (Andelson 
2000) on the capital base carried a revenue motive (Harris 2006) but   changed 
to a site value tax in 1957 (Sjoquist 2007) to fulfill both a political and revenue 
motive (Copes and Rybeck 20008). In 1993 it changed being earmarked for 
garbage, street lighting and community beautification services (Policy 8/93)  but 
the revenues have always been inadequate to cover these services. The  tax is 
centrally managed by two ministries9. The 1993 policy also mandated local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Jamaica	  has	  been	  with	  the	  IMF	  since	  the	  1970s	  	  
8	  See	  (Copes	  and	  Rybeck	  2000)	  Jamaica	  and	  other	  Caribbean	  States	  IN	  Land	  Value	  Taxation	  around	  the	  
World,	  (Andelson,	  R	  (ed).	  
9	  The	  ministry	  of	  local	  government	  and	  community	  development	  and	  the	  ministry	  of	  finance.	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authorities to assist with enforcement and compliance but to date this policy 
isn’t made into law.  Revenue collections are low (Cornia and Walters 2010) 
and compliance low with the literature suggesting that it may be a result of the 
tax not being locally managed (Mikesell 2003, Rühling 2006;Bahl and Cyan 
2011).  The findings in chapter six suggest that players in the field appeared not 
to be anxious to devolve the tax despite the establishment of the PMC gaining 
its autonomy in 2003. As previously mentioned, Jamaicans’ lack of 
interpersonal trust and or trust in institutions (Powell et al 2006) seems to be 
one of the main  factors influencing localization of the tax (sections 6.4 to 6.5).  
1.4	   Overview	  of	  research	  design	  
In order to meet the research objective of having an increased understanding of 
property tax practice one main research question was posed broken out into 
three sub-questions.  These sub-questions were further unpacked with their 
associated objectives.  The questions and objectives were based on the 
literature review on tax administration including  property tax administration,  
fiscal decentralization and Bourdieu’s theory of practice (sections 3.2; 3.3 & 3.4 
and 3.5 and their respective subsections), the theoretical framework (section 
4.5 and its subsections) and the findings from the exploratory interviews. 
An interpretive inductive methodological approach was taken (section 4.3) 
because it was appropriate  to meeting the research objective that of gaining an 
increased understanding of property tax in practice, the subject of this study. 
Sections 4.4 to 4.4.4 outline the research design. In keeping with the research 
approach, the main research method was face-to-face interviews.  A detailed 
literature review was done along with a review of Jamaica’s background was 
updated following findings from the fieldwork.  Before going in the field, I drew 
up an interview guide (see Appendix 2) with a semi-structure design appropriate 
for each  class of interviewees.  Interviewees included current and former 
politicians at the national and local levels and included cabinet ministers, 
legislators, councillors, mayors and a former prime minister; senior government 
bureaucrats affiliated with both the ministries of local government and finance 
and  a local authority; senior tax administrators both in tax administration and 
property tax administration; members of civil society; taxpayers; a tax 
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accountant from the financial sector and a senior board member from a housing 
development company (see Appendix 5).  Section 4.6	   details the interview 
process and section 4.6.3 outlines the justification for choosing these 
interviewees. 
The main data collected consisted of interview transcripts, post interview notes, 
and correspondence received from some interviewees by way of telephone and 
email, were analyzed with the assistance of NVivo a computer-aided analysis 
software.  Section 4.7  details this process.  
The conceptual framework developed synthesizes the three different strands of 
literature: tax administration, fiscal decentralization and Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice and is presented in two stages.  Stage one (figure 4.1)  draws on 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice interpreted by Swartz 1997 and supported by 
interpretation of his work by other authors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992;Lingard, Rawolle  and Taylor, 2005;  Loveman, 2005; Neu, 2006; Xu and 
Xu, 2008; Malsch, Gendron and Grazzini, 2011;  Gracia and Oats, 2012).  The 
framework shows the division of the field, the main actors and  their interactions 
at each level and between the various levels within the property tax field with 
power as the overarching field (Gracia and Oats 2012). The policy level defines 
the boundaries of the property tax field; the implementation or enforcement level 
and the compliance level.  Stage two (figure 4.2) of the conceptual framework 
shows the theoretical concepts drawn from the three strands of the literature.  
The data analysis (section 4.7) and the conceptual framework formed the basis 
for the presentation and discussion of the findings as contained in chapters five 
to seven.  
1.5	  	   Contribution	  of	  the	  study	  
This research comes at a time when there’s a call for  more tax research 
because of its under representation in tax scholarship (Lamb et al 2005; Oats 
2012) dispelling the notion that tax as a field of enquiry is adequately dealt with 
when it’s not (Lamb et al 2005).  My research also contributes to the tax 
scholarship by demonstrating that tax is not a technical subject (Boden et al 
2010) but rather that it’s both a social and  institutional practice (Oats 2012), in 
24	  
	  
other words it’s a social construction.   This study also contributes to the tax 
scholarship by demonstrating that taxation is not  based on economic theory 
only; but demonstrates its interdisciplinary nature  encompassing management, 
practice and politics. It also extends the scholarship by using Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice as an interpretive lens. My research provides a better understanding 
of why tax practice is different from what obtains in legislation and policy.  It 
provides an improved understanding of how culture and other resources  in the 
field when used as capital, influence or shape tax practices.  Additionally, my 
research provides an in depth understanding of the  contextual nature of 
property tax confirming that the ‘one size fits all doesn’t necessarily work’ (Bird 
and Slack 2006; Bahl 2009). My research also improves our understanding of 
taxpayers’ motivations for compliance; that these motivations go beyond the 
deterrence level.   
In addition to the above, this study makes a number of other important  
contributions to knowledge both empirical and conceptual.  
Empirically, this study involved the interviewing of a wide-cross section of 
players in the property tax field.  These players include those who formulate the 
property tax laws and policies such as legislators, cabinet ministers, 
policymakers which included a former prime minister and minister of finance; 
those responsible for  implementing the policies or maintaining the boundaries- 
senior government technocrats, ministers of government, senior local 
government officers, mayors, councillors and senior tax administrators; and the 
compliers, residential and  taxpayers.  There were other players who did not 
neatly fit into the foregoing classifications but for which their work influenced the 
property tax practice in all these areas playing a critical role in the tax field.  
These include developers and members of civil society. Gaining access to 
some  interviewees like the politicians, senior tax administrators and senior 
technocrats government technocrats was good and the insights gained were 
extraordinary.  
As outlined in Chapter 4, the interpretive methodological approach used for this 
study provides rich insights and an in depth understanding of property tax 
practice, and also gives additional perspectives of property tax practice in 
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Jamaica which  emphasizes the limitations of quantitative methodology (section 
4.4.1). 
Conceptually, the study advances a theoretical framework for property tax 
practice as described in Chapter 4.  This chapter provides a thorough 
description of the property tax field, the arena in which property tax practice 
takes place and also links the actions of the  power brokers of the various levels 
in the field. The framework pulls together the levels and the actors by using the 
three main strands of the literature: tax administration, fiscal decentralization 
and Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  Furthermore the framework has power to 
interpret and explain the findings as evidenced in Chapters 5 to 7 inclusive. For 
example the framework provides an understanding that property tax 
administration involves more than technical issues. The framework helps us to 
see the linkage between tax morale and fiscal decentralization demonstrating 
how fiscal decentralization can build a compliance tradition. The framework 
interprets why the legal framework and administrative framework differ from 
what happens in practice; property tax practice is shaped by the actions and 
interactions of players in the field making it a social construction; that players 
use their power to influence property tax practice (Swartz 1997); that players 
actions are conditioned by their background (Swartz 1997).  
1.6	   Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
Chapter two provides background information on Jamaica: its history, 
demography, governance, local government reform, tax administration and 
relevant cultural practices.  Chapter three reviews the relevant literature from 
three strands: tax administration, fiscal decentralization and Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice which make up the conceptual framework in this study.  Chapter four 
the methodology chapter sets out the main research question and the three 
sub-questions with their associated objectives.  This chapter discusses my 
philosophical assumptions, the methodological approach, the research methods 
used, the interview process, the interviewee selection, data analysis and the 
limitations.  It  also describes the conceptual framework. 
Chapters five to seven inclusive contain the findings and their analyses. The 
chapters are in response to the three sub-questions emphasizing the major 
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themes from the data analysis.  Chapter eight summarizes the key findings 
along with their implications for the study, my contribution to the study and 
finalizes with my recommendations for future research. 
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2.0	   Background	  of	  Jamaican	  environment	  
2.1	   Introduction	  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on Jamaica: 
its history, geography, demography, economic and social indicators, its tax 
system with special emphasis on property tax  administration, a short history on 
Portmore, local government reform and how property tax and Portmore sit 
within the framework of local government reform. A snippet of Jamaica’s culture 
is also given.  Provision of background information contextualizes the  findings 
of the study  which helps the reader to gain a greater understanding of the 
property tax field, the aim of the study.  The chapter is arranged as follows: 
section 2.2 gives details on the geography and infrastructure; section 2.3 history 
and governance; section 2.3.1 local government reform and property tax reform; 
section 2.3.2 local government reform in relation to Portmore,  section 2.4 a 
summary of Jamaica’s demographic and economic indicators. Jamaica’s tax 
system is discussed in section 2.5 followed by an overview of property tax 
administration in section 2.6.  Section 2.6.1 details its administrative structure, 
section 2.6.2 its administrative processes; 2.6.3  the legal framework. Section 
2.7 describes Jamaican culture with section 2.7.1 discussing land tenure in 
Jamaica. Section 2.8 summarizes the  chapter. 
2.2	   Geography	  	  and	  infrastructure	  
Jamaica is the largest English speaking  island in the Caribbean and the third 
largest island in the West Indies. It is 90 miles south of its closest neighbour, 
Cuba.  It is approximately 11,424 sq. km. Jamaica’s natural assets, land for 
agricultural purposes, picturesque beauty, high levels of  biodiversity,  long 
stretches of white sand beaches and  a fair amount of mineral resources with a 
tropical climate all year round.  Approximately, 80% of Jamaica‘s land surface is 
mountainous. Forestry, shrubs and woodlands account for 44% of the land; 
agriculture and pasture 46%; mines and wetlands, 6% with the remaining 4% 
occupied by urban and rural  settlements (National Land Policy 1996, 11). 
Jamaica busiest port, the Kingston harbour is strategically situated on one of 
the world’s best shipping routes, approximately 32 miles from the Panama 
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Canal10.  Jamaica has three international airports complemented by smaller 
airports,  a modern road network (Highway 2000) that links the capital city to the 
major towns in the north,   west and south of the island. Its financial sector is 
well established, having a money and financial services market and also a stock 
exchange.11 Jamaica’s information and communication service is comparable to 
what obtains in any first world country.  It has land and  mobile telephone 
services, international voice and data services and  fibre optic capability. 
2.3	   History	  and	  governance	  
Jamaica was originally named Xayamaca – “land of wood and water” by the 
Arawaks (Tainos), Jamaica’s first inhabitants.  In 1494 Christopher Columbus 
came to Jamaica, found the Arawaks living here. The Spanish introduced 
slavery, subsequently continued by the English from 1655 until its abolition in 
1834. Jamaica continued under  British  rule from then until 1962 when it gained 
independence. 
It has a parliamentary democracy with two legislative councils: the parliament 
and the senate (Jamaica Country Profile).12 This political system is based on 
the Westminster model and has a strong history of a two party system.  There’s 
a prime minister with the British monarchy being the ceremonial head of state 
represented by a governor general.  National elections are held every five years 
and local parish council elections every four years.  
Jamaica is divided into fourteen parishes, each having a capital town. The 
capital town is Kingston.   Each capital town has a local parish council (local 
authority) with the exception of the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew which 
is governed by the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation (Schoburgh 2010) and 
the Portmore Municipality which is neither a town nor a parish but a part of a 
parish but nevertheless enjoys municipality status.  Funding for the operation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  JAMPRO	  doing	  business	  in	  Jamaica.	  http://www.jamaicatradeandinvest.org/doing_business	  	  
11	  http://www.dunncox.com/?q=content/an-­‐overview-­‐of-­‐the-­‐regulation-­‐of-­‐financial-­‐services-­‐in-­‐jamaica	  	  
The	  Bank	  of	  Jamaica	  and	  Financial	  Services	  Commission	  regulate	  the	  financial	  services	  sector.	  
12	  http://www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/1/files/Jamaica%20local%20government%20profile%202011-­‐12.pdf	  
	  	  retrieved	  December	  19,	  2014	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the respective authorities is largely from property tax property tax, fees 
generated from within the parish and or municipality and from large government 
transfers13. Since 1993, property tax has been earmarked for street lighting, 
garbage collection, drain cleaning, road maintenance, bushing and park 
maintenance. This new funding arrangements for the property tax and the 
formation of Portmore as a municipality resulted from local government reform. 
2.3.1	  	   	   Local	  government	  reform	  and	  property	  tax	  reform	  
This section gives a brief history of the governance of property tax including 
attempts at reforming local government.  Both items are intertwined and go 
hand in hand because property tax is an integral part of local government 
because it’s one of the main own source revenues for the local authorities.  
Jamaica’s political system of governance is two tiered: central and local.  Local 
government is organized along geographical lines with fourteen parishes with 
the exception of the Portmore municipality since 2003 which is within a parish; 
and the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation which is a combination of two 
parishes since 1923 (Jones 2003).  
The authority of local government  is prescribed by  law enacted by central 
government making it revocable at any time.   Local authorities therefore cannot 
act outside of the law nor go beyond the power of the law. The Parish Councils 
Law, Chapter 271, and the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation Law, Chapter 
192, give legal status to the existence of the local authorities (Jones 2003) and 
the Municipality Act 2003 give status to the Portmore municipality. 
Historically, there has always been an interest in local government reform in 
Jamaica (Eisner 1961, Mills 197414, Osei 2002; Jones 2003; Schoburgh 2007 
Nettleford 2009). 
The literature suggests that local government in Jamaica was established in 
piecemeal manner transplanted from the British model, fashioned on the Vestry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   A	   new	   property	   tax	   policy	   was	   introduced	   on	   April	   1,	   2013	   which	   sought	   to	   stop	   the	   system	   of	  
transfers	  from	  Central	  government.	  	  Review	  of	  this	  system	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  
14	  See	  Nettleford,	  R.	  (2009)	  p27.	  	  Final	  report	  of	  the	  National	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Local	  Government	  
Reform	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and Justices (Mills 1985, Jones 1998, Osei  2002, 32; Jones 2003).  Local 
government elections was a reality in 1944 with the advent of universal adult 
suffrage (Jones 2003).  According to Osei prior to Jamaica’s independence in 
1962, the local authorities were seen as an essential tool for preparation for 
constitutional advance and following independence it was thought that the new 
leaders would improve their development to encourage local initiative and 
enterprise (Duncan 1970, Singh 1972, Osei 2002, 32).  Local authorities since 
their inception in the 1660s provided a range of services15 but there has been a 
call by for them to be the main supplier of local public services (Hamilton and 
Associate 1990, Osei 2002).   One of the underlying  issues implicit in this call is 
the adequacy of financial resources along with an enabling environment for 
example, governance structure, adequate legal framework and personnel to 
make this a reality.  Over the hundreds of years local government seemed to 
have been grappling with these issues without finality (Eisner 1961; Osei 2002, 
Nettleford 2009).  
Eisner (1961) states that governance of property tax in the 1850s was by a 
parochial board elected by freeholders of each parish with members  enjoying 
autonomy in all local affairs. Eisner suggests the board members seem not to 
have any obligation in  accounting for their actions to the central government. 
Their responsibility was mainly local road maintenance, poor relief, policing and 
maintenance of the Courts of the Common Pleas.  Although not responsible for 
education, they gave some of the revenues collected towards education.  Eisner 
purports that although little is known of the local revenues, but what is known, is 
that local revenue sources were similar to those raised at the central level but 
the main contributions were from poll tax and from the property tax. Following 
emancipation, the local authorities had to find new sources of revenues to 
replace the poll tax16, but instead of raising additional revenues they reduced 
expenditure.  Although they had  extensive powers, their recording keeping was 
poor,  thus making it impossible for them to account for tax revenues and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Services	  include	  public	  cleansing,	  public	  markets,	  building	  and	  physical	  planning	  controls,	  fire	  rescue	  
services,	  disaster	  preparedness,	  poor	  relief,	  cemeteries,	  street	  lighting,	  abattoirs,	  minor	  roads,	  public	  
community	  parks	  and	  traffic	  control.	  
16	  The	  poll	  tax	  was	  charged	  on	  each	  slave,	  so	  with	  the	  abolition,	  all	  of	  this	  revenue	  was	  lost.	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exemptions made to taxpayers.  The home country curbed their authority in 
1854 by taking away their tax raising powers but they were allowed to have 
control over expenditure. At the introduction of Crown Colony government in 
1865, the parochial boards were replaced by municipal boards and until 1885 
parochial services were administered by central government.  It was in 1885 
when semi-representative government was introduced that the municipal 
boards were replaced by elected boards.  This was also done in tandem with 
administrative reform: i.e. changing parish boundaries and reducing parish 
numbers etc. The elected boards were to develop water, gas and sanitation 
services with power to levy certain taxes to meet the cost of services but would 
be supported financially from the consolidated funds.  The reforms stemming 
from the introduction of Crown Colony government and reform of semi-
representative government at the introduction of municipal boards have largely 
remained in place and local authorities continue to function along those lines 
(Jones 2003). 
Little else is known from the literature on local government reform up to 1943.  
But there seemed to be surge of interest in local government reform which was 
signified by the number of written reports, seven in total  from 1943 to 2003 
(Nettleford, 2009).  According to Nettleford, the reports had common threads:  
• Central-local government relations 
• Financing of local government 
• Operational responsibilities 
• Local government participation 
• Institutional framework 
The concentration here will be mainly on the financing aspect of local 
government as this study concerns property tax but will make reference to other 
areas as they become relevant.  According to (Nettleford 2009) financing of 
local government is seen in the context of local autonomy reflecting two main 
issues:  
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• Firstly, the insufficiency of financial resources to meet the increased 
demand for local services and  
• Secondly, the inability of the councils to engage in long term financial 
planning due to inadequacy of resources. 
 Nettleford points out that authors writing on local government reform seem to 
all agree that  local authorities  should have control over their expenditures and 
should at least be able to fix their own rates subject to central government 
guidelines. Nettleford (2009, 2717) argue that over-dependence of the local 
authorities on central government was ‘the largest single cause of financial 
deterioration of the local authorities  and therefore the government should 
pursue a path of decentralization in a bid to reduce central government’s 
overbearing and discretionary powers in allocating resources to local authorities  
According to (Nettleford 2009), the government in the mid to late 1970s made 
attempts to commence the decentralization process by implementing the 
recommendations from the Mills 1974 report starting with those that were 
easiest.  For example,  easiest were the removal of  members of parliament as 
ex-officio members of local authorities  regularizing the term of office of mayors 
along with their  appointment. The author continues that in 1977 a Local 
Government Reform Committee was established to advise on the progress of 
the recommendations from the Mills Report but this committee was  later 
marginalized with the appointment of the community councils which somehow 
stymied the local reform process.  But the shift came in 1984-85 when the  
Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) the new government reduced local government 
dissolving the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation (KSAC), Jamaica’s only 
municipality and also either removed or transferred all the functions of local 
government to regional or national agencies. Schoburgh (2007) argues that this 
constituted one of the greatest threats to local government.  The consequence 
of these actions was that local government was reduced to a facilitation body.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  	  Arguments	  based	  on	  findings	  from	  Gladston	  Mills	  1974	  Report	  on	  Reform	  of	  Local	  Government	  .	  
18	  An	  interviewee	  from	  my	  study	  obviously	  opposed	  to	  local	  government	  autonomy	  particularly	  fiscal	  
autonomy	  stated	  that	  	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  give	  fiscal	  autonomy	  to	  local	  authorities	  as	  they	  have	  other	  
avenues	  to	  make	  representations	  for	  funds	  (former	  politician).	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Thus, the role of the local authority  was relegated to making representations on 
behalf of their localities accompanied by the reduction in number of councillors.  
Another  change which took place in that period was that councillors were 
remunerated for their services. The public responded to these changes by 
voting for the People’s National Party (PNP) in 1989.  The JLP was labeled by 
the people as anti-local government but the JLP insisted that the actions were 
‘dictated conditionalities of external lending agencies’ (29).  During the 1990s 
the PNP treated local government reform as a priority.  It developed a Policy 
Paper  8/93 in which it referred to the current financing arrangements for local 
government as ‘flawed in that there was no connection between revenues and 
expenditure’ (2).  The policy paper  therefore addressed a number of revenue 
issues  including the property tax including autonomy to the local authorities. 
The  main issues addressed in the paper were:  
• Local authorities would be ‘allocated  adequate and independent sources 
of revenues along with effective control over these sources of revenues.’  
• Development of a comprehensive formula for financing local authority 
which consisted of a number of revenue sources of which property tax 
was  one of the revenue sources.   
• Property tax should be used to fund services such as public cleansing, 
street lighting and protection of property.   
• Raising of loans and the issuing of local bonds by local authorities to 
finance capital and development projects by local authorities.  
•  Local authorities would have full control in setting rates, fees and 
charges.   
• If rates along with property tax were used by the local authority then 
there should be a separation of both.  10% of the property tax collected 
in each parish should go towards community organizations for 
development activities.   
• The ministry of local government would work along with Tax 
Administration to improve the collection of property tax revenues.  
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The establishment of new arrangements for the financing of local government 
allocating to them adequate and independent sources of revenue and giving 
local authorities effective control of over these sources was made effective in 
1993/94 (2-6). The other areas were slated to be completed in two years 
allowing for adjustments and teething pains (6). During this year, the local 
authorities and  the  KSAC  were restored to their previous status.  The 
changes were accompanied by  training and legislative reform. Several laws 
were revised and updated.    
The policy paper stated that the objective of the reform was to:  
‘…create a de-centralized democratically controlled system of local 
administration which will facilitate maximum participation by all elements 
of the local community in the management of local affairs and taking the 
initiative to solve local problems.  A major challenge of the process of 
local government reform is to devise means for applying the concept of 
direct community participation in the development and administration of 
communities to the situation of fast-growing, major new urban Entrees 
such as Portmore…’ (Policy paper 8/93) 
According to Nettleford, the implementation of the financial initiatives in the 
policy paper reaped  a number of successes:  
• Grants to local authorities from central government  declined from over 
90% to 40% in 2003/04.  The Parochial Revenue Fund (1996) was set up 
in which all the fees and taxes collected for the local authorities went. 
• Over twenty Acts and Regulations were amended and introduced, giving 
flexibility and autonomy to local authorities offering the right to large 
urban areas to apply for municipality status.  There was institutional 
strengthening and capacity building at the local level enabling the local 
authorities to offer local improved services 
• The granting of municipality status to  Portmore in 2003  
Reforms may lead to a relationship changes.  According to (Nettleford 2009, 32)  
the change in local government lead to a change in   relationship between the 
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local authorities and central government which according to Nettledford caused 
a certain degree of discomfort due to  ‘deep seated social and cultural 
obstacles.’ The JLP  on its return to power in 2007, took away the ministerial 
status of the ministry of local government but in 2012 the PNP on  regaining 
power, restored ministerial status to the ministry.   The PNP which now forms 
the government is taking steps to have local authorities entrenched in the 
constitution offering protection to the Local Government System19 removing the 
discretion to dissolve the local authorities from the remit of any single minister.  
Entrenchment also demonstrates the commitment of the PNP to local 
government as a critical ingredient of the national governance process by 
providing it with constitutional protection according to a cabinet minister, a 
participant in the study. It remains a topical issue in the public domain in 
Jamaica.20 Entrenchment will also guarantee local autonomy to the local 
authorities making the localization of property tax a central issue in the process. 
Kaufman (1988) debates that the strengthening of local government was one of 
the goals of democratic socialism, the political ideology of the PNP in the late 
1970s.  The ideological divide may have contributed to the continued tension 
between the major political parties on local government autonomy and is 
explained in the treatment of  the local government when the respective parties 
is in power. 
2.3.2	   	  Local	  government	  reform	  and	  Portmore	  
Portmore  was known as the Salt Pond District (Reid 2009) and was first 
occupied by the Arawaks as early as 900AD. When Jamaica was discovered by 
Christopher Columbus in 1494, the Spaniards settled in Portmore.  The English 
arrived in Passage Fort, Portmore in 1655 capturing the island from the 
Spaniards. The English later divided Portmore into pens   building forts along 
the coast using Passage Fort as a “trans-shipment point and  a link for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  http://www.localgovjamaica.gov.jm/localgovernmentreform.aspx	  	  retrieved	  December	  3,	  2013	  
20	  http://jamaica-­‐gleaner.com/gleaner/20130603/cleisure/cleisure5.html	  	  retrieved	  December	  3,	  2013	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towns of Spanish Town, Kingston and Port Royal”21  (Reid 2009) Sugar and 
later bananas were the main agricultural produce supplemented by fishing.  
During the 17th  to the 19th  centuries  Portmore was populated with mostly 
militia and slaves.    The area saw little development until the late 1950s  when 
the area was targeted by the government as a potential place to house the 
growing urban population as land was becoming increasingly scarce in 
Kingston, the capital city. Portmore’s strategic location to Kingston and later 
Spanish Town, motivated the government to  develop the area as a dormitory 
town for Kingston and later Spanish Town, the capital of St. Catherine. 
Because the area is low lying, eleven miles of dyke were built to prevent 
flooding.  A causeway bridge was also built providing the main passageway 
linking  Portmore to the capital. The first phase of formal housing development 
commenced in 1968  in  Independence City with  1,383 building lots approved 
for home construction.  The plan provided social infrastructure such as parks, 
schools, commercial areas and a sewage disposal installation but no  provisions 
were  made for garbage collections, maintenance of parks, maintenance of 
roads  or street lighting. These seemed to reside with the St. Catherine parish 
council. In the early 1970s a second community was added. Portmore now 
houses approximately 85 communities and close to 200,000 residents, 
approximately 10% of Jamaica’s population with most of these communities 
being planned settlements. In 2011 Portmore had  49,407 households22  and in 
2001, 21,162	  tenured	  households23 occupying a physical space of approximately 
572 sq.km. There are approximately 43,000 parcels of land based on findings 
from the study.  In 2011 there were 27, 219 tertiary trained graduates living in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  http://www.portmore.info/history/portmore-­‐history03.html	  	  retrieved	  September	  30,	  2014	  
	  
22	  Household is one person who lives alone or a group of persons who, as a unit, jointly occupy 
the whole or part of a dwelling unit, who have common arrangements for housekeeping, and 
who generally share at least one meal. The household may be composed of related persons 
only, of unrelated persons, or a combination of both (Statistical Institute of  Jamaica, email staff 
correspondence with author dated July 8, 2013).	  
23	   Tenure	   refers	   to	   the	   legal	   arrangements	   for	   occupancy	   of	   land	   and	   or	   dwelling	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
census.	   The	   categories	   identified	   were,	   owned,	   leased,	   rented,	   rent-­‐free	   and	   squatting. (Statistical 
Institute of  Jamaica, email staff correspondence with author dated July 8, 2013).	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Portmore24. Portmore’s geographic boundaries are determined by the 
Municipalities (Portmore) Order Act of 2003. 
In 2003 history was created in Jamaica, when  Portmore one of the largest 
single living spaces in Jamaica was granted municipal status via the 
Municipalities (Portmore) Order 2003 and called the Portmore Municipal 
Council. Portmore even though huge is neither a town nor a parish but enjoys 
equal status as other local authorities. Citizens in the Portmore community 
campaigned for its new status on the basis that this large community had 
unique features and as such its uniqueness and special needs could only be 
adequately met through municipal government described as citizens’ activism 
(Schoburgh 2007, 164). The integral role played by citizens in realizing this 
particular change to the local government structure in Jamaica is more 
appropriately conceived as reform ‘from below’ and is indicative of the potency 
of ‘people power’ on policy direction (ibid). Additionally, the quest for municipal 
status coincided with the government’s agenda to reform local government and 
to return governance to the hands of the people at the local level (Leakey 1993; 
Jones 2003).  
Whilst the Municipal Act 2003 does not explicitly define a municipality, S3(3) of 
the act outlines that the citizens’ expectations must be incorporated and S(5)(a) 
clearly articulates that the citizens’ wishes  “.. an urban centre...that would be 
better served by a regime that is focused exclusively on managing the area  in 
order to achieve sustainable and orderly development.”  Sections 8 (a) to (g) of 
the act also make provision for revenue raising: property tax, local motor vehicle 
licenses, trade licenses, building fees, grants from central government, loans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Highest	  Level	  of	  Educational	  Attainment	  2001	  Male:	  3315	  University	  and	  6242	  Other	  Tertiary.	  Female:	  
5272	   University	   and	   11930	   Other	   Tertiary.	   .	   University	   refers	   to	   persons	   with	   a	   degree	   both	   at	   the	  
bachelor	  level	  and	  the	  Masters	  and	  PHD	  level.	  Other	  tertiary	  refers	  to	  diplomas,	  associate	  degrees	  and	  
certificates. (Statistical Institute of  Jamaica, email staff correspondence with author dated July 
8, 2013).	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and other sources.  According to  Portmore’s 2008/09 budget 55% of 
Portmore’s25 own source revenues were from property tax. 
2.4	   Demography	  and	  economic	  indicators	  
Jamaica’s population is 2.71m (STATIN 2010) with an average growth rate of 
0.5% and a net migration of 18,500.  52% of Jamaica’s population lives in urban 
areas (PIOJ 2010). English is the official language with patois26 as its creole 
language. Jamaica has an adult literacy rate of 91.7% (PIOJ 2010). The island’s 
infant mortality rate is 16.7 per 1000 live births and life expectancy is 74.1 years 
at birth (PIOJ 2010). Jamaica is classified as a middle income island state 
(UNESCO 2009) and has plans to become a developed nation by 2030 
(Vision2030). Three productive sectors: agriculture, industry and service27 
contribute to Jamaica’s GDP. Jamaica’s formal trading currency is the J$  with 
US$1 being the equivalent of J$99.36 (BOJ 2014).28 Jamaica’s inflation rate in 
2010 was 11.7% (PIOJ 2010) and its unemployment rate is 12.8% (IMF 2012).  
Jamaica’s fiscal deficit is US$56.0b (PIOJ 2010) with a  gross national reserves 
the equivalent of 23.2 weeks of GDP and services (PIOJ 2010).  Jamaica’s 
GDP per capita is US$4,967 (BOJ 2010). Tax revenues for 2011/12 financial 
year have been estimated at 27.8% of GDP (IMF Country Report 2010)  
representing 92% of Jamaica’s total revenue (BOJ 2011).  In 2012 its debt was 
140% of GDP (IMF 201229).  In 2010/2011 its  Global Competitive Index (GCI) 
was 3.9.30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  http://portmoremc.gov.jm/sites/default/files/resources/portmore_budget_2008_9-­‐_draft4.pdf	  	  
retrieved	  September	  28,	  2014	  
26	  Patois	  pronounced	  ‘patwah’	  is	  a	  mix	  of	  African	  and	  English	  languages.	  	  	  
27Agriculture	  (6.2%);	  Industry	  including	  mining	  and	  manufacturing	  (22.1%)	  and	  services	  	  including	  
tourism	  and	  financial	  (71.7%)	  Jamaica	  at	  a	  glance	  World	  Bank	  Statistics	  2011	  
28	  http://www.boj.org.jm/foreign_exchange/fx_historical_rates.php	  	  retrieved	  September	  26,	  2014.	  	  
This	  figure	  represents	  the	  exchange	  rate	  on	  the	  last	  day	  of	  trading	  in	  April	  2013	  when	  I	  completed	  my	  
field	  work	  in	  Jamaica.	  	  The	  rate	  has	  changed	  since	  that	  time.	  	  
29	  Statement	  of	  IMF	  mission	  to	  Jamaica.	  	  Press	  Release	  No	  12/100	  dd.	  March	  22,	  2012.	  	  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12100.htm.	  	  Retrieved	  April	  30,	  2012.	  
30	   http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-­‐11.pdf	   	   retrieved	  	  
December	  18,	  2014.	  	  	  GCI	  score	  is	  based	  on	  a	  value	  1-­‐7	  with	  1	  being	  the	  lowest	  value.	  It	  is	  published	  by	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Jamaica has had a history of recurrent deficits since the 1970s.  Successive 
governments have tried many and varied strategies both monetary and fiscal to 
arrest the deficit but with limited success.  Having failed at this, Jamaica  sought 
the assistance from the IMF in 1976 brokering its first arrangement in 1977 but 
terminated its arrangement 1979 because  it failed to meet the IMF’s targets. 
Negotiations were reopened in the 1980s and Jamaica/IMF relationship  has 
continued on an on-again-off again basis. A new arrangement commenced in 
2007 and continues to date (2014) with the  working  arrangement of new tax 
reform measures with the hope of increasing tax revenues. One such measure 
which came into effect April 1, 2013 was increasing  property tax compliance 
rate by 10% along with a simultaneous doubling of the property tax rates.  The 
objective of the measure is  for local authorities to have enough revenues 
obviating the need for transfers from the centre.  This would achieve the goal of 
increasing the independence of local authorities making them less dependent 
on central government for their financing.  
2.5	   Jamaica’s	  tax	  system	  
The Medium Term Framework of Jamaica’s National Development Plan 2009-
12 casts the Jamaican tax system as “…increasingly complex and 
cumbersome.  The most recent global assessment indicates that, despite 
reforms, Jamaica has one of the worst tax systems in the world, ranking 173rd 
out of 181 countries in the overall ease of paying taxes, 175th in the number of 
required annual tax payments, 148th in the time required to pay taxes, and 133rd 
in the total tax rate.  For example, tax compliance for a typical company is 
estimated on average to take a total of 414 hours each year, compared to say 
76 hours per in year in Ireland and 61 hours in St. Lucia a small island in the 
Caribbean.”31  This statement points to the issue that Jamaica’s tax system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  World	   Economic	   Forum	   (WEF)	   and	   the	   GCI	   seeks	   to	   measure	   and	   compare	   the	   competitiveness	  
levels	   of	   139	   countries	   worldwide;	   Jamaica	   has	   a	   ranking	   of	   95.	   The	   score	   is	   based	   on	   a	   weighted	  
average	  of	  	  12	  factors:	  institutions,	  physical	  infrastructure,	  macroeconomic	  stability,	  health	  and	  primary	  
education,	   higher	   education	   and	   training,	   goods	  market	   efficiency,	   labour	  market	   efficiency,	   financial	  
market	  sophistication,	  technological	  readiness,	  market	  size,	  business	  sophistication	  and	  innovation.	  
31	  Chapter	  3	  –	  Medium	  Term	  Priority	  and	  supporting	  national	  outcomes	  chapter	  3,40	  IN	  	  Medium	  Term	  
Socio-­‐Economic	  Policy	  Framework	  2009-­‐2012	  Planning	  Institute	  of	  Jamaica.	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begs for change for it to become efficient and productive. Bahl and Wallace 
(2007) debate  that Jamaica’s tax administration is dogged with problems 
because of the “culture problem” – i.e. the “unwillingness of citizens to accept 
the idea that the payment of taxes is a civic responsibility.32” They further argue 
that the  tax administration rather than tackling the problem holistically tend to 
concentrate  on the taxes that are easier to collect –income taxes and GCT and 
from the small number of compliant firms  leaving a large number of potential 
taxpayers outside of the tax net.  Alm (1988) confirms that 50% of potential 
income tax revenues were lost through non-compliance. Anecdotally, views 
have been expressed that  the informal economy is about 50% with most or all 
of these not contributing to the tax revenues.  Consequently, compliant 
taxpayers feel they are overtaxed; giving rise to “horizontal and vertical equities” 
in the system with attendant revenue loss (Bahl and Wallace 2007).  Despite 
this negative picture of the tax system, the government continues to make 
attempts to improve the system and is optimistic that the system can change. 
Jamaica’s tax system is ‘shaped’ (Frankema 2010; Mendes, McLean and 
Wynter, 2013) by Britain and in recent years by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Jamaica seeks financial assistance from time to time from IFIs both to reform its 
tax system and for projects  for economic development.  A pre-condition for 
economic support from the IFIs, as such the IMF, the World Bank, regional 
development banks and aid agencies (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008, 238) usually 
comes in the form of agreeing to imposed “conditionalities”33  and  in the case of 
the IMF  ‘those policies the Fund expects a member to follow in order to be able 
to access  Fund’s resources’ (Bullock 1986, 130). These conditions normally 
shape or influence the tax policy and tax system. Jamaica’s has had a long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Bahl	  and	  Wallace	  (2007,	  9-­‐10)	  Comprehensive	  tax	  reform.	  Public	  Finance	  Review.	  	  
33	  Conditionality	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  one	  offers	  support	  and	  attempts	  to	  influence	  the	  
policy	  of	  another	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  compliance	  with	  a	  programme	  of	  measures.	  	  Buira	  2003	  An	  analysis	  
of	  IMF	  conditionality,	  p3	  Discussion	  Paper	  G-­‐24,	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	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relationship with the IMF which commenced in 1976   and continues to date 
albeit34 with brief periods of discontinuances.  
The tax structure is skewed towards income taxes (Bahl and Wallace 2007) 
accounting for almost 50% of total tax revenues (BOJ 2010)35 with the largest 
portion of the income taxes from the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE), consisting of 
more than 20% of total tax revenues (Bahl and Wallace 2007). Corporate 
income taxes is paid at a flat rate of 33 1/3%  by regulated companies and 25% 
by unregulated companies (McLean, Mendes and Wynter 2013).36 There are 
also four payroll taxes imposed on employees and employers: two relate to 
pension and housing (national insurance scheme –NIS and National Housing 
Trust (NHT); one is earmarked for human resource development (Human 
Employment and Resource Training-HEART) and Education tax which  goes 
into the general revenue fund.  
General consumption tax (GCT) a value added tax is the main indirect tax. 
Introduced in 1991, it accounts for 8.6% of GDP (IDB 2010 JA-L 1034 loan 
proposal, 8).  It’s levied at the standard rate of 17.5%.  Special consumption 
taxes are also applicable raising revenues largely from fuel, tobacco and 
alcohol (Bahl and Wallace 2007). 
Property tax the subject of this study is another important tax and is not self-
assessed with three methods of taxing property: stamp duty, transfer tax and 
land tax (Bahl and Wallace 2007).  This study concerns itself with land tax only 
and is referred to in the study and in Jamaica as  property tax.   Other taxes in 
Jamaica include travel tax, assets taxes and international taxes from imports 
(Bahl and Wallace 2007).There are no capital gains taxes in Jamaica. Taxes in 
Portmore are similar to taxes levied at the national level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Its	  	  first	  	  major	  tax	  reform	  was	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  has	  several	  since.	  	  The	  last	  tax	  reform	  commenced	  in	  	  
May	  2011	  and	  at	  	  December	  2013	  was	  ongoing.	  
35	  Bank	  of	  Jamaica	  (2010)	  Statistical	  Digest,	  89;	  figure	  calculated	  from	  data	  given	  for	  tax	  and	  non-­‐tax	  
revenues	  
36	  Chapter	  10,	  	  Taxation	  of	  Companies	  IN	  Essentials	  of	  Jamaican	  Taxation	  (Mendes,	  McLean	  and	  Wynter	  
2013)	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The administration of the tax system is regulated by both the Revenue 
Administration Act and the Tax Collection Act.  The Revenue Administration Act 
covers the administrative structure, the powers and duties of the respective 
departments in Tax Administration Jamaica whilst the Tax Collection Act 
regulates  tax collection, appointment of tax collectors and their assistants.  
The Ministry of Finance through its Tax Policy Unit has oversight responsibility 
for the tax administration and direct responsibility for taxpayer appeals.37   
The primary objectives of the unit are to: 
• ensure the tax base is broadened and that equity is maintained; 
• ensure that Jamaica’s interest in tax issues is protected regionally and 
internationally; 
• ensure that tax legislation is consistent with government’s economic 
policies and encourages savings and investment; 
• ensure the effective management of human, financial and technical 
resources” 
Since May 1, 2011 the tax administration is responsible for administering local 
taxes38 with international tax falling under the purview of the Customs 
Department.  The administrative model is mixed and is organized along 
operational lines with a large taxpayer office.  
2.6	   Property	  tax	  administration	  	  
Property tax is a legacy of British colonization, introduced in 1806 (Andelson 
2000) as a tax on  quit rents,   houses, horses and horned stock and tax based 
on land usage (tax on horned stock was removed in 1892) (Eisner 1961). The 
tax on houses was  dedicated to poor relief  up to 1885; after then it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  http://www.mof.gov.jm/taxpolicy	  retrieved	  April	  10,	  2012	  
	  
38	  Tax	  Administration	  Jamaica	  is	  the	  merger	  of	  The	  Inland	  Revenue	  Department,	  Taxpayer	  Audit	  and	  
Assessment	  Department	  and	  the	  Tax	  Administrative	  Services	  Department.	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collected by the local authorities.  In  1890 an additional tax was imposed on 
house to make up for the loss of income resulting from the abolition of school 
fees.  Houses and lands were subject to five different taxes with the heaviest 
burden falling on the poorest class in 1897 but the arrears were so great and 
remissions became so frequent that the tax ceased to fulfil its purpose. In 1899, 
the method of taxing property was changed due to a financial crisis in the 
island. A new property tax law which now governs Jamaica was passed in 
1903.  The tax was self-assessed on a  capital base until 1957  when it changed 
to the unimproved value or the site value with the government doing the 
assessments.   
The rationale for changing to the site value was two-fold:  Norman Manley, 
Jamaica’s Prime Minister  argued then, firstly, that ‘the present system  is a tax 
not upon land, but on man's efforts put into land; it was a tax on labor and the 
consequence is that it implies that there is no tax upon those who do nothing 
with land, and more tax on those who do more and more with land’.  Secondly, 
he continued ‘the new system will tend to discourage the withholding of land 
from use, and to encourage the putting of land to use’ (Andelson 2000, 114). 
Jamaica is among a small number of countries in the world that uses the site 
value.  In 1993/94 there was a major policy shift at which time the revenues 
ceased to go into consolidation fund and were dedicated to the local authorities  
to finance street lighting, solid waste, beautification and road rehabilitation but  
revenues were never enough to finance these activities. The policy required 
local authorities to pay a more pivotal role in the management of the property 
tax but to date  of the study this has not happened. 
Property tax continues to be centrally administered with a 3% fee deducted for 
collection with special funds raised for revaluation exercise. Since April 1, 2013 
properties with values up to $100,000 attract a flat fee of J$1000; those 
between J$100,001 and J$1m, 1.5% and any value over a J$1m 2%.  
Previously, the rates were J$1,000 payable on properties up to J$300,000 and  
any amount above this value a rate of 0.75%. Commercial and residential 
properties are similarly rated. In 2004 property tax generated 1% of Jamaica’s 
total revenue and 0.23% of GDP (Sjoquist 2007).  The study concerns itself with 
the tax before the increase. 
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2.6.1	   Administrative	  framework	  
Property tax is centrally  managed with its activities spanning two ministries: 
ministry of finance and planning (hereinafter referred as the ministry of finance) 
and the ministry of local government & community development (hereinafter 
referred to as ministry of local government)  with supporting departments. The  
ministry of finance along with its subordinating departments- Tax Administration 
Jamaica and the National Land Agency  is responsible for the financial aspects 
of the property tax; valuation and assessment, reliefs and exemptions, 
budgeting, targeting, collections, enforcement and compliance. On the other 
hand the ministry of local government oversees the distribution, allocation of the 
property tax along with the provision of residential garbage services through its 
subsidiary department, National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA). 
It also  supervises the local authorities and municipalities.  The local authorities 
partner with  Tax Administration Jamaica with enforcement and compliance 
activities based on a policy decision of 1993 (see Policy 8/93). The parliament 
determines property tax rates, provides funding for valuations and also 
determine valuation periods and dates. 
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The following diagram represents the property tax process based on the current 
administrative and legislative framework. 
Figure to show departments and ministries in property tax administration 
 
Departments and ministries involved in  property tax administration 
Figure 2.1 
Source: Carlene Wynter, December 2013 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of duties  
Ministries of finance and local government and their associated departments 
Ministries Related departments Specific duties 
Ministry of Finance  Budgeting; targets; reliefs and 
exemptions 
Land Valuation 
Department 
Valuation of properties and production 
of valuation roll 
Tax Administration 
Jamaica (TAJ) 
Assessment; compliance and 
enforcement  
Fiscal Services Printing of  assessment notices 
Ministry of Local 
Government and 
Community 
Development (MOLG 
& CD) 
 Distribution of notices; 
Partners with TAJ in compliance 
Allocation of PT revenues to councils 
and municipalities 
Payment for garbage and street 
lighting services 
NSWMA Provision of solid waste services 
JPS (unrelated) Provision of street lights 
Parish councils and 
municipalities 
Provision of beautification services 
Partners with TAJ in compliance and 
enforcement 
Ministries and departments with PT duties 
Source: Author December 2013 
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2.6.2	  	   Administrative	  processes	  
 
 
Figure 2.2 
Diagram to demonstrate property tax administrative process 
 
Diagram of property tax administrative process in Jamaica 
Source: Carlene Wynter, December 2013 
Assessment	  and	  valuation	  
Valuation responsibilities fall under the Land Valuation Department (LVD) which 
is headed by a director who  reports to the National Land Agency (NLA) and   
the ministry of finance.   It centrally administers land valuations and its  
responsibilities  include  maintenance of a valuation roll to support property 
taxation and valuations to  government organizations.  
Valuations are  required to be carried out by law every five years but on an 
average they are  done  every ten years (Sjqouist 2007; Cornia and Walters 
2010)39.   The findings also revealed that  for the  financial year 2012/13, there 
were approximately  eight hundred thousand properties on the property tax roll 
with  forty two thousand seven hundred and ninety six (42,796)  of those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Funding	  for	  the	  revaluation	  exercise	  is	  a	  political	  decision	  with	  determined	  by	  the	  government	  of	  the	  
day.	  	  A	  legislator	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  was	  in	  no	  haste	  to	  do	  revaluations	  as	  they	  would	  result	  in	  
increased	  liabilities	  for	  taxpayers	  but	  suggested	  instead	  that	  increased	  revenues	  should	  come	  from	  
increased	  compliance.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  a	  cabinet	  minister	  argued	  that	  late	  revaluations	  were	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  tardiness	  of	  the	  agency	  responsible	  for	  revaluation	  but	  this	  was	  refuted	  by	  an	  interviewee	  
who	  stated	  that	  the	  agency	  is	  ready	  to	  carry	  out	  revaluations	  during	  the	  specified	  periods	  but	  cannot	  do	  
so	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  funding	  from	  the	  government.	  	  
Valuajon	   Assessment	   Collecjon	   Distribujon	   Services	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properties in Portmore. A participant explained that mass appraisals  are used 
to arrive at the values, which are  imprecise but nevertheless reflective of the 
market  values  of properties within a locality due to their common 
characteristics. The valuation process also involves inventorying the properties 
constructed on locational and neighbourhood characteristics; collecting market 
evidence of sales transactions; classification  of properties, assigning values 
based on the ‘predetermined models that have developed’ with the final stage 
being the  transfer of properties to the LVD’s database- the Property Tax 
Database (PTS) according to the interviewee.  The interviewee also confirmed 
that as soon as the values are transferred to the database, then the property tax 
rates are applied in order to arrive at the property tax liabilities which is referred 
to as the assessment process. The PTS is shared with the Tax Administration 
Jamaica.   
Property tax assessment is the job of TAJ. Following the assignment of values, 
based on market values tax rates are then applied to the tax base. The tax 
administration is then required by law to raise an assessment and deliver such 
assessment notices to taxpayers for payment of their property tax liability. Even 
though some properties are exempt from property tax they are still represented 
on the valuation roll a requirement of the law. Section 3 of property tax act 
requires the tax administration to serve assessment notices on taxpayers. 
However findings from the study suggest that the printing and distribution of 
assessment notices to taxpayers are overseen and executed by the ministry of 
local government.  The findings further suggest that the tax authority supplies 
the  necessary data to the Fiscal Services Unit at the beginning of the year at 
which time the ministry takes over the distribution of the assessment notices.  
Property tax rates are based on the likely cost of providing the services by the 
local authorities but subject to approval by the parliament. This way of assigning 
rates suggests that it supports the benefit view40 which is in keeping with the 
government policy of 1993/94.  The local authorities are tasked with the 
responsibility to prepare the budget of expenditures,  based S3(a)(b)(c) of  the 
Parochial Rates and Finance Act and S13 of Municipalities Act 2003.  By law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Cameron	  1999,	  102-­‐103,	  	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	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budgets are to be submitted to the ministry of local government by December 1 
for the minister’s approval. The budgets should be accompanied by a financial 
statement showing the financial position of the local authority along with  a 
statement showing how it expects to meet the estimated expenditure. The 
statement of expectations on meeting the parochial expenditure  should include 
property tax being one of the major sources of income in the budget.  The 
minister may amend the budget.   
Enforcement	  and	  collection	  
TAJ has responsibility for the enforcement and collection of property tax 
supported by the local authorities41.   The property tax legislation has not been 
amended to incorporate this policy but it  remains operational.  Enforcement 
and collections are governed by the Property Tax Act, the Tax Collection Act 
and the Quit Rents Act,  the Land Valuation Act and the Land Value Taxation 
(Relief) Act (see Section 2.6.3 below).   Cornia and Walters (2010, 25 & 6) 
argue that ‘collections are low and  have proven to be intractable in Jamaica 
(25) and that that there is also a steady decline in billing taxpayers’.  For 
example, the authors suggest that in 2009/10 only 41% of all properties paid in 
full (3) with over a third of the most valuable properties and 66% in the lowest 
band not honouring their obligations at all (9-10).  Sjoquist (2005, vii) argues 
that collections declined ‘precipitously’ after 2002	   falling from  52% in 2002 to 
37% in 2004.  In 2005, property tax arrears were topped at the J$5b mark 
(Tharkur 2010) which is attributable to weak enforcement.  The government in 
2006 instituted the Property Tax Arrears project in a bid to reduce  the arrears 
(Cornia and Walters 2010). According to the findings,  the project no longer 
remains per se, but the property tax coordinator who was appointed in 2006 to 
oversee the programme remains in place working  alongside five regional 
managers along with compliance and records officers.  This team  form the core 
of the property tax enforcement and compliance activities with support from the 
local authorities. Property tax collection carries an integrated payment system 
facilitating payments at  any of the twenty nine collecting stations in Jamaica or 
through the online property tax payment  portal. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  In	  1993	  policy	  paper	  8/93	  made	  it	  policy	  for	  	  LAs	  	  to	  partner	  with	  the	  TAJ	  in	  its	  enforcement	  and	  
compliance	  activities,	  and	  it	  was	  again	  reinforced	  in	  policy	  paper	  7/03	  in	  2003.	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Distribution,	  allocation,	  services	  and	  auditing	  
S6A of the Parochial Rate and Finance Act  1900 mandates that all property tax 
collected including penalties and fines are to be paid into  the  Parochial 
Revenue Fund. According to the act, control of the management of the fund 
should be an officer designated by the minister.  S6B requires payouts to local 
authorities to be ‘not later than the last day in each month in respect of the 
amounts received  by the fund…in the preceding month an equivalent of 90% of 
the property tax paid in the relevant parish…the remaining 10% shall be 
distributed  to each parish council on the basis of needs of the parish upon an 
application made to the minister…’  Where there is a municipality within a 
parish,  the Minister by order, subject to negative resolution, should specify the 
percentages to be paid out of the fund in relation to a relevant parish council 
and the Municipality.  Portmore being a part of  the parish of St. Catherine, it 
implies therefore that property tax funds collected in St. Catherine should be 
allocated by negative resolution between the St. Catherine Parish Council and 
the PMC.  Additionally, based on the law, the PMC is also eligible to receive a 
portion of the 10% which remains in the fund once it demonstrates that the 
revenues are needed. However the findings suggest that neither the ministry 
nor the minister operate both funds according to the law. 
 The law requires the mandatory annual auditing of property tax revenues by 
the Auditor General  and based on the minister’s directive   within three months 
of the close of the financial year. The minister should then submit a report to the 
House of Representatives. Local authorities by law are required to provide the 
necessary services to their respective parishes.  
2.6.3	   Legal	  framework	  
Property tax administration is governed by several laws:  the Property Tax Act 
of 1903, the Tax Collection Act of 1867, the Land Valuation Act of 1957, the 
Land Taxation (Relief) Act of 1959,  the Parochial Rates and Finance Act of 
1900, the Quit Rents Act of 1896.  These acts work together for the effective 
administration of the property tax. 
The Property Tax Act is the principal legislation and speaks to the general 
administrative framework for assessment, payment dates and  non-payment but 
works in tandem with the other property tax legislation.   Based  on S3(1) of the 
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act, property tax is due and payable on the April 1, each year…and requiring 
the TAJ to raise assessments on those persons in possession of property.  The 
assessments should state the amounts to be paid, delivering the assessment 
notices to the address where the taxpayers normally live or their business 
places. S3(3)(a)(b)(c)  of the act further states that a notice of assessment may 
be served personally on the taxpayer or leaving it at his address for service or it 
may be  sent through the post by registered mail at his address for service with 
service deemed to be effected ‘at the time when it would in the ordinary course 
of the post have arrived at the place to which it was addressed or the town or 
post office nearest to that place’. Section 3(4) clarifies the taxpayer’s address 
for service as the address that was last given to TAJ of the parish where the 
taxable property is located and where no address is provided or where the 
taxpayer changes his/her address and has not provided a notification to this 
effect to TAJ, then the address  for service of the taxpayer shall be any address 
that the tax administration has on record for this taxpayer.  
The Tax Collection Act governs the collection of all taxes, including the property 
tax, regulates the appointment, duties and powers of tax collectors along with 
their assistants, payment periods and giving permission for tax to be paid in 
installments.  The act also establishes a lien on property of outstanding property 
taxes.  S13 of the act imposes the responsibility on Collectors of Taxes to 
advise the Accountant General of anyone who is in arrears of any taxes if such 
a person receives salary from the government or if the person receives money 
from the public purse.  In such situations, the law permits the Accountant 
General to setoff taxes owed against money to be received.   
The Land Valuation Act covers the process of land valuation, stipulating the 
frequency of valuations (s11); such valuations are carried out every five years. 
However, this has not been the case in Jamaica. Valuations were undertaken in 
“1974, 1983, 1993 and 2002 (Sjoquist 2007, 128).One is scheduled to be done 
by the end of 2013 or sometime in 2014 based on findings from the field. 
Revaluations are not done between general revaluations except for certain 
conditions, but in practice have been changed when “property is subdivided” 
(Sjoquist 2007, 128).   
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The Land Taxation (Relief) Law contains provisions for derating, i.e. 
“authorizing a  reduction  of  land  tax payable by any person”  and relief of land 
taxes.  Relief may be given for agricultural as well as residential land based on 
its current use.  The act also empowers the Minister of Finance to give 
discretionary relief from the payment of property taxes whether partially or 
wholly for any land providing he’s satisfied that it’s equitable and just to do so. 
The Parochial Rates and Finance Act  governs the actual receipt and payments 
of the property tax revenues and other revenues collected on behalf of the 
respective local authorities.  The act stipulates that a “Parochial  Revenue 
Fund” shall be established by the Ministry of Local government to receive “the 
total amount of property tax paid pursuant to the Property Tax Act including 
penalty and interest” (S6A(1)(2)(a)) and this fund was set up in 1996 (Policy 
1993). Additional details of this act were provided above (section 2.6.2 – 
distribution allocation, services and auditing).   
The Quit Rents Act, 1896 addresses forfeiture in cases where property tax is 
not paid. It empowers TAJ to seize  taxpayers’ property to settle  outstanding 
property tax liability although it does not make specific reference to property tax 
(Sjoquist 2005).   
2.7 Jamaican	  culture	  	  
Jamaica a former British colony has enjoyed  political stability having always 
changed governments by democratic elections being described ‘untypical’ case 
within the third world (Edie 1989, 2). Its governments therefore are often 
compared to liberal democracies of the developed world (Dahl 1971, Edie 
1989). Edie argues that Jamaica’s   two-party system since 1938 carries two  
distinctive features:  serving their respective sectoral interests while in power 
and secondly the parties act or serve as dominant forum for the expression of 
political conflict with loyalty to a political party rewarded with state resources 
which the party controls while it is in power- ‘the victor gets the spoils’ (4).  
According to Edie, this second feature referred to as   patronage or clientelism,    
increases the dependence of the poor on the party and the support sometimes 
come in the form of some work programmes or grants. Recipients of the 
patronage often believe that connections to the politicians  will provide them 
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with jobs, employment etc. which would eventually change their social and 
economic status in the society. Thus, they  strategically align themselves to  
political parties in the hope of getting jobs and contracts which are distributed by 
politicians (Edie, 1989). Stone (1980), LaGuerre (1983, 145) further debate that 
the benefits derived are mutual but the power balance in the relationship is 
unequal as the parties are the dominant players.  Edie  also suggests that the 
civil service often carry political appointments which may attribute to its  low 
productivity and efficiency.  The requests for political appointments are usually 
facilitated because later on the senior civil servants who did these appointments 
may need the politicians to do a favour (Mills & Robertson 1974) for them or pull 
a string or get a bly42. 
Jamaica is also known for its rich cultural heritage: music, dance, art, food and 
for a warm friendly people (Seaga  2005).  But it is also known for its lack of 
civic responsibility (Bahl and Wallace 2007). Seaga (2005, 79) suggests that 
Jamaica’s culture is stratified into layers of society, shaped by the experiences 
of folk life and modern society, molded by metropolitan influences making the 
country a well-defined model of a dual society ‘two Jamaicas blending at points 
of contact. ’ Stone (1992) on the other hand argues that Jamaica’s culture is 
shaped by its history of slavery; the post-emancipation plantation era and the 
post war modernization.  Overall, the suggestion is that Jamaica’s culture has 
been in the making for a period of five hundred years but that each period has 
distinct core values, norms regulating behaviour, institutional roles, functions 
and tasks in the major domains of social space. Stone also suggests that the 
post slavery period values were shaped by the family, church and community in 
rural Jamaica but in urbanized communities values were shaped by the schools 
and the workplace.  Of note here is the absence of government institutions 
(Waller et al 2006).   
Austin (1983) in a study on Jamaica, concluded that culturally, there was class 
domination where the formation of groups is constrained by the pervasive 
power of large institutions which are controlled by other classes; political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Bly	  means	  to	  give	  a	  chance	  or	  to	  ignore	  or	  overlook	  something.	  See	  
http://jamaicanpatwah.com/term/Bly/918#.VXCI5s6yOJU.	  Retrieved	  June	  4,	  2015.	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patronage that renders the working class as clients of the middle class but it’s 
not peculiar to the working class  because of the shortage of resources making 
the working class particularly dependent on patronage for survival.   
Historically, Jamaica has been plagued by violence and social disorder  during 
different periods of its history (Lacey 1977, Chevannes 1981, Chevannes 1994 
1-40; Smith 1984; Girvan 1999; Harriott 2003; McLean, Mendes and Wynter, 
2013, 6,43 Oats, Sadler, Wynter 2014).  Goulbourne (1984)  describes  the 
incidence of violence as a norm of day to day life suggesting that its visible at all 
levels of structures and pervades all kinds of social practices.  Goulbourne 
further states that ‘intolerance, contempt  and fear inform many social attitudes 
which show the many deep-seated prejudices arising out of racial, colour and 
class considerations…’ (151).  Harriott’s (2003, 39) study on Fear of Criminal 
Victimization…revealed that fear  was found to be prevalent in the Jamaican 
society with approximately 40% of the population regarding themselves as 
being highly at risk, and exhibiting high levels of worry about criminal 
victimization. The author argues that fear may lead  to cautionary and self-
protecting behaviours.  
More recently, a survey conducted by the Centre for Leadership44 (Powell et al 
2006) revealed that whilst Jamaicans have a strong commitment to democracy 
and related ideals of equality, freedom and social justice, existing alongside 
this, there is some degree of ambivalence between democratic and 
authoritarian rule, though favoring democracy.  The results also revealed that 
there is a strong sentiment in favour of possible authoritarian intervention of 
public sector entities albeit under extreme circumstances. The survey results 
also showed that Jamaicans have trust issues, i.e. trusting both people and 
institutions. Of the 1,338 respondents polled45 only 10% trust public institutions: 
local government, the police, judiciary, parliament; government and political 
parties.  The most trusted institutions were banks, schools, churches, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43See	  McLean,	  Mendes	  and	  Wynter	  ,	  2013,	  6,	  note	  9,	  Essentials	  of	  Jamaican	  Taxation	  	  
44	  Centre	  for	  Leadership	  is	  a	  research	  centre	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Government,	  Faculty	  of	  Social	  
Sciences,	  University	  of	  the	  West	  Indies,	  Mona.	  
45	  The	  questionnaire	  response	  rate	  was	  above	  95%.	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universities and families with families heading the list.  On the question of 
interpersonal trust, 60%  of the respondents said they had no trust in people, 
i.e. is in their fellow Jamaicans.  
Another phenomenon in the Jamaican society is that people do not readily 
report others ‘culture of silence’.  This may be attributed to the lack of legal 
protection by the law as  required under the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption46 .  
2.7.1	   Land	  tenure	  practices	  
The Jamaican Constitution provides every Jamaican with the fundamental right 
to use and receive income from property (Allen 1993).  The author argues that 
this rule is a legacy of British colonization and is common in commonwealth 
countries. Historically, land in Jamaica was mostly owned by the colonizers and 
this was particularly so up to emancipation. However, various historical events 
have occurred which have shifted or changed this pattern of land tenure.  
Following the end of the Maroon war with the British in 1739-1740 as a part of 
the treaty, tracts of land were awarded to the maroons (Oats, Sadler and 
Wynter 2014). Another major shift in land tenure followed the abolition of 
slavery (Tindigarukayo 2004). Eisner (1961) articulates that after emancipation, 
free slaves came into ownership of property by either renting from large land 
owners through the missionaries’ special land acquisition program spearheaded 
by William Knibb an abolitionist or by squatting. According to Eisner, on the 
death of Knibb in 1845, the special land acquisition programme ceased.  With 
the downward trend in sugar cultivation, and the abandoning of properties, by 
many plantation owners, many free slaves took over these properties (Eisener 
1961).  This unlawful takeover is referred to as squatting (Tindigarukayo 2004) 
or extra-legal ownership, (USAID 2010), and thus squatters would have no 
titles. In 1867 two years after the Morant Bay Rebellion, the government  in a 
bid to deal with this situation, established the Lands Department to investigate 
and put in place legislation to recover illegal possessions.  However this proved 
to be challenging in  that there was difficulty tracing ownership due to the long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  	  Operational	  guidance	  note,	  Home	  Office,	  Jamaica	  (2013,5).	  
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52a6f6cc4.pdf	  	  	  	  	  	  	  retrieved	  May	  13,	  2014	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periods of abandonment by the owners (Eisner 1961).  The legislation therefore 
evicted those who could not produce a title and forfeited those lands that did not 
pay quit rents or land taxes or where there was no owner apparent. During 1867 
to 1876 period, the government recovered approximately 27,000 acres of land.  
 Since then, land inaccessibility remains an issue in Jamaica, so does squatting 
and titling issues (National Land Policy 1996; Tindigarukayo 2004;USAID 2010) 
Through government’s latest land policy of 1996 to look at titling issues and  the 
application of the adverse possession rule some persons were able to obtain 
titles for land.  In the case of land  occupied by squatters, they were able to 
come into freehold ownership after being in peaceful and undisturbed 
occupation or possession by land for a minimum of twelve years. This process 
is facilitated through the Registration of Titles Act  1969, allowing squatters to 
obtain a good title (Allen1993; GOJ 1964, GOJ 2006b Reynolds and Flores 
2009, USAID 2010). Prior to 2007, approximately 21% of the population lived on 
rented/leased land but since the introduction of the National Land Policy, the 
percentage has been declined (Nadelman 2009,USAID 2010). 
There is also another feature of land tenure in Jamaica: ownership by a 
community, for example in the maroon community (USAID 2010, Stanfield et al 
2003) and family owned lands (USAID 2010; National Land Policy 1996; Clarke 
1953).  According to (Clarke 1953) and the National Land Policy 1996 ‘family 
land’ is land that is passed undivided to a group of relatives, with each person 
having customary rights, which is not lost through prolonged absence from the 
island. All relatives can work the land, reap the fruits and claim a ‘house spot’ 
but no one in the family can sell the land.  This arrangement is strongly 
influenced by social relationships which exists among the family. The 
implication for this type of ownership is that it’s inconsistent with the codified 
and recognized legal system and it is difficult to obtain  information on 
ownership for use for taxation purposes (National Land Policy 1996).  
2.	  8	  	   Summary	  
This chapter provided background information on Jamaica history, geography, 
demography, economic and social indicators, its tax system including property 
tax  administration, a short history on Portmore, local government reform and 
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how property tax and Portmore sit within the framework of local government 
reform along with a snippet of Jamaica’s culture. This background information 
contextualizes the  findings of the study  which helps the reader to gain a 
greater understanding of the property tax field, the aim of the study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58	  
	  
Literature	  review	  
Chapter	  3	  –	  Tax	  	  administration,	  Fiscal	  Decentralization	  and	  
Bourdieu’s	  Theory	  of	  Practice	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
This chapter reviews the three strands of literature namely tax administration 
including property tax administration, fiscal decentralization and Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice which interpret the findings.  These three strands of literature 
form the framework of the study and provide the theoretical lens through which 
the findings are discussed, analysed and interpreted in Chapters five to seven 
inclusive. These strands have been chosen based on the multidisciplinary 
nature of tax, my study covers two main areas in tax scholarship; firstly the 
organization and management of tax practice, compliance and planning, 
secondly, policy issues (Lamb et al 2005). These strands along with Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice bring together all three areas as demonstrated in the 
theoretical framework in Figure 4.2.  Firstly, the organization, management of 
tax practice and planning speaks to how tax as a resource is administered, that 
is, how it’s enforced, the strategies and resources used in the enforcement 
process to obtain compliance and to earn the desired revenues as dictated by 
the government.  Secondly, it covers issues of compliance such as tax 
motivations, those intrinsic and external factors that make a taxpayer voluntarily 
compliant. Thirdly, administration of any tax is a policy issue.  Policymakers 
may decide that  all taxes should be centrally managed or they may decide that 
some or all should be locally managed or fiscally decentralized. Therefore, it’s 
government policy which determines what level of government and what tax this 
particular level of government will administer, hence the strand on fiscal 
decentralization. For this study, property  tax is discussed within the context of 
fiscal decentralization. As will be further discussed, property tax is regarded as 
a local tax within the literature suggesting that it should be locally managed. Tax 
administration and tax policy do not function in a vacuum, people organize and 
manage the tax, make policy decisions about tax and take decisions to comply 
or not to comply.  It is therefore important to have an understanding of those 
issues underlying their interactions. Bourdieu’s theory of practice the third 
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strand is the lens to understand and interpret those interactions. Section 3.2 
provides an overview of tax administration highlighting those issues that 
influence tax administration; 3.2.1 discusses issues influencing tax morale; 
section 3.2.2 social norms in tax compliance; section 3.2.3 discusses external 
cues and demographic factors; section 3.2.4 designing tax compliance 
strategies;  section 3.2.5 profiling taxpayers; section 3.2.6 responsive regulation 
and tax enforcement.   
Section 3.3 introduces the property tax; section 3.3.1 defines property tax along 
with its features; 3.3.2 discusses taxpayers’ perception of the property tax; 3.3.3 
the role and relevance of the property tax; 3.3.4 its revenue performance; 
section 3.3.5 property tax enforcement, billing and collections.  
Section 3.4 introduces fiscal decentralization; section 3.4.1 drivers and benefits 
of fiscal decentralization; section 3.4.2 assessment of fiscal decentralization 
3.4.3 fiscal decentralization in practice.   
Section 3.5  introduces Bourdieu’s theory of practice; section 3.5.1 discusses 
the concept of  habitus; section 3.5.2 field; section 3.5.3 capital.  Section 3.6 
summarizes the chapter.  	  
3.2	   Tax	  administration	  and	  its	  environment	  
	  	  	  
Mansfield (1988) defines tax administration as the link between the statutory 
foundation i.e. the various tax laws which form the basis of the tax system and 
the operative tax system or the ‘real system’ or what happens in practice.  Both 
systems may differ (Tanzi 1987b, Mansfield 1988) on account of issues in a 
country’s cultural, political or economic environment (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez 
and Rider 2006; Bahl and Wallace 2007; Tennant and Tennant 2007; Nerre 
2008; Oats and Sadler 2011). Specifically, these include but are not limited to  
institutionalised corruption, criminalisation in politics, standards of public 
morality and citizens’ attitude towards compliance by their peers (Bird 2004) or 
the interaction of actors and values such as honesty and justice (Oats and 
Sadler 2011, 115) or the entirety of all relevant formal and informal institutions 
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connected with the national tax system and its practical execution, which are 
historically embedded within the country’s culture (Nerre 2008, 25).   
Resources consist of one of the major inputs into tax administration and its 
limitations may undermine an administration’s  ability to carry out enforcement 
activities by forcing serious constraints on it (Gill 200). This appeared to be an 
issue with the property tax enforcement in Jamaica (section 5.2.3). Resource 
allocation maybe informed by policymakers’ perception that  tax administration 
is  a technical or mechanical process in which case enforcement becomes a 
matter of affordability. For example (Lange 2002)  argues that in some 
situations the goal of enforcement is to achieve that degree of compliance 
behaviour that the society believes it can afford and this is dependent on the 
amount of  resources devoted to the task. Bird (2004) also  suggests that  tax 
administration ought to be perceived as a process where its inputs are people, 
materials and information with outputs as revenues for the government and 
equity (139). 
Tax administrators rely on the law which provide the boundaries for their 
operations to effect enforcement (Gill 2000).  Where the law appears to be 
ambiguous, it’s argued that a range of choices is opened up to the 
administrators  causing dilemmas for them (Hume et al. 1999, Doyle, Hughes 
and Glaister 2009) creating complexity in decision making.  In the 
circumstances, enforcement becomes more challenging (Gill 200). Non-tax laws 
may also influence tax enforcement as was confirmed in the findings by a tax 
administrator. The judiciary may also influence the functioning of the tax 
administration.  For example, this may be reflected in the length of time that a 
case takes to go through the court system which can impact enforcement (Gill 
2000). The findings suggested that the judiciary was mostly used for collection 
of property tax arrears but using this strategy seemed time consuming and 
costly and therefore it was used only as a matter of last resort (section 5.3.6).  
With respect to seizures on large land barons, this was perceived to be  time 
consuming, and costly through the judicial system, thus forfeitures were rarely 
used in Jamaica as an enforcement strategy  (section 5.3.3). 
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Governments rely on tax administrations to maximise revenue collection (Bird 
and Slack 2004) while  simultaneously maintaining that critical balance which 
prevents  tipping in the direction of pervasive non-compliance, sending the 
message to citizens that non-compliance is unacceptable and will be effectively 
punished (Silvani 1992). While, some  authors argue that maintenance of  this 
balance is predicated on the amount of resources that is devoted to 
enforcement (Lange 2002;  Bird 2004, 139) it’s argued by others that it’s 
fundamental to understand those  issues that motivate taxpayer compliance as 
discussed in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.6 and confirmed by the tax compliance 
literature. 
 Despite great strides over the years some administrations in developing 
countries remain weak (OECD 2011) and ineffective  as demonstrated by the 
low level of voluntary compliance and the presence of high delinquency (Silvani 
1992).  The environment in which tax administration functions has many issues 
competing for the tax dollar.  It’s important for tax administration to place itself in 
the position to know what these competing issues are.  Equally important is for 
the administration to know what motivates a taxpayer to comply in face of these 
competing factors and also those environmental factors affecting compliance 
and risk factors in enforcement (Vazquez-Caro and Bird 2011).  The following 
sections highlight some key issues about which tax  administrations should 
have knowledge. 
3.2.1	  Tax	  morale	  
Tax morale is a much debated subject in tax scholarship. Frey and Frey (2002)  
suggest that it’s a ‘black box’ issue without much attempt being made to discuss 
or even give consideration as to how it may have arisen or how it might be 
maintained (Schmolders 1960, Strumpel 1969, Alm and Torgler 2006).  
Kornhauser (2007) debates that tax morale are those individual traits or intrinsic 
factors such as a person’s sense of integrity or degree of altruism and those 
external conditions or societal norms such as procedural justice, trust in 
government, or the form of government that influence  them to comply.  Some 
authors call it  the internal or intrinsic motivation to pay tax (Torgler 2005; 2006; 
Alm and Torgler 2006; Kornhauser 2007) or those norms of behaviour 
governing citizens as taxpayers in their relationship with the government (Song 
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and Yardbrough 1978 and Alm and Torgler 2006) or those general principles or 
values that individuals hold, simply put their “tax ethics” (Alm and Torgler 2006, 
228).  
The literature carries two main strands on those issues that affect tax morale: 
the traditional rationalist economic view and the non-economic view.  The  
traditional economic view posited by (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Fisher, 
Wastick and Mark 1992, Taylor 2002)  states that a taxpayer’s compliance is 
based on an economic opportunity   conditioned on  the probability of  being 
caught and  the likely penalty that the taxpayer maybe called upon to pay.  
Thus, the probability of being caught motivates the taxpayer to comply.  
Bergman (2003), supports this view suggesting that  “voluntary compliance is 
rarely the outcome of altruistic behaviour, but rather that  tax compliance  is the 
result of policies that rely on deterrence, that is the ability of tax administrations 
and other state organizations to effectively detect and punish citizens who 
disobey the law”(593).   Some researchers have generally concluded that 
economic models focusing on opportunity and penalties provide only a partial 
understanding of tax compliance choices made by taxpayers positing that 
factors such as social norms and ethical beliefs also play a role (Alm, 
McClelland and Schultze 1992, Alm, McClelland and Schultze 1999, Jackson & 
Milliron1986, Wenzel 2005; Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008, 685). Other authors 
also confirm that economic motivation is not the only factor that influences 
compliance (Cullis and Lewis 1997;	  Cowell 1999, Falkinger 1999, Wenzel 2002; 
Korhnauser 2007). 
For example, (Kornhauser 2007) suggests that the deterrence model accounts 
for a minor portion of tax compliance providing a poor explanation,  given that it 
assumes that the taxpayer complies solely on a rational cost benefit analysis.    
Additionally, (Cullis and Lewis 1997, 305) argue that  the  model  lacks 
“humanity and realism” casting tax evasion as a technical issue only, failing  to 
address issues such as people’s behaviour, values, attitudes and perception of 
moral.  Thus, Cullis and Lewis posit that  even though economic actions are 
important, compliance isn’t  just a function of tax rates, probability of 
detection…but it’s also based on the taxpayer’s willingness to evade or to 
comply and may also be conditioned by the behaviour of  others(305) in other 
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words, social issues are also involved.  Michael Wenzel debates that the model 
fails to recognise that taxpayers have a share in government services and 
public goods which is funded by their tax payments and that the taxpayers 
consider whether the exchange they receive is equitable (Cullis and Lewis 
1997; Cowell 1999, Falkinger 1999, Wenzel 2002). 
The literature also suggests that compliance may be influenced by a number of 
other issues including cultural norms  (and as such  tax morale may be different 
across countries (Alm and Torgler 2006); citizens’ participation  and trust in 
government  (Feld and Frey 2002); management of the tax (Guth, Levati and 
Sausgrubber 2005; Mikesell 2003, Rühling 2006, 2);  citizens’ treatment by the 
government (Strumpel 1969, Alm and Torgler 2006); citizens’ perception of the 
tax administration, fiscal exchange, attitude towards the government 
(Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler 2004; Alm and Torgler 
2006)  or even by their feelings of guilt and social stigma (Grasmick & Scott 
1982, Taylor 2002) and institutions and social norms   (Ockenfels 1999, 
Ocknekfels and Weimann 1999, Alm and Torgler 2006). Thus the issues may 
range from  taxpayers’ personal values (Kornhauser 2007) to social norms 
(Traxler 2010) and non-rational cognitive processes. It is also suggested that 
some internal norms influence tax compliance- those values showing high moral 
reasons, honesty and altruism may provide internal rewards which act as stimuli 
for tax compliance (Mazar and Ariely 2006; Kornhauser 2007, 612) 
With respect to a government’s behaviour towards taxpayers and its influence 
on tax morale (Alm and Torgler 2006) argue that when government’s 
enforcement strategies are coercive, they serve to alienate taxpayers resulting 
in lower tax morale  as was evidenced in taxpayers’ behaviour in Germany.  On 
the other hand, where governments treat taxpayers with respect and less 
control, there is increased tax morale as evidenced  in the United Kingdom.  For 
example (Cullis and Lewis 1997)  argue that countries which make a deliberate 
effort to improve compliance by treating taxpayers  like consumers, where tax 
administrations try to be more responsive to taxpayers’  needs and to improve 
their ‘fiscal consciousness, there is a greater level of compliance   as evidenced 
in the  USA, Sweden and the UK. The increased compliance gains made in  
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these countries seem to confirm that the consideration and incorporation of 
social issues into tax administration do work.   
Feld and Frey (2002) also debate that governments are in a contract with 
taxpayers implying fiscal exchange i.e.  citizens are obtaining some reciprocal 
services in return for their tax contributions (Fjeldstad 2001) and when 
taxpayers are treated fairly and with respect, trust in the authority improves 
which leads to increased voluntary compliance (Murphy 2005). Three types of 
fairness have been identified in the literature: distributive, procedural and 
retributive (Wenzel 2002;47 Kornhauser 2007; OECD 2010).  Distributive 
fairness is the view by taxpayers that the government acts as a good custodian 
and wise spender of tax revenues (OECD 2010, 6). On the other hand, 
procedural fairness or justice which is a  key determinant to tax morale (Murphy 
2005; Kornhauser 2007) is the extent to which the taxpayers are treated  in their 
dealings with the tax administration. Here taxpayers believe that they have a 
voice,  the tax authorities will listen to them and that there is neutrality in the 
decision. When an individual believes he’s heard and given a fair hearing and 
the more he thinks that the tax authority is responsive to his situation, the more 
the taxpayer sees the authority as just and this will increase compliance 
(Kornhauser 2007, 615).   Procedural justice builds trust, loyalty and 
commitment to the tax authority or other government organizations as 
suggested by the author. Findings from an (OECD 2010) study suggest that a 
lack of fairness is linked to a taxpayer’s disposition to evade. 
The literature also suggests that fairness works hand in hand with trust: mutual 
trust and cooperation between the tax authorities and the taxpayers leads to 
voluntary compliance (Murphy 2005; Braithwaite 2009;OECD 2010).  When 
taxpayers are treated fairly  and at the same time the tax authority is reliable 
and honest, taxpayers’ voluntary compliance increases. Evidence from studies 
done amongst a mix of  countries -USA, Spain,  Botswana and South Africa  
confirmed this (Alm and Torgler 2006, 226).  Drawing from previous work 
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  See	  (Wenzel	  2002,	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  Tax	  	  compliance	  and	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  Taxing	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carried out by (Alm et al48 1995 and Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and 
Torgler 2004) the authors state that the results of studies carried out in these 
countries indicate observed differences in tax compliance and tax morale based 
on differences in the fairness of tax administration, as well as equity of the fiscal 
exchange and the overall respect for government.  
Finally, retributive fairness is the perception that the tax authority is fair in its 
application of punishment when the rules are broken (Elkins 2009; OCED 
2010). Taxpayers believe that the tax authority applies fair punishment to those 
who don’t comply (OECD 2010).  According to the authors reciprocity also 
increases tax compliance even when the person doesn’t feel he’s  is receiving 
fiscal equity.  
3.2.2	  Social	  norms	  in	  tax	  compliance	  
Traxler (2010)  debates that tax morale maybe  influenced by social norms, with   
taxpayers’ compliance dependent on how well  they perceive that their fellow 
taxpayers comply.  Taxpayers therefore, comply not only because they want to 
avoid the penalty but because of moral and social considerations (Sandmo 
2005, Traxler 2010).   Traxler further articulates that the strength of social 
norms is not only determined by the behaviour among peers within a group but 
also by the compliance in other groups because group-specific policies may 
create spill overs in other communities i.e. cooperation works not only within but 
also between groups (90).	   Evidence from Traxler’s study also suggests that 
looser enforcement among one specific group results in more evasion, creating 
an externality on the norm strength in other groups. 
Additionally,  when taxpayers identify with their groups as seen by responses 
from taxpayers from gated communities as demonstrated in section 7.3.2, they 
are more likely to comply because compliance signifies that the person is 
trustworthy, honest and reliable (Kornheauser 2007, 613).  Kornhauser  argues 
that when leaders in a group for example, a politician  emphasises compliance, 
this strengthens compliance.  Signalling may also encourage compliance, for 
example, a politician opens up his tax returns or it could be the situation where 
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  2006,	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the tax authority publishes the names of delinquent taxpayers debates 
Kornhauser.  The findings suggest that politicians’ action of non-compliance 
negatively influence taxpayers (section 7.5.1). The author suggests that in order  
to maintain strong social norms, it’s crucial to enforce high levels of tax 
compliance among ‘moral leaders’  or members of a moral reference group as 
discussed in the findings in section 7.3.1. When taxpayers have strong 
connections to a group so much so that they identify with that group, they are 
usually more collectively oriented and are more likely to forego immediate self-
interest for the sake of the public good the author continues.  Thus taxation will 
not be seen as coercion but rather as ‘self-imposed levies, expressions of their 
commitment to the wellbeing of all and the taxpayers identification with the 
group lessens the importance of the fiscal exchange  (Kornhauser 2007) as 
confirmed from results in the finds in section 7.3.2.  Taxpayers’ involvement and 
participation  influence tax morale and compliance.   Generally, tax morale is 
higher in situations where taxpayers are more able to influence tax laws, tax 
rates and the rules in the tax game (Feld and Frey 2002). The authors further 
debate that taxpayers’ increased involvement in the political decision-making  
process not merely by voting, but it amplifies  their view of their civic duty, thus 
making them more compliant.   
3.2.3	  External	  cues	  and	  demographic	  issues	  
The literature suggests that external cues may serve to motivate taxpayers into 
compliance and as such  norms should be phrased positively (Hasseldine and 
Hite 2003; Kornhauser 2007). The authors suggest for example that, reminding 
people that most people comply, reminds taxpayers what the norm is and then 
encourages them to follow.  But they debate that laws communicating how 
many persons are evading may decrease compliance among formerly 
compliant taxpayers and that laws can influence behaviour and activate 
personal norms in various ways.   
According to (Kornhauser 2007) expressive provisions such as shaming may 
signal socially approved behaviour and possess  the ability to shape behaviour 
in increasing compliance but  seems to work best if people are in a group 
setting. However, shaming may backfire if the target of the embarrassment is 
unaffected, communicating to the  taxpayer that the norm is not followed (Dan 
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2006). It is believed that  education increases moral reasoning and higher moral 
reasoning can be taught because education strengthens social norms(Swartz 
1997).  Norms and morality are acquired through socialization as confirmed by 
a tax administrator in section in 7.2.3   and it can  improve positively related tax 
compliance attributes such as honesty, morality, national pride, concern for 
others and fairness  according to (Mazar and Ariely  2006).  
It’s argued by some authors that older people are generally more compliant 
than younger ones (McGee & Tyler 2006) but (Torgler 2006, 87-88)  argues that 
although many studies have found that age increases the level of compliance 
there are still other studies  that have found that age doesn’t matter.   
Taylor (2002)49 also argues that tax morale is not simple to understand, 
debating that taxpayer’s attitudes  change towards the payment of tax  is 
dependent  on the situations they have to face. People sometimes obey the law 
in order to maintain their reputation for being a good type, so legal enforcement 
can be minimal (Posner  2000, 1797) as was confirmed by two taxpayers from 
gated communities (section 7.3.2).  
3.2.4	  Designing	  tax	  compliance	  strategies	  
Seeing there is evidence in the  literature  suggesting  that   taxpayers’ 
compliance  is  not motivated by economic gains only  but may be influenced by 
a multiplicity of other factors, in designing tax compliance policies it’s argued 
that  due regard should be given to social and institutional issues.  Some 
studies suggest that tax administrations should apply measures  both to 
encourage voluntary compliance and deter  evasion (Levi 1988; Hasseldine et 
al 200; McKerchar and Evans 2009)  a strategy called ‘quasi-compliance’ (Levi 
1988).  Both Levi and Hasseldine argue that it’s important to foster voluntary 
compliance as a  tax system will not survive if taxpayers are not willing to 
comply, furthermore when there is no voluntary compliance, enforcement 
becomes too costly (Levi 1988) putting the tax system in deep trouble (Cullis 
and Lewis 1997).  Additionally, (McKerchar and Evans 2009) suggest that 
effective tax administration is critical to improving compliance outcomes, thus 
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   taxpayer	   	   attitudes	   through	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   taxpayer	   	   identities	   IN	  
Taxing	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administrations should endeavour to strengthen their organizational, 
institutional, management structures, build their integrity or legitimacy and 
tackle corruption (183). 
Others suggest that tax strategies should appeal to taxpayer’s sense of moral 
duty  (Grasmick and Scott 1982, Taylor 2002) taxpayers’ civic virtue, 
conscience and other issues rather than only to their self-interest (Alm 1991, 
Mason and Mason 1992, Taylor 2002).  It is also suggested that tax policies 
should also take into consideration fiscal policies and enforcement regimes on 
one side and tax attitudes and fiscal consciousness on the other hand  as they 
are interdependent (Cullis and Lewis 1997, 310). Hasseldine and Hite (2003); 
Kornhauser (2007) suggest that due consideration should be given to external 
cues such as how information to taxpayers is framed as framing affects 
taxpayer’s willingness to comply. How the tax authorities present information 
and how information is  labelled or  how information is presented in the general 
rules to the public affects taxpayers’ reaction influencing  their  compliance.  If 
the tax authority in presenting information to the taxpayers does so in a manner 
to depict the taxpayer as being compliant, then there will be compliance as in  
“prospect theory” (Kornhauser 2007, 609-611). The author suggests that when 
the message is framed in this manner, taxpayers  identify  themselves with the 
nation’s  goals and objectives, motivating them to be tax compliant.  Here, they 
will be more willing to pay their tax even if their tax burdens are more than 
benefits.  The taxpayer may also consider that the reduction in his economic 
status contributes to provision and goods and services for others in the 
community the author debates.  
There is also a school of thought that tax compliance is  a social construction, 
here, people look at the behaviour of others to establish what is reasonable, 
expected and acceptable within their particular social setting (Traxler 2010).  
Additionally, (Frey and Feld 2002) argue that  tax compliance is determined by  
a psychological tax contract between citizens and the tax authorities and for the 
contract to remain in place, there must be incentives such as rewards, 
punishments but loyalties and emotional ties should be considered as well.  
Another view is that people evade tax because it is may be the only avenue 
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through which taxpayers can express their antipathy’ (Torgler  2005, 135) or 
their defiance (Braithwaite 2009).  
In concluding therefore, the combination of issues that influence taxpayers’ 
compliance is  how a taxpayer defines himself in relation to the tax system, the 
tax administration and other groups of taxpayers (Taylor 2002). 
3.2.5	   Profiling	  of	  taxpayers	  
The literature also debate that when designing strategies for enforcement and 
compliance, it is helpful to know the profile of the taxpaying population. In other 
words it is good to know what drives or motivates taxpayers’ behaviour. 
In this regard (Cullen and Lewis 1997, 307)  posit three taxpayer classifications 
based on the  (Kelman 1965 and Vogel 1974)50 model: the complier, the 
identifier and the internalizer.  The complier they argue is motivated to comply 
out of fear and the attendant consequences of not paying.  Those categorised 
as identifiers are influenced to comply based on the social norms, beliefs and 
behaviours of people close to them or important to them.  Finally, those 
taxpayers who are characterised as  internalizers are those who are motivated 
to pay because of their belief system based on their morals (ibid).  
With the respective typologies, it’s expected that the tax authorities would then 
be in a better position to  craft strategies for compliance and enforcement.  But 
why is this is so important to know the typology of the taxpayer or what 
motivates tax morale?  Tax evasion is different from any other illegal activities; it 
is interconnected to fiscal policy which affects a government’s ability to carry out 
its economic policy” (Cowell 1999, Cummings et al 2004,1) affecting its ability to 
provide public goods and services.  It’s not a only revenue issue and it’s tied to 
civil order (Knack an Keefer 1997, Cummings  et al 2004) as well.  It’s about 
people’s attitude and behaviour. Thus, the suggestion is for tax evasion policy 
to be seen not only in the light of just increasing penalties as this may not be 
good as it may backfire and may unwittingly lead to more corruption and bribe 
posit (Cullen and Lewis 1997). It’s  therefore important to develop policies which 
understand the behaviour and attitudes of the taxpayer. If tax compliance 
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  Lewis	  1997,	  Journal	  of	  Economic	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  18	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  312.	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attitude is based on social issues and culture then policies should be developed 
along those lines they suggest.  
Vázquez-Caro and Bird (2011) debate that  tax administrators’ engagement in 
risk management works as a tool in understanding taxpayers. They perceive 
that as tax administrators learn more about taxpayers, taxpayers will eventually 
learn that they will be caught in carrying out their evasive tactics.  This was 
evident in Brazil’s  engagement  of risk management and its use significantly 
increased administrators’ performance	  	  (Pinhanez 2008,	  Bird and Vázquez-Caro 
2011). 
3.	  2.6	  Responsive	  regulation	  
Braithwaite (2002)  has moved beyond the realm of the three typologies of the 
taxpayers suggesting instead that tax enforcement strategies should be 
designed in response to assumed postures  or attitude of the  taxpayer towards 
the tax authority, the responsive regulation model (see Figure 3.1). In this 
model, the authorities start with the assumption that taxpayers are cooperative, 
but if it proves that this isn’t  the case, then the authority escalates its actions 
with punitive measures until compliance is achieved with the objective of 
voluntary compliance, and mutual respect between the taxpayers and the 
authority (Gracia and Oats 2012) A graphical presentation of the model 
demonstrated below.       
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Figure 3.1 Enforcement strategies	  
Adapted from Taxing Democracy p3 –  A new approach to tax compliance 
Braithwaite (2002).  
3.3	   Property	  tax	  administration	  	  
This study concerns itself with property tax, thus the following sections provide 
an overview of the tax, its definition and features, taxpayers’ perception, its role 
and relevance, its administration,  enforcement and compliance.  
According to Bird and Slack (2002, 27) ‘property tax administration is more 
dependent on tax administration than any other tax.  This is so they argue 
because  the extent to which  property taxes are administered influences the 
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generation of property tax revenues along with their efficiency and equity.’ 
Accordingly, poor tax administration maybe  an impediment to implementing the 
property tax measures resulting in incomplete cadastres, low collections and in 
some cases, non-existent enforcement which all result in low revenues: good 
tax administration is important for the production of revenues (Bahl and Bird 
2008); even though the best administrations may not be the ones that produce 
the highest revenues as conceded by (McKerchar and  Evans 2009).  Property 
tax administration comprises three main areas: enforcement and compliance, 
valuation and assessment and the management  of the tax (Dillinger 1988; 
Bahl; Ellis, Kopanyi and Lee 2006).  This thesis addresses two of those areas of 
administration- enforcement and compliance along with its management.  
Valuation and assessment could the subject of further study. 
Those general issues relating  to enforcement and compliance: tax  morale, 
social norms, designing tax enforcement strategies,  external cues, responsive 
regulation which are already discussed in sections 3.2.1. to 3.2.6; those issues 
that are relevant to property tax enforcement only are discussed in section 3.3.5 
This direction is taken because it’s assumed that taxpayers are driven by similar 
motivations regardless of the tax type, thus it’s important for the discussions to 
take place within this general context.  But at the same some  due cognisance 
should be given to it in that it’s a local tax. The literature therefore argues that 
special consideration should be given to issues such as rate setting (Powers 
2008)  having an updated valuation roll, a successful  billing system  which 
determines the definition of liability and the mechanics of producing a bill 
(Dillinger 1988; 1992: Youngman 1996); a good payment administration and 
collection system (McCluskey and Franzsen 2005; Ellis, Koyanyi and Lee 2006) 
and  strategies to ensure enforcement and compliance (Dillinger 1988, 1992)  
which will be discussed in section 3.3.5.  
3.3.1	  Definition	  and	  features	  of	  the	  property	  tax 
Property tax is a recurrent tax imposed on both real and personal property 
(Cameron 1999). It’s the ‘oldest form of tax in the public finance system  and 
has features of old and new philosophies’ (Hale 1985, 382). It was used in	  
Egypt, Babylon, Persia, and China and throughout the ancient world with land 
and production value being its main motive (Carlson 2005).  Bird, Slack and 
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Tassonyi (2012) also confirm that it’s a ‘well established tax that yields 
substantial revenue…its base is immobile and easily accessible to and 
verifiable by local authorities’, (224).  There is a difference around the world as 
to what it’s called and the base that is used.51 For example, in the United 
Kingdom it’s  called council rate (Bird and Slack 2010) but in Jamaica although 
it’s a tax on land, it is called property tax. It’s  ‘a good local tax’ (Bird, Slack, 
Tassonyi 2012, 224)  because of its potential to be a great source of revenue 
for local governments (Franzsen and McLuskey 2005;	   Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008) and its management may be local/subnational or national.  Bird, Slack 
and Tassonyi (2012, 224)  argue that it’s not ‘simply a law’, but that it’s  a 
‘system comprising the relevant laws and regulations and how they are 
administered with its structure and operation  reflecting the  larger political 
institutions as well as the particular interactions of the central and local 
government,   the creator’s ideologies  of  the economic and political outcomes 
of alternative property tax policies’.  Paugam (1999), Ellis, Kopanyi and Lee 
(2006, 31) also suggest that it’s not merely a technical instrument, but a 
substantial revenue factor with strong financial, institutional, and political 
connotations.  
Hale (1985) articulates that the property tax is  a legacy of 17th century 
revolutions,  ‘an unjustified relic of the middle ages which has unaccountably 
survived into modern time but gives an insight into the purpose of the state and 
public financing’.  Hale also debates that it has ‘mystified economists for years, 
as it carries a  legal façade, but conceals a very different tax  behind it  with the  
trappings of the  old time traits shrouded by the system of decentralization, 
informal and illegal assessment procedures…and… that there is a challenge as 
there is  confusion between the “legal” and the “real” property’ (381). One of the  
commonly held views is property tax is a tax on capital and when it falls on 
houses, it’s a tax on services (Bird and Slack 2002). 
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3.3.2	  Taxpayers’	  perception	  of	  tax	  
The property tax is perceived as a stable and reliable source of income with its 
property values not inclined to change in the short run (Hale 1985; IAAO 2004).  
Administratively the tax system is seen as open and visible because taxpayers 
are able to view their assessments along with the assessment of others (IAAO, 
2004, 45) which promotes accountability and openness. The tax is difficult to 
evade because it’s secured by immovable property and it’s simple and 
straightforward to operate with little economic distortions if land is the base (Bell 
1999). 
Some see the property tax as  ‘inherently arbitrary, inelastic, making it unique 
and different from other taxes due to its visibility, inelasticity of its base and it’s 
based on stock, not on flows as other taxes’ (Bird  and Slack 2006 , 16). Some 
taxpayers view the tax as being a fair and an effective method of raising 
revenue but on the other hand it may be seen as unfair and  regressive 
(Youngman 2002, Bird 2003, 44).  In some countries it comes across as a 
complex form of taxation because of the ‘difficulties in implementation, its costly 
administrative costs and its unpopularity amongst taxpayers’ (Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2011, 2).  Despite these issues, the property tax continues to 
be a main source of funding for local jurisdictions (Bird and Slack 2006) and it 
would appear that it will be a mainstay local tax for the future.  Hale (1985, 383)  
attributes its  survival  on account of its primitive puzzling nature. The traits of 
reliability, stability, predictability, longevity and its immovable tax base make it 
an attractive choice for  local government funding globally (Bird, Slack and 
Tassonyi 2012).  In Jamaica the findings suggest that some interviewees 
perceived the property tax as being the ‘lifeblood’ of the local authorities while 
others viewed the tax as unimportant. 
The question is what should be the role and how relevant is the property tax? 
3.3.3	   Role	  and	  	  relevance	  of	  the	  property	  tax	  	  
Property tax commenced as  a means  to measure land owners’ obligations  
evolving  through the ages to become the basis for measuring other types of 
property (Hale 1985). But Hale advocates that it has outgrown its economic 
sense because land is no longer seen as the main measure of wealth as 
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property currently has many permutations (Seligman 1895, 383, Hale 1985).  
This he believes accounts for the increasing insignificance of property tax 
revenues in some countries.  For example, the author argues that in the USA, 
its significance as a source of national income  reduced from  41.6% in 1902 to 
6.4% in 1981.  However, (Gaffney 1970, 10)  argues that the different 
permutations  are merely ‘layers of ownership and are not additional assets, but 
additional claims on the same assets…suggesting that assets like stocks and 
bonds are just paper…corporate income is property income and most corporate 
property is taxable real estate property’. 
Seeing that its role as national revenue earner is insignificant, Hale argues that 
it’s income that should be taxed and not wealth, because property  is a store of 
wealth and income is a flow.  However, despite its insignificance as a national 
revenue earner and attempts to  abolish it, it remains, as it is believed, that ‘an 
old tax is a good tax’ (383): when a tax is old, it carries a ‘deep reservoir of 
public acceptance’ (ibid), and its removal would lead to too many problems 
(Netzer 1966; Hale 1985, 384). Furthermore, because it’s  a main source of 
revenue for local governments  and its base grows much faster than GNP, there 
is reluctance to have it removed (Netzer 1966, Hale 1985, 384). Bahl, Martinez-
Vazquez and Youngman  (2008) debate that  the property tax’s  huge and fast 
increasing base, makes its income dynamic and revenue-income elastic. The 
property tax is criticized by some economists for its ‘lack of sound theoretical 
justification’ (Seligman 1895, Hale 1985, 383).  Testimony to this, he argues is 
that property tax  was not kept by all countries but remained a main source of 
revenue for local governments especially in English speaking countries.  Since 
the time of Hale’s 1985 assertion most of  the countries in the Eastern Block  
since abandoning the socialist or communist ideology have embraced the 
property tax as a source of local revenue.52   Additionally, The Republic of 
Ireland after not  embracing the property tax  for a number of years reintroduced 
it.   
The question has been asked as to what role the property tax should play.  
There  appears to be  no ‘textbook’ suggestion to this question,  so its  role 
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  The	  ownership	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  have	  changed	  from	  state	  owned	  to	  privately	  owned.	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seems to vary from country to country and from period to period based on the 
prevailing politics and the current tax policy of the particular government with 
the literature  highlighting divergent views.  At one spectrum of the debate, it is 
posited that it should be ‘designed primarily to raise revenue’ (Dillinger 1988; 
Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman 2008, 5) a position normally held by the 
revenue authorities. At the other end, a perspective held by planners, that it 
should be used as a regulatory device to determine ‘land use and urban 
development (Bird and Slack 2006, 5-6; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008 ). According 
to (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman 2008, 5).   ‘…any instrument that 
taxes land has a great potential to influence social policy and economic 
decisions’. Australia and New Zealand in the early years of British colonization, 
used property tax  as a social and political instrument: a device to break-up the 
large estates and to encourage settlement and development (Daunton 2007).53  
But in the earlier years, Heaton (1925) argues Australia used it as  a revenue 
raising tool obtained unearned increment for the community. In the USA it’s  an 
economic device, primarily raising revenue for local counties and towns 
‘accounting for 72% of all local revenues’ (Shan 2010, 195). But (Shan 2010) 
suggests that the tax may carry  social motives in that it may affect the mobility 
of some homeowners. Jamaica’s introduction of the property tax in 1806 under 
British colonization carried a  revenue motive (Harris 2006) but  later changed to 
the twin objective of being  a revenue and political oriented stratagem in 
1957(Copes and Rybeck 2000).54 A policy change in 1993 shifted its motive to a 
benefit tax with its purpose to cover three local services: streetlight, garbage 
and community beautification (Policy 1993).  
Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, Youngman (2008) argue that where the tax   is  
‘primarily a revenue raising instrument, the administration should ensure that 
this function  carries minimal effects on economic choices’, giving due 
consideration for it to be used as policy tool for rural development. If used as a 
policy tool, the suggestion is for the ‘bottom-up approach of governance’ but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  See	  (Daunton,	  Martin	  2007,	  143)	  Tax	  transfers:	  Britain	  and	  its	  Empire,	  1848-­‐1914	  IN	  Global	  Debates	  
About	  Taxation	  (Nehring	  and	  Schui	  2007)	  
54	  See	  note	  7	  
78	  
	  
they  have doubts whether this is feasible in that this method of governance 
may create a conundrum in deciding on expenditures  along with its 
enforceability. For these authors the answer lies in the use of the ‘top-down’ 
approach but they  perceive this  approach makes the property tax unworkable 
in rural areas.  
The  tax if used as a policy tool (Dillinger 1988); (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Youngman 2008) may either have an  allocative or distributional objective.   
Allocative purposes achieve social, political or economic purposes. For 
example, the tax maybe used to encourage intensive development of urban 
land, or encourage home ownership, or even  to attract new industry.  In the 
case of  a distributional  motive,  then its purpose  is distinctly social, i.e. wealth 
redistribution.  Here,   they argue that it attempts to shift the burden of the tax to 
a higher income  group in their capacity as property owners or businessmen, 
.i.e. shifting the burden off the poor.  The government uses the rate structure, 
the tax base or exemptions to achieve these goals.  If land alone is taxed, then 
the motive is allocative (Dillinger 1988).   In Jamaica,  land alone is taxed 
(Andelson 1957) suggesting that the motive is allocative but on the other hand 
the 1993 policy determines that the tax should cover services, functioning as a  
benefit tax (Policy1993). 
In developing countries, historically, the property tax role has been that of a 
revenue raiser (Bird and Slack 2006) with it being the most important source of 
own source revenues (Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011, 2) for local 
authorities. This has been so because  local governments are increasingly 
called upon to provide improved services for a growing urban population.  It not 
only provides the revenues for the services needed but it actually determines  
the nature  and quality of local services  offered,  in that it ‘shapes the physical 
and social character of city-regions’ (Bird and Slack 2007, 729). It’s argued that  
that social and economic interactions are increased when there are large 
numbers of people and businesses in any one place as this coexistence 
encourages the exchange of ideas in different areas (Bird and Slack 2008). The 
property tax funds services in these regions (McCluskey and Franzsen  2005; 
Bahl and Cyan 2009;  Bahl 2010), directly facilitating  these social and 
economic interactions. Thus, according to the authors huge urban areas are 
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able to have this critical mass to attract and support high degrees of 
specialisation in labour, knowledge, businesses, services, infrastructure, 
institutions and media because of the property tax.  If municipalities are to retain 
their competitiveness and preserve this critical mass, it’s important for them to 
provide reasonably good social services which are normally funded by property 
tax revenues, they further argue.  
However doubt is sometimes expressed about the sufficiency of revenues to 
provide such services (Rakodi 2003). In light of what the property tax can do, 
it’s  critical for municipalities to have  governance structures in place so as to 
have  reliable, predictable and sufficient revenues to provide and sustain  good 
social services the literature suggests.  Reliance on the property tax  also 
contributes to local autonomy and transparency and thus its argued that  local 
governments have exclusive rights to the use of property tax contributing  to its 
effectiveness to its role in promoting local autonomy (Bell, Brunori55 and 
Youngman 2010, 3). 
3.3.4	   Revenue	  performance	  of	  property	  tax	  
Despite the laudable features of the property tax; its potential to raise revenues 
to support local services in order to develop and maintain  the critical mass of 
people for the development of social interactions; it  appears that the tax is 
unable to produce the revenues in order to  contribute to the fulfilment of these 
subsidiary objectives  particularly in developing countries, (Bahl 2009;  Mou 
1996, McCluskey and Franzsen 2005). In  OECD countries property tax 
revenues represent 2% to 4% of GDP; while in developing and transnational 
countries it’s an average yield of 0.6% of GDP (Bird 2009, 1-3).  In  Jamaica 
property tax revenues accounted for  0.23%  of GDP in 2004 or 1% of total 
revenues (Sjoquist 2007) decreasing to 0.1% of GDP in 2009 (Cornia and 
Walters 2010).   Various suggestions have been put forward as to why 
revenues have been this low.  
Some of these issues and hypotheses include  ‘a...lack of financial and 
technical means to assemble accurate, comprehensive and updated 
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  Property	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cadastres…the arrangement  of incentives in the decentralization system’ 
(Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011, 2);  ‘...human resource 
shortage…titling issues…unreliable data on sales of property, politics of 
imposing and enforcing the laws…social engineering of the tax…political 
pressure from wealthy individuals…’ (Bahl 2009, 16-21) ‘…the coverage of the 
tax is not comprehensive, assessments are low as are nominal tax rates and 
collections….rate increases difficult… most visible of taxes difficult to sell 
politically’ (Bird and Slack 2006, 5); ‘poor policy and poor administration’,	  
(Dillinger 1992, 5);	   (Bahl 2009); ‘…incomplete tax roll and poor assessment 
practices’ (Gaffney 1976, 170); ‘…high administration costs which limits its 
earning capacity even in countries with good administrative systems’ (Bird and 
Slack 2010).  
But, Bahl and Wallace (2008) theorize that its poor performance is influenced by  
taxpayers’ perception of the unfairness of the tax.  Boyd (2011, 640)  in a review 
of the  property tax in the USA reported that the  opinion polls cast the tax ‘as 
the worst or least fair tax’. Brunori (2003),	  Slack (2010, 4),   posit that the tax is 
regarded  by taxpayers as ‘most hated’ due to its visibility. Its visibility influences 
taxpayers’ voting by encouraging them to block legislation relating to increase  
property tax or on the other hand, those with economic means and skills may 
use legal ways of reducing their tax obligations (Bird, Slack, Tassonyi 2012, 
225). But on the other hand some taxpayers are unaware of what the tax does.  
Bahl and Cyan (2011) suggest that the lack of  decentralization (in developing 
countries) inhibits the revenue earning capacity of the tax with (Bahl 2009) 
suggesting  that it works best as a local tax.  Mikesell (2003), Rühling (2006) 
argue that property tax not only would increase if there’s decentralization but it 
‘stands a better chance of bringing the population into the system, thus creating 
a compliance tradition that would an administration impose on them from a 
distant capital’ (2). Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) in underscoring the 
importance of decentralization suggest that more countries are considering 
decentralization as a means of making the property tax an  independent source 
of revenue for their local governments. Rühling (2006) argues that the  lack of 
decentralization creates the need for  transfers. Transfers he argues may cause 
non-maximization of property tax revenues.   Furthermore, when transfers are 
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made,  they tend to make the system inefficient because they don’t  do as well 
as they should he argues.  This in itself creates a  morale hazard in that the 
transfers contribute to the situation where local government might not see the 
need to work diligently for the property tax to perform at its best.   
In a bid to increase property tax revenues, governments from time to time  have 
embarked on property tax reforms (Kelly 2000). But (Bird and Slack 2006)  state 
that successful property tax reform carries a number of preconditions one of  
which is  taxpayers’ support.  He argues that buy-in from taxpayers will only 
happen if they perceive that the service is good and that the property tax 
system is ‘fair and accountable’ (27). The Brazilian tax reform in Belo Horizonte 
in 2009 (Domingos 2011) provides confirmation that taxpayers’ ‘buy in’ is critical 
to the success of any property tax reform process.56 Domingos (2011) states 
that the reform concentrated on paying ‘attention to soothing the taxpayer and 
focused its attention on what really matters’. The author further states that 
revenues not only increased but the municipality through engagement with their 
taxpayers experienced a 26.69% in advanced property tax payments.  This was 
a demonstration of the taxpayers’ acceptance of both the tax and the system.  
On the other hand, Canada’s property tax reform in Ontario ‘introduced in 1998 
following 30 years of commissions and reports’ (Bird and Slack 2002, 34) was 
not well received by the taxpayers.  The nature of Canadian reform was that it 
dealt with assessment issues and policy changes. Such policy changes related 
to the municipalities being able to set their rates based on the property classes 
(Bird and Slack 2002). Whilst there is consensus that the Ontario reform  was 
successful in implementing a province-wide market property tax reform, the 
‘reform did not improve either the economic efficiency or the political 
acceptability of the property tax as the major source of local revenue’ (Bird, 
Slack,  Tassonyi 2012, 3).57  This view by the authors underscore the need that 
property tax reform should address not only technical and procedural issues but 
also pay special attention to the taxpayers in the process.  
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Another view expressed for increasing revenues is to take special note of its 
features:  property tax being the unique tax that it, requires that its paradigm 
takes cognizance of the unique features of the jurisdiction for which it’s 
intended, the concept of the one all fits all cannot work with a general property  
tax model  (Bird and Slack 2006; Bahl 2009). 
3.3.5	   Property	  enforcement,	  billing	  and	  collection 
Dillinger (1988) suggests that property tax revenue production is dependent on 
effective enforcement along with the billing of the taxpayer,  the tax authority’s 
legal obligation of advising the taxpayers of their obligations. Bahl and Martinez-
Vazquez (2008); Bird (2011) posit that  property tax is  difficult to enforce but 
(Dillinger 1988) argues that this maybe so because  enforcement strategies are 
often overlooked.  Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) further debate that 
enforcement is sometimes hampered by inadequate strategies or  the process 
may be influenced by the relationship between enforcers and local politicians.  
The literature suggest a number of strategies to enhance enforcement some of 
which include use of the powers as contained in the law, like foreclosures and 
seizures, sale at auctions, use of clearance certificates,  increasing accessibility 
of collection points   or by making the process more corruption proof (Kelly 
1995, Rao 2008, Bahl 2009) or to offer collection incentives  (Domingos 2011). 
Senegal uses penalties and seizures (Monkam 2011a), but on the other hand  
Brazil  doesn’t practice confiscation methods (DeCesare 2004).  According to 
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2008) some  countries consider seizures too 
extreme and or unfeasible because of the political consequences that  may 
arise or because of special attachment taxpayers may have to land.  Cornia and 
Walters (2010) argue that there are no consequences for non-payment of  
property tax in Jamaica and call for the reform of the various laws to enable the 
court system to be more supportive of property tax collections.  Bahl (2009) 
suggests that if governments were to systematically apply the property tax laws, 
simplify the tax, making its liability more transparent or even publishing the 
names of evaders in newspapers, or imposing draconian measures on 
taxpayers such as tying their payment to electricity supply as obtains in El 
Salvador and South Africa and using banks as collection points would make 
people more compliant thus increasing the performance of the tax. 
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Collections may be centrally or locally managed.  In the Punjab collections are 
centralised and revenues are paid to the local authorities, a model which seems 
common in Europe (Ellis, Koyanyi and Lee 2006).  According to the authors, 
although the legal framework changed in the Punjab for collections to take place 
locally, this activity reverted to the central government because of the 
perception of  the local authorities’ apparent lack of capacity to execute this 
function.   
Bahl (2009) suggests that when collections are assigned to local governments, 
they aren’t vigorous enough with enforcement especially on large property 
owners who may be politically powerful.  On the other hand when collections 
are centrally managed but revenues are shared with local governments, there is 
little incentive for strict enforcement he posits.  Additionally, low compliance 
may result from taxpayers perceiving that the tax is unfair and their 
unawareness of how the tax works (Bahl 2009).  Bahl also suggests that  there 
are  challenges with  large taxpayers exploiting the system because of an 
overworked court system as obtains in Jamaica (Cornia and Walters 2010).  
Typically, collections in developing and transition economies are low sometimes 
as low as 15% but nevertheless higher in Latin American countries with 
municipalities in Bogota boasting a rate of  90% (De Cesare 2004, Bahl 
2009,19).58 Jamaica’s collection rate was 41% in 2009 (Cornia and Walters 
2010).	    Bahl attributes the low collections to weak enforcement, small penalties, 
high administrative and compliance costs and who has responsibility for 
collections. Bahl further argues that when collections are localised, there’s 
usually hesitancy to collect from wealthy connected persons.  On the other 
hand, he debates, when central government is responsible and shares with the 
local authorities, then there’s not much motivation to enforce. He also proffers 
some reasons for low compliance: the taxpayer thinks the tax is inequitable or 
doesn’t know how it works; in the case of large taxpayers, they may exploit the 
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legal system by using the appeal process which they might find appealing 
because   during the appeal no upfront tax payments are required or in other 
situations they may exploit the slow court system because the court may not 
have expert knowledge on tax and land matters to bring issues to resolution 
(Bahl 2009).   
Resource constraints may also influence enforcement, billings and collections 
as obtained in countries in East and southern African countries (Franzsen, 
2002; Bird and Rodriguez 1999, McClusky and Franzsen 2005).  Another issue  
may be the lack of information flow between some stakeholders as evidenced in 
the findings (Konyimbih, 1995, McCLuskey and Franzsen 2001)	  (section 7.4.3).  
3.4	   Fiscal	  decentralization	  	  
Fiscal decentralization has been posited as one of the means to increase 
property tax revenues (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  It’s  debated that 
countries who pursue     fiscal decentralization  spend more through  their  local 
government and are more reliant on property tax revenues to finance these 
expenditures (Smoke 2001; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2008).   If there’s to be 
effective fiscal decentralization, then there has  to be a local tax and property 
tax  is long regarded as a tax that fits the characteristics of this local tax (Bahl 
and Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  But (Smoke 2001) suggests  that reluctance by 
some  countries to fiscally decentralise,  makes the future of the property tax 
tenuous.  Nevertheless, developed countries like USA and Canada have taken 
tax decentralization quite far but in many other countries, particularly low-
income countries and those in transition, it  hasn’t been an important part of 
their decentralization strategy according to (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2008). 
This difference they argue  is usually explained by tax administration capacity, 
historical traditions of centralization, and macroeconomic policy concerns they 
continue. However  (Bahl and Cyan 2011, 264) argue that the story is much 
more complicated and there is much still to be learned about why governments 
make the revenue assignment decisions they do. This study seeks to provide 
insights into some of those issues which are discussed in the findings in chapter 
6.  
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But what is fiscal decentralization? Decentralization is the devolution by central 
(i.e., national) government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, 
political, and economic attributes that these entail, to regional and local (i.e., 
state/provincial and municipal) governments that are independent of the centre 
within given geographic and functional domains (Manor 1999, Faguet and 
Sanchez 2008, Faguet 2014, 3).  Or on the other hand, it’s  the reconstitution of 
government from the top-down approach i.e. the hierarchical  bureaucratic 
mechanism, to local government characterized by participation, cooperation, 
transparency and accountability of public servants’ behaviour (Faguet 2014, 1). 
The World Bank outlines political, administrative, fiscal, and market 
decentralization as the main types of decentralization positing that these  may 
appear in different forms and combinations across countries, within countries 
and even within sectors.  Whilst each aspect of decentralization may be further 
explained and broken out, for the purpose of this study, it be will limited to  fiscal 
decentralization.   
Thus, fiscal decentralization is  the passing of fiscal power  or budgetary power 
to subnational government  i.e. any level of government  below the centre to 
make taxing and spending decisions (Bahl 2008, 20). In the Jamaican context it 
would be  the passing of power to the local authorities or to municipalities to 
make both taxing and spending decisions. Bahl suggests that fiscal 
decentralization comes with empowerment of people by virtue of their local 
governments being empowered. Bird and Vaillancourt  (1999, 3) posit that there 
are varying degrees of  fiscal decentralization with each method corresponding 
to the extent of independence of decision–making exercised at the local level  
and list the following types: de-concentration, delegation and devolution. 
 De-concentration  is the ‘dispersion of responsibilities within a central 
government to regional branch offices or local administrative units while  
delegation is the scenario in which local government acts as agents for central 
government.  Finally, devolution is the situation in which not only there’s 
implementation but also the authority to decide on what is done in the hands of 
the local government’ (ibid).  Devolution is the complete localization of functions 
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and responsibility of the property tax and for the purpose of the study, the use of     
fiscal decentralization equates to devolution. 
Wolman et al (2010) suggests  that fiscal decentralization isn’t equal to local 
autonomy but a component of it.  Wolman (2008), Wolman et al (2010, 71)59 
argue that whereas local autonomy addresses ‘the role local government plays 
in relation to the national economy and the intergovernmental system, the 
capacity of the local government  to engage in activities as it sees fit and 
whether it has the resources to carry out the activities… fiscal decentralization 
on the other hand is not a sufficient condition for local government but there can 
be fiscal decentralization without local autonomy’. This study concerns itself 
with fiscal decentralization within the context of local autonomy and primarily 
looks at the property tax. According to  (Brunori and Bell 2010, 260) property 
taxes are fundamental to local autonomy mainly because there are no viable 
alternatives to raising revenues.  One  of the arguments posited for 
decentralising the property tax is that property tax revenue performance tends 
to improve under expenditure decentralization (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez 2008). 
But it’s argued by some authors that there might not be increased revenues. 
The decision to localise the property tax is a key issue in a country’s 
decentralization policy (Bird and Slack 2002). But due consideration has to be 
given to the local management of the  tax because its complex administration 
demands significant managerial and professional capacity sometimes 
necessitating the sharing of responsibilities by local and national government in 
some countries particularly developing countries (Ellis, Kopanyi and Lee 2006), 
concluding that a local authority’s ability to manage the tax locally is dependent 
on its size and staffing  capacities. Although some countries make  
pronouncements, plans, and even political promises, there has been no rush to 
grant state and local governments significant taxing powers and increased 
expenditure autonomy’ (Bahl 2008, 9).  Jamaica is one such country. 
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3.4.1	   Drivers	  and	  benefits	  of	  fiscal	  decentralization	  	  
The literature suggests that fiscal decentralization has been one of the  most 
important reforms in recent times (Manor 1999, Faguet 2014)  with countries 
showing  renewed global interest as they  seek to re-examine the roles of the 
various tiers of government, their relationships with civil society and private 
sector partnership (Shah 2005; Arzaghi and Henderson 2005; Faguet 2014) 
and also in a bid to improve governance (Faguet 2014). The literature argues 
that one of the benefits of  fiscal decentralisation  is increased property tax 
revenues resulting from the development of a tax compliance tradition as the 
local management of the tax ‘stands a better chance of bringing the population 
into the system’ as this would probably prove to be quite challenging for a 
centrally managed property  administration system (Mikesell 2003, Rühling 
2006, 2).  Guth, Levati and Sausgrubber (2005) also confirms that localization 
may  improve tax morale.   
As populations migrate to urban areas with increased demand for services, 
fiscal decentralization provides the opportunity to reinforce local government 
involving  it more closely (Shah 1994,  McCluskey and Franzsen 2005) in the 
provision and delivery of demanded services. Having increased property tax 
revenues would go a long way in providing these needed services.  This makes 
the localisation of the tax   a critical issue in many developing countries  (Manor 
1999,  World Bank 1999, Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000; McCluskey and 
Franzsen 2005).  Additionally, fiscal decentralisation brings  other  expected 
benefits  such as enhanced transparency, accountability, probity, frugality, 
efficiency and equity (McCluskey and Franzsen 2005) improved accessibility, 
local responsibility, and the effectiveness of government (Bird and Vaillancourt 
1999) and increased citizen voice (Fauget 2012, 2014) all of which contribute to 
increased tax morale as discussed earlier on in section 3.2.1.  Under 
appropriate conditions, it can assist in simplifying complex bureaucratic 
procedures and alleviate the decision-making bottlenecks that are caused by 
central government planning (Robinson and Stiedl 2001). 
Fiscal decentralization is conventionally debated from an economic perspective  
drawing heavily on the fiscal federalism theorem (Musgrave 1959, Smoke 
2001).  The tenets of the theory are that the public sector’s main purpose is to 
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provide stability, distribute and allocate goods and services and that these 
functions can be shared among decentralised units or different tiers of 
government. Traditionally, central government is given the  responsibility of 
stabilization and distribution  while allocation is assigned to local government 
based on the demand for local public services (Smoke 2001).  
At this level, services may not be uniform, thus local governments may be able 
to give their own ‘unique’ service to their locals he argues. Smoke continues 
that in this situation, residents would choose their mix of public goods and taxes 
based on their preferences suggesting that local governments would be more 
innovative in providing the goods and services ultimately leading to improved 
resource productivity. An extension of this argument is that people will move to 
jurisdictions where local government has their preferred mix of services (Tiebout 
1956) resulting in a market-like solution to local services.  An equilibrium 
position will be reached when people distribute themselves across the different 
jurisdictions when there’s  no longer any enticement to move (Smoke 2001, 6). 
There are some exceptions to these rules in the provision of services and these 
are where there are large capital intensive services such as, transportation, 
electricity, transportation where it is felt that if controlled from the centre there 
will be economies of scale debates Smoke.  Additionally, the provision of some 
services like road and water may lead to externalities.  Smoke further argues 
that the welfare gains from establishing lower tiers of government to provide 
public services must be evaluated against the institutional and the transaction 
costs in having more smaller jurisdictions.  He advocates that it’s better to have 
policies that have the same effect.   
Thus according to Smoke where local governments are assigned allocative 
duties  it should be supported by a revenue  system where local taxes are 
neutral in their effect on economic behaviour supported by the following four  
conditions: 
• Benefits and costs of local taxes are clear to those for whom services are 
provided 
• The pattern of local incidence of local taxes should meet the basic equity 
standards 
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• Administration and compliance costs should be minimised 
• Local tax bases should be immobile (as much as is possible) supported 
by central government policies in relation to transfers; service standards 
and finally the criteria for revenue assignment.  
The decision therefore to be decentralised including  becoming fiscally 
decentralised  is a deliberate policy issue on the part of government. Although a 
deliberate part on the action of the government, (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 
2006) suggest (based on studies)  that countries  don’t  necessarily have a 
clearly defined path but rather do what they think best.   Indonesia, Tanzania, 
India and Russia and Mexico, are examples of countries that have 
decentralised regimes but their path to decentralization has been different (Bahl 
and Martinez-Vazquez 2006) with Indonesia taking the  ‘big bang’ approach 
state the authors.  
3.4.2	   Assessment	  of	  	  	  	  	  fiscal	  decentralization	  
Bird and Vaillancourt (1999) argue that it is difficult to assess     fiscal 
decentralization in any particular setting because of the challenges  in deciding 
what is good     fiscal decentralization because this has to be weighed against  
government’s intended objectives or goals: whether the goal is to achieve the 
central government’s aim of improving national welfare or  to improve local 
welfare.  The two approaches yield different results and according to the 
authors a government  will  unlikely choose to implement  a strategy to achieve 
both goals.   This, they debate inevitably leads to conflicts between central and 
local governments.  Whilst decentralising brings with it improved accessibility, 
local responsibility, and the effectiveness of government on one hand, on the 
other hand, it may lead to increased expenditure, something which the central 
government may dislike they debate.  
Thus, deciding on which goal is to be chosen has far reaching implications for     
fiscal decentralization. The authors suggest that whilst the top-down approach 
seems to be the preferred choice in developing countries, government seeks to 
reassert macroeconomic control and to secure adequate resources for the 
central government to achieve such objectives as developing interregional 
infrastructure (Bird and Vaillancourt 1999, 5) as was the situation in China.  The 
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authors suggest that developing nations have had concerns on the matter of 
decentralization that it may impact and  undermine the national stability of the 
country and it may not improve local service delivery as well.   
The concern is even greater in an environment where there is lack of local 
revenue mobilisation and doubt that the local authorities are able to carry out 
expenditure responsibilities for example as with the situation in Argentina in the 
1980s (5). According to Bird and Vaillancourt when countries decentralize more 
expenditure responsibilities than revenues resources, services will likely fall or 
the local authorities press for more transfers, or more loans, or both as was the 
case in the Russian Federation (Wallich 1994, Bird and Vaillancourt 1999).  But 
it’s equally argued that if more revenues are decentralized than expenditures, 
local revenue mobilisation creates macroeconomic imbalances as happened in  
countries like Colombia and Brazil. 
There’s  also the fear that if revenues and expenditures are balanced, then the 
local authorities might not have the administrative nor technical  capacity to 
successfully manage as obtained in Morocco and Tunisia.   
3.4.3	  Fiscal	  decentralization	  in	  practice	  and	  associated	  challenges	  
As earlier discussed, the decision concerning fiscal decentralization is one of 
policy.  But (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006)  suggest, governments  rarely 
develop a defined path of fiscal decentralization but rather do things 
haphazardly or intuitively. This itself creates problems like lengthening the 
process, or taking decisions that run against the vein of the decentralization 
process.  The authors developed a conceptual framework for implementation of 
a fiscal decentralization policy61. The following sections seek to highlight some 
challenges that have arisen in some governments’ attempts to fiscally 
decentralize some of which may be attributable to their piecemeal approach. 
Inadequacy of the tax base: Bird (2011)  articulates  that a desirable feature of a 
local tax is that it should be able to yield sufficient revenues to meet the local 
needs.  Brueckner (2009, 23) confirms Bird’s point by debating  that a lack of 
adequate tax capacity (especially at the local level) often prevents local 
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governments from funding expenditures out of their own revenues.  It’s  
therefore desirable that if the property tax is to be localized then it should be 
able to raise adequate funds to cover the designated services.  But on the other 
hand increasing revenues to the extent to get enough money to  support the 
services may not be such a good idea as this action may run counter to central 
government’s tax raising   policy argues (Brueckner, 2009) as evidenced in the 
findings (section 6.4.4). 
Bird (2011) further debates that many  emerging countries face high costs in 
property tax  administration, compliance in addition to other costs which may 
arise from allocation inefficiencies of scarce resources.  Even though Jamaica is 
not classified as an emerging economy,  this statement maybe applicable 
because  emerging economies and developing nations are normally lumped 
together in studies mostly because they tend to have similar economic 
indicators. 
Equalization has been a concern in tax assignment that the taxable capacity 
and the administrative capacity are significantly greater in the wealthy regions 
(Bahl and Cyan 2011, 272).  The authors claim that more local taxing powers in 
this case would lead to greater fiscal disparities and is most problematic in the 
case of low-income countries because regional variations in taxable capacity 
are greater (Hofman and Guerra 2007,Bahl and Cyan 2011, 272,) 
According to Bahl and Cyan, countries have dealt with this issue of equalization  
in four different ways. Firstly,  an equalization formula is put in place as exists in 
Denmark, Sweden, Spain and Japan  where  excess revenue collected above 
whatever is estimated for expenditure is paid into an equalization fund and 
distributed to local authorities that have shortfall.   Secondly, a system of tax 
sharing can be done as what existed  in China during the 1980s and  1990s 
where local authorities that took revenues from  taxes that were extra budgeted. 
This practice  was discontinued  in 1994 on account of recentralization of 
China’s fiscal reform (Bahl 1999, Bahl and Cyan 2011).  Thirdly, some countries 
deny tax powers to local or regional authorities as obtain in Netherlands and 
Germany. The authors debate that this policy obtains because the argument is 
that the centre needs the higher taxes and  is sometimes used as a basis to 
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deny taxing powers to local governments in developing countries. The fourth 
and final is the use of  intergovernmental transfers from a higher tier of 
governments, or by the direct assumption of expenditure responsibility by higher 
level governments. According to the authors, this method is used in  South 
Africa allowing cities to impose a payroll and turnover tax, but equalized with an 
‘equitable shares’ grant that allocated about one half as great a per capita 
amount to rich than to poorer local governments.  In Chile 60% of the land tax 
collected at the local level goes to the common municipality fund for horizontal 
distribution among municipalities.62  
Limiting the powers of local government: The literature suggests that sometimes 
central government whilst undertaking decentralization may carry out policies 
which run contrary to their decentralization policy which send conflicting signals  
to the local authorities (Ribot, Agrawal and Larson 2005).  Although this case 
doesn’t speak to fiscal decentralization, it addresses the issue of taking away 
the powers of the local authorities despite the government’s declaration of and 
mandate of decentralization.  Sometimes the central governments may limit the 
fiscal powers of local authorities. Bahl and Wallace (2005); Asher (2002) in 
trying to answer this question of limiting fiscal powers of the local authority 
articulate that governments in developing countries may be justified in limiting 
some powers especially  borrowing powers similar to the position taken by the 
government in Jamaica in the interest of macroeconomic stability (section 
6.3.2). The argument of the authors is that developing countries are more likely 
to suffer  from   ‘external shocks’  e.g. movements in the international markets, 
or changes in world price for primary export products or energy prices (Bahl and 
Wallace 2005, 94). Brazil and Argentina were cited by the authors as examples 
of     ‘fiscal decentralization compromising macroeconomic stability’(ibid).  In 
these situations, the central government would want to limit the financial powers 
of local governments and control  so as to have full control over the national 
debt particularly in situations where there are no ‘hard budget constraints at the 
local level’ (Bahl and Wallace 2005, 94).   
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Bahl and Wallace also suggest that some research disagree with the idea that 
‘macroeconomic stability is a constraint to the enactment of     fiscal 
decentralization program (sic) saying that if business cycles are regional, some 
local governments may be positioned more strategically to absorb the external 
shocks than central government’. Others debate that in certain situations local 
governments can play a role in stabilization policy (Gramlich 1987, Bahl and 
Wallace 2008, 95). Additionally, the pooling of resources  by the centre may be 
linked to the debt issue as well they debate. 
Smoke 2001 debates that many analysts, opponents of     fiscal decentralization 
argue along this line of adverse macroeconomic effects of  the behaviour of 
local authorities but their conclusions he believes are drawn from studies from 
countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Russia who might not be 
representative.  He debates that few developing countries decentralise to the 
point or allow uncontrolled access to capital markets by local governments 
where their actions would impact the economy. 
Resource constraints, capacity issues and regulatory framework: Fauget (2004; 
867) drawing from studies  conducted by (Smith 1985; Crook and Sverrisson, 
1999) states  that local government’s lack of human, financial and technical 
resources may hinder it from providing appropriate public services under 
decentralization, and thus power should remain at the centre. He however 
argues that although  these claims are  made they have never  been extensively 
tested.  
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) suggest that lack of local government 
capacity is sometimes used to justify lukewarm response  of fiscal 
decentralization in order not to go through or approach the process half-
heartedly.  Such excuses they say were given for the less than desirable 
responses in countries like India and Mexico.  Based on this justification the 
decentralization process  was stopped at the second tier of local government 
not reaching the final tier. In Tanzania decentralization was called off because 
of the lack of resources at local government they debate.  But the authors argue 
that in Indonesia this issue was ignored bypassing the second tier of 
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government in order to implement.  They however cautioned that the risks were 
minimised because fiscal decentralization  followed on from de-concentration. 
Smoke 2001 argues that there should be an enabling environment for 
decentralization and by extension fiscal decentralization.  This can be done 
through implementation of a legal framework with laws and regulations that are 
clear and unambiguous (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006, 24). The framework 
should be reflective of policy goals and consensus from the national debate and 
address issues such as division of powers and fiscal relations they argue as 
was the situation in India, Russia and Mexico.  However, (Smoke 2001) 
suggests that even though a legal framework is in place, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that there will be fiscal decentralization as obtained in 
Indonesia. 
Trust issues and political will: Trust is a rather complex issue to unravel. 
(Nguyen and Rose 2009, 168)   posit two definitions for trust ‘willingness of a 
party (truster) to be vulnerable to the actions of another party on the expectation 
that the trustee will perform a particular action important to the truster, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor and control the other party (Mayer et al 
1995) and secondly, a psychological state, a positive attitude toward the partner 
and confidence that the partner will perform’.  The authors raise the issue as to 
how ‘willingness or psychological’ state is developed.  They suggest that trust 
tend to differ in the treatment of the background experiences; concluding that 
the debate normally surrounds ‘conceptualization and antecedents of trust’.  
Antecedents of trust fall into three categories contextual factors, past 
experience and individual attributes (ibid). In the antecedents of trusts, people 
tend to  trust others if they have had positive experiences with them (Zucker 
1986, Lewiciki and Bunker 1995, Doney and Cannon 1997, Nguyen and Rose 
2009). 
Sometimes implementation of policy is stymied by the absence of political will 
(section 6.5.1). The literature suggests that political will is an essential 
ingredient for any policy execution (Post, Raile and Raile 2010, Carbonetti et al 
2013) defining it as  “the extent of committed support among key decision 
makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem” suggesting that 
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commitment and determination are needed to carry out the policy or achieve the 
desire goals. The authors debate  that political will speaks to actors’ 
commitment to create and or implement a policy for the sake of the policy’s 
implementation. 
Carbonetti et al (2013) debate that an absence of political will may stand in the 
way of decentralization articulating that political will may be driven by people 
coming together to address the threats that face the community supported by 
the power of collaboration but its absence may be a primary factor for weak 
governance.  
Corruption, transparency and accountability: One of the primary arguments of 
the benefits of devolution is increased accountability; more accountability on the 
part of government officials because they are responsible for service delivery to 
the local population who elected them (Bahl 2008). But there is a another 
school of thought that decentralized systems are more corrupt, in part because 
local politicians are more likely to give in to pressure from local interest groups 
(Bahl and Wallace 2005). 
Lessmann and Markwardt  (2009) in a study on corruption in sixty four countries 
concluded that the level of corruption is found  to be lower in decentralized 
countries as decentralization has been assumed to be an appropriate 
instrument for tackling the issue of corruption.  This  study also confirms 
previous literature on corruption  that effectiveness in monitoring bureaucrats’ 
behaviour is an important determinant of the relationship between 
decentralization and corruption. In another study  conducted by (Fisman and 
Gatti 2002), looking at the cross-country relationship between     fiscal 
decentralization and corruption suggests that devolution in government 
expenditure is strongly and significantly associated with lower levels of 
corruption when decentralization emanates out of the country’s legal system. 
Decentralization is therefore a  feasible instrument for reducing corruption if the 
monitoring of bureaucrats works they perceive. Otherwise, if those institutions  
don’t  work sufficiently well, decentralization can contribute to high levels of 
corruption. Studies have shown that in Russia in the absence of monitoring at 
the local level there was high scale corruption (Blanchard and Shleifer 2000, 
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Lessmann and Markwardt 2009) as against other previous communist countries 
where there was  monitoring of local corruption was less. 
3.5	   Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  practice	  
Two common underlying themes resonated in the interviewees’ responses: 
culture and power resources used by players to either maintain, dominate or 
enhance their position in the field ultimately shaping property tax practices.   
This ties in with Bourdieu’s theory of practice in its interpretation  of culture. 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice is considered an appropriate lens because culture 
as a concept is descriptive and doesn’t explain (Hanson 2014).  Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice using the  concept of habitus  provides a means to interpret 
and explain the concept of culture and how culture shapes property tax practice. 
In relation to power, power isn’t just the ability to get someone to do something 
but power using Bourdieu’s concept involves the use any kind of capital that is 
used to influence players in the field, in other words anything thing that acts as 
a social relation of power as explained in section 3.5.3 below. Finally, 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice not only explains but also connects action to 
culture, structure and power… with habitus being the key concept’ (Swartz 
1997, 9).  The following section discusses Bourdieu’s theory of practice. 
3.5.1	   Habitus	  
Habitus is a central concept in Bourdieu’s theory of practice (Swartz 1997). 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice seeks to answer a number of questions 
concerning players’ actions.  For example, one such question is, how does 
action follow regular statistical patterns without being the product of obedience 
to rules, norms or conscious intention? The answer ‘actors participate in social 
interaction…as strategists responding through time’ (Swartz 1997, 95-99).  He 
further articulates that choices…stem from practical dispositions that 
incorporate ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting through time 
and space. For Bourdieu, actors are not rule followers or norm obeyers but 
strategic improvisers who respond dispositionally to the opportunities and 
constraints offered by various situations.  The idea here is that actors are 
practical strategists linked to social structures through the concept of habitus 
(Swartz 1997,  99-100).   
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Swartz articulates that habitus is not inborn or intrinsic it  comes from group and 
family socialization; shapes individual actions, perpetuates  structures, and 
tends to reproduce those actions, perceptions, and attitudes in keeping with the 
conditions under which they are produced.  The dispositions of habitus 
predispose actors to select forms of conduct that are most likely to succeed in 
light of their resources and past experiences (Swartz 1997, 106). The author 
further states that habitus orients action according to anticipated consequences 
(ibid).  Values and expectations appear to merge in Bourdieu’s understanding of 
habitus as a practical adaptation to the basic conditions of existence (109). 
The  literature provides a number of definitions for habitus, a few of which are 
given.  It is  ‘a system of durable, transposable, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or 
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them’ 
(Bourdieu 1990h, 53; Swartz 1997, 100-101).  
Wacquant (2006, 6) defines it as a ‘system of durable and transposable 
dispositions through which we perceive, judge act in the world: they are those 
unconscious dispositions that are learned through lasting exposure to particular 
social conditions and conditionings via the internalization of external constraints 
and possibilities’. According to (Swartz 1997) these dispositions tend to be  
shared by people with similar experiences  despite each person’s  uniqueness. 
Habitus can also be seen as the ‘internalized scheme which guides the player’s 
behavior’ (Madsen and Dezalay 2002, Oats and Gracia 2012, 115) ‘with 
learning taking place in a dialectical process and it’s produced by the social 
world’ (Oats and Gracia 2012,115). 
Neu (2006, 394)  argues that habitus is  the “durable inculcated system of 
structured, structuring dispositions that are inculcated in the body and exist in 
the form of mental and corporeal schemata which mediate perception, 
appreciation and action” (Everett 2002, 65, Neu 2006, 394) ‘…it is also the 
implicit values and beliefs that are taken-for-granted yet guide our daily 
activities’ (Bourdieu 1990, 61, Neu 2006, 394) ‘…these represent those 
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idiosyncratic but taken for granted meanings, vocabularies and practices of a 
particular institutional field that both rationalize and reproduce the hierarchy of 
capitals within the field’ (Bourdieu 1990, 57-8, Neu 2006, 394).  Or on the other 
hand it may be seen as a set of  dispositions that influence actors to act and 
respond in certain ways to certain situations (Xu & Xu 2008) and ‘an actor’s 
second nature having the capacity to create meaningful practices’ (Swartz 
1997, 75) and meaning giving perceptions adapted to specific situations 
(Bourdieu 1990, 53, Swartz 1997) within the field. 
Habitus is usually formed through an extended processes of inculcation based 
on education and socialization in family and peer groups (Swartz 1997, 102).   
3.5.2	   Field	  
Field is another key concept it defines the ‘broadest possible range of factors 
that shape behavior rather than delimit a precise area of activity and by viewing 
field this way, it  gives breath to the researcher’s investigation’ (Swartz 1997, 
121). Field is ‘the structure of the social setting in which habitus operates’ 
(Swartz 1997, 118) that is the different levels in the field as reflected in Figure 
4.1 and is a site of social practice, having a certain degree of autonomy, and  its 
own boundaries (Gracia and Oats 2012) but yet such ‘boundaries are  not 
sharply drawn’ (Swartz 1997, 212). The field may also be ‘construed as  a 
network or configuration of objective relations between  positions which are 
objectively defined or  sites of production, circulation, and appropriation of 
goods, services, knowledge, or status and the competitive knowledge held by 
the players in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize the different kinds of 
capital’ (Swartz 1997, 117).  Or on the other hand,  they may be thought of as 
organized spaces structured around specific types of capital or combinations of 
capital.  Swartz further argues that fields are ‘sites of resistance and 
domination, one being relationally linked to the other and they, capture  struggle 
within the logic of reproduction seldom becoming the sites of social 
transformation’ (Swartz  1997, 121). There are three subfields in property tax 
field in Jamaica as seen in Figure 4.1: the policy level, the implementation level 
and the compliance level. The legal boundaries are determined at the policy 
level; the laws and policies are implemented by the ministries and the tax 
authority; revenues are produced and circulated at both the implementation and 
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the compliance levels, the ministry along with the minister determine how the 
revenues are to be allocated and the level of services that each local authority 
obtains.  Additionally, taxpayers in the field use their knowledge to withhold the 
revenues. Property tax carries its own administrative practices which are 
determined by the laws and policies at the policy level.   But even though they  
have  their own logics and practices they are  nevertheless interdependent 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Swartz 1997) with what happens in the 
environment are  interrelated and  overlapping with other fields  based on their 
cultural and or social nature, with the field of power as the dominant field 
(Bourdieu1986, Oats and Gracia 2012).  All fields come together to form the 
wider social field in which players   interact. In this case the Jamaican economy.  
Boundaries and membership in the respective fields may change as they are 
not permanent.  Boundaries are not rigid but are relational because ‘boundaries 
themselves are objects of struggle’ (Swartz 1997, 121). 
Fields are ‘always relational, dynamic social microcosms’ (Everett 2002, Neu 
2006, 394) with lasting but changing patterns of social relationships as a key 
feature (Neu 2006).  In this regard ‘an actor’s position within the field is based 
on his struggle to define access and acquire different forms of capital’ (Bourdieu 
1986, Gracia and Oats 2012, 306).    The field is therefore the scene of 
competition between actors competing  for control of the interests specific to the 
field and utilizing their capitals (Swartz 1997; Lingard et al 2005), the most  
valued resource in the field. According to Swartz actors struggle for 
legitimization, the right to monopolize the exercise of symbolic violence. Swartz 
further argues that fields are structured spaces of dominant and subordinate 
positions based on type of capital and amounts of capital.  Thus positions in the 
field are determined by the unequal distribution of relevant capitals rather than 
by personal attributes (Swartz 1997, 123). It is a system in which  each element 
in the system gets it distinctive properties from its relationship to all other 
elements (ibid). Fields are ‘tightly coupled’   relational configurations where 
change in one position shifts  the boundaries among other positions.  Struggles 
in the field put those in dominant positions  against those in subordinate 
positions. ‘The struggle for position in the fields  opposes those  who are able to 
exercise some degree of monopoly of power over the definition and distribution 
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of capital and others who attempt to usurp the advantages (Swartz 1997, 124).  
This is usually between the  old members and the new arrivals. This is 
evidenced in the findings which shows how the established say the legislators 
normally want to use conservative strategies like  using  enforcement through 
the court system which is around for more than a  century  whilst the new 
arrivals like the tax administrators use subversive strategies as not using this 
strategy  (see section 5.3.1). Both the old actors and the new arrivals accept 
that the struggle in the field is worth pursuing.  According to Swartz, Bourdieu 
calls this the doxa, because it represents a tacit/unspoken  fundamental 
agreement on the stakes of struggle between those advocating for heterodoxy 
and those holding on to orthodoxy (Swartz 1997,125). Both the challenger and 
the challenged share a common interest that the field should be preserved, 
even if there is disagreement on how it is divided (ibid).  Entry in the field is 
unspoken acceptance that the rules of the game will change, accepting that 
specific forms of struggle are legitimated whereas others are excluded.  The 
underlying and invisible relations  of  the actors in the field shape action that 
takes place within the field (Swartz 1997, 119).  According to Swartz, resistance 
as well as domination takes place in the field and seldom become sites of social 
transformation. 
Swartz also argues that analysis of the field brings into sharp focus the 
institutional  aspects of  individual and group action, whereas  in institutions 
there is the suggestion of consensus, ‘the concept of field covers the social 
worlds where practices are only weakly institutionalized and boundaries are not 
well established’ (Swartz 1997, 120).  
TAJ is the dominant actor in the tax enforcement field having being entrusted or 
conferred with the authority  or responsibility by law made by the policymakers 
to take money from taxpayers in the form of property tax payments. Other 
actors include policymakers, the ministries and their associate departments and 
the IMF.  The tax administration, the ministries, the IMF may operate taking 
group action but at the same time players within these institutions may make 
their own decisions, conditioned by their disposition.  Additionally group and 
institutional actions may not be in keeping  with the property tax laws  and 
policy-  the parameters of enforcement, compliance and management.     
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3.5.3	   Capital	  
Bourdieu doesn’t view capital in the normal sense of the word.  For him capital 
is anything that has significance or is capable of being influential, and includes 
all forms of power whether they be economic, material,   cultural, social or 
symbolic (Bourdieu 1997, Gracia and Oats 2012) and may be used  by 
individuals and groups to maintain and enhance their respective positions within 
the social order  (Swartz 1997, 73). According to (Swartz 1997, 73, Bourdieu 
1989) these resources become capital when they act as ‘a social relation of 
power’ i.e. when they become objects of struggle as valued resources. ‘Each 
type of capital carries a different value, different degree of liquidity, convertibility 
and susceptibility to change’ (Everett 2002, Gracia and Oats 2012, 306). 
Individuals and groups may therefore employ different tactics or plans to 
accumulate it, invest it and also convert it form one form to another  so as to 
maintain and enhance their position within the field (Swartz 1997). Neu (2006) 
argues that the organization of capital within the field influences both the 
patterns of interaction and flows of information. For example, information on the 
property tax laws in the field in Jamaica can be both a resource and a flow. 
Additionally, information of the  assessment process or the statute bar, or how 
the Quit Rent Act operates may also be viewed as a type of capital- ‘cultural 
capital’ (Neu 2006, 394) as it’s  both a material resource and a way of 
influencing ‘ways of thinking and ways of doing’ (Bourdieu 1994, 7, Neu 2006, 
394) in the field. Economic capital normally includes money and property and 
underpins other forms of capital (Gracia and Oats 2012, 306-7). Cultural capital 
refers to ‘culturally authorized attributes like general awareness, educational 
credentials, tastes and aesthetic preferences and is regarded as less stable 
which makes it  not so  easily managed’ (Swartz 1997,  75; Gracia and Oats 
2012, 306-7) or it may be ‘various kinds of cultural knowledge, competences 
and dispositions’  (Xu and Xu 2008, 76). Swartz argues that  (Bourdieu 1986a, 
Swartz 1997, 76) evaluates cultural capital in three different forms, firstly ‘the 
group of cultivated dispositions that are internalized by the individual through 
socialization which make up patterns of understanding and appreciation (what 
we call culture). It is different from other forms of capital in that it can only be 
used when its meaning is understood: accumulation of this capital     begins 
from an early stage in life’.    Swartz also debates that ‘cultural capital may 
102	  
	  
come into objectified forms  such as  books, works of art and scientific 
instruments which requires specialized abilities to use them’. Thirdly, cultural 
capital may come in an institutionalized format  like an educational  credential 
system.    For example, in Jamaica low tax morale as discussed by (Bahl and 
Wallace 2007) which stems from Jamaicans’ unwillingness to accept the idea 
that the payment of taxes is a civic responsibility is a form of cultural capital. 
Some participants in study attributed this culture to the freeness mentality i.e. 
not wanting to pay one’s way as discussed in section 7.2.1. Evidence of this is  
reflected in how some taxpayers used their knowledge of the law and the field 
to evade tax (7.4.5; 7.5.5).  As seen from the findings, large land barons used 
cultural capital, their specialized knowledge  of the law  to evade the property 
tax obligations (section 5.3.3).  Other taxpayers with special awareness  of the 
law and what happens in the property tax field to evade tax by either avoiding 
the receipt of their assessment notices and or using the loopholes within the  
statute bar (5.3.2, 7.4.5 and 7.5.5). 
 Social capital refers to the support provided from having acquaintance of 
influence or inclusion in social networks valued within a particular field (Swartz 
1997) as suggested by a tax administrator (section 7.5.1) and confirmed by a 
taxpayer (section 7.5.5).  Symbolic capital is regarded as the legitimization or 
recognition of an actor’s status within the field and this form of capital is 
acquired by using other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1977, Gracia and Oats 
2012).  Thus, it’s a combined form of capital that occurs when other forms of 
capital are seen to be legitimate within a particular field.  Any  property or any 
form of capital may be regarded as symbolic if it so perceived by the social 
agents in the field once they give recognition and value to it (Bourdieu 1994 p9, 
Neu 2006, 394).  Symbolic capital is unique in that it is disguised concealing the 
fact that it comes from material forms of capital.  According to Gracia and Oats  
an agent who is high in symbolic capital commands more credit or respect 
within a field than one with low symbolic capital.  
3.6	   Summary	  	  
This chapter reviewed the three strands of literature namely tax administration 
including property tax administration, fiscal decentralization and  Bourdieu’s 
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theory of practice which is used as the lens to interpret the findings.  These 
three strands of literature formed the conceptual framework of the study and 
provide the theoretical lens through which the findings are discussed, analysed 
and interpreted in Chapters five to seven inclusive. The three strands are used 
because they are inextricably linked in the tax field.  Tax administration, policy 
(fiscal decentralisation) and actors are core elements in the tax field. They all 
interact to produce or shape property tax practices.  Fiscal decentralization in 
this study is the main policy issue, a	   political agenda issue (Bird and Slack 
2002).  Fiscal decentralization can be an important tool to  increase property tax 
revenues and build tax morale but invariably governments in developing 
countries seem not to implement this policy.   Tax administration on the other 
hand is designed to implement tax policy which may be fiscal decentralization 
and legislation through enforcement and compliance strategies with resources 
provided by policymakers.  Bourdieu’s theory of practice seeks to provide the 
answers as to why localization isn’t a reality, or why enforcement and 
compliance are less than desirable.  It does so by highlighting actors’ 
interactions and actions in field; it shows how actors are often driven by their 
respective habitus to make decisions and how they use their capital to justify 
such decisions that are made in relation to fiscal decentralization and tax 
administrative practices. These decisions ultimately shape the property tax field. 
Figure 4.2 in the conceptual framework further develops. The following diagram 
shows the link between the three strands of literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax	  pracjces	  
Actors	  habitus	  &	  
capital	  
Tax	  
administra5on	  
Fiscal	  
decentraliza5on	  
Diagram	  to	  show	  link	  between	  the	  three	  strands	  of	  literature	  
Figure	  3.2-­‐	  Relationship	  between	  three	  strands	  of	  literature	  
105	  
	  
Chapter	  4	  
4.0	   Methodology	  
4.1	   Introduction	  
	  
The aim of this chapter is to present the three research questions accompanied 
by their objectives, the general research method taken in conducting this study, 
the theoretical framework, data collection, data analysis and the limitations of 
the study.  Section 4.2 outlines the research questions along with their 
associated objectives.  These questions were finalised based on the literature 
review and the conducting of the exploratory interviews which were undertaken 
in the early stages of my study.  Section 4.3  discusses my philosophical 
assumptions; section 4.4 discusses my research design with details of the 
design discussed in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4.  Section 4.4.1 debates the 
methodology: the interpretive approach is taken so as to have an increased 
understanding of property tax administrative practices. Section 4.4.2 the 
research methods, section 4.4.3 the domain and section 4.4.4 the theory.  
Section 4.5 debates the conceptual framework used in the study drawing from 
tax administration, fiscal decentralization and Bourdieu’s theory of practice. 
Section 4.5.1 describes the theoretical framework.  Section 4.6 discusses the 
interview process; section 4.6.1 debates the interview schedule while section 
4.6.2 discusses how the interviewees  were selected for participation in this 
study.  Section 4.7 speaks to the data analysis.  Section 4.8  the final section 
provides some limitations of the study and some challenges encountered in the 
field. 
4.	  2	   Research	  questions	  
This study examines property tax practices within an urbanized municipality.  It 
addresses one main question which  is broken out into three sub-questions 
along with their associated objectives. These questions have been considered 
after careful examination of the literature on tax administration including 
property tax administration, fiscal decentralisation, the theoretical framework, 
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and the conducting of exploratory interviews at an early stage in the research. 
The main question and the sub-questions  with their attendant objectives are 
detailed below: 
Main Research Question: How do the three dimensions of property tax: 
administration, politics   and taxpayer compliance play out in practice? 
Research Question One: What are the main property tax enforcement practices 
and how  do the  tax authority and policymakers use their capital to shape these 
practices?  
Objectives: 
• To gain insights into some of those actions and interactions which 
contribute to weak and selective enforcement practices  
• To establish how policymakers use resources to gauge property tax 
enforcement, indirectly emphasising the large tax types 
• To provide insights into how the tax authority and the policymakers use 
the enforcement field as a site of struggle and resistance  
• To provide insights into how Jamaica’s land tenure history and culture 
shape enforcement strategies 
• To provide an overview of the reminder system; to establish how  the tax 
authority uses it as a means to support government policy, extract 
resources from the local authorities and to maintain and enhance its 
dominance and visibility in the community 
• To provide insights into how the tax authority  uses  the judicial system 
as means as of demonstrating its disagreement with the lack of 
inadequate resources  
 
Research Question Two: To what extent is non-localization of the property tax 
in Portmore influenced  by the  political dispositions of players within the 
property tax field?  
Objectives:	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• To investigate the key policy issues that influence the non-localization of 
the property tax in the PMC 
• To establish how the lack of a White Paper and the absence of cultural 
knowledge at both the national and local levels  influenced non-
localization  
• To provide insights into how the disposition and actions of bureaucrats, 
local politicians and citizens influence non-localization of the tax   
• To provide insights as to how the redefinition of local fund raising by the 
policymakers influence localization  
• To provide insights into how the social, political and legal environment 
act as inhibitors to localisation  
• To provide insights into how the lack of  economic capital influenced 
localization 
• To provide insights into how fiscal decentralization can be used as a 
means to increase tax morale and tax revenues within the PMC 
Research Question Three: What are the dimensions of property tax compliance 
and non-compliance in Jamaica and how do taxpayers use their capital to 
influence compliance practices? 
Objectives: 
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ indifference, alienation from the 
community and their lack of awareness of the property tax or cultural 
capital shape their compliance practices   
• To establish how property ownership or the lack thereof  influence 
compliance  
• To establish how some taxpayers use their economic and cultural capital 
to maintain and enhance their evasive practices 
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ disposition towards  public 
financial commitments and tax in particular  shape their attitude towards 
property tax compliance 
• To highlight those issues that motivate tax compliance 
• To establish how administrative and institutional practices  shape 
compliance practices 
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• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ attachment to property,  moral 
and social conditioning shape their compliance practices  
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ perception of Jamaican 
politicians,  government departments (including the tax authority) and the 
local authorities influence tax compliance 
• To provide insights into how the media and taxpayers’ interaction with 
housing developers influence compliance 
4.3	   Philosophical	  assumptions	  	  	  
 For this research, I adopt the  stance of an interpretivist, here I embrace the 
view that ‘society is viewed as relative and the social  world consists of names, 
concepts, labels by which we structure reality’ (Oats 2012, 10) otherwise 
referred to as social constructivism (Creswell 2003).  My assumption is that 
‘individuals seek to understand the world in which they live and work, and these 
meanings are many, varied and subjective’ (ibid). The interpretive approach is  
a way therefore in which I ‘interpret the meanings, values, experiences, 
opinions and behaviours of other people’ (, 2002 557).   In this study, I make 
sense of the actors’ social construction and  provide the interpretation of the 
meanings these actors have about the world, i.e. the practice and process of 
property tax  administration, assigning labels and categories(ibid).  The 
objective of the interpretive approach is to understand meaningful social action, 
and also to understand what goes on in the actors’ head. According to (Benton 
and Craib 1984) these help to develop an understanding of what is logical and 
what is symbolic. For this research, my epistemological position is that ‘social 
science cannot create true knowledge of any kind; knowledge is subjective’ 
(Creswell 2003). Social sciences is different from natural sciences in that the 
objects of the research is expressed differently.  The difference lies in the fact 
that human beings and human groups are used- have self-consciousness which 
gives them the ability to reflect on their activities and relationships (Benton and 
Craib 1984). ‘Human life is essentially a life of meaning, of language and 
reflective thought and communication(76).  The social world (property tax 
practice) is ‘produced through the human actions and interactions  and we have 
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to get inside the worlds of these actors involved in meaning construction, which 
is both context and time dependent’ (Oats 2012, 11).   
Positivism has had a long standing tradition for use as a research method and 
according to (Gilbert, 2001); it is the leading perspective in social science 
methods.  It is argued that positivism in the social sciences is used by those 
researchers who seek objectivity in their explanation of a social reality 
(McKerchar 2010). The epistemological assumption of positivism is that , there 
should be the ‘elimination of human subjectivity in research…observation of 
data and the interpretations  of their meaning were to be strictly 
separated…scientific facts were to be objective and quantifiable…subjectivity of 
the researcher should be eliminated or minimised’ (Kvale and Brinkman 2009, 
58). Thus, positivists are removed from their research subjects (Gilbert 2001) 
and their explanations are obtained through tested theories or hypothesis 
(Mckerchar 2010).  Interpretivism on the other hand, seeks to provide 
understanding of social reality which comes out of the subjective interpretation 
of the researcher (McKerchar 2010, 75). Interpretivism is grounded in inductive 
reasoning; therefore, it does not provide a ‘hard and fast explanation from which 
casual relationships are identified and predictions made’ (ibid).   
I am interested in understanding the activities, operations, functions and 
interactions of the actors in the practice of a centralised  property tax  
administration within an urbanised municipality i.e. obtaining an insight into  
property tax enforcement and compliance; the strategies used, the reasons for 
such strategies;   the reasons for non-localization of the property tax within the 
PMC;  the activities, functions and interactions of the various agencies that are 
involved in the administration of property tax; and the behaviour, values and 
attitudes of the various actors within the property tax system. The focus of the 
study is therefore on how the actors  within the property tax field created, 
modified  and interpreted (Oats 2012) the practice of property tax   in the PMC 
and why property tax localization was not implemented at a given point in time 
within a given context (Merriam 2002).  The study is time and context driven 
because I spent  three and half months in the field thus the meanings derived 
from the data collected are related to that particular period, the actors 
interviewed and organizations researched.    Additionally, I was an active 
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participant in the research.   In all of this, I took the position that all actors in the 
property tax field were independent, making their own decisions (Oats 2012).   
4.4	  	   Research	  Design	  
McKerchar (2010) suggests that research design is   a way of acting, thinking 
and speaking- the way to the research.  McKerchar debates that the literature 
on research design and conduct,  normally focus on the two main strands 
positivism and interpretivism and the path adopted by the researcher largely 
determines how the researcher crafts his research.  This is so because the 
chosen stance provides the ‘theoretical underpinning or inquiry paradigm’ 
(McKerchar 2010, 63) or the groundwork for the framework (Crotty 1998, 
Creswell 2003, 4).   The framework guides the researcher in the organization of 
the study (Grix 2004, McKerchar 2010) and ‘influences the methodology, 
research methods and knowledge claims’ (Crotty 1998, Creswell 2003, 4; 
McKerchar 2010, 64; Oats 2012, 10). My knowledge claims, strategy,  and 
research methods all come together to demonstrate the research process and 
are further discussed in sections  4.4.1 and  4.4.2.  
4.4.1	   Methodological	  approach	  
 
In light of my foregoing philosophical assumptions coupled with my research 
objective of gaining an increased understanding and insight of the practice of 
property tax administration in an urbanised municipality, a subjective approach 
was  the best method to do this, hence the choice of the qualitative approach.  
Additionally, there is the call in the literature for more qualitative research in the 
accounting discipline  to provide that greater understanding of the practice of 
accounting as advocated by (Hopwood 1983, 302-303)  and also to raise 
awareness that there are alternatives to positivistic approaches to accounting 
scholarship (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Chua 1986, Merkl-Davis and Brennan 
2011, Oats 2012, 12-13). 
Qualitative approaches may be naturalistic, holistic, interpretive and 
phenomenological (Tomkins and Groves 1983, Ahrens and Chapman 2006).  
Being an interpretivist provides the opportunity to explore the meanings of  
actors’  actions, providing interpretations for them.   It offers an alternative to 
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positivism, which makes the ontological assumption that empirical reality is 
objective and external to the subject (Chua 1986, 36, Ahrens and Chapman 
2006, 4) with the epistemological effect or consequence that it can be studied 
through objective categories and verified by empirical scientific methods 
(Ahrens and Chapman 2006, 4). According to (Ahrens and Chapman 2006)  
qualitative methodology should not be seen as just doing some work in the field 
but rather  it should be regarded as extremely theoretical.  It is debated that 
qualitative methodology  is really constructions of the researcher (Atkinson 1992 
and Miles and Huberman 1994). Patton(1985, 1), Merriam’s (2002, 5) definition 
of qualitative methodology aptly encapsulates what it does: it ‘is an effort to 
understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular context and the 
interactions there.  This understanding is an end in itself, so that it is not 
attempting to predict what may happen in the future necessarily, but to 
understand the nature of the setting- what it means for participants to be in that 
setting, what their lives are like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings 
are, what the world looks like in that particular setting…The analysis strives for 
depth of understanding’. 
Quantitative methods on the other hand simply aims to prove or disprove the 
existence of a particular reality without offering an interpretation but this is not 
the purpose of qualitative methodology. 
Seeing that my objectives are to obtain an increased understanding of the 
actors’ perceptions and meanings  of property tax administration practices in the 
PMC, and for the researcher to provide an interpretation of their responses, the 
standard yes or no answers that are usually used in quantitative methodology 
are inappropriate to meet such objectives. This research  therefore called on 
actors to play an active role by sharing their views, perceptions, their feelings, 
opinions and experiences of the practices in property tax administration. 
Additionally, this study called for me to be an active participant in the field, i.e. to 
be a part of the research setting.   Whilst I strived to maintain objectivity, I do 
acknowledge that my interpretations of some of the findings maybe subjective 
(Merriam 2002; McKerchar 2010) based on my intimate knowledge Portmore 
(my home is there), my personal and professional experience and also my 
personal views (Carrol and Swatman 2000, McKerchar 2010) of the  practice of 
property tax administration in Jamaica.  Secondly, subjectivity was also  
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attributed to me being an active participant in the field (Merriam 2002) by virtue 
of my extensive interaction with some of the subjects whilst conducting the 
interviews, seeking their participation or observing their actions. Additionally, the 
outcomes of my research may have limited application. 
I choose qualitative methodology for  my research on the following bases. 
Firstly to explore the social realities of what exists in property tax practice and 
how things are practiced in the municipality and the various agencies that 
administer property tax  so as to interpret such actions  and interactions (Benton 
and Craib 2011). My research isn’t  an attempt to prove or disapprove any 
particular phenomenon, hypothesis or any set of phenomena nor to establish 
causal relationships;  it merely seeks to understand what exists, purpose of their 
existence,  provide an interpretation and at the same time to use theory to make 
some sort of linkage.  Secondly, qualitative methodology is  a ‘better fit for my 
research questions’ (Silverman 2010). The questions that I posed weren’t  
seeking the standard yes and no answers; they sought detailed responses from 
the respondents, so that I can gain an understanding to what exists. Yes and no 
answers provide no such detail, and they would defeat my research objective of 
gaining a greater understanding of property tax practice , going beyond what is 
already known.  
Thirdly, qualitative methodology gives a voice to each respondent in the 
research (Silverman 2010) whereas in quantitative methodology, the subjects 
are usually silent, they don’t carry a voice, the outliers aren’t recognized as the 
respondents are masked in generality. These advantages gives me  the best of 
both worlds.  
Going the qualitative way  provides depth and richness, giving the subject a 
voice, and at the same time adding feeling and passion to my  work,  making 
the work lively (comes alive), and giving authenticity of the varying human 
experiences (Silverman 2010);  providing holism… giving ‘thick descriptions’ 
that are vivid, nested in a real context…having a ring of truth’ (Miles and 
Huberman 1994,10)  If I were to use quantitative methodology, then I  would 
miss  these details with the attending advantages.  The approach, provided me 
with a good basis to understand the social constructions  within the property tax 
field  as the various actors interacted (Merriam 2002). 
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Finally, engagement of this method was a personal one. I  got the opportunity to 
engage and interact with the respondents which increased my understanding 
through nonverbal as well as verbal communication.  Moreover, I was able to 
‘immediately respond, and adapt’ (Merriam 2002, 5) to happenings in the field.  I 
got the ‘opportunity to ask for immediate clarification, summarized material, 
checked with respondents for accuracy of interpretation, and also obtained the 
chance to explore unusual and unanticipated responses’(Merriam 2002, 5). 
4.4.2	   Research	  methods	  
The literature suggest  interviews, documents, observation and audio-visual 
materials (Patton 1990; Creswell 2003; Bedard and Gendron 2004)  as  the 
usual methods of collecting  qualitative data with qualitative interviews the 
mostly widely used method (Gilbert 1993; 2001; Myers and Newman 2006; 
Kvale and Brinkmann 2009; Oats 2012).  Within the disciplines of  social 
sciences  interviews are a  key method for producing scientific and professional 
knowledge (Kvale and Brinkmann 2006, 9). Interviews are not only a major 
source of collecting data but are deemed effective as well( Bedard and Gendron 
2004, 197). Among its main advantages, interviews are argued to be the  best 
means to tap into the subjects’ knowledge base about their experiences 
(Alvesson 2003).  Ahrens and Chapman (2006) posit that interviews may be 
used for different methodologies ‘depending on the notion of reality they intend 
to explore’ (4). In my study interviews were used to ‘understand the world of the 
actors’, obtain their perspectives, unfold the meaning of their experiences, and 
uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations’ (Kvale and Brinkman 
2009, 1).  
The literature suggests structured, semi-structured, unstructured and group as 
the different types of interviews (Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006; Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2006; Myers and Newman 2007) with each type carrying its own 
merits.  I used semi-structured interviews for the advantages they offered. 
Semi- structured interviews facilitated the asking of certain open ended, major 
questions centred around themes (Gilbert 1993; 2001) around the research 
questions and their stated objectives.  Secondly, they  offered  me some degree 
of flexibility  (Kvale and Brinkmann 2006), for example, I was able to rephrase 
or re-craft some  questions for additional data and  clarification,  ‘explore 
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emerging paths’ (Bedard and Gendron 2004, 197); seek confirmation,  change 
the sequence  of the questions; to ask additional questions based on the 
progress of the interview (Gilbert 1993; 2001; Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 
2006; Meyers and Newman 2006) and to make changes to the interview 
participants and the timing of the interviews.  Additionally, this method allowed 
me to take ‘methodical decisions’  (Kvale and Brinkmann 2006, 16) which was 
really a judgment call on my part.  For example, I had to decide which question 
to ask when faced with time constraints.  
As the  interviews  were geared to ‘explore meaning and perception, to gain a 
better understanding…’(Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006, 314), they were 
characterized by  careful planning, questioning, and listening ‘between unequal 
partners,’ with the attendant objective of gleaning ‘thoroughly tested knowledge’ 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2006, 3).  Based on the foregoing, each successive 
interview was informed by my previous interviews in that I read the transcripts 
and or listened to the recordings before conducting  a new interview. 
 
4.4.3	   Domain	  
Ahrens and Chapman (2006) drawing on Silverman’s concepts of qualitative 
studies refers to domain as a space in which data is collected but it’s not 
necessarily a physical space like a factory ‘but the shape of the field depends 
on the usefulness for answering the research question’ (6). Although my 
research is on the PMC, participants were not confined to the PMC but included 
respondents who provided useful data on property tax administrative practices 
in relation to the PMC. Participants included present and past residents of the 
PMC,  members of civil society, senior tax administrators, senior government 
bureaucrats, cabinet ministers, councillors, mayors, a tax professional, a 
developer and former politicians including a former prime minister.  The 
interviews explored important issues in the property tax field:  attitude of actors 
towards fiscal decentralization, political issues associated with fiscal 
decentralization,  tax enforcement practices and the dimensions of property tax 
compliance to get my research questions answered. The field carried great 
interaction between the participants and me.  I learned that I should allow the 
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participants to speak and express their views,  I tried not to cast judgment at 
their responses and even to appreciate moments of silence or long  pauses.   
Some participants offered great suggestions as to who could be potential 
participants   For example, one participant, a senior government bureaucrat 
(interviewee 4) said ‘have you spoken to Mr X, he is the one who mentored me, 
bringing me into this business, he is a good person to talk to on property tax’. 
4.4.4	   Theory	  
In the earlier part of my study, there was the challenge of  making the decision 
as to whether I should use  theory.  I debated its usefulness and  even toyed 
with the idea of whether descriptions alone were enough for my work (Oats 
2012). I mused about whether I want to be this type of researcher, that of doing 
research without theory.   The nagging question was how would theory help in 
my research? Why not descriptions only?  At the earlier stages, I must confess, 
that I  had challenges making the connection between theory and findings and 
therefore  was unable to see its worth.   However, after much debate with my 
peers and research, I was convinced that for my present research, use of theory 
would be advantageous and that it would provide the necessary grounding for 
my data.  The other challenge that I had was, at what point I should  begin  to 
engage with theory: before my fieldwork or after?  Adopting (Silverman’s 2010) 
perspective that  theory should guide the research, give directions but should 
not restrict it, frame research questions and also that theory should give the 
study  some sort of context to the field, (Miles and Huberman 1994), I engaged 
with theory before going in the field but did not allow it to restrict my study or for 
me to become myopic as I didn’t want to miss important data or emerging 
issues in the field.   I therefore chose the middle ground to give some sort of 
framing to my study but at the same time left myself open so that I could explore 
the issues that emerged in the field.  In this regard,  I briefly reviewed  the 
theories of subsidiarity and new institutional sociology (NIS) as I perceived that 
they would somehow assist me in clarifying and interpreting my findings but I 
left myself open for whatever would emerge. 
However,  these theories didn’t  connect with my main findings.  Subsidiarity 
was inappropriate because it seemed to be explaining what should be the case, 
rather than interpreting why things are the way they are.  NIS on the other hand 
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has to do with change and how organisations change, eventually resembling 
their counterparts. The major findings did not reflect this.   I reviewed historical 
institutionalism but couldn’t use it as my findings were not  confined to a series 
of events per se. I looked at agency theory but realised that this is rational 
choice theory and it wouldn’t  be in keeping with my philosophical assumptions 
as it catered to positivism only.  
I continued to research, attend workshops, held  discussions with my academic 
colleagues, and my supervisor.  My supervisor  suggested that I continue to 
explore and immerse myself in my data, simultaneously exploring other theories 
and hopefully, one would  eventually would make sense.  In the  writing up 
phase, after reading extensively on culture and power, I decided that Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice was the most suitable  theoretical lens to interpret   my 
findings.   
 
Thus the use of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to ‘lluminate and explain’ what 
others cannot see (Gilbert 2001,17) and also adds value in the social science 
field by development of theories (Oats 2012, 16). Sutton and Staw (1995) argue 
that  theory is the ‘answer to queries of why’ as debated in Kaplan (1964) and 
Merton (1967). ‘Theory is about the connections among phenomena, a story 
about why actions, events, structure, and thoughts occur…’ (372 & 377)  
The objective of using Bourdieu’s theory of practice  isn’t  to make 
generalisations or to make the findings complex (DiMaggio 1995, 391) or to 
have a grand theory (Silverman 2010) but  to have a ‘set of concepts to define 
and explain’ (Silverman 2010)  or to have an ‘an orienting set of explanatory 
concepts…’ (Ahrens and Chapman 2006, 23) to use as lenses to interpret  the 
findings. Using these simple explanations as given by (Ahrens and Chapman 
2006) and (Silverman 2010), this is where, I positioned my findings to connect 
with theory.  
4.5	  Conceptual	  framework	  
This study makes a theoretical contribution  by developing a conceptual 
framework which provides a rich description of the property tax field in which 
enforcement, management and compliance of the property tax take place. 	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The study draws on three strands of  literature: tax  administration, fiscal 
decentralization and Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  The literature serves to link 
the actions of the actors to the various levels of administration and policy within 
the field demonstrating how they influence property tax practice.  The main 
themes and conceptual theories within the literature provide the basis for the 
conceptual framework developed and are used and drawn upon to explain and 
help to interpret the findings in Chapters five to seven. The explanatory power 
of the construct is evidenced throughout the study as it serves to give an 
increased understanding of property tax administrative  practices, the main 
objective of the study.  The framework is presented in two steps: first the 
descriptive framework which provides the means through which the property tax 
field can be described, and to understand the dynamics and the structure of  
interactions amongst the actors within the  property tax field. The second stage 
brings together the core theoretical concepts drawn from the three strands of 
the literature, through which the findings of the study will be explained and 
interpreted.  
4.5.1 Description	  of	  property	  tax	  field	  
Swartz’s (1997) interpretation of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is the framework 
used to describe the property tax field.  First of all, field is key spatial metaphor 
in Bourdieu’s sociology and it’s the structure of the social setting in which 
habitus operates (Swartz 1997, 117) as outlined in section 4.4.3. 
Fields are arenas of struggle for control for all forms of power is used to 
maintain, dominate or enhance their position the field (Swartz 1997; Gracia and 
Oats 2012).  It’s also the structure of the social setting in which habitus operates 
(Swartz 1997, 118), a site of social practice, having a certain degree of 
autonomy, and  its own boundaries (Gracia and Oats 2012) but yet such 
‘boundaries are  not sharply drawn’ (Swartz 1997, 212). It can also be seen 
network or configuration of objective relations between  positions which are 
objectively defined or  sites of production, circulation, and appropriation of 
goods, services, knowledge, or status and the competitive knowledge held by 
the players in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize the different kinds of 
capital’ (Swartz 1997, 117). Applying these concepts to my study, the field is 
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hereby described.  The property field is divided in three subfields: the policy 
field, the enforcement and compliance field.   
Policy level 
Actors at the policy level establish the boundaries or set the parameters for the 
property tax field. This is the social setting for the production of the  property tax 
legal framework. It’s  this setting which determines the allocation of enforcement 
resources; gives property rights to taxpayers through the constitution; 
enforcement and administrative responsibilities to tax administrators, local 
authorities and government ministries and rights to taxpayers via the property 
tax laws and policies covering issues such as, land titling,  property tax base, 
penalties to be imposed, devolution and allocation of revenues are all produced  
at this level in this field.    The final law and the decision concerning the 
management of the property tax are shaped by the underlying and invisible 
relations (Swartz 1997,119) of the actors and also by the habitus (Bird, Slack 
and Tassoyoni 2012) and by the available capital of the actors in this field. The 
actors in this field include politicians at the national level: cabinet ministers, 
senators and legislators. For my study three cabinet ministers, one legislator 
and a former prime minister were  interviewed.   
Property tax administration operates within a country’s political, social and 
economic environment. Thus its performance, its complexity, allocation of 
resources are impacted by whatever  happens nationally and also  
internationally as Jamaica is an open economy.  For example, fiscal policy 
determines the agenda of the tax authority (section 5.2.3). Tax policy emerges 
from fiscal policy and is fundamental to the tax authority’s strategies, processes 
and output and  prescribes the relative importance of the respective taxes for 
which property tax is one such tax.  
Policymakers decide what role the property tax should play as discussed in 
section 3.3.3. The policymakers’ combined philosophy is that the property tax 
should have multiple roles:  revenue raiser or device to give both political and 
financial autonomy to local authorities and that it should also serve as  a benefit 
tax.  Additionally, they believe the tax should be a fairly easy tax to administer, 
thus there was strong support for the continued use of the unimproved value 
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with one stating that this base maybe inappropriate for Portmore.  The working 
of the property tax system should support and protect property rights as dictated 
by the constitution and as such the law supports the adverse possession rule.  
It’s this level which also determines  whether the tax should be fiscally 
decentralised.  There was no uniformity of opinion on this.  The views ranged in 
a continuum from  a yes to a no and with uncertainty and ambivalence in the 
middle. The yes suggested that it was necessary for better governance,  
fulfilment of a political commitment, increased accountability, increased financial 
viability, and local autonomy.  On the part of those who said no,  it was 
suggested there was a lack of trust in the local authorities to manage, a lack of 
an enabling environment,  The PMC’s likely inability to provide services which 
require  huge demands for capital outlay (Smoke 2001) and the reluctance of 
the PMC to take on this role as articulated a legislator ‘they just don’t want to do 
it’.  Those in the middle were unsure because of political and economic issues.  
Enforcement level 
Those at the organizational level are the enforcers or implementers of the 
property tax laws and policies.   Their effectiveness is to some extent 
determined by the level of power they have and the level of support from those 
at the individual level, the taxpayers and also support from policymakers. The 
taxpayers are fundamental actors in the field because if they don’t comply, then 
there would be no revenues making tax administration of non-effect. At this 
level, knowledge of the actors, that is their cultural capital,  is critical in their 
struggle to accumulate and monopolize the economic capital especially property 
tax revenues, the main object of the struggle within the field.  Implementers are 
also themselves taxpayers and are expected to obey the law.  While seeking to 
enforce the law and to provide services, implementers are impacted by their 
environment (Mansfield  1988) and their habitus. For example, if actors are to 
dominate and maintain their position within the field they should have intimate 
knowledge of the laws, policies, profile of taxpayers; risks taxpayers face and 
their tax morale which are fundamental. Interviewees included four government 
bureaucrats, five tax administrators, two councillors, two mayors and four senior 
managers from a local authority.  Actors from the policy level may also serve at 
the organizational level, thus serving as policymakers and implementers. For 
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example, cabinet ministers make the laws but at the same time, they are 
implementers seeing that they oversee some ministries that enforce the 
property tax.  Thus, there is the struggle of what will dominate at any point in 
time.  Speaking of the struggles in being an actor in both fields a policymaker, 
interviewee 5 said ‘it’s stressful…the things are diametrically opposed…	   You 
are caught between a rock and hard place.  So we cannot win, we just cannot 
win, something have to give’.   
Compliance level 
This is the individual level where the property tax laws and policies are either 
complied with or evaded.  It’s at this level where service is given and received.  
In the compliance field, there are various stakeholders, those who by their 
actions either encourage or discourage taxpayers into compliance for example, 
housing developers, tax professionals, managers of cooperative societies,  and 
taxpayers themselves. But it’s the  taxpayers who are the most important 
players because they are the ones who ultimately take the decision to comply or 
not to comply and they are the ones whom the tax administration goes after for 
the money  ‘the economic capital.’ According to (Bourdieu 1989, Swartz 1997, 
73) property tax resources become capital when it acts as a ‘social relation of 
power’ i.e. because it becomes an object of struggle as a valued resource in the 
field.    As can be seen from the study, taxpayers used various means and 
arguments in order to retain their economic capital, (sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.6).  
Taxpayers’ attitude towards taxation and the property tax also influence their 
compliance decisions (Gill 2000)(see sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2). Taxpayers’ 
interaction with actors in the property field and the wider social field also 
influence their property tax compliance (section 7.5). 
The levels in the field are related to each other and overlap at times with the 
field of power as a dominant field (Bourdieu 1986,  Gracia and Oats 2012, 
Wynter 2014). 
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A diagrammatic description of the property tax field is presented in Figure 4.1   
Figure 4.1 Diagram of the property tax field 
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4.	  5.	  2	  Theoretical	  concepts	  
Stage 2 connects the key theoretical constructs with the three main strands of 
the literature: tax administration, fiscal decentralization and Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice through which property tax practices and the actions of the actors in the 
property tax field in Jamaica are analysed.  Figure 4.2  is a diagrammatic 
representation.  As noted, all areas were discussed in chapter 3 but some are 
briefly mentioned here to provide some context. 
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Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
Bourdieu’s theory practice in this study relies  largely on Swartz 1997’s  
interpretation of Bourdieu’s work supported by other authors;	   (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992; Lingard, Rawolle  and Taylor 2005;  Loveman 2005; Neu 2006; 
Xu and Xu 2008; Gendron, Grazzini and Malsch 2011;  Gracia and Oats 2012).  
These concepts  are used as the lens through which to interpret and explain the 
findings.  Bourdieu’s theory of practice seems to be the most appropriate lens 
through which to explain and interpret the findings  as the findings seem to 
cluster around two main issues: culture and power.  The concepts are therefore  
used as the lens to analyse and interpret  how the  invisible and underlying 
interactions of actors in the field shape property tax practices; the struggles 
between the different players in field and how players use their resources 
(power) to maintain and dominate their positions within the field, or attempt to 
make changes to the rules or boundaries within the field. Furthermore the 
concepts explain how players’  actions are conditioned by their dispositions and 
beliefs.   Bourdieu’s theory of practice seems more all-embracing because it’s 
able to connect actors’ actions to culture, structure and power (Swart 1997).  It’s 
used above (Lukes 2005) because Lukes’ definition of power appears  more 
limited in scope. 
Additionally,   Lukes’ concept of power appears be more organizational focused, 
it seems that power is orchestrated and planned by and within the 
organizational context requiring some sort of consensus, whilst Bourdieu’s 
concept of power is both individual and institutional.  Secondly, Lukes’ concept 
of power seems to be  more rational:  actors  give more thought to their actions 
in applying power,  whereas with Bourdieu’s theory of practice  people’s actions 
tend to be dispositional- it’s second nature, it’s a part of who they are based on 
their socialization.  Even though  actors are independent, they may arrive at the 
same decisions within an organization  or may act similarly due to their 
conditioning and socialization (Swartz 1997). 
In order to have a complete understanding of the property field, the concepts 
weren’t individually applied but were used collectively in order to see what 
drives or motivates the underlying actions of actors.  According to (Swartz 1997, 
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141). ‘Bourdieu’s complete model of practices conceptualizes that actions are 
the outcome of a relationship between habitus, capital and field’ (Swartz 1997). 
Sections 3.6.1, 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 have already discussed the concepts  habitus, 
field and capital. 
Tax administration and fiscal decentralization 
The literature on tax administration and fiscal decentralization make two 
important contributions .  Firstly, they guided the areas for discussions with the 
interviewees and they formed the bases on which the literature review was 
presented (see sections 3.2; 3.3 and 3.4).  The second area of contribution is by 
virtue of them making up the conceptual framework as presented in Figure 4.2.  
 The main concepts drawn from the tax administration address the normal 
issues encountered in tax administration in relation to  enforcement and 
compliance. In terms of fiscal decentralization a part of tax administration, that 
is at what level the tax is managed,  this is process is politically determined but 
yet  may not succeed without the involvement of the various stakeholders. Tax 
administration carries a number of challenges in practice.  Some examples of 
the references are illustrated below:  
• Selective enforcement of tax law and policy: tax administrations 
selectively enforce tax laws and policy based on culture, resource     
constraints, tax policy along with ambiguity of the laws and their own 
dispositions etc. (Tanzi 1987b, Mansfield 1988; Bird, 2004; Alm, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2006; Bahl 2007; Tennant and Tennant 
2007; Nerre 2008; Oats and Sadler 2011). Selective enforcement results 
in the tax authority being unable to maintain that critical balance between 
evasion and compliance and to maximize revenue collections (Silvani 
1992). 
 
• Tax morale  is  a key issue in tax administration thus tax administrators 
should be aware of those issues that motivate taxpayers’ compliance. 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Cullis and Lewis 1997;	   Fisher, Wastick 
and Mark 1992, Taylor 2002; Frey and Frey 2002; Cowell 1999, 
Falkinger 1999, Wenzel 2002; Bergman 2003;  Torgler 2005; 
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Schmolders 1960, Strumpel, 1969, Alm and Torgler 2006; Alm and 
Torgler 2006; Kornhauser 2007).   Fiscal decentralization, local 
management of property tax can be used to build a compliance tradtion 
(Guth, Levati and Sausgrubber 2005; Mikesell 2003, Ruhling 2006).  
 
• Taxpayers’ non-compliance may be based on a number of factors some 
of which include  their attitude towards the property tax (Youngman 
2002,Bird 2003; Brunori 2003, Slack 2004; Bird  and Slack 2006; Bahl 
and Wallace 2008; Boyd 2011; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011),  
fiscal exchange, trust in government (trust in government  and fiscal 
exchange (Feld and Frey 2002), or social norms and ethical beliefs 
(Jackson and Milliron 1986, Alm, McClelland, & Schultze 1992, Alm, 
McClelland and Schultze 1999, Wenzel 2005; Blanthorne and Kaplan 
2008, 685; Traxler 2010) or fiscal exchange. 
 
• Successful enforcement requires tax administrations to  engage with 
social, economic and institutional issues  (Levi 1988; Cullis and Lewis 
1997; Hasseldine et al 2001; McKerchar and Evans 2009) and at the 
same time trying to maximise voluntary compliance (Levi 1988; Cullis 
and Lewis1997) within the field. 
Fiscal decentralization 
	  
• The decision to fiscally decentralize or locally manage the tax is tied to 
government’s decentralization policy  (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1999; 
Smoke 2001; Bird and Slack 2002; Bahl and Wallace  2005;  Bahl ad 
Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Bahl and Cyan 2011) but it might not be a 
preferred choice if administration costs are likely to increase along with 
inadequacy of funds for local services(Brueckner 2009; Bird 2011).  
 
• The decision is influenced by political, social and economic issues within 
the environment and  also stakeholders attitude (Asher 2002; Ribot, 
Agrawal and Larson  2005; Bahl and Wallace 2005); Brueckner 2009; 
Bahl and Cyan  2011; Bird  2011 Carbonetti et al 2013) 
126	  
	  
 
• Fiscal decentralization carries a number of perceived benefits including 
building a tax compliance tradition and also increasing tax morale (Guth, 
Levati and Sausgrubber 2005). Other benefits include  but not limited to 
improved governance, more intensive use of the property tax, increased 
accountability and transparency, reduced corruption and increase in 
citizens’ voice (Bird and Vaillancourt 1999; Robinson and Stiedl 2001; 
Smoke 2001; Shah 1994,  McCluskey and Franzsen 2005; Fauget 2012, 
2014) all of which will help to improve tax morale. Strengthening of these 
institutional issues will improve tax compliance (McKerchar and Evans 
2009). 
4.6	   Interview	  process	  
Based on my research design and the objective of my research, I conducted 
thirty-two face- to-face semi-structured interviews with two in a group setting.  
However participants from three of the one-to-one interviews  asked their 
colleagues and or subordinates to  join in the discourse. In one of those 
interviews,   at the  wrapping up point I asked the participant  ‘do you wish to 
say anything else to me concerning …?’ The respondent, a senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 17 immediately said, ‘let me ask my people from my 
department to talk with you…’ inviting her five subordinates (compliance 
officers) to join the interview. Invitations to have these to join suggested that 
there was a level of trust and openness of the interviewee,  a willingness to 
share as much data as possible and also giving the opportunity to ‘lower-status’ 
(Heiskanen and Newman 1997, Myers and Newman 2007) participants  to give 
additional insights adding to the richness of the data as demonstrated in this 
case. Another one of these interviews detailed insights into the property tax 
system were provided as both participants  used the  interview as a platform to  
flesh out ‘black box’ property  tax matters, demonstrating some of the existing 
tensions between actors within the field. This was quite useful for my research 
as it provided rich data. Generally the interview participants were welcoming, 
open and ready to talk.  Arriving for one interview, interviewee 14A, a senior tax 
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administrator said ‘oh, it’s you, I am glad we are having people doing research 
in tax…’. 
For the most part in conducting the interviews, I took a pragmatic approach, i.e. 
I assumed  whatever posture was necessary in order to obtain the data: 
whether that of  a ‘miner’ or  a ‘traveller’(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 18) i.e. 
unearthing data but also created stories or a ‘romanticist’  where I tried to 
establish an excellent rapport with my respondents, in order to  gain their trust 
and commitment (Alvesson 2003,16). Despite the assumption of these 
postures, two of my respondents appeared to be ‘cautious and superficial’ 
(Alvesson 2003) in their responses but became  relaxed  in our post interview 
‘chit chat’ revealing rich data on property tax policy issues. None of these post 
interview conversations were included in my thesis. One of these participants 
observed me to see whether I was recording these post interview 
conversations.  This suggested a lack of trust. 
Humphrey and Lee (2004) suggest that one of the pitfalls of conducting 
interviews is the cancellation at last moment of the interview. I suffered this fate.  
 
Another limitation with interviews was the   reluctance of  participants in being  
recorded (Horton, Macve and Struyven 2004).  Luckily, all interviewees gave 
their consent with the  exception of one.  Recording the interviews provided me 
with the freedom to concentrate on the topic and dynamics of the interview such 
as words, tone, pauses (Kvale and Brinkman 2009, 179) while the interview was 
being recorded.  Each record is stored on the university’s database.  Having 
them  recorded and permanently stored allowed me to revisit the recordings for 
verification  and clarification.   I listened to the recordings several times to get 
myself immersed in my data. In the case where the interview was not recorded, 
the data  was not  as accurate because I relied on my memory.   
 
There was another challenge, that  of getting past the ‘gatekeepers’ - 
secretaries, public relations personnel, communications officers or personal 
assistants of some senior participants in some organizations.  Some 
organisations in Jamaica  especially the larger and government ones are 
hierarchical in structure.  The  ‘gatekeepers’ were the first point of contact for 
some senior officers, potential interviewees.  I persisted and persevered 
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through several emails and telephone calls, remaining composed, politically 
correct, warm, pleasant and polite until a firm date was received for the desired  
interviewee.   
 
Whilst no interviewee requested copies of their interview script, I received three 
requests for copies of my thesis with one being a condition for participation. 
Each expressed the  belief that my study will be of  value  to their respective 
organisation and the  property tax field in Jamaica. 
4.6.1	   Interview	  schedule	  	  
Creswell (2004) suggests that qualitative research takes place in the natural 
setting as the researcher normally goes to the site of the participant to conduct 
the research.  He argues that this gives the researcher an advantage as the 
researcher  is able to develop a level of detail about the individual or place and 
also gives the researcher the chance to be involved in the actual experiences of 
the participants. Interview sites varied, whilst most were conducted  in the 
natural setting of the interviewees, i.e. their office or homes a few did not fit into 
this scheme.  Four were conducted at the researcher’s home and one in a fast 
food restaurant.   Interviews conducted at interviewees’ office had a particular 
advantage in that interviewees had access to data from their colleagues and 
records,  and it also gave  me the opportunity to be a part of the interviewees’ 
experience. But on the other hand, it was distracting at times in that the 
interviewees were interrupted by telephone calls or by walk-ins from their 
colleagues.  One of the interviews involved  members from an unplanned 
community, I was able to see the issues that affected these residents.  At three 
sites (restaurant, residence and at an office), the surroundings were particularly 
noisy. I was concerned about the quality of the recordings. However, after 
listening to the audio recordings,  the quality was clear and the voices were 
distinct and audible.  
Thirty two interviews were conducted in two phases.  In the first phase, I 
conducted two ‘exploratory’ interviews in July 2012 over a two week period.  My 
plan was to do three but one person did not respond to my invitations despite 
my many attempts. These interviews were done in order to establish among 
other things: access to  major players in the property tax field; to give direction 
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to my research questions; to see the sort of detail that participants would likely 
give; to establish the topical issues in property tax field; to see where the 
interests of the actors lie; to  help me to gauge the questions that I could 
possibly ask; to test people’s willingness to respond to requests for interviews; 
to improve and build my interviewing skills and  finally to improve my confidence 
level.  These two interviews were invaluable and the findings were rich.  
Consequently, I   incorporated them along with my findings from phase two in 
Chapters five to Chapter seven .    
 
Following the transcription and analysis of these interviews, I further reviewed 
the property tax literature and engaged in other literature  based on issues that 
arose from these interviews.  For  example   fiscal decentralization and tax 
morale.  I then spent time preparing for the second phase.   
The preparation included deciding on the  general themes along with a second 
set of research questions with associated objectives, i.e.  modified those used 
in the first phase;  sought funding, prepared the list of potential participants, 
made travel arrangements and made initial email contact with my potential 
participants. Before going to Jamaica, I  made some initial contacts, and blanket 
confirmations subject to the confirmation of interviewing details on my arrival in 
Jamaica.    
Phase two was conducted February 2013 to April 2013.  During this phase, 
thirty interviews were conducted including two scheduled group interviews.   
The interview participants were drawn from different interest groups in the 
property tax field: residents/taxpayers, tax administrators and professionals, 
politicians, members of civil society and the business community (Appendix  5).  
It was challenging  confirming with  some interviewees particularly politicians 
and tax administrators. It was a busy time for Jamaica.  It was the middle of tax 
season- end of year of filing of returns, plus it was the close of the property tax 
year.  This was  compounded by the fact that policymakers, tax administrators, 
government bureaucrats were busy dealing with property tax policy  changes 
which became effective on April 1, 2013.  But all these were good in that the 
property tax was a topical issue and it seemed as if people were more willing to 
talk. 
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My list of interviewees came from a number of sources:  referrals from my 
exploratory interviews, internet searches, government reports, my professional 
and social network.  Whilst it was not difficult to make contact with  people from 
my professional and social network, the challenge was in convincing them to 
participate.  Some viewed the interview as a way of testing their technical and 
professional knowledge on property tax  and even felt that they had to ‘study’ or 
read up on property tax  before giving their consent. I reassured them that the  
interviews were not about testing their technical and professional knowledge but 
rather was a way for them to share their views, opinions, experiences and 
perceptions of the property tax field. 
 
For those persons for whom I received referrals or through reports, for which I 
had no direct contact, I conducted internet searches or used my professional 
and or social networks to obtain their contacts, contacting them was a 
challenge.  Sometimes the internet information was outdated. Where this 
happened, I relied on my social network. A contact through my social network 
was particularly fruitful in making contact with a potential interviewee who 
eventually agreed to be interviewed and also provided me access to key players 
in the property tax field.   
Before proceeding on to the next interview, I listened the previous interview(s), 
reflected on them to ascertain what is relevant for the upcoming interviews.  I 
also  attempted to transcribe if there was time. Sometimes, depending on who 
the next interviewee was, it necessitated me reviewing  a number of interviews.  
Reviewing and reflecting on the previous interviews gave me the opportunity to 
correct the mistakes I made and also to modify some questions for the next 
interview (Miles and Huberman 1994). When I wasn’t conducting interviews, I 
spent time  reviewing and reflecting on interviews, adjusting my interview list, 
contacting potential interviews, confirming interview details and transcribing.   
 
I prepared an interview guide which had the major themes, research questions 
emphasising different areas based on the interviewee being interviewed.  For 
example, interviewing cabinet ministers,  the emphasis concentrated on policy 
issues.  Usually my first question in each interview was one which I perceived 
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the interviewee would be willing to answer and I then I moved to those which 
were more involved and intense. 
After completing the 32nd interview, I believed that I had reached saturation 
point (even though I wanted to interview one other person) as I had adequately 
covered the various bases based on what I had set out to do and what the 
participants wanted to tell me about the property tax field.  However, while 
analysing and writing up, I noticed that there were some gaps in the data, so I 
followed up with emails and telephone conversations with selected participants. 
 
4.6.2	   Ethical	  considerations	  	  
At the start of each interview, I introduced myself, advised the interviewee of the 
purpose and nature of my study outlining the ethical issues. Most times, before 
commencing the questioning, I engaged the interviewees in pre-interview 
discussions which served as ‘ice  breakers’ i.e. putting both participant and 
interviewer at ease paving the way for a more relaxed  interview atmosphere.  
There were occasions when I was invited to the interviewees’ office  while the 
interviewees  concluded or finalised a task.   This afforded me the opportunity to 
observe the interviewees performing their  job.    
 All ethical issues were taken into consideration before, during and after each 
interview. I received approval from my Business School (see Appendix 7).  I 
prepared an informed consent form for each participant to both reaffirm my oral 
representations on the ethical issues involved in the study and for the 
interviewee to keep a copy for reference (see Appendix 3).  All participants 
signed with the exception of one who forgot to sign in his haste to join his 
colleagues for a game of football.  Additionally, at the start of each interview, 
participants were advised of their right to withdraw at any time, that their 
participation was voluntary, that the data would be used for academic purposes 
only;  that  their confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009; Silverman 2010). I also requested their consent to record the 
interview showing them the devices that I would be using.  
In the main, most participants instantly agreed to be recorded but some were 
initially hesitant, reasoning for a moment or two on being recorded, but 
eventually agreeing.  At no time, I  attempted to persuade or influence them in 
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making the decision. One participant declined to be recorded.  This particular 
consent form was to adjusted to reflect the interviewee’s decision.  
4.6.3	   Sample	  selection	  and	  participants	  
The  participants selected were  actors who were intimately involved in the 
property tax field and or had a strong association with the PMC and or local 
government. Players  included current and previous residents of the PMC 
including residents from an unplanned community, senior government 
bureaucrats, senior tax administrators, a developer, a tax professional, 
members of parliament (including current cabinet ministers), councillors, 
mayors, former politicians (including a former prime minister) and civil society.  
Since, my objective is to gain a better understanding of the existing realties of 
the non-localization of the property tax and  issues relating to enforcement and 
compliance practices in the PMC from  the interviewees’ perspective, it was 
critical  for me to choose the right participants, to meet the objective of depth, 
rigor and richness. With this in mind, I used  purposive sampling which I 
considered was the most appropriate way  to fulfil this objective of richness, 
rigor and depth (Marshall 1996; Merriam 2002; Silverman 2010; Tracy 2010). I 
believed that the use of say  random sampling was inappropriate (Merriam, 
2002; Marshall 1996) as this wouldn’t  enable me to deliberately choose the 
participants to get the desired richness of data. Additionally, I didn’t  have to 
say, fulfil the condition of interviewing  a prescribed number of participants  but 
rather the number of interviews was dependent on whether I thought  I had 
enough descriptions and explanations based on my research questions. This 
sample therefore included subjects with  specific experiences , special expertise 
and outliers.  Before knowing who the final participants would have been, while 
in the field, I left my  myself open to include additional interviewees based on 
recommendations from participants who   were selected to be interviewed 
(Marshall 1996).  Thus the final selection of participants was based on my 
judgment that the selected participants provided me with the richest data that I 
could have gotten based on the research questions,  making them the best 
candidates based on the desired insights and understanding that I thought I 
wanted (Marshall 1996) influenced by my literature review on property tax.  
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For example, I chose a particular politician, because of his perceived knowledge 
of the PMC, his understanding of     fiscal decentralization,  his knowledge on 
issues relating to revenue raising in the local authorities, his understanding of 
the various constituents which he serves and the relationship between  fiscal 
exchange and tax morale.  On the other hand, I chose persons from the 
unplanned community (outliers) who do not pay property tax, so they could 
share experiences as to why they don’t pay; to  understand how the non-
payment of property tax impacted the delivery of services in their community, 
how the non-payment of property tax impacts their interactions with the PMC 
and what plans they have in place to pay their property tax.  
In concluding, because my aim is for depth, richness and rigor (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Marshall 1996; Tracy 2010) i.e.  obtaining a  deep 
understanding  and not to make generalisations (Marshall 1996) but to  give 
generous, unstinting, bountiful, descriptions and explanations (Weick 2007, 
Tracy 2010, 841), the sample size was  context  driven and studied in depth 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994).    When I got to the 32nd interview, I believed that I 
had gotten sufficient explanations but as already mentioned while analysing, I 
noticed that there were some gaps in the data, so I went back to some 
interviewees via email and telephone conversations to obtain the additional 
data.     
4.7	   Data	  analysis	  
 
As previously explained, my research method was mainly interviews, thus my 
data was mainly in the form of words. The  transcripts, post-interview notes and 
email correspondence prior to and after the interviews made up a lot of data 
requiring detailed analysis.   The challenge was therefore for me to analyze  
and  make sense of all this data.  Miles and Huberman (1994); Silverman 
(2010) suggest   that one of the major  strengths of qualitative data  lies in the 
competence of data analysis as it’s out of data analysis that the interpretations 
are arrived at.   I found the data analysis stage as the most laborious and 
intense but the most  important  (Miles and Huberman 1994)  in my study.  
According to (Miles and Huberman 1994; Silverman 2010, 234) data analysis 
consists of three concurrent stages: data reduction; data display or classification 
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and conclusion or interpretation. The following is a diagrammatic representation 
of the stages of data analysis in the iterative mode which represented how I did 
the data analysis.  
 
Figure 4.3 
Diagram of data analysis process: interactive model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Miles and Huberman 1994 
 
Figure 4.3 
As seen from the diagram, data analysis is an iterative process, all the elements 
were performed simultaneously throughout my study with most of the time spent  
in reducing the data to facilitate the drawing of conclusions.  It was particularly 
important  for me to perform all functions simultaneously  during the data 
collection process as  the processes of data collection, data reduction, data 
display and the drawing of conclusions influenced my data collection.  The 
rationale for doing them all at once during this period  and during the data 
collection period was that it informed  me of gaps in the data collection.  For 
example, while in the field, after each interview, I listened  and reviewed the 
previous  interviews before conducting the next interview.  I attempted to 
transcribe and if unable to transcribe, I made notations.  By doing this I was 
able to identify gaps (Miles and Huberman 1994) from the previous  interviews, 
which led me to  modify my questionnaire in some instances,  and in some 
cases influenced my decision to amend my list of potential interviewees.  
Data	  
collection	  
Data	  display	  
Conclusions:	  
Drawing/verifying	  
Data	  reduction	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Constant review of the interviews and my transcripts  pointed me in the direction 
where I felt I had enough data or where I reached saturation point.    
Data reduction  is the process of  selecting , focusing, simplifying, abstracting,  
and transforming the data that appear in written up field notes was an iterative 
process  (Miles and Huberman 1994) and this  characterized my actions 
throughout the duration of my study. Before I went in the field I did “anticipatory 
data reduction” (Miles and Huberman 1994, 10)  narrowing down my themes, 
research questions,  conceptual framework etc. Data reduction was largely 
iterative  (Miles and Huberman 1994) allowing for the  shrinking of  the data to 
draw  final conclusions .  A part of data reduction was transcribing the data. The 
data transcription was labour intensive and repetitive but nevertheless was   
enlightening and enjoyable. 
I received professional assistance to transcribe eight of the thirty two interviews. 
For the professionally transcribed interviews, I listened to the recordings, made 
some minor corrections, and incorporated those corrections into the transcript, 
for example punctuations that would emphasize certain points and to correct 
some words that were used which may have been misunderstood by the 
transcriber. To ensure accuracy of all the transcribed texts, I read the 
transcriptions while listening the audio recordings.  I was careful to note the 
pauses, emphases of  certain words, quotations, use of colloquial words, where 
sentences run into each other and noting the interviewee’s tone as well.  I found 
this to be important and enlightening as the correct sentence structure 
sometimes gave a whole new meaning to the data. Additionally, the 
interviewee’s tone and the use of some colloquial words or jargon sometimes 
revealed the interviewee’s true feelings about particular issues.    
My data is presented as an  organised compressed extended text supported by 
tables to make reading easier, more manageable  and understandable for the 
reader.  
Transcribing data can be an overwhelming and labour intensive activity (Miles 
and Huberman 1994).  To ensure the quality of the transcriptions, I repeatedly 
listened to the interviews,  I also read the transcriptions while listening to the 
audios.  Interviews with more than one participants  were particularly 
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challenging to transcribe but were rich in descriptions as respective individuals 
gave additional insights into “black box” property tax issues especially when 
they had divergent views as was the case with two senior tax administrators.   
 
Following each interview, I transferred  both audio recordings to my laptop- the 
university’s database giving a pre-assigned code to protect the identity of the 
interviewee(s).   Interviewees are only identifiable in the audios  if they gave 
their names in the introductions.  
 
 I used two recording devices; a small digital tape recorder and an Echo pen.  
These were not intrusive and therefore less distracting to both the interviewer 
and interviewees with each serving as a backup device in the event one should 
fail.  Additionally, the quality of the audio recordings was good.  In the first 
phase of my interview, I used a digital tape recorder and my laptop as a back-
up. Although the audio recording quality  of the laptop was good, it was 
cumbersome and invasive especially when the interview was offsite,  therefore 
the change to use two small devices.  
Following the transcription of the data, I entered the coding phase, here I used a 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) based on my 
research and discussions with colleagues on the advantages and usefulness of 
using CAQDAS.  Qualitative data is bulky, thus it is important to have some sort 
of mechanism or tool to assist in the management of this huge volume of data.  
Thus CAQDAS  was chosen to  assist me in the more efficient management 
and  retrieval of the data (Bringer et al 2006; Liamputtong 2009, McKerchar 
2010, 247) for the enhanced transparency in the data analysis process and also  
for the  help it provides in seeing the connections in the data (Bryman 2008, 
McKerchar 2010).  However, I was mindful that using CAQDAS may lead to the 
fragmentation of the data thereby losing its ‘essence’ and depth of meaning the 
foundation of qualitative research (McKerchar 2010).  To counter this, I always  
sought to maintain the storyline so as to keep the data contextualized by 
referring back to the respective interviews to ensure that the context and depth 
of the data were being captured.   
Having decided that I would use CAQDAS, I chose QSR NVivo on the following 
bases: it carried the advantages associated with using CAQDAS software; 
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secondly it was easy to learn and manipulate, thirdly, this software was 
supported by and provided by my university for qualitative researchers.  The 
university took  care of  licensing and IT issues. Additionally, I obtained 
assistance from colleagues, plus  YouTube carried a range of online tutorials  
which were quite useful.  It’s  an excellent data management tool which 
executed some lines of interrogation and performed text searches across my 
entire data sets.  NVivo  was also useful as a storage medium for my  interview 
documents. NVivo  facilitated data queries or interrogation  and analysis.   It 
also aided me in my literature review. I relied on it extensively to assist me in 
the coding process primarily as the means to organise my coded data. 
 I also used Microsoft word and manual method to support NVivo.  Microsoft 
was useful when I probed data with respect to individual interviews.   
 
After transcribing each interview, I read and I reflected on each one developing 
a storyline and themes for each interview.  This developed my familiarity with 
each interview, so that I could match the respective storylines with the 
respective interviewees which aided me with the coding. I uploaded each 
interview into NVivo along with the audio recordings and commenced coding 
which was iterative, time consuming and laborious.   
Coding is ‘analysis…differentiating and combining the data making reflections’ 
and thus it was an ongoing, iterative reflective process (Miles and Huberman 
1994, 56).  I used codes to label or tag chunks of  connected data and I also 
used them for data retrieval (Miles and Huberman 1994).  The final codes are 
displayed in Appendix 1. 
The coding process began with those themes that I used for the interview 
process, modifying them by adding new themes and subthemes generated from 
the raw data paying attention to concepts and terms used by participants 
(Barbour 2008) simultaneously discarding those that I  thought were 
inappropriate.  In developing the final codes and sub codes, I looked at those 
codes that seemed to capture what was happening in the property tax field, i.e. 
those  that were compelling and seemed to resonate with the respondents.  I 
reviewed the storyline of the main code/theme, then questioned what is it that 
the data is trying to say about this particular issue, fleshing out the various 
aspects with each aspect forming a sub code or sub theme. In all of this, I 
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ensured that every line or every word was coded.  I was careful also to present 
the opposing view point.  
4.8	   Limitations	  	  
 
This study carries a number of limitations which are acknowledged hereunder. 
The qualitative study on property tax practice in an urbanised municipality with 
data collected from thirty-two interviews in the field is not statistically 
generalizable. However the objective of the study is not to provide 
generalisations but rather to obtain a deeper understanding of property tax 
practice as discussed in section 4.4.1 and also for the development of theory.  
However the findings carry policy implications for both Jamaica and other 
countries internationally.  Chapters five to seven with the findings provide 
evidence of the developed  theoretical framework on interpretations of the 
findings.  All the data weren’t  confined to participants from the property tax field 
in  Portmore as discussed in section 4.4.3. Portmore is a unique dormitory town 
with noticeable political, social and economic differences. An argument could be 
made that if participants were drawn from Portmore only, the results probably 
would have been different.  But this probably would be unlikely.   Seeing that 
property tax is centrally managed, it was important to obtain perspectives not 
only from Portmore but also from the wider cross section of actors in the 
property tax field which  adds to the rigor and richness of the data.  A second  
limitation was obtaining secondary data63  not in the public domain.  I made 
several requests by way of the interviews, then by email and telephone 
reminders  but received no response. I believe that the secondary data  would 
have helped to corroborate the empirical evidence adding richness to the 
findings.   
4.8.1	  Subjective	  judgment	  	  
Subjective judgment comes with the use of an interpretive methodological 
approach, the truth claims that I have made are relative to my ontological and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Documents	  requested	  included	  Portmore’s	  budget	  for	  the	  past	  seven	  years	  (this	  would	  provide	  details	  
of	  property	  revenues	  collected	  and	  those	  allocated	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government;	  a	  breakdown	  
of	  the	  property	  tax	  revenues	  for	  Jamaica	  and	  Portmore’s	  Citizen’s	  Charter	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epistemological assumptions (Sandberg 2005). The nature of qualitative 
methodology demanded that I be a part of the lived environment of the actors, 
and therefore I provided the interpretations as one experiencing the field.  
Additionally, my interpretations are influenced by my own historical, cultural, 
and linguistic understanding or reality, my education, my socialization, my 
professional experience (Sandberg 2005) and also my intimate involvement 
with Portmore seeing that my permanent home is there. The issue therefore is 
how I justify that my knowledge claims are true or feasible  in the light of the 
foregoing.   
Throughout the study, I engaged in continuous self-reflexivity: I tried to be 
honest and frank about  myself, identified my weaknesses, shortcomings and 
my strengths, leading me to understand who I am, the purpose of  my research 
and who is my audience (Tracy 2010, 842). I also reported my own voice as an 
active participant in the field (Merriam 2002).  This self-reflexivity heightened me 
into deep critical thinking and reflection which was intensely subjective and 
spiritual (Tracy 2010), a process which helped me to get to the knowledge 
claims I made. 
Secondly, in the initial phase of the project that is before and during the 
interviews, I developed a ‘community of interpretation’ (Sandberg 2005): I 
sought to develop an understanding of what my project is about between the 
participants and me. My initial invitation letters, letters of consent, email and 
telephone conversations to my participants contained this and at the start of 
each interview, this was reconfirmed. In this way, my participants and I referred 
to the same object being researched. Thirdly, during data analysis, I sought to 
develop a circular relationship between the different parts of the data.  In other 
words, the data reported say on an area was not looked at in isolation but was  
analysed in relation to all the parts and the whole.  In doing this I was able to 
see the  big picture with the conflicting views. This strategy enabled me to give 
a coherent interpretation  supporting the communicative validity of the 
knowledge claims(Sandberg 2005).   
The literature argues that truth is achievable through dialogue (Gadamer 
1990,1994, Sandberg 2005).  Throughout my research, I discussed my 
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knowledge claims with different groups of interpreters to see how feasible they 
were. These discussions helped to refine, confirm and in some situations 
challenged those claims I made giving me the opportunity to rethink and adjust 
them. 
I had the situation in the study where some participants seemed to pass on data 
through impression management, storytelling or through cultural scripts which I 
identified was not their reality.  To get to the reality, what I did was to ask follow-
up questions.  For example, in an interview involving two participants from an 
highly regarded community64, one of the participants was careful not to reveal 
his compliance status giving the impression that he was a compliant taxpayer. 
However, as the interview progressed and with further questioning, it was 
revealed that he was an evader for many years having been threatened with 
legal action from the tax authority.  
Another strategy that I used to validate my interpretations was through 
participant observations.  Most of the interviewees were observed in their own 
settings during the interviews: I got the chance to see the connections of what 
they said and making comparisons with my interpretations.  
Although I strived for coherent interpretations, this may have caused me to 
overlook some forms of ambiguity, complexity and multiplicity in the property tax 
field. I engaged transgressive validity (Sandberg 2005)  to seek out those taken-
for-granted frameworks within the field.  Here, I carefully searched for 
differences and contradictions in the lived experience.  For example, in 
searching to understand why forfeitures are not used as a strategy, I repeatedly 
read the transcripts which carried a particular line on the issue checking it 
against other perspectives or opposing views continuing the exercise until I 
found the truth.  Another thing that I did was to include a wide range of voices 
from the field including women, various types of property owners and occupiers, 
different age ranges and people from various communities and sectors within 
the field. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  participant’s	  career	  required	  him	  to	  be	  compliant.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  participant	  was	  
from	  a	  community	  where	  the	  expectation	  was	  that	  people	  from	  these	  communities	  would	  be	  compliant.	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Finally, to ensure that my interpretations are reliable, I continuously controlled 
and checked my interpretations throughout the research process, that is, from 
the research questions, selecting interviewees, gathering and analysing the 
data. As mentioned in my opening paragraph, I continuously dealt with my 
subjectivity instead of overlooking it, I was continuously reflective throughout the 
process.  I carefully interpreted the findings through the Bourdieusian theoretical 
lens, the methodological perspective that I used as the lens, also drawing from 
the interdisciplinary nature of taxation. 
4.9	  	   Summary	  
This chapter described the main approach taken to the study as well as 
presented the three research questions and their related objectives. A detailed 
explanation was given of the interpretive approach and why it was taken. The 
suitability of the semi-structured face-to-face interviews was given, outlining the 
interview process, schedule and basis for the sample selection and the ethical 
consideration outlined. The study’s conceptual framework was presented in two 
stages: a description of the framework of the property tax field and the key 
theoretical concepts from the main strands of the  literature for the study; tax 
administration including property tax administration; fiscal decentralization and 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice which provide the lens for the interpretation of the 
findings as demonstrated in Chapters five to seven. The next three chapters 
provide the discussions, analyses of the findings within the context of the 
theoretical framework all of which serve to increase our understanding of 
property tax in practice. Chapter five looks at enforcement, chapter six, non-
localization of the tax and chapter eight compliance issues. 
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Empirical	  findings	  
5.0	   Chapter	  5	  	  -­‐	  Property	  tax	  enforcement	  practices	  
5.1	   Introduction	  
This chapter provides the findings, discussions and analysis of the findings in 
relation to the first research question.  Research Question One: What are the 
main property tax enforcement practices and how  do the tax authority and 
policymakers use their capital to shape these practices?  
Objectives: 
• To gain insights into some of those issues and circumstances which 
contribute to weak and selective enforcement practices  
• To establish how policymakers use resources to gauge property tax 
enforcement, indirectly emphasising the large tax types 
• To provide insights into how the tax authority and the policymakers use 
the enforcement field as a site of struggle and resistance  
• To provide insights into to how Jamaica’s land tenure history and culture 
shape enforcement strategies 
• To provide an overview of the reminder system; to establish how  the tax 
authority uses it as a means to support government policy, extract 
resources from the local authorities and to maintain and enhance its 
dominance and visibility in the community 
• To provide insights into how the tax authority  uses  the judicial system 
as means of demonstrating its disagreement with the lack of adequate 
resources and its lack of trust and support of the court system 
 Firstly a number of observations is  presented in 5.2 concerning the tax 
administration’s  enforcement practices: 5.2.1 weak enforcement; 5.2.2 
taxpayer profiles, risk and audit and 5.2.3 enforcement resources. This is 
followed by the discussions and representations surrounding  the non-use of 
forfeitures in section 5.3.1;  section 5.3.2 discusses enforcement on small 
residential taxpayers, non-enforcement on renters and squatters; section 5.3.3 
enforcement in relation to large land barons; section 5.3.4 enforcement through 
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the provision of third party information; section 5.3.5 the reminder system; 
section 5.3.6 the judicial system.  Section 5.4 summarizes the chapter.  
5.2	  	  General	  observations	   
 
5.2.1	  	  	  Weak	  enforcement	  
Some interviewees expressed concern that there was a problem with 
enforcement practices by the tax authority,  in that the tax authority was not 
strict about enforcement. In this regard, a taxpayer, interviewee 25A argued that 
non-enforcement was pervasive,  that everybody in Jamaica was able to get 
away with evasion because tax enforcement  and tax collection  weren’t   that 
serious. Interviewee 25A, also believed that there  was no  strict property tax 
collection so taxpayers were able to owe property tax for many years without 
being bothered until there was an amnesty.  The interviewee concluded his 
point by saying,    ‘if you don't really want to commit to paying…every year, you 
have a choice, nobody will come at you (Interviewee 25A/Taxpayer). A 
legislator, interviewee 8 expressed dissatisfaction at the level of evasion and 
also suggested that the tax authority should bring the ‘boom’ down on evaders. 
A member of civil society, interviewee 22 stated that there was non-compliance 
amongst a large cross section of persons and companies on account of weak 
enforcement according to a tax professional.  
Some interviewees singled out  specific groups of taxpayers who evaded tax.  A 
senior manager, interviewee 20B from a local authority stated ‘in Jamaica, the 
big men don’t pay tax’. This view was confirmed by a taxpayer, interviewee 26 
who said	   ‘the rich evades tax altogether as  they don’t  see it  back in their 
community…’.  Yet,  another  taxpayer, interviewee 30 perceived that the tax 
authority was not aggressive in enforcing on professionals arguing that ‘doctors 
and lawyers in Portmore not (sic) paying tax on their income that they earn in 
Portmore and they try to avoid or hide the income to pay… and that is 
something that the government  goes after more forcibly than the property tax, 
then who is going to remember the property tax?  
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In discussing property tax enforcement with a senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 16 the researcher posed the following question: Should voluntary 
organizations be asked to assist in property tax enforcement and if so what 
would be their role? The administrator expressed doubt about the viability or 
practicality of such a  partnership attributing this to people’s attitude or habitus 
or the culture towards tax paying as demonstrated in the literature (Bahl and 
Wallace 2007; Tennant and Tennant 2007).   The following  quote reflects this:  
‘But guess what happen, this could not happen here, because most of 
the people don’t pay tax here. So you can’t be fighting people to pay tax 
and you not paying. Because sometimes I will be listening to the radio 
and hear some people talking about what the government need (sic) to 
do…Yes, but these people do not pay tax and what are they talking 
about.  I am sitting there and I know that these people do not pay 
tax.  But what can I do, I have to keep quiet. I sit in my house and hear 
and I say the individual don’t (sic) realize what they are saying, who is 
paying for that? (Interviewee 16/Senior Tax Administrator). 
5.2.2	   Profiling	  taxpayers,	  risk	  management	  and	  audit	  
Another observation in the findings that impacted tax enforcement was the 
absence of  taxpayer profiles (Culllis and Lewis 1997) by the tax authority.  The 
authority had no formal profiles for use in their enforcement activities. A senior 
tax administrator, interviewee 16 stated… ‘we don’t know (the) taxpayer, we 
have no idea…of the ages…of a person’s profession…employment status…we 
do not have that information’. This  statement was rather interesting and telling 
suggesting that the tax authority didn’t   seem to know who they targeted or 
serviced (Cullis and Lewis 1997) or  seemed to know what motivated or 
influenced taxpayers’ compliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Cullis and 
Lewis 1997; Cowell 1999; Torgler 2005; Alm and Torgler 2006; Kornhauser 
2007)  or taxpayers’ relationship with the tax authority,  a method to  gauge their 
response or  to regulate them (Braithwaite 2002).    
Additionally, the findings revealed that the tax authority didn’t engage a risk 
based approach nor was there an enforcement strategy for property tax.  In this 
regard another senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A pointed out that there 
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was no risk management (Bird and Vazquez-Caro 2011)  or segmentation 
strategy whether by geography or demographics. The interviewee further 
explained   that with the exception of setting up a collecting station in Portmore, 
and  the  strategy to have additional outstations to support the twenty-nine 
collecting stations to facilitate enforcement and compliance, there was no other 
strategy in place.  This senior administrator, interviewee 14A justified a non-risk 
based enforcement strategy to the IMF’s dictates (Stewart 2008).  The 
interviewee suggested that  when a risk assessment was done of all taxes i.e. 
their ability to contribute towards the national revenue goals as dictated by the 
IMF, property tax fell at the bottom of the scale as its contribution towards 
national revenues was minimal; thus the concentration was on meeting the 
revenue goals of the large taxes leaving the property tax behind.  This is what 
the senior administrator said: 
‘…come last year September,… we were going to be losing…, about 
J$5b in PAYE. GCT was wobbling, SCT wasn’t performing and we 
(were) projecting that we were coming in below 97%, we knew we had to 
hit 97% or more to meet the numbers for the IMF. When we look at the 
number, if we look at property tax double, it don’t (sic) change.  We were 
looking at an $11b so we would have to double property tax then. And if  
we double it, we would still have J$5 (outstanding)…(Interviewee 
14A/Senior Tax Administrator) 
This senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A stated  that the absence of a risk 
based approach  led to the underestimation of the number of  parcels in some 
areas.  For example, the participant stated that with the new planning dynamics 
and planning laws  as confirmed by (Gill 2000), Portmore was never taken into 
consideration and was never treated as a strata which accounted for the 
exclusion of some properties from their compliance model.  However, the 
interviewee stated  that corrective action was being taken which utilized  a  risk 
assessment  approach.  The following quote reflects this:  	  
‘We have been changing and…we are seeing the dynamics of 
compliance in a sort of risk basis...Where, maybe we take a parish like 
say Hanover or St Mary; maybe those parishes will have property tax 
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having a greater significance than say a Kingston.	   	  A Mandeville would 
have that factor, because it is,…when you look at PIOJ 65report bauxite 
is not as big as we think. But you have other economic drivers, 
wholesales, retail  right, so property tax  is important.  So we know it is a 
high value housing area, property in Mandeville is expensive, 
Manchester in general…Montego Bay is a good example,…one of the 
reasons is the high level of villas…and a lot of absentee owners. So if we 
push that, that is likely to be collected  (Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax 
Administrator).  
In terms of property tax audits, two interviewees: a tax professional, interviewee 
18 and former administrator for sixteen years along with a senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 14A confirmed  that the use of property tax audits 
weren’t  a practice in the enforcement field.  Interviewee 14A, senior tax 
administrator however stated that he didn’t perceive any problems if the practice 
were to be introduced  despite the absence of TRN66 numbers in the property 
tax base. Interviewee 14A, senior tax administrator further debated that  
property tax audits could be an easy fix, requiring no special framework, adding 
that they could ‘piggy’ back on the other tax audits.  Interviewee 14A, senior tax 
administrator, perceived that such audits  would be  particularly useful in  areas 
which carried a high concentration of trading and business activities.  
5.2.3	  Enforcement	  resources	  
A tax administrator, interviewee 14A stated that even though the penalty and 
interest provisions were not draconian there was little voluntary compliance 
necessitating the tax authorities to carry out a lot of enforcement activities which 
were costly (Levi 1988; Bahl and Cyan 2009; Bahl 2009). Bahl (2004) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  PIOJ	  –	  Planning	  Institute	  of	  Jamaica	  
66	  Tax	  registration	  number-­‐	  this	  is	  a	  unique	  nine-­‐digit	  identification	  number	  assigned	  to	  each	  individual	  
taxpayer,	  business	  enterprise,	  organization	  (non-­‐profit,	  partnership,	  charity,	  etc.)	  by	  way	  of	  an	  
automated	  system.	  The	  TRN	  is	  needed	  to	  transact	  business	  with	  other	  institutions	  e.g.	  banks,	  schools,	  
examination	  boards	  etc.	  The	  number	  must	  be	  used	  when	  conducting	  business	  transactions	  with	  Tax	  
Departments	  or	  Government	  Agencies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.jamaicatax.gov.jm/index.php/2012-­‐05-­‐14-­‐21-­‐28-­‐18#WhatisTRN	  	  	  retrieved	  December	  19,	  
2014	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articulates that tax administration should be seen as a production process and 
in this regard adequate inputs such as staff, technical support and equipment 
should be given to carry out the process. The findings suggest that the tax 
authority was hampered in its enforcement efforts by resource constraints: 
monetary; human, equipment and technological which appeared to be a 
consequence of Jamaica’s tax policy. 
A key issue in any country’s tax policy is the level at which the tax is managed 
as discussed in the literature review  as articulated by (Bird and Slack 2006; 
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011, 2). Despite the local government 
reform of 1993/94(see section 2.3.1) which passed on local management of the 
property tax to the local authorities, findings from the field suggest that this is 
not yet a reality. The issues concerning the reasons for lack of local 
management of the property tax are fully discussed in chapter six.   
A senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A in discussing the duties of the tax 
administration stated that among other things, it’s primarily to administer the 
legislation relating to tax, the  main.. Of note here is the absence of any 
reference to the property tax.  The property tax is not a major contributor to 
national revenues (Sjquoist 2007; Cornia and Walters 2010) nevertheless it’s 
critical to the survival of the local authorities as confirmed in the findings and 
supported by the literature.  Based on its  nominal contributions to  the national 
revenues,  not much resources were dedicated to the enforcement and 
compliance confirmed a tax administrator. This was confirmed by a  government 
bureaucrat, interviewee 2, who stated that  historically little or no attention was 
paid to the property tax. Property tax revenues were paid into the consolidated 
funds with the local authorities receiving a deficit grant or given some funds in 
lieu of the property tax collected.  But there was a policy shift in 1993 according 
to the bureaucrat  (Policy 1993)  and property tax was made a dedicated fund to 
cover street lighting, garbage disposal and beautification.  
An essential part of the reform programme  the interviewee continued was also 
to allocate to local authorities adequate and independent sources of 
revenues(including the property tax)    to cover these services. The reform also 
called for  local authorities to have a greater say in the fixing of the property tax 
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rates and also gave them power   to introduce a system of indexation to remedy 
the lengthy revaluations according to the bureaucrat, interviewee 2. However, 
the local management of the property tax never passed to the local authorities 
and at the same time, much attention was not given to it by the central 
government.   This  attitude towards the property tax  was also worsened by 
Jamaica’s association with the IMF (Stewart 2008).67 in that it paid  little or no 
attention to the property tax in piloting the various tax reforms in Jamaica during 
the last thirty years according to the administrator.   
Property tax was never on the agenda. According to a senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 14A, the property tax doesn’t  not drive  a large percentage of the  
revenues or it’s not a revenue raising tax as confirmed in the 
literature(Mansfield 1988),   thus the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
never really got into the debate of the role and function of local authorities as 
confirmed by (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008) and therefore  when they are looking 
at broadening the tax base, they tend to look at the wider level with  the 
adequacies of  the larger tax types like GCT and the income tax focusing more 
on issues such as tax expenditure, waivers, tax incentives etc. Additionally,  the 
property tax never really featured in risk management of the production of tax 
revenues (Mansfield 1988).  According to the administrator, the justification for 
this was  that when the  risk assessment was done of all taxes i.e. their ability to 
contribute towards the national revenue goals as dictated by the IMF, property 
tax fell at the bottom of the scale as its contribution was minimal (Sjquoist 2007; 
Cornia and Walters 2010); thus the concentration was on meeting the revenue 
goals of the large taxes leaving the property tax behind as previously discussed.  
So the senior administrator, interviewee 14A stated that priority in allocating 
resources were given to meeting the revenue targets of the large tax types 
leaving the property tax to sort of fend for itself.  Thus property tax received little 
resources to support its compliance and enforcement activities. Tax 
administrators therefore struggle with the limited resources with which they 
have to work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  See	  (Stewart	  2007,	  Chapter	  10)	  Tax	  policy	  transfer	  to	  Developing	  Countries	  In	  Global	  Debates	  in	  
Taxation	  (Nehring,	  and	  Schui	  2007)	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Staffing 
The findings revealed that staff shortage influenced property tax  enforcement. 
A senior tax administrator, interviewee 17 in speaking of the Albion Port tax 
office68 stated  that  ‘we can’t grab everybody’ i.e. enforce on everyone,   
because,  it is a wide amount (sic) of persons  to be serviced by only two 
compliance officers. This office coverage is forty three thousand parcels of land 
with a delinquency of 51% for the 2011/12 tax year. However, staffing 
assistance is received from the local authority increasing the complement to  
eight69 including two temporary officers used on a needs basis and are 
important  particularly for Sunday work as the tax office doesn’t work on 
Sundays according to this tax administrator. Sometimes the assignment of 
personnel by the local authority is tenuous influenced by partisan politics, 
ultimately threatening enforcement activities reported by a mayor, interviewee 9.  
The following quotation reflects this: 
‘…we send people (tax office) and they work… That relationship was 
almost destroyed the other day because we have three young (people) 
there working. Their contract expired and the council want (sic) to get rid 
of the three young (people).  And  this is why: they were employed when 
the former mayor was (there). I said, ‘Well you can’t hold this against the 
young people... It was the tax lady  I saw on the street and she was 
upset: ‘Look at this.’ So I went back and said, ‘OK, you get rid of three 
(people)  in the  middle of the tax season in April and you don’t employ 
anybody?’ So I just, this is where I act (sic), cancelled the termination 
notice, extended the thing and said ‘we’re going to reorganise the thing 
and all of you can apply’. I don’t play party politics as mayor, that’s me. 
Part of the Jamaican problem is the tribal politics…Nonsense! 
(Interviewee 9/Mayor). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Named	  changed	  to	  protect	  interviewee	  
69	  The	  complement	  is	  a	  manager,	  two	  compliance	  officers	  plus	  three	  	  contract	  assigned	  and	  two	  
occasional	  (needs	  basis)	  	  employees	  provided	  	  by	  the	  local	  authority.	  
150	  
	  
Equipment shortage 
The findings suggested that enforcement efforts were also hampered by  the 
lack of equipment: computers, telephones and printers.  A senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 17 from the Albion Port Office stated that the 
Property Tax Unit had only two computers to be shared  amongst six staff 
members: at times staff members were 'bungled70 (sic)  around just one 
computer’. The problem was further exacerbated  because this same computer 
was also used for printing jobs  and telephone calls.  Interviewee 17, senior tax 
administrator explained that  the main printer that was used for printing  of 
notices and reminders was also used by staff in the main service area. 
Consequently, there was competition for its use.  Additionally,  the staff in the 
customer service area complained about the noise level from the printer arising 
from the printing of large batches of notices according to this interviewee.   The 
resolution to this problem according to the senior tax administrator, interviewee 
17 was that ‘we have to be printing after work or in small batches, sometimes 
five at time,  which slowed up the work’. Furthermore, in order to catch up on 
the work,  the administrator often times worked alone until 7pm in the nights 
stating:  
‘So it boils down to just me just staying back and doing the work for most 
evenings.  I just do everything, I don’t limit myself anywhere, any job, I 
just do everything (Interviewee 17/Senior Tax Administrator). 
Based on  the lack of monetary resources other staff members from the 
property tax unit  weren’t  asked to work beyond regular work hours  because 
they wouldn’t  be compensated. But this administrator based on her disposition 
of wanting to move the work along used her cultural capital to perform the tasks 
of other staff members as reflected in her comments, ‘I just do everything’ 
(Interviewee 17/Senior Tax Administrator) 
Whilst concluding this interview, I asked this participant,   would you like to tell 
me anything else about the property tax system?  At this point, the interviewee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Bungle	  around	  	  in	  Jamaican	  parlance	  means	  huddled	  together,	  grouped	  together.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  
would	  	  that	  the	  staff	  members	  are	  grouped	  or	  are	  crowded	  around	  using	  the	  one	  computer	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  (to	  be	  obtain	  	  information	  on	  this	  from	  Ms	  Smith,	  what	  she	  meant).	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invited five subordinates to join the discussions.  They confirmed their superior’s 
claim of the lack of physical and financial resources.  With regards to the work 
resources, one stated, that they had to be ‘all over the place getting calls from 
taxpayers…we have to be at this desk and that desk…’(Interviewee 
17A/Compliance Officer) . Another one said, ‘the chairs are not working well 
with our backs’ (Interviewee 17B/Compliance Officer). One remarked about the 
low salaries ‘honestly, the pay is very discouraging, but seeing that you like the 
job, you would probably bypass it… it is better to have a job rather than not 
having one’ (Interviewee 17A/Compliance Officer).   
But even in the face of limited resources for enforcement activities and poor 
remuneration, some interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the tax 
authority’s ability to stem property tax evasion as previously mentioned in 
section 5.2.1.    Speaking of the inadequacy of the online property tax payment 
portal, a tax professional, interviewee 18 complained of the system’s  inability to 
accommodate advanced  property tax payments and its incapacity to handle the 
volume of transactions on the due date. The above resource limitations 
hampered the tax authority’s ability to effectively carry out enforcement activities 
which may have attributed to some taxpayers’ scant regard for the authority.  
According to a tax administrator  some taxpayers made fun of the tax authority’s 
inability to enforce on delinquent taxpayers.  Interviewee 17, senior tax 
administrator stated that some taxpayers  have told her that  ‘they  have never 
paid it (property tax) and they have never seen anybody come to them’. Another 
interviewee 17C who is compliance officer attributed this attitude to taxpayers’  
knowledge that ‘we’re (the administration) weak, i.e. have limited resources to 
effectively enforce compliance.  
Weak enforcement practices regardless of the reasons suggest that tax 
administrators aren’t  carrying out their mandate to maximise revenue collection 
and maintain the critical balance  between evasion and non-compliance and 
also to send the signal that evasion will not be tolerated (Slivani 1992). Their 
failure to maintain this balance  may ultimately lead to more tax evasion within 
the society  as non-compliance in one group may encourage evasion in other 
groups (Traxler 2010). Additionally, through weak enforcement, tax 
administrators inadvertently redefined  the enforcement field by institutionalising 
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selective enforcement. Weak enforcement also  brings to the fore the issue of 
retributive fairness, that is, some people are punished  for  evasion while others 
aren’t  (Elkins 2009; OECD 2010). 
One of the main contributors to weak enforcement was the absence of 
adequate of resources to the authorities by the government.	   Economic and 
material resources are powerful and valuable  within the field (Gracia and Oats 
2012) and are fundamental to successful enforcement.  Resources can thus be 
used as a means to determine enforcement activities as was confirmed in the 
findings.   
Over the years, the disposition of policymakers  is the unimportance of the 
property tax as a significant revenue producer (Rosengard 2012).   In keeping 
with this belief,  inadequate resources were allocated to the tax authority to 
effectively enforce property tax which is a contributing issue in its weak 
enforcement and  poor revenue production.  Poor revenue production not only 
reaffirms the belief that the property tax is unimportant but that it’s  incapable of 
producing significant revenues which may further lead to the pattern of 
continued allocation of inadequate resources in the field. It would appear that, 
policymakers’ action of the government is really a strategy to communicate not 
only the relative unimportance of the tax but also to dominate and dictate to the 
tax authority their sphere of influence in the property tax field: the extent of  
work that they should perform  signalling to the tax authority as to which taxes 
take should take precedence in Jamaica in keeping with the IMF dictates. As 
stated by a policymaker and cabinet minister, interviewee 7, the property tax  ‘is 
coming from the same pocket’, thus it seems that the government wants to 
ensure that the majority from the pocket goes to the larger national taxes. In this 
regard, the policymakers by withholding economic capital to the tax authority 
maintains  and perpetuates the practice of weak enforcement in the property tax 
field (Swartz 1997).  
5.3	  Enforcement	  (non)practices	  
As previously mentioned, the perception is that the tax authority doesn’t 
routinely enforce on all segments of taxpayers but concentrate on enforcing on 
certain segments.  The enforcement strategies used  result in an average 
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compliance rate in the low fifties and in some cases less than 30% in some 
parishes according to tax administrators, a government bureaucrat and a 
policymaker. The findings also suggest that some enforcement (non) practices 
may be conditioned by tax administrators’ beliefs, or maybe  the methods or 
means by which they struggle with the policymakers in  disagreement  against 
the boundaries, laws or policies. The following sections discuss the 
enforcement strategies. 
5.3.1	  Forfeitures	  	  
A feature in the property tax field  was the practice of non-forfeiture  by the tax 
authority which isn’t  unique to Jamaica  as confirmed in the literature (Dillinger 
1988; DeCesare 2004; Bird and Martinez-Vazquez 2008) and was confirmed by 
a number of tax administrators. A government  bureaucrat  however believed 
that its use would be effective arguing that it was  the best strategy to obtain 
compliance.  Although it’s not practiced, a senor tax administrator, interviewee 
16 debated that it would be ‘nice’ if it could be used but  another senior 
administrator, interviewee 14B stated that,   ‘this will never happen in Jamaica’ 
and another senior administrator, interviewee 17, saying this doesn’t happen in 
Jamaica.  Interviewee 14B, senior tax administrator was rather articulate and 
passionate, emphatically asserting that this will never be a feature in the 
property tax system because forfeiture was a politically delicate purporting that 
politicians will never support its use as evidenced in the literature (Bahl and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2008). This is what the interviewee said: 
‘I wait and see, I say, I  know  that no politician in this country passing 
(sic) that law…and land is a very  emotive thing, any government of 
Jamaica who decides to take people’s land, remember, I tell you, it is not 
going to go down well (Interviewee14B/Senior Tax Administrator).  
The senior administrator, interviewee 14B further argued that the idea of not 
seizing land ‘probably (came)  out of our Slavic experience’, reasoning ‘this, 
was all we got (from slavery)  and so it is  a very, very, very  sensitive issue’. 
Another senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A  also posited additional  
reasons for not using forfeitures as an enforcement tool but nevertheless stated 
that in the rare situation when it was used, it’s application  was  to prime real 
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estate property only, when such  properties were deemed to be  beneficial to 
the government and or if  the action was initiated by the taxpayer. A squatter, 
interviewee 31B taxpayer from an unplanned community confirmed the tax 
administrator’s assertion on the occasion of her relative’s prime real estate 
forfeited to the government  for use in tourism development because the 
property was abandoned by her relatives. 
Firstly, the senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A argued  against its use on 
humanitarian grounds purporting  that forfeitures  ‘would be putting a lot of 
people out of where they lived and it is generational’ Secondly, the interviewee 
stated that the government didn’t  need any more lands: 
 ‘…government don’t (sic) want or need to have one iota more  piece of 
land (author’s emphasis). It doesn’t want it… because it knows it would 
maybe get back about half of St. Ann, top Clarendon, St. Elizabeth and 
Manchester from the bauxite... It really need no more right now and once 
its government, squatting becomes paramount as a problem to look at’ 
(Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax Administrator). 
Thirdly, the  senior administrator, interviewee 14A continued,  forfeiting lands 
created a conundrum or social dilemma for the government and by extension 
the politicians.  The interviewee argued that  as soon as some citizens became 
aware that government owned the lands,  they  immediately occupy such lands.  
This interviewee suggested that sections of the Jamaican society  made it their 
business to squat on government  lands with the objective of forcing the 
government to give them the land and in the event that their bid failed, the 
government was then forced to relocate them, providing them with houses, 
implying the use of their cultural capital in the form of ‘anancism’ (Seaga 2005). 
The interviewee said: 
‘…people know how to do it…right now, near (their) home you know, 
there is an old road, an old abandoned road, the New Wannings Vale 
Road71, the older maps have it...And what you see, you see people start 
to squat, (squatters) know exactly where the road is.  And that is parish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Name	  changed	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council property and they squat, you understand and they expect to get it 
and if they don’t get it, they expect to be moved into a house. It is like an 
industry (Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax Administrator) 
These taxpayers used their cultural capital, based on their disposition of 
‘anancism’ (Mordecai 2005; Seaga 2005) to obtain property via the adverse 
possession rule.    The tax authority in a bid to avert this situation takes pre-
emptive action of not forfeiting properties to the government unless the 
government has an immediate need for such properties. Tax administrators 
take this decision because their actions are interest oriented (Swartz 1997). 
They will not support the government giving lands to squatters or finding houses 
for them. Thus, even though the law stipulates that properties should be 
forfeited for non-payment, acting on their belief that  taxpayers will illegally 
occupy the forfeited properties, they used their belief to guide their decisions 
and actions resulting in non-enforcement power on these tax evaders.  Their 
actions also suggest some amount of contempt, an attitude reflective of the 
wider society (Goulbourne 1984; Nerre 2008; Oats and Sadler 2011).  
The senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A also perceived that the culture of 
squatting had become so engrained in the psyche of some sections of the 
Jamaican society  that even when some citizens  acquired economic and 
cultural capitals  which give them the power  to purchase property and the 
opportunity to become legal owners, refused this option choosing to continue to 
squat instead .  The administrator provided this example to substantiate the 
point:  
‘…there is a  (lady) who is employed by a bank, who has a university 
education wanted somewhere to live… instead of going to look a 
mortgage and buy something with title, she took a personal loan to add 
on to the capture property that she grows (sic) up in…so we might have 
a generation of bank managers that live on capture land…she went and 
took an expensive short term loan to build on something that tomorrow 
morning they can come and bulldoze it…it was said that all they tried to 
convince her, ‘don’t do it’, she did it...so she risks her five or seven year 
156	  
	  
future income on a piece of land that somebody could easily bulldoze. 
(Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax Administrator). 
Another senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B  perceived  that some people 
chose to live  in squatter settlements  because they didn’t  want to pay  for 
public utilities.  
Fourthly, interviewee 14A, senior tax administrator stated that attempts by the 
tax administration to forfeit land to settle tax liability particularly inherited land, 
created disputes amongst the beneficiaries as they often complained that the 
sale price determined by the authority was too low.  This senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 14A claimed that the tax authority’s involvement in  
the whole matter of  seizing and selling properties to settle tax debt pushed the 
department ‘into the business of real estate’. Getting involved in this activity 
probably would be considered too much work for administrators.  Rather than 
getting involved in the additional work it’s better to do nothing in keeping with 
their habitus (Mills and Roberts 1974), that is maintaining their current work load 
stemming from their experience of the issues with taxpayers that arose in 
getting involved in the sale of property to cover tax liability.  This is a way of 
sending a message to the policymakers that they do not wish any additional 
work to be tagged on to their jobs, thus their resistance in the field. So in a bid 
to maintain their position they don’t enforce by using forfeitures as a strategy. 
 Finally, senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A, believed that selling one’s 
property in order to settle property tax liability would be an unfair exchange, in 
that the purchaser would be obtaining the property for much lower than its fair 
value,  because the property tax base is on the unimproved value. The 
quotation reflects this:  
‘…looking at it mathematically that where you have the tax based on the 
improved value and you have the property tax outstanding  for a long 
period of times, you are likely to find that the tax due is equivalent with 
penalty and interest and even more  than the value of the property.  So it 
becomes a fair exchange in my mind’ (Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax 
Administrator). 
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Another senior tax administrator’s view of the unimproved value was that it was 
‘ridiculous’ and inequitable because the tax base bears no relationship to 
services offered (Interviewee 15/Senior Tax Administrator).   
Tax administrators’ view of the unimproved value seemed to influence their 
decision on the use of forfeitures as a strategy. Their decision not  to forfeit is to 
demonstrate their resistance in the field to its use and to raise the awareness of 
the policymakers’ for them to change the valuation base to a more appropriate 
one.  
Tax administrators are not the only ones against the use of forfeiture as an 
enforcement strategy. Policymakers and taxpayers were not in favour of it. A 
cabinet minister and policymaker, interviewee 7 stated that ‘selling somebody’s 
property is really not a light matter because it goes to the heart of a 
constitutional protected right of every Jamaican. So it’s not something… To me, 
it is a very last resort, but just indicating that, that is available’(Interviewee 
7/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker). The interviewee further elaborated, that even 
though people run the risk of losing their property, ‘…we haven’t gone to the 
extreme of seizing and selling property’ (Interviewee 7/Cabinet 
Minister/Policymaker).  
Where taxpayers are concerned, the  findings suggest that some taxpayers 
didn’t   support this remedy.  For example, a member of civil society, 
interviewee 23 stated that he found the advertisements that delinquent 
taxpayers run the risk of losing their properties to be distasteful (Hasseldine and 
Hite 2003 Kornhauser 2007).  A taxpayer, interviewee 26 argued that the action 
of forfeiting properties for non-payment was ‘cruel’ but instead suggested that 
the tax authority should use some other means like public shaming (Kornhauser 
2007)  which he perceived  nobody wants. 
Even though the tax authority rarely practiced forfeitures, some  taxpayers 
nevertheless complied out of fear  based on the threats of losing their property 
issued in advertisements via the public media.   
The enforcement field is both a site of resistance and domination. The matter of 
not using forfeitures is a complex matter bringing into focus a number of issues: 
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cultural and  political.  Additionally, the tax authority is tasked with enforcing this 
boundary  which isn’t supported by the very people who made the boundaries in 
the first place. This disagreement calls attention to the institutional aspects of 
individual and group action (Swartz 1997).  According to Bourdieu the idea of 
institution suggests consensus but within fields, practices are weakly 
institutionalised and boundaries are not well defined (Swartz 1997).  In the law, 
the cabinet minister agrees with forfeiture but in practice the boundaries are not 
well defined. The enforcement field therefore becomes a site of resistance or 
struggle over the boundaries. The tax administrator and the policymakers 
decide on non-forfeitures for different reasons. 
5.3.2	   Small	  residential	  property	  owners	  and	  renters	  
Residential and small land owners: Interviewee 22 from civil society 
suggested that the practice of the tax authority is to target small land owners 
and owners of residential properties - the poorer people because they perceive 
that the tax from these taxpayers were  collectible but failed to enforce on 
taxpayers who owned large tracts of land.   A taxpayer, interviewee 27 was 
unhappy with this practice and suggested that the authority ‘shouldn’t   just 
target the poor man or the one who can’t make it, who you consider insignificant 
(but should) target everybody’’. With the practice of targeting the ‘poorer’ 
people, interviewee 22 from member of civil society, suggested that  this set of 
taxpayers was compliant because of the threat of losing their property while at 
the ‘same time multi-million dollar companies owe(sic) tax plus some are 
delinquent’. This view was supported by a taxpayer, interviewee 26 who  stated 
that ‘there are quite  a few rich people who are not paying,… millions and 
millions of dollars”  (sic).  
The literature confirmed that more than one-third of the high value properties in 
Jamaica had outstanding property tax liability (Cornia and Walters 2010). A 
participant, a former politician attributed non-enforcement to the lack of 
economic capital because these properties may not be in  productive use  and 
therefore not generating any income to pay the tax implying that it would be 
pointless to enforce when there’s was no means to pay.  A  senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 15 attributed two reasons for non-enforcement on 
larger non-residential properties:  firstly some of these large properties were 
159	  
	  
inaccessible (Land Policy 1996), and thus owners wouldn’t  want to pay for 
them. Secondly, some of these properties were owned by successive 
generations, with the  present generation not having the financial resources to 
meet tax payments.    This was  further compounded by the fact that the tax 
authority didn’t routinely seize properties to settle the outstanding liability. 
However, another senior  tax administrator, interviewee 14A stated that in some 
situations, legatees sold portions of the lands to settle the tax liability.  A 
taxpayer, interviewee 30, a life underwriter stated that the insurance industry 
having recognised the liquidity problem of legatees markets life insurance 
policies to provide funds on the death of the donor to cover outstanding tax 
obligations.   
Tax administrators’ used their cultural capital to maintain their position of 
dominance in the enforcement field.  Threats are used against the small 
taxpayers which didn’t  necessarily work for the large taxpayers. The tax 
authority doesn’t have the resources to go after the large taxpayers, thus their 
concentration on the smaller ones.  Additionally, this is the way of resisting the 
government’s allocation of limited resources, thus it is easier and cheaper to go 
after small taxpayers, even though the revenue returns may be smaller.   
Approximately 80% of the parcels of land are owned or occupied by smaller 
taxpayers (Cornia and Walters 2010)72.  Even though the cumulative values of 
these parcels might be smaller than the  cumulative values of the  20%, the tax 
authority’s interest is to convey to the public that enforcement is being carried 
out on  the majority of taxpayers. Thus, it would appear that the interest is not 
necessarily raising the highest amount of tax revenues but rather to bring 
compliance on the largest number of taxpayers  into compliance, thereby 
conveying the message to the population that non-compliance will not be 
tolerated. At the same time the larger taxpayers know that it would be a very 
long legal battle through the court system, thus they appeared to be unmoved 
by the threats of losing their property for non-payment. Small taxpayers with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	   There	   are	   approximately	   800,000	   parcels	   in	   Jamaica.	   In	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   was	   outstanding	   for	  
unpaid	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  tax.	  	  Of	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  J$2b	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their knowledge of the property tax laws and the threat of losing their property 
chose to comply as confirmed in the findings.  
Renters: The findings revealed that it was the tax authority’s practice not to 
enforce on renters despite the high percentage of rented properties (National 
Land Policy 1996) especially in some areas like Portmore. A  senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 16  in seeking to justify this practice argued that they 
didn’t  routinely enforce on renters  because they may get the ‘back end of the 
stick’ (Harriott 2003) while another senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A 
stated ‘you would probably get something worse than the poll tax revolt’. The 
tax administration’s fears were grounded in their beliefs that the Jamaican 
public may not only rebuff or reject their actions of enforcement on this category 
of taxpayers but were also likely to carry out violent acts against them and or in 
the society as chronicled by the country’s history  of rebellions, riots and 
demonstrations (Girvan 1999; Seaga, 2005; McLean, Mendes and Wynter 
2013, 6; Oats, Sadler and Wynter 2014) or on the other hand suffer 
victimisation (Harriott 2003).  
Tax administrators were unsure  whether  Jamaicans would accept enforcement 
on tenants, that is, as stated by a senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A ‘that 
you go to a tenant and collect from a tenant’. In situations where there was no 
buy-in,  from the public, interviewee 14A, senior tax administrator was emphatic 
that ‘you cannot impose it’  regardless of  what is contained in the  legislation.  
To support his viewpoint, the interviewee stated : 
‘People power in my view is always greater than legislative power.  It has 
always been and it will ever be and it will never change. So no matter 
how you legislate to collect from people, if the society does not accept it, 
they are going to throw it back at you (Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax 
Administrator). 
This senior administrator, interviewee 14A perceived that Jamaicans may 
regard enforcement on renters as an injustice and that their response to this 
perceived injustice would be to carry out violent demonstrations based on the 
country’s history or even attack them personally.  But a taxpayer, interviewee 27 
appeared unimpressed  or unsympathetic with the authority’s fear of perceived 
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violence in the society or against them insisting that there should be 
enforcement on all.  The quotation reflects this:  
‘Don’t come to me because of who I am and you cannot got to the next 
person down there because they will fire shot, target everybody’ 
(Interviewee 27/Taxpayer). 
To address issues of  enforcement on renters and other taxpayers,  a tax 
administrator expressed  the view that the Jamaican tax system should have  
similar procedures or practices to those obtained in countries like Singapore.  In 
Singapore, the senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A stated ‘when tax is 
owed the state  simply deducts it from the taxpayer’s bank account’. But the 
interviewee stated (with a strain in voice): ‘but I don’t know if I would want to go 
publicly and say that.  I would be eaten because of our sensibilities to those 
things’(Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax Administrator).  
Furthermore, this senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A argued that the 
practice of non-enforcement on  renters was also conditioned by  an apparent 
‘legal impediment in the law’  which created uncertainty for them. Although, the 
property tax law allows renters to deduct property tax liability  from the rental 
payment, interviewee 14A, senior tax administrator debated that the tax 
authority was uncertain whether the landlord could still claim the full rent from 
the renter, emphasising  that this issue was dogged by the many ‘why nots’ in 
law stating that ‘there’s no place for ‘why nots’. Another senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 16 also stated that the lack of clarity also exposed renters to 
possible abuse from landlords. According to (Hume et al 1999, Doyle, Hughes 
and Glaister 2009) where the law is not specific, then it gives a number of 
choices from which to select.  In this case the tax authority selected to do 
nothing, that is not enforcing on renters.  Interviewee 14A, senior tax 
administrator stated that   until or unless a definitive legal opinion is given  to the 
tax authority  that ‘it doesn’t matter, you can offset it’, there will be no 
enforcement on renters.  
Jamaicans when they view a situation as unjust will rally to the cause to vent 
their feelings.  As argued by tax administrators, interviewees 14A & 16 when 
taxpayers disagree and  there is consensus on the issue of disagreement, there 
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is people power. They would then use their social capital to oppose what is 
contained in the law,  making it impossible for them to enforce as there will be 
no compliance.  The struggle in the field is not really between the taxpayers and 
the tax authority but between the tax administrators and the policymakers.  The 
tax administrators think that the laws are too loosely defined and this is their 
way of initiating the process of getting the boundaries redefined.  Rather than 
directly confronting the policymakers, they use their internal organizational 
culture  (Mills and Roberts 1974) of doing nothing.  According to Bourdieu 
organizations draw disproportionately from their cultural resources in their 
struggle to maintain and enhance their positions in the social order (Swartz 
1997, 137) in this case the enforcement field relating to renters.  The tax 
administrators’ interest is having the  policymakers make the law  clearer in all 
respects in relation  to the duties of landlords and also to provide protection for 
renters.   Then and only then will they enforce on renters.    This action of the 
tax administrators is in keeping with the civil service culture if you don’t agree, 
you do nothing and at the same time proffer excuses for inaction.	  
Squatters: The findings revealed that Jamaica has  two categories of squatters, 
those occupying government lands and those private lands.  Those occupying 
government lands have no property tax obligation as government lands are 
exempt from property tax but private lands are liable to property tax with the 
expectation that they pay property tax   and if they are not compliant, then the  
tax authority will enforce.  The findings revealed that some Jamaicans use 
squatting via the adverse possession rule (National Land Policy 1996) to come 
into land ownership or obtaining title to land as indicated in the following quote 
by a squatter: 
‘Guess what happen, the land, if you pay the tax over a period of time 
and no one claims the land over a period of time, and no one claims it, 
you can claim the land…’ (Interviewee 31A/Squatter). 
A cabinet minister/policymaker, interviewee 7 confirmed that whilst some 
squatters paid property taxes, with the hope of earning rights to the property, he 
argued  that it was not so much the payment of the tax but rather the 
undisturbed occupation of the land for twelve years or more that had a bearing 
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on the receipt of title or legal ownership (National Land Policy 1996).  The 
findings suggested that the tax administration tended not to enforce on 
squatters or occupiers  out of fear that they may aid them in obtaining property 
dishonestly  or on the other hand that they may be assisting the agenda of 
politicians. 
According to a  senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B some squatters 
manipulate the law and beat the system (Mordecai and Mordecai 2001; Seaga 
2005) by using the adverse possession rule to ‘steal people’s property’. This 
interviewee  believed that the law doesn’t  make a distinction between those 
who  honestly occupy the land with a  genuine attachment to it  as against those 
who don’t. Therefore, there was   wariness in taking  a compliance action on 
these squatters who didn’t   pay. A senior tax  administrator, interviewee 14A in 
advocating  for changes to the law stated that the law shouldn’t  be taking the 
same route that the ‘dishonest man’ takes and thus there should be another 
way of forcing him to pay, arguing that a  distinction ought to be made between 
the  dishonest  taxpayers who voluntarily pay  the property tax for the ‘piece of 
land beside him’ according to interviewee 14B another senior tax administrator. 
i.e. land that is next to him, with the full knowledge that he’s  not in possession 
but merely paying to outrun the owner.  With this implicit dishonesty, 
interviewee 14A, senior tax administrator stated,  ‘I am very cautious of taking a 
compliance action and when people look at it, they don’t see a distinction 
between it and a dishonest approach’  In the circumstances,  no enforcement 
action is taken against squatters as the government would be horrified if it finds 
out that  it unwittingly aids property ownership or title to dishonest taxpayers via 
application of the adverse possession rule. 
Additionally, senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B  articulated that the law 
was inequitable because of the difference in timing of private lands and 
government lands occupied by squatters under which the squatters can obtain a 
legal title. This administrator stated that until the law is changed to reflect parity 
in timing,  there will be enforcement on this set of taxpayers.  The quote reflects 
this: 
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 ‘…the commissioner  of lands don’t say that if somebody who  occupies 
government or crown lands for twelve years, they can get it, who why do 
you put that there…’ (Interviewee14B/Senior Tax Administrator). 
This senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B argued that the timing remains 
this way because it was advantageous to the politicians for people to squat on 
private lands,  taking them over after twelve years while it took sixty years to get 
ownership for crown lands.  The administrator further articulated that the twelve 
year rule was part of the colonial way of taking away little people’s land, (and as 
such) the law needs to be changed…’ (Interviewee 14B/Senior Tax 
Administrator). The suggestion here by interviewee 14B, senior tax 
administrator is that under colonial rule, many Jamaicans migrated to other 
parts of the world. During this period, the government was uncertain whether 
the  migrants would return to Jamaica, thus the twelve year rule debated this 
administrator. 
Thirdly, it was the belief of senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A that  some 
elements of the adverse possession rule were no longer applicable stating 
that’s not the case that existed thirty or forty years ago’ although conceding  that 
the law does offer some accommodation. The senior tax administrator argued 
that even though Jamaica has presumably gotten rid of some of these rules, 
some people in the society refused to accept that it doesn’t exist.  Still relying on 
the old rule, the administrator claimed people squatting on land were still paying 
their property tax as the route to obtain land.  
Administrators are in disagreement with the adverse possession rule,  based on 
two issues: firstly there is the fear of rewarding dishonest taxpayers and that 
they maybe inadvertently fulfilling the politicians’ objectives of rewarding 
taxpayers with land. Secondly, they believed that some elements of the adverse 
possession rule were no longer applicable. On these bases, they argued that 
the law should be changed and until the changes are made, they will not 
enforce on squatters.  However, one of the senior administrators, interviewee 
14B did say that in the situation where taxpayers occupied very large 
properties, the presumption was that there were some arrangements between 
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occupier and legal owner, and thus  enforcement action is normally taken 
against such occupiers.  
The struggle here is between the government and  or the politicians and the tax 
authority. They used their capital to withhold enforcement on squatters and to 
bring attention to policymakers that they weren’t in agreement with the adverse 
possession rule and that it should change. The tax authority had particular 
concerns about the twelve year rule for the occupation of private lands and it 
would appear which they believed politicians used as a means to surreptitiously 
award property to taxpayers.   
5.3.3	   Large	  land	  barons	  	  
The findings suggest that there was non-enforcement on some large land 
barons as it was perceived that the law wasn’t  forceful enough to obtain 
compliance.   Some tax administrators believed that  effective enforcement  was 
predicated on the changing of the  property tax laws to give  them more  ‘force’ 
as presently the law has ‘no teeth’ according to interviewees 16 and 17, senior 
tax administrators.  This view was supported by a senior government 
bureaucrat, interviewee 4 who argued that there are no stringent measures in 
the law to enforce compliance on large land barons.  Providing an example, to 
support this perception, government bureaucrat, interviewee 4, stated that the 
best way to get compliance in Jamaica is  through the action of  forfeitures but 
argued that the current property tax law through the Quit Rents Act, a century 
old law  was not only circuitous but costly (see section 5.3.1).  Thus the tax 
authority with limited financial resources would refrain from taking this route. 
This he argued encouraged manipulation  of the system by large land barons,   
despite  the ability to pay.  Frustrated with their actions, this senior government 
bureaucrat, interviewee 4 described them as ‘troublesome delinquents’ who  
played around with the system,  by virtue of their knowledge of the legal 
process and its attendant costs. Senior government bureaucrat interviewee 4 
further debated, that large land barons sold their titled properties  with 
outstanding tax liabilities and when the tax authority attempts to enforce 
compliance,  they simply retorted,  ‘I don’t business with it’ i.e. I have no interest 
in the property, implying here that the authority may choose to take whatever 
action it deemed appropriate but at the same time, they knew that the authority 
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didn’t  have the necessary resources to enforce compliance on them because of 
the prohibitive costs and the lengthy court process to effect enforcement.  The 
tax authority therefore shied  away from enforcing on this category of taxpayers.  
Thus, these barons continued to evade. On the other hand, there could be 
enforcement on the purchaser but the purchaser according to interviewee 4, 
senior government bureaucrat became  aggrieved when told that if he submitted 
an application for a title for the said property, then the outstanding property tax 
became his responsibility or else the property would be forfeited.  Although the 
findings didn’t  specifically state what the purchaser did  in the circumstances, 
it’s assumed that the purchaser wouldn’t apply for title to the property, thus 
leaving the liability outstanding.  It was  also assumed that the purchaser would 
be au fait with the current enforcement practice of non-forfeitures and that the 
tax authority might just be issuing empty threats. Furthermore even if the lands 
are forfeited, it might create additional problems for both the tax authority and 
the government.73 The senior bureaucrat, interviewee 4 stated that  action was 
being taken to make changes to the law to correct this situation but until the 
changes are made, there’s no enforcement on large land barons who sell their 
properties with outstanding property tax liabilities. 
Tax administrators did not enforce on large land barons because they perceived 
that their conduct will most likely not  succeed in light of their limited resources 
and past experience (Swartz 1997, 106).  With their limited  economic 
resources to pursue these evaders through the court system, maybe it wouldn’t 
be worthwhile for them to take this route.   Going through the court system 
demanded huge outlays of economic and human capital.  A senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 17 suggested that the court system was time 
consuming. Additionally, tax administrators’ practical knowledge of the field 
gave some  awareness of  some policymakers’ tacit opposition to the use of 
forfeitures to obtain payment as in the words of a policymaker, interviewee 7 ‘it’s 
not a light thing to sell somebody’s property…and we have not really gone to 
the extreme of selling people’s property’ as mentioned in section 5.3.1.  They 
also seemed to have knowledge of  the taxpayers’  lack of support  for this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  See	  section	  5.3.1	  above	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enforcement tool which results in them taking no enforcement action 
demonstrating that ‘habitus orients action to anticipated consequences’ (Swartz 
1997, 106).  
The above situation is a complex one.  There’s a small percentage of  high 
value properties in Jamaica (Cornia and Walters 2010). It’s likely that the 
barons within this category know each other.  With their huge amount of 
economic and social capital, there was the likelihood that that  they would be 
able to function outside of the formal system.  Selling  a large property would 
likely to be to another large baron or people from the drug trade who wish to 
sanitize their takings.  With their intimate knowledge of the land market and the 
land system, they would be able to function without reference to the tax 
authority. They thus used their cultural, social and economic resources to 
maintain  and dominate their position in the field, to evade the tax. The tax 
authority on the other hand doesn’t have the economic means to bring them to 
books. There was no point in forfeiting the properties as there was the likelihood 
that someone from among the same group would buy and for reasons already 
expressed, it would be passing on land way below the fair value to another 
baron. Information about the land would be confined only to large land baron.  
Furthermore if forfeited and taken by the government, then, there was the 
possibility that it would be set upon by squatters, thus they did nothing.  
Politicians wouldn’t intervene because they don’t agree with seizures, thus the 
barons indirectly obtained  the support of the politicians.  Jamaicans don’t  
agree with seizures either. The lack of means of the tax authority to pursue 
them and bring them to books was out of the question, thus their course of 
redress was to call for the  changing of the law.  
Although the large land barons used their cultural capital to evade the  property 
tax, the job of the tax authority is to use their enforcement power to effect 
compliance.   Instead, the tax administrators used their social capital, i.e. 
combined enforcement power within the tax administration to withhold 
enforcement justifying that pursuit of the barons would be too lengthy and 
costly.   But behind this action (inaction) was the hidden  motive or interest  of 
the tax authority,  pressuring the government to change the boundaries  to 
effect easier and cheaper enforcement.  They were holding out  or struggling 
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with the policymakers to maintain their dominance rather than struggling with 
the land barons.  By not enforcing, the tax administrators changed the 
boundaries in the field, communicating to taxpayers that there was no 
enforcement on large land barons who sought to sell their property with 
outstanding property tax liability.  
Tax administrators’ dispositions therefore influenced them to act and respond in 
certain ways to certain situations (Xu & Xu 2008), in this situation that it was  
too costly to enforce on the land barons and that the law should be changed to 
make it easier for them to enforce compliance on them.  
5.3.4	   Third	  party	  information	  	  
There is the practice by the  tax authority that it doesn’t provide third party 
information to enforce compliance.  The Tax Collection Act requires the tax 
authority (see section 2.6.3)  to provide  information to the Accountant General 
of all persons within the government’s employ and or of persons in receipt of 
payment from the government purse who may have outstanding property tax 
liabilities.  The Accountant General on receipt of this information would deduct 
the outstanding liability from the employees’ salaries and or from payments to 
the said individuals.    A senior tax administrator, interviewee 16  stated that 
although this is required by the law, this is not practiced stating ‘I don’t think that 
would be a favourite move especially where people can’t or don’t get any 
increase in pay’.   The senior administrator, interviewee 16 appears to be 
sympathetic to fellow government servants who are believed to be at an 
economic disadvantage because of the  severe economic conditions imposed 
by the IMF on the economy- one of those being a wage freeze.  Additionally, 
reporting fellow employees is like breaching the code of silence a feature of the 
Jamaican culture.  Additionally, talking or whistleblowing may prove to be 
personally detrimental (Operational Guidance Notes, Jamaica 2013). 
Jamaica has been with the IMF for many years. Some of the austere economic 
conditions imposed included wage freeze for civil servants.  Tax administrators 
who are also civil servants were sympathetic with their fellow civil servants and 
were not prepared to ‘whistle blow’ on them.  On the surface it might appear 
that they were afraid to speak out  because their colleagues maybe unhappy 
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with their action or they may have felt  that their personal safety maybe in 
jeopardised.  It can be argued that  the real motive of not advising the 
Accountant General was to let the government know that they were not in 
agreement with the harsh policies imposed by the IMF, inflicted on government 
workers of which they are a part.  In this regard, the enforcement field becomes 
a site of resistance  against the government in imposing the harsh economic 
conditions on the civil servants. To maintain their position in the field, tax 
administrators withheld enforcement power and maintained the culture of 
silence.   
5.3.5	  	  Reminder	  system	  
The tax authority engages a number of tax strategies to obtain compliance but 
seems to place greatest emphasis on the practice of the reminder process. 
According to the findings, the standard procedure is to send three reminders to 
taxpayers prior to using the severest measure of taking court action against the 
taxpayer.  The law makes provision for one reminder74. It is normally carried out 
throughout the year but with greatest intensity during the period April to June. 
According to a senior tax administrator, interviewee 16 harsher approaches are 
used after June because after then  ‘it means that (taxpayers) don’t want to 
pay’. Another senior tax administrator, interviewee 17  argued that reminders 
were sent  to taxpayers because the tax authority had no means of verifying  
the  delivery and or receipt of the original assessment notices. Without proof 
that the taxpayers received their assessment notices, there can be no 
enforcement action declared another senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B. 
Thus, the assumption is that those who did not  pay their property tax were 
those who  may not have received  their assessment notices ‘that is why we 
repeat the process’ claimed a senior tax administrator, interviewee 17.  The 
following procedures  were outlined by senior tax administrator, interviewee 17 
as the reminder process. This process seemed to be typical across Jamaica as 
confirmed by other senior tax administrators, interviewees 15 and 16.    The 
process starts with the review of the arrears list.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  See	  Tax	  Collection	  Act	  ,	  section	  23	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According to interviewee 17, senior tax administrator, the arrears list  for a 
particular area say Canada City75 within Portmore is selected- targeting those 
taxpayers whose tax liabilities are between three and six years. This time period 
was selected because the authority wanted to catch those liabilities closest  to 
the six year band making them more worthwhile to pursue  through the court 
system should the taxpayer not respond to the reminder and to catch those  
liabilities before they are written off76.  Secondly, those taxpayers whose 
liabilities that were closer to the three year band were more likely to respond.  
According to the interviewee, older debts proved more challenging to collect.  
According to the administrator, typically, five hundred reminders  were printed at 
a time for distribution. Each reminder  carried the following information:   
• The taxpayer’s property tax liability for the current year 
• The taxpayer’s outstanding liabilities itemised year by year 
• A contact telephone number  for the tax office  
• A request for the taxpayer to respond to the notice to settle the arrears 
within  fifteen days  
The procedure is to deliver each reminder by hand within the selected area with 
the staff staying within the assigned area until ‘when we get some of the money 
from Canada City, then we might move on to another area’ stated interviewee 
17, senior tax administrator. The  reminder team is typically comprised of two 
compliance officers supported by three other staff members assigned by the 
local authority (Policy paper 8/1993). Notices were normally served within 
working hours, during the week due to the financial limits placed on the tax 
authority. However, the service time may be extended to include week-ends 
especially Saturdays with assistance from the local authority. The preference is 
to personally serve the notices to taxpayers as provided by S3(3)(a)(b)(c)  of the 
act which also provides for the leaving of the notices at the taxpayer’s address 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  The	  tax	  administrator’s	  naming	  of	  community	  within	  the	  local	  jurisdiction	  that	  is	  targeted.	  Name	  of	  
community	  is	  changed	  to	  preserve	  anonymity	  	  the	  interviewee.	  
	  
76According	  to	  the	  Tax	  Collection	  Act	  	  S21(3),	  there’s	  a	  statute	  bar	  of	  six	  years	  on	  outstanding	  property	  
tax	  liability.	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for service or for the notice to be sent by registered post to the service address. 
The taxpayer’s address of service according to S3(4) of the act, is the last 
address given to the tax administration of the parish where the taxable property 
is located and where no address is provided or  where the taxpayer changes 
his/her address and has not provided a notification to this effect to the tax 
administration, then the address  for service of the taxpayer shall be any 
address that the tax administration has on record for this taxpayer.  A tax 
administrator, interviewee 16 explained that even though they may opt to leave 
the notices at the premises, they were unsure if the taxpayer actually received 
the notice. So, the interviewee  asked the rhetorical question ‘if the taxpayer 
doesn’t respond, what do you do?(Interviewee 16/Senior Tax Administrator). 
According to this respondent, interviewee 16 leaving the notice at the premises 
was not a guarantee that the notice was received and recognised by the 
taxpayer and in the event that no notice was received, no enforcement action 
can be taken as previously explained by another tax administrator.  
The taxpayer on receipt of the notice had  three options:  
1. settle  the outstanding liability  
2. contact  the tax authority using the  telephone number  provided or   
3. do nothing, i.e. ignore the notice,  be unresponsive.  
According to the senior tax administrator/interviewee 17 of the five hundred 
notices assigned for delivery, a few may be returned.  Returns were attributed 
to the team’s inability  to locate addresses or the team’s inability to enter a 
premises. While interviewing a tax administrator, I got the opportunity to interact 
with a team of compliance officers, interviewees 17A, 17B, 17C, 17D, 17E. The 
team complained that stray dogs on the roads or hiding under cars, hindered 
them from delivering notices; pointing  out that this was one of the biggest 
obstacles which prevented them from serving notices on a premises as 
reflected in the following quote:  ‘we might go to a house and the dogs are not 
actually chained and even if it is outside, they are under the car...’(Interviewee 
17A/Compliance Officer).  
Of the five hundred delivered, senior administrator, interviewee 17 stated that 
approximately one hundred taxpayers responded by calling the tax office using 
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the given number.  The call from the taxpayer signalled  the start of a 
relationship with the tax office to collect the outstanding arrears.  The 
administrator stated that it was  easier to collect from those who owed for three 
years. The senior tax administrator further stated that on contact with the office, 
payment arrangements  were worked out  with the respondents,  beginning with 
the date for a first payment.  This was what the administrator outlined: 
‘We have a book over there (showed me the record book), so we give 
them dates; they call, they say they can pay next two weeks; we put 
(their) names, the date, the amount that is outstanding and when (they) 
are coming in to pay.  We follow up, we call.  Every morning we have a 
page and all the persons who would have paid say by the 6th, we would 
have called  by the (preceding) weekend or call before to remind them to 
come in by the 6th… So we keep in touch with (them) until the (liability) is 
completed. (Interviewee 17/Senior Tax Administrator). 
The idea was to collect the outstanding debt, thus the tax authority  became  
accommodating, providing taxpayers with many payment options not provided 
for within the law.  In the situation where a  taxpayer was unable to settle the 
entire debt immediately, a payment arrangement was brokered giving the 
taxpayer a reasonable time to pay stated an administrator.   Interviewee 16, 
senior tax administrator stated that  the tax authority willingly accepted  
‘whatever (they) have, (they) can come in and pay each month.  So if (they) 
want to divide it into twelve part parts, we are willing to accommodate 
(them)’(Interviewee 16/Senior Tax Administrator).  This arrangement seemed to 
offer an unfair advantage to non-compliant taxpayers. There seemed to be no 
retributive fairness: even though taxpayers break the rules, they are rewarded 
for their non-compliance by being given  extended time to settle the debt, 
decide the amounts they wish to pay and payment dates (Elkins 2009; OECD).  
 However once, the taxpayer agreed to the payment schedule, the tax team 
ensured that the taxpayer stuck to the agreement by applying pressure  by  
being insistent that the taxpayer maintains the arrangement until the liability is 
settled. The following quote reflects this situation. 
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‘… we call…we know people have hardships but we put on the 
pressure and then you find out that they will come in.  Sometimes they 
are tired of us and they would say,  I don’t get the money yet’ and our 
response would be ‘but you gave us a date, and the last time you told us 
you didn’t come’.  We just continue until we get most of them’ 
(Interviewee17/Senior Tax Administrator). 
For those who were unresponsive, a  second  set of notices reflecting similar 
information as was contained in notice number one was prepared and delivered 
by hand.  Again, the taxpayer had the option to settle the liability, respond by 
calling or do nothing at all.  In the case where they responded by telephone, the 
process as described above was repeated. The process was repeated a third 
time to the same set of persons within Canada City following the same 
procedures. Where there were no responses after three notices, then the tax 
authority  moved to the next stage of issuing summonses but only on a few of 
the non-responders according to interviewee 17, senior tax administrator 
because  it was ‘not easy to do a lot of summonses’ (implying here that some 
responders wouldn’t  be enforced on, remaining non-compliant.  Again this 
raises the issue of retributive fairness.  Some taxpayers will not honour their tax 
obligation because they will never be punished by the tax authority because the 
tax authority concentrates on collection rather than compliance which was 
probably is influenced by resource constraints. 
The reminder process appeared to be time consuming and expensive: a 20% 
response rate; three reminders to unresponsive taxpayers; a minimum of 300 
telephone calls and five members of staff  in the field on three separate 
occasions to pursue delinquent taxpayers. However, using the reminder 
process seemed to give the tax authority a sense of control over the taxpayers. 
But more importantly it appeared to be a way of giving support to the 
government policy of the partnering approach to property tax enforcement and 
compliance.  The tax authority received limited resources for property tax 
enforcement.  With the local authorities on board, they were at least ensured of 
some amount of resources for compliance. Additionally, the authority had the  
opportunity to work alongside with local politicians, getting them involved in tax 
enforcement process. Involvement of politicians in enforcement, probably will 
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send a signal to the community (Kornhauser 2007) that property tax was indeed 
important and thus they should comply.  Using the reminder process could also 
be construed as a means  of exacting funds from the local authorities to support 
enforcement activities seeing there was minimal resource support from central 
government because property tax wasn’t  seen as a large tax with importance 
attached to it. 
The tax authority’s  latent interest of wanting to be visible so as to maintain its 
position  within the field (Swartz 1997) necessitates them using this process 
despite its apparent inefficiency. Using the process, gives some visibility to the 
tax authority within the community giving the impression that they were working 
and that they were serious about tax compliance which is symbolic. Use of the 
reminder process also gave the impression that there was unity between the 
institution of tax and  politics.  
Additionally, the tax authority got the opportunity to  ‘flex’ its  muscles with 
taxpayers through direct  interaction.  This was also symbolic as it conveyed the 
message of the seriousness of the tax authority and its mission to ensure 
compliance with  the property tax.  Having such direct interaction with the tax 
authority may be threatening or intimidating to the responsive taxpayers, thus 
out of fear they complied as indicated by an administrator that pressure was 
applied until the bill was paid.  Nevertheless some taxpayers remained 
unresponsive. 
The use of the reminder system may have given the impression to taxpayers 
that tax authority was working hard and doing a great job which may build their 
legitimacy in the field and ultimately their power base.  Their presence in the 
field seemed to create fear amongst some taxpayers as they were in direct 
contact with them as was reflected in the words of a taxpayer77.  They also used 
their presence in the field to apply additional pressure on the taxpayer to get 
compliance.  The TAJ dominates the relationship by using their resources and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  ‘…they	  going	  around	  closing	  down	  people	  business,	  it	  started	  out	  from	  the	  other	  day,	  it	  started	  from	  
the	  other	  day	  out	  in	  the	  country,	  pharmacies	  anywhere,	  the	  people	  don’t	  pay	  their	  taxes.	  	  They	  order	  
them	  to	  close	  their	  business’	  (Interviewee	  28).	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symbolic capital to get compliance as indicated by the tax administrator to apply 
pressure until they pay. 
Outstation activities: Outstations are  temporary collecting stations  
established  in  some communities including Portmore making it more 
convenient for taxpayers to comply.     As previously indicated in section 5.2.2 
the use of outstation activities was a direct enforcement strategy.  A senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 16 explained that the outstations had to be carefully 
planned  and can only be utilised when there was security stating… (we) have 
to make sure we have security to take us back with the money’ (Interviewee 
16/Senior Tax Administrator). Because of the security threat and the concern for 
staff safety, oftentimes outstations were  set up in Police Stations.  ‘[T]he police) 
just give us a little area and people come in (to pay) and at least we know that 
we are secured’ stated interviewee 16, senior tax administrator. The outstations 
were staffed by cashiers and recorders and the transactions were usually 
manual. On return to the office, the transactions are ‘key(ed) into the computer’ 
stated interviewee 16, senior tax administrator.  
Based on the objective of increased convenience to taxpayers in an area for 
example, Portmore, outstations were usually setup on weekends as it was 
discovered that there was little support for the week days stated an 
administrator, interviewee 17.  This senior administrator stated that the actual 
outstation activities were preceded by the town crier or cry78 announcing to the 
taxpayers  within the locality the details of the outstation’s schedule: i.e. location 
and purpose along with an invitation to go in and pay their property tax. The use 
of the town cry is also a means of ‘getting to everybody’ within  a designated 
community  stated a interviewee 17, senior tax administrator. A typical 
announcement by the town crier would be: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  The	  interviewee	  tax	  administrator	  explained	  that	  the	  town	  crier	  was	  a	  vehicle	  often	  a	  car	  with	  a	  public	  
address	  system	  that	  carriers	  a	  pre-­‐recorded	  message	  announcing	  details	  to	  	  taxpayers	  concerning	  the	  
impending	  outstations	  activities,	  that	  is,	  date,	  time	  and	  location	  along	  with	  a	  message	  	  encouraging	  
them	  to	  pay	  their	  property	  tax.	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‘…residents of Albion Port, our Tax Office will be at the Bananas Police 
Station79 on 23rd of March, make every effort to come out and pay your 
property taxes to avoid the penalties’ (Interviewee 17/Senior Tax 
Administrator) . 
The local authority partnered with the tax authority in enforcement activities 
based on (Policy 8/93) by providing resources such as staff, transportation and 
underwritten expenses for the town crier. Senior tax administrator, interviewee 
17 emphasised that  ‘anything we can’t afford we ask them (the local authority) 
and they assist  as it would be a cost to them for which they couldn’t afford. The 
implication here is that the local authorities were fundamental to the outstation 
station as well as other enforcement activities and without their help, 
enforcement would be severely curtailed. At the same time, the local authority 
by virtue of it providing the economic resources to carry out the field work  used 
its capital to enhance or maintain or even dominate the enforcement field by 
being able to dictate the frequency and amount of work that is done.  
5.3.6	   Judicial	  system	  
Summonses is the most extreme enforcement practice to effect compliance and 
is usually reserved for unresponsive taxpayers (Braithwaite 2002). However as 
previously mentioned by a tax administrator in section 5.3.5 only a few 
summonses are sent to unresponsive taxpayers from the unresponsive batch in 
the reminder process. The practice of serving three reminder notices is the 
preferred choice of the tax authority: serving of summonses for court 
appearances may not be feasible because the liabilities  are small, preparation 
for this action is time consuming and costly thus  making  the process 
uneconomical according to tax administrator.  An administrator, interviewee 17  
speaking on the preparation of summonses stated ‘you have to prepare the 
summons, you have to get it signed by a Justice of the Peace… and (then) you 
have to serve it when it comes back’ (Interviewee 17/Senior Tax Administrator). 
So, according to another senior administrator, interviewee 14B  tak(ing)a person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Name	  changed	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to court for $200080 is just not on…’.  The implication here is that collections are 
given priority over compliance (McKerchar and Evan 2009) thus  taxpayers, with 
small liabilities may remain non-compliant (Murphy 2005; Kornhauser 2007) as 
the tax authority is not interested in pursuing them through the courts to effect 
compliance . 
Even, though the preference was to use the reminder process, an administrator, 
interviewee 17 pointed out that the serving of  summonses for intended court 
action sometimes acts as a measure of last resort in securing immediate  
compliance. Some  taxpayers  rather than facing the courts preferred  to vacate 
the summons by immediately paying the outstanding arrears. A taxpayer, 
interviewee 25B  confirmed this, explaining that   service of a summons on her, 
motivated her to immediately settle the arrears rather than face the courts:  
‘I  got a summons to go to court that property tax was outstanding, and 
then I wondered what was going to happen to me and I talked to an 
ombudsman who lives in my scheme and he said “just go and pay it and 
you don’t have to go to court’ (Interviewee 25B/Taxpayer). 
By law, summonses must be personally served on taxpayers between the hours 
of 6am to  6pm Mondays to Saturdays and even in situations where taxpayers 
can be found on Sundays, summons  cannot be served as this wasn’t  
permissible according to an administrator.   The findings suggest that this may 
be an issue for Portmore, due to its dormitory nature, where large numbers of 
taxpayers were out of Portmore during the summons service period.  This was 
compounded by the fact that the tax authority didn’t  have a day time work 
address  for taxpayers.  
This proved to be  problematic for the tax authority as some taxpayers could 
‘stay out there and don’t pay’ stated interviewee 16, senior tax administrator.  
Interviewee 16 also stated that some   taxpayers even on receipt of the 
summons failed to respond, in which case the court issued a warrant  for  their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Approximately	  £13.00	  at	  2013	  values	  at	  an	  exchange	  rate	  of	  J$153.85	  to	  1GBP	  or	  US$20.56	  at	  an	  
exchange	  rate	  of	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  to	  1US$	  	  http://www.boj.org.jm/foreign_exchange/fx_historical_rates.php	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  2014	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arrest.  Interviewee 16, senior tax administrator explained that when the matter  
becomes a  court issue, it fell outside  of the tax authority’s jurisdiction, so it was 
left up to the court to decide the taxpayer’s fate.  According to interviewee 16, 
the  court may not abide by the statute bar. 
Administrators  seemed not to routinely use the court system (Tennant and 
Tennant 2007), with one, interviewee 15  stating   that court cases took too long 
to be resolved, in some situations up to  three years.  This senior tax 
administrator, interviewee 15 stated that ‘tax is something that is immediate’, 
debating that property tax laws should be drafted so as to obtain  immediate 
effect on those who evade.  Enforcing by way of the  court system was 
therefore a last resort stated interviewee 15 with the preference of using the 
reminder route.   
Enforcing by way of the court can be also be costly in terms of the time it took 
for a case to be finalized.  As previously mentioned, some court cases took  as 
long as three years to be finalized. The longer a case stayed  in the court 
system, the more time an administrator had  to spend on the case thus 
increasing the cost of operation.  According to senior administrator, interviewee 
14A, the lengthy court times were based on the limited hours dedicated to tax 
matters by the court system. For example, in the  Kingston Resident Magistrate 
courts, only two days per week between the hours of 10am-12noon are 
dedicated to handling tax cases.  The dedicated times in the rural courts may be 
even shorter because  these courts deal with other issues such as traffic 
matters. Thus, interviewee 14A concluded ‘we don’t have a lot of time in the 
courts to bring a lot of cases and that is a challenge’  (Interviewee 14A/Senior 
Tax Administrator).  
Tax administrators resisted the use of summonses and the court system to 
maintain their position or  to show their disagreement with the amount of 
economic resources that were given to the authority.   Additionally, based on 
their practical knowledge of the enforcement field in using the court system, 
they probably perceived that the courts will not impose  or enforce meaningful 
judgements against taxpayers with outstanding liabilities (Cornia and Walters 
2010, 20) and thus limited used of the court system is to demonstrate their lack 
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of trust in it. Thus, even though a legislator was of the view that evaders should 
be taken to court, the tax authority thought otherwise and resisted because they 
perceived that the courts were unsupportive in their enforcement efforts. Here, 
the enforcement field is a site of struggle between the policymakers and the tax 
authority with the tax authority assuming a dominant role by virtue of the level of 
the unequal distribution of capital. In this situation it’s the lack of capital that 
gave the tax authority its dominance.  So even though the preference was to 
take taxpayers to court, the non-availability of capital for them to carry out this 
task reaffirmed  their dominant position in the field and it’s also sending a 
message to  policymakers, that additional economic resources are needed for 
enforcement action through the court system.    
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Figure 5.1 
Diagram to show cycle of actions of actors reinforcing unimportance of property 
tax 
Source: Author  
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5.4	   Summary	  	  	  
This chapter presented and discussed the main findings for Research Question 
One: What are the property tax enforcement practices in Jamaica, and how  do 
the tax authority and policymakers use their capital to shape these practices? 
Policymakers provide the legal framework and resources for enforcement while 
the tax authority uses the resources to enforce the legislation. The findings 
suggest that there is a gap between legislation and enforcement. Enforcement 
is  fundamental in encouraging voluntary compliance, however the findings 
suggest that enforcement was weak and selective which compromised the 
critical balance between evasion and compliance. Tax administrators functioned 
in an environment of inadequate enforcement resources, absence of a 
comprehensive compliance and risk strategy, cultural issues within the field and  
ambiguous legislation,  Their choice of enforcement strategies was driven by 
their own practical dispositions and the use of their capital especially cultural 
capital with a bid  to dominate, maintain or enhance their position in the field.  At 
times, the field was a site of struggle between them and policymakers. The 
reminder system, the main enforcement strategy was  used to increase its 
visibility and legitimacy in the field, support policy, involve politicians in tax 
enforcement activities and to extract additional resources from the government 
through the local authorities. But on the other hand it resisted the use of the 
judicial system to show its disagreement with resource allocation. The findings 
suggest that  tax administrators and policymakers are really strategists who 
respond over time to  one another as they seek to move through a  maze of 
constraints and opportunities that they grasp imperfectly through their various 
experiences in practice (Swartz 1997) ultimately shaping the property tax doxa.	  	   
Weak and selective enforcement don’t  encourage compliance or tax morale or 
increased revenue collections. Currently, property tax in Jamaica, is centrally 
managed and the question is whether local management of the tax would make 
for better enforcement and compliance and improved revenues.  The literature 
argues that local management of the tax would build a compliance tradition 
through which would somehow help with improving revenues. The following 
chapter discusses the management of the property tax with particular reference 
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to those issues contributing to  the lack of devolution or non-passing of taxing 
powers to the local authorities.   
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Chapter	  6	  
6.0	   Fiscal	  decentralization	  
6.1	   Introduction	  
The property tax in Jamaica appears to meet the requirements  of a local tax 
(section  3.4.2) and despite a history of ongoing local government reform (Mills 
1974; Policy 8/93; Nettleford 2006)  the tax continues be organized, managed 
and administered centrally.  The findings in this chapter seek to  tell  Portmore’s 
story of devolution by answering  Research Question Two: To what extent is 
non-localization of the property tax in Portmore influenced  by the  political 
dispositions  of players within the property tax field?  
Objectives: 
• To investigate the key policy issues that influence the non-localization of 
the property tax in the PMC 
• To establish how the lack of a White Paper and the absence of cultural 
knowledge at both the national and local levels  influenced non-
localization  
• To provide insights into how the disposition and actions of bureaucrats, 
local politicians and citizens influence non-localization of the tax   
• To provide insights as to how the redefinition of local fund raising by the 
policymakers influence non-localization  
• To provide insights into how the social, political and legal environment 
act as inhibitors to non-localization  
• To provide insights into how the lack of  economic capital influenced non-
localization of the tax 
• To provide insights into how fiscal decentralization can be used as 
means to increase tax morale and tax revenues within the PMC 
Section 6.2 discusses local government reform, its entrenchment in the 
constitution; sections 6.3 to 6.3.2 policy  issues; sections 6.4 to 6.4.4 trust, 
accountability and corruption matters;  sections 6.5 to 6.5.4 issues relating to 
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power, political will, attitude of bureaucrats and the nonchalant attitude of 
taxpayers; sections 6.6 to 6.6.2 the mayoral powers and the regulatory 
framework. Sections 6.7 to 6.7.4 discuss resource issues and 6.8 summarizes 
the chapter. 
6.2	  Local	  government	  reform,	  entrenchment	  and	  Portmore	  
The Ministry of Local Government has responsibility for local government 
reform with its minister assigned with the responsibility to have local authorities  
‘entrenched into the constitution’  stated, interviewee 5, cabinet minister and 
policymaker, a key feature in the fiscal decentralization process debated a 
cabinet minister as confirmed in the literature by (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 
2006).  Another cabinet minister, interviewee 6 stated that this action was 
historic in that it was the first time in Jamaica’s history that a local government 
minister has ever been assigned this job.  Having someone assigned to this 
process  keeps the momentum going (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006). Local 
government reform has been a long standing matter  ‘suffering many casualties 
along the way’, interviewee 13, former prime minister pointed out, e.g. an 
unsuccessful hearing by a constitutional committee. Despite these hindrances, 
the current political administration continues the reform programme  with the 
objective of constitutional entrenchment of local government.  Entrenchment  
has now become a pressing issue with the ministry of local government  
working on changing the legal framework. The following quotation from a 
cabinet minister reflects this:   
‘Well we are almost where we can begin the process, they are all  in the  
legislative (process), they have been drafted, they have been to the 
Ministry of Justice, the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman, the Counsel’s 
office…it came back with Portmore not on it, so Portmore has been 
placed on it now…’(Interviewee 5/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker). 
 
 The intent is to  have local authorities permanently implanted in the Jamaican 
constitution stated a former politician with the ultimate goal of  having property 
tax devolved, one of the main sources of revenues, as in the past ‘municipal 
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councils were completely financed by the central government’ stated 
interviewee 6, another policymaker/cabinet minister. A cabinet minister, 
interviewee 5 suggested that Portmore was  central to local government reform 
because  the conferment  of  municipality status in 2003 was with goal of it 
being developed as a model municipality. Portmore was expected to chart the 
way in governance,  revenue enhancement and collection measures debated 
the interviewee.  Despite its  status,  Portmore wasn’t given authority to manage 
and administer the property tax.  This chapter seeks to explore those underlying 
relational issues which  may  have accounted for this. In order to explore those 
interactions, the findings will concentrate on a cluster of issues: policy issues, 
trust, power and accountability issues,  resource issues and  attitude of 
stakeholders within the municipality.   
6.3	   	  Policy	  issues	  
6.3.1	   Conflicting	  views	  by	  policymakers	  
Evidence from the findings indicated that  while the  government was moving 
ahead with the entrenchment of local government, conflicting signals were 
being given by cabinet ministers and some government departments.  As 
previously mentioned,  the laws to have local authorities entrenched were in an 
advanced stage, having  already been reviewed by the Chief Parliamentary 
Draftsman, with the bills for entrenchment  shortly to make their way to the 
legislature  for passing.81  Apparently, the  government was proceeding   post-
haste to have this done wanting to give permanence to local authorities, not 
risking the demise of the local authorities.82The previous administration 
threatened to dissolve the Portmore municipality some years ago and at one 
point the Ministry of Local Government was downgraded to department status 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  More	  than	  likely	  	  the	  bills	  will	  pass	  in	  both	  houses	  as	  the	  current	  political	  administration	  has	  a	  majority	  
in	  both	  houses.	  	  The	  history	  of	  voting	  in	  the	  Jamaican	  senate	  and	  parliament	  is	  that	  	  legislators	  	  tend	  to	  
vote	  along	  party	  lines,	  thus,	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  bills	  is	  what	  I	  would	  call	  a	  	  fiat	  accompli.	  
82	  http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/mobile/news/Watch-­‐it-­‐Portmore_7769526	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
retrieved	  December	  19,	  2014	  
	  
http://rjrnewsonline.com/local/prime-­‐minister-­‐chastised-­‐for-­‐threatening-­‐the-­‐portmore-­‐
municipal-­‐council	  	  	  
	  
retrieved	  December	  19,	  2014	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(Osei 2002).  Government’s actions suggested that to mitigate this risk and to 
remove uncertainty,   it  was moving ahead with the entrenchment process 
before it leaves  office.  This process  will not only ensure the longevity  of the 
local councils but will also give them local fiscal  autonomy, the foundation for  
fiscal decentralization. 
 Even though the bills were being prepared for submission to the legislature, 
conflicting statements were being made by  cabinet ministers on the issue of 
devolution (Bahl and Wallace 2005). For example, one cabinet minister, 
interviewee 7 stated that  the  passing of the bill,  didn’t   guarantee devolution 
debating that entrenchment  was merely a symbolic gesture and an  exercise to 
ensure that the local authorities have some measure of permanence as 
evidenced in the literature as was the case of Indonesia (Smoke 2001). The  
following statement from this policymaker suggested this perspective:  
‘Well, I think that (entrenchment)  is under consideration but I don’t know 
how far down that wicket (fiscal decentralization)  we’re likely to go. But 
suffice to say, consideration…’  (Interviewee 7/Cabinet 
Minister/Policymaker) 
Another cabinet minister, interviewee 6 didn’t share this view but  argued that 
the government was committed to the entire process of devolution and was 
going ‘full speed ahead’  to make it a reality. This interviewee further stated,  
that if the process remained incomplete it would be a ‘serious indictment on the 
part of the PNP83’)(Interviewee 6/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker).  It was the PNP 
government he argued that gave ‘municipality status to Portmore (2003)  with 
the intent that it would serve as a model local authority’ in governance, revenue  
enhancing and collection measures (Interviewee 6/Cabinet 
Minister/Policymaker).  In this regard, the cabinet minister, interviewee 6 argued 
that Portmore should have already been fiscally decentralized with its own 
revenue  sources with property tax being one of those sources. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  The	  current	  political	  administration	  (PNP)	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  (February	  to	  April	  2013).	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Yet another cabinet minister/policymaker/interviewee 5, a member of the 
current administration was not even prepared to share an opinion on devolution 
of the property tax to Portmore  despite the interviewee’s apparent intimate  
knowledge and involvement  of and in the entrenchment process.  The 
interviewee perceived that a decision on devolution should be driven by the  
results of  a  cost benefit analysis  (Smoke 2001) and therefore in the absence 
of such data was not prepared to comment.  However, the interviewee  
conceded that even if  Portmore were to be fiscally decentralised, then it  would 
still be dependent on central government funding for some infrastructural items  
like water and draining cleaning.  The concern of this policymaker, interviewee 6 
seemed to be that Portmore would not have the capacity to provide these 
services or it could be that  there would be no economies of scale in the 
provision of these services.  
Bird and Wallace (2005) on decentralization in their study argue that although 
there is the fear that the delivery of some infrastructural services is beyond the 
reach of some local authorities, there is evidence to suggest  that some local 
governments do have the capacity to provide such services, citing some 
localities in the Russian Federation. Findings from my study showed that some 
gated communities were responsible for their water and infrastructure such as 
roads much smaller units of governance than say a local authority.  The 
inference here, is that if they as small units are able to deliver such services, it 
is likely that the PMC  would or should have the capacity to deliver these 
services. 
But what accounts for these varying perspectives on     fiscal decentralization  
from these policymakers serving in the same administration?   Bahl and 
Wallace (2005:85) attempt to shed some light as to the reasons for such 
conflicting opinions. They debate that  ‘many countries never take the steps of 
developing a White Paper that specifically identifies the problems and how 
those problems  might be resolved while attempting   fiscal decentralization.  
The   white paper was the reference for  cabinet ministers and government 
bureaucrats on the  boundaries or rules of games on how to implement   fiscal 
decentralization. 
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 According to Bahl and Wallace, it wasn’t  the practice of governments to define 
or establish the rules of the games. And this  situation in Jamaica was no 
different.  Thus, Bahl and Wallace seem to capture the essence of what was 
happening in the Jamaica.  Although, government and interests groups in 
Jamaica have produced many reports and policy papers  (Nettleford 2009), 
there was no  evidence  to suggest that a  white paper was produced to provide 
the requisite knowledge and guidance and to establish the rules of the games 
as to how to resolve some of these very issues84 to which they refer.  Thus, 
cabinet ministers the main actors whose responsibility it is to  give direction to 
the     fiscal decentralization process  were unable to do so as they seemed to 
lack the requisite knowledge or the cultural capital as to how to proceed with the 
fiscal decentralization process.  There was  no white paper, the ‘repository of 
knowledge’ for the process, thus variation in their views on the policy direction. 
According to Swartz when questions arise about boundaries, these questions 
can function as instruments of struggle as is evidenced in this case.   In the 
absence of these established rules, policymakers  tend to have their own ideas 
shaped by the ‘structures constitutive of their type of environment’ (Bourdieu 
1977)   which in turn influence their actions as to the process, procedures of 
fiscal decentralization, if,  how and when this process should take place and 
also the guidelines to be followed, which further serve to reaffirm their  beliefs 
on the process.  This is evident in the discussions, the participant  who 
perceived that     fiscal decentralization must be a reality in Portmore has been 
in Portmore’s reform  process  since its inception, while the others came on 
board later in the process. 
The absence of this cultural capital to give the process direction has now led to 
the current state of uncertainty and division and Portmore no nearer to being 
fiscally decentralized.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  The	  National	  Advisory	  Council	  (NAC)	  produced	  a	  report	  in	  2009	  on	  local	  government	  reform	  	  which	  
was	  commissioned	  by	  the	  government	  but	  to	  date	  most	  of	  the	  proposals	  have	  not	  been	  implemented.	  	  
Economic	  Development	  Institute	  an	  interest	  group	  on	  local	  government	  reform	  also	  published	  a	  paper	  
in	  2003.	  The	  government	  also	  published	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  papers	  on	  local	  government	  reform.	  	  All	  
these	  reports	  and	  papers	  speak	  to	  the	  issues	  of	  fiscal	  decentralization	  but	  there	  was	  no	  White	  Paper.	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6.3.2	   Revocation	  of	  borrowing	  powers	  
Although the ministry of local government is actively pursuing  local government 
reform, action from the ministry of finance  implied that the government is 
tending towards  fiscal recentralisation.  i.e.  while  the government is in the act 
of decentralizing, it’s taking active steps in centralising some fiscal functions. 
The findings   speak to a change in borrowing policy which took away or 
curtailed the borrowing powers of local authorities as seen in (Ribot, Agrawal 
and Larson, 2005). Although, this case study didn’t point specifically to     fiscal 
decentralization per se, it speaks to the issue of power: it speaks to the principle 
of taking away the powers of local authorities in an environment of 
decentralization.   
The dominant player in the field, the ministry of finance used its power  to 
change the rules of the game.  The local authorities  accepted the legitimacy of 
the ministry of finance to make those changes, thus they went along with the 
changes.  A government bureaucrat, interviewee 4 argued that the government 
rescinded the borrowing  powers of all local authorities and at the same time 
made it mandatory for local authorities to request and receive approval from the 
Minister of Finance should they want to borrow funds.  The interviewee debated 
that  Jamaica has been going through a programme of tax reform under the 
‘watchful’ eye of the IMF for the last  five years.  According to the bureaucrat,  
taking away the borrowing powers was a fulfilment of a statement made that 
the: 
‘…the proposed measures or legislation which  would directly benefit the 
local authorities, there was some innuendos that those would have been 
absorbed within the centre (Interviewee 4/Senior Government 
Bureaucrat). 
As a follow-up to these two assertions from the government bureaucrat,  the 
researcher asked the participant to shed some light on  the  National Advisory 
Council (NAC) 2009 Report  in which  recommendations were made to the 
government that financial autonomy   should be given to local authorities 
including Portmore.  To which the participant responded:  
189	  
	  
‘…it (NAC) got what I  believe the formal blessing up to the centre but 
then unless there are requisite approvals in terms of specific measures to 
support enhancement and to implement those proposals it becomes just 
that; a blessing, so we keep on praying’ (Interviewee 4/Senior 
Government Bureaucrat) 
However,  a cabinet minister/policymaker, interviewee 5 perceived there were 
no issues with the NAC 2009 report and that strides were being made to fulfil 
the recommendations but at this stage (2013) the ministry was waiting on a 
response from the Attorney General with respect to both entrenchment and 
autonomy of the local councils. Whilst the Attorney General worked on these 
issues,  the government continued its policy of central pooling of property tax  
resources justifying that ‘we are not operating under the normal scheme of 
things’ according to interviewee 4, senior government bureaucrat, and in the 
circumstances, the PMC’s property tax revenues and by extension other high 
collecting jurisdictions are used to support other parishes in Jamaica as 
confirmed by this interviewee. 
Ribot, Agrawal and Larson (2005) in an article Recentralizing while 
Decentralizing contend that central governments may limit the powers that are 
transferred to local authorities in order to stymie the type of decisions that they 
can make leaving the decision making to the centre. Smoke (2001, 19) also 
debates that in the midst of decentralization, Indonesia was recentralized.  
Smoke suggests that Indonesia  became more fiscally centralized after a major 
decentralization law was passed in 1974. Evidence in the literature suggest that 
this may not be an unusual occurrence. 
Based on the findings from the study, the government rescinded the legislation 
for local government borrowing making it mandatory for local authorities to seek 
approval through the Ministry of Finance to carry out this function.  Secondly, 
the expenditure decision of the local councils have been significantly curtailed in 
that the central government pools the financial resources to cover the two main 
property tax related services. Local government cannot independently borrow 
funds nor can it determine the nature of the garbage collection and street 
lighting services for their citizens.    
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But this action begs the question as to why?  Bahl and Wallace (2005); Asher 
(2002) in trying to answer the question articulate that governments in 
developing countries may be justified in limiting some powers especially  
borrowing powers similar to the position taken by the government in Jamaica in 
the interest of macroeconomic stability.   The argument of the authors is that 
developing countries are more likely to suffer  from ‘external shocks’  e.g. 
movements in the international markets, or changes in world price for primary 
export products or energy prices (ibid). Brazil and Argentina were cited by the 
authors as examples of    ‘fiscal decentralization compromising stability.’  In 
these situations, the central government would want to limit the financial powers 
of local governments so as to have full control over the national debt particularly 
in situations where there are no ‘hard budget constraints at the local level’ (Bahl 
and Wallace 2005).  
Currently, Jamaica’s deficit is 134.1% of its GDP(Fiscal Policy Paper 2013),  
curtailing this power might just be one way of ensuring that the government 
controls the debt from the centre even though this move runs counter to its 
attempts at decentralization. Bahl and Wallace also suggest that some research 
disagree with the idea that ‘macroeconomic stability is a constraint to the 
enactment of     fiscal decentralization program (sic)’ saying that if business 
cycles are regional, some local governments may be positioned more 
strategically to absorb the external shocks than central government. Others 
debate that in certain situations local governments can play a role in 
stabilization policy (Bahl and Wallace, 2008:95, Gramlich 1987). Additionally, 
the pooling of resources  by the centre may be linked to the debt issue as well. 
 Anecdotal evidence suggested that if local authorities were directly responsible 
for their own borrowing and if the government didn’t  take over the pooling of 
resources, then there was  the likelihood that local authorities would not repay 
loans and or not pay their bills for the services provided resulting in the 
accumulation of  huge deficits  increasing the government’s debt  portfolio.  
Smoke (2001) debates that many analysts-opponents of     fiscal 
decentralization argue along this line of adverse macroeconomic effects by the 
behaviour of local authorities but their conclusions he believes are drawn from 
studies from countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Russia who might not be 
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representative.  He debates that few developing countries decentralize to the 
point or allow uncontrolled access to capital markets by local governments 
where their actions would impact the economy. 
It could be argued that government in  removing borrowing powers and  the 
pooling of resources were strategies to keep the national debt in check.  The 
rules of the games or the boundaries are being redefined and this is done by 
taking away one source of their economic capital.  The message is being sent 
that the ministry of finance will be the only actor that determines the extent of 
the national debt.  
6.4	  Trust,	  	  accountability	  and	  	  corruption	  	  
One of the primary arguments of the benefits of     fiscal decentralization is 
increased accountability on the part of local government officials because they 
are responsible for service delivery to the local population who elected them 
(Bahl 2008). But there is a another school of thought that decentralized systems 
maybe more corrupt, in part because local politicians are more likely to give in 
to pressure from local interest groups (Bahl and Wallace 2005). Some 
participants spoke about issues of  trust, abuse of power,  accountability, 
transparency and corruption by some local politicians citing these as issues why 
the PMC should not be fiscally decentralized. Findings in these areas  also 
suggested some tensions between the stakeholders.  
6.4.1	   Trust	  in	  local	  authorities	  and	  abuse	  of	  powers	  	  
A bureaucrat, interviewee 3 feared that localization of the property tax would  
result  in the local authorities  abusing their new independent financial powers 
by virtue of them having full control of the property tax revenues.  The 
participant voiced the view that the authorities would use this  power  to 
manipulate  and starve the service providers - ‘hold them to ransom,’ fulfilling 
their   intent  to  have control over the money, ‘choosing what to pay and when 
to pay’ (Interviewee 3/Senior Government Bureaucrat).  The participant’s 
perception was based on  previous interactions between the local authorities 
and the  NSWMA, provider of garbage services.  The participant claimed that 
the NSWMA had an arrangement with the local councils to clean public markets 
for which they refused to make payments  on the grounds that such payments 
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should be properly taken from  the Parochial Revenue Fund85 and as such were  
already included in payments made to it from the central government.  On the 
other hand, the NSWMA contended that cleaning of markets was a commercial 
service and therefore shouldn’t  be from the fund but from direct payments from 
the authorities’ budgets. According to the bureaucrat, the local authorities didn’t  
pay and hadn’t paid.   This issue led to  mistrust by the NSWMA in the local 
authorities,  with the NSWMA convinced that should the local authorities control 
the funds,  service providers would be held to ransom ultimately leading to 
breakdown in the delivery of services.    A senior manager, from a local 
authority, interviewee 20B  whilst not saying that the NSWMA would be held to 
ransom; commented  that should the property tax be localized, ‘it would not be 
business as usual’  and the NSWMA would  only receive payment for services 
rendered, so in situations where there was no garbage collection in selected 
areas in a local authority the authority would simply prorate payment and the 
standard payment that it was accustomed to receiving from the ministry of local 
government would no longer be a feature of the system.  
Another government official, a senior government bureaucrat, interviewee 2 
stated that there were some bureaucrats at the centre  with different 
orientations  in terms of governance with some of them still having the ‘thing to 
command’  giving excuses as to why there shouldn’t  be local autonomy.  One 
such excuse was that local authorities were not paying as promptly as they 
should, justifying their decisions by referring to past payment disputes that local 
authorities may have had with service providers. The interviewee pointed out 
that he didn’t support the local authorities utilizing  the services and not paying,  
although there was evidence to suggest ‘there were some legitimate things on  
which the local authorities spent the money leaving the bills outstanding and  
run up(sic) deficits’ (Interviewee 2/Senior Government Bureaucrat).  The 
interviewee seemed not be convinced by the non-payment argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Parochial	  Revenue	  Fund	  is	  	  fund	  to	  which	  property	  tax	  revenues	  are	  deposited	  and	  pooled	  and	  from	  
which	  allocations	  and	  or	  payments	  are	  made	  for	  the	  designated	  services.	  	  See	  the	  Parochial	  Rates	  and	  
Finance	  Act	  (1900)	  Sections	  6A	  and	  6B.	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There was another dimension to the trust issues, some participants were fearful 
of how the funds would be spent by the local authorities.  A former prime 
minister, interviewee 13 revealed that he didn’t trust the local authorities to have 
control over the  property tax stating  that in the past there were too many 
issues concerning mismanagement of funds coupled with the lack of concern by 
the authorities over their level of accountability.  This view is probably based on 
local government’s history of not reporting their finances (Eisner 1961).  
6.4.2	   Trust	  within	  Jamaican	  society	  
A developer, interviewee 32 was of the opinion that there can be no devolution 
of property tax due to mistrust amongst the Jamaican society as confirmed in 
the literature by (Powell et al 2006).  The participant elaborated by  stating  that 
there was no trust between the different tiers of government and also between 
the national government and the general populace. The issues the participant 
debated stemmed from a history of corruption, with the government not living up 
to its promises and a lack of accountability in the Jamaican society:   
‘We have a trust issue in this country… central government doesn’t trust 
local government to do what local government says they will do, and 
rightly so…If you cast your mind way back to when local government 
officers were elected… it was not a non-paid function…A lot of their pay 
for workmen was monies that came through that fund, somehow just 
reached them (elected officials)… So central government felt ‘why no, 
we’d better keep this money and hold it back and dole it out little bit 
because they go through that process…And now central government’s in 
the position that nobody trusts their leader.  They (politicians) are doing 
the same thing… So the government themselves break the law…’ 
(Interviewee 32/Developer) 
The PMC was not keen to have the property tax localized because of past 
experiences with the government based on its failure to deliver on its promise  
to give start-up capital for staffing and physical infrastructure at the inception of 
Portmore becoming a municipality. Thus the PMC is wary to take on this task as 
they feared that the government wouldn’t give the requisite support for the 
proper management of the  property tax according to a mayor, interviewee 9. 
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The foregoing evidence from the study suggest that there was little or no 
confidence in either the local authorities  and or the government that they will 
perform to expectations to make fiscal decentralization a success as 
demonstrated in literature (Nguyen and Rose 2009).    The NSWMA’s  past 
interaction with the local authorities was an unpleasant one and this led to the 
bureaucrat, interviewee 3 not to have any trust in the local authorities as it is 
thought that there is the likelihood that the local authorities will  repeat their 
action once they have control over the funds. Similarly, the former prime 
minister’s past experience with the local authorities’ mismanagement of public 
funds led him to believe that the authorities have not changed and  fiscal 
decentralization will  provide an opportunity for them to repeat their actions, thus 
he has no confidence in them to judiciously appropriate public funds. Thirdly, 
the mayor, interviewee 9 did not have a positive experience with the 
government when the PMC received municipality status.  The interaction with 
the government at the time placed the PMC under severe financial constraints 
which made it very challenging for it to  effectively deliver services to Portmore.  
The participant therefore does not trust the government to provide the 
necessary start-up funds to put the PMC on the right footing to carry out its job if 
it the property tax were to be localized.  
The point raised by the developer seemed to fall in a larger realm touching both 
contextual factors of trust which has to do with  culture and institutions  and also 
past experiences (Dore 1987, Fukuayma 1995,Nguyen and Rose 2009). 
6.4.3	   Accountability	  of	  councillors	  and	  transparency	  in	  PMC	  
 Findings from the study revealed that the lack of accountability and 
transparency in the council coupled by the corrupt action(s) of some councillors 
who used their office for personal gain and the absence of a strong internal 
control system  were some of the issues that  interviewees  suggested  that 
made  PMC not ready for  fiscal decentralization.   A policymaker/cabinet 
minister, interviewee 6 debated that although councils wanted local autonomy, 
their actions didn’t  demonstrate that they were serious about managing 
themselves.  The interviewee expressed displeasure in the conduct of some 
councillors who seemed never  available to interact with and make themselves 
accountable to their constituents.  Furthermore the policymaker/cabinet minister 
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suggested that the position of councillor was used more for personal advantage 
rather than as the  means or medium to serve and make themselves  
accountable to their constituents .  The following quotation reflects the views of 
the policymaker (preceding the expression  of the view, he wondered out 
aloud whether he should these perceptions recorded and also reread the 
consent form out aloud- section which relate to how his views would be 
treated, having been satisfied he continued…) 
 ‘(Someone) is elected as councillor and he is not seen again because 
the whole thing has change (I wonder if I should say this on the tape, 
words of the interviewee). For some  (councillors) it is a way of moving 
to another stage.  It is almost like a profile, you get that on your profile, 
and you also get a concession of  20%,  so you are going to get a Prado.  
You have a nice job, you have the council thing and you get a money 
(sic). And you can get benefits thereafter…One of the biggest problem 
affecting local government is transparency, they are not, they are not 
doing, they are not showing, they are not telling and it is  not 
manifested in the work.  No matter how you tell them to take photographs 
before and after, you cannot get one…’ (Interviewee 6/Cabinet 
Minister/Policymaker). 
Similarly, a member from civil society, interviewee 23 argued that the PMC was 
not ready for     fiscal decentralization until  the requisite ‘checks and balances’ 
(internal control mechanism) were in place and making the reporting structure 
‘more rigid and tightened up’.   In the absence of these checks and balances 
and the reporting structure,  the interviewee claimed that the actions of some 
councillors increased the vulnerability of the PMC.  For example, the 
interviewee stated that some councillors  contracted  work to their constituents  
without proper terms of reference  and work conditions and related an incident 
to demonstrate the point:    
‘I was somewhere couple of months ago and a councillor came on and 
there were two gentlemen who were standing by the side and they knew 
the councillor and they started to talk to the councillor and they were 
complaining about another councillor giving them work and the work that 
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was given to them,  they don’t know how much the job was for, but at the 
end of the day the councillor came and gave them X(sic) amount.  Things 
like that leave us open for corruption and that is why I said the checks 
and balance…’ (Interviewee 23/Civil Society). 
Speaking of councillors, a cabinet minister also a policymaker, interviewee 6 
also stated that councillors operated in a climate where they ‘don’t believe that 
they can be fired’ and under the circumstances they perceived it was 
unnecessary to make themselves accountable to their constituents.  This 
attitude or belief according to this policymaker, interviewee 6 stemmed from the 
practice that councillors were not implementers but rather like policymakers who 
didn’t  ‘carry out the work ’ in other words they were not on the front line the 
policymaker further argued.   
6.4.4	   Corrupt	  politicians	  
Evidence from the study also revealed that there was also the fear of corruption 
if there were fiscal decentralization.  A tax administrator, interviewee 15 voiced 
the concern that  the present  political climate in Jamaica was conducive to 
corruption (Transparency International 2012)86 and thus wasn’t   prepared to  
support devolution unless the local authorities were supervised. A taxpayer, 
interviewee 30  equally supported the view  that the present level of corruption 
in the PMC demanded central government supervision as the PMC didn’t  have 
the ‘credibility’ to be fiscally autonomous.   
A  mayor, interviewee 9  claimed that corruption was  always an issue in the 
society, pointing out that everyone faces it, and everyone  has to deal with it.  
He stated ‘it’s like an elephant in the room; not only in Southmore87 but in the 
country…’‘(Interviewee 9/Mayor). Even civil servants at the higher level are 
caught in the web of deceit and corruption’ stated interviewee 23 from civil 
society.  Thus, in advance of any sort of     fiscal decentralization in the PMC, 
this member of civil society suggested that the PMC needed a ‘culture shock or 
culture change, implementing clear rules of engagement  in the way things are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Jamaica	  was	  ranked	  83	  out	  of	  176	  in	  2013	  in	  the	  International	  Transparency	  Index.	  The	  ranking	  was	  
similar	  in	  2012.	  	  http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results	  	  retrieved	  December	  19,	  2014	  
87	  Name	  of	  community	  changed	  to	  protect	  the	  anonymity	  of	  the	  interviewee.	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done’(Interviewee 23/Civil Service). Interviewee 23 also stated that the process 
of changing the culture of corruption will take a long time to happen as 
confirmed in the literature  so he was not hopeful that the local authorities would 
be ready for this.   
Interviewee 23 further argued  that the political situation in Jamaica was one 
characterized by party patronage (Edie 1989) where some politicians use 
government funds as a  means to enrich their loyal party constituents   providing 
them with contracts even though they may be unqualified to execute such 
contracts.  In this regard, interviewee 23 from civil society  stated that ‘whenever 
one political party is(sic)  in power, they tend to look out for their people to give 
them contracts, whether these persons can do the contract or not. You have a 
mason doing an engineer’s job’. 
Interviewee 23 argued further that in the hope of securing government 
contracts,  party supporters make  election campaign contributions to their 
party.  Interviewee 26, a taxpayer in supporting this view, stated  that some 
party supporters  went to the extreme of making political campaign contributions 
to both political parties to guarantee obtaining contracts from whichever  party 
wins the elections. Interviewee 23, from  civil society believed that if there were 
a proper internal system of accountability, it would prevent  or curb this type of 
activity. 
Another  feature of the political environment was the appropriation of 
government property by politicians in certain situations with attendant 
justification for such  action.   For example,  interviewee 6, a cabinet 
minister/policymaker pointed out that when the previous government demitted 
office,   ‘the previous government ministers took away all the vehicles, took 
away everyone…’ but argued that he didn’t  see anything wrong with this action 
as these politicians  were poorly paid and they had nothing else to show for the 
hard work and long hours that they put in  while they were in office… ‘so for 
them to get the vehicles when they are leaving, it is just a little incentive’ 
(author’s emphasis)(Interviewee 6/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker). 
Interviewee 6 also stated that councillors in some situations were involved in 
corruption  colluding with technocrats within the local authority in 
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misappropriating government funds.  This he believed was done subtly via 
project work within the community, i.e. submitting work as special project but 
ordinarily executed;  the money paid for the special project was then shared 
between the councillors and the contractor.  The  participant provided this 
scenario to substantiate the point:  
‘There is a drain at northwest and bush comes over the drain, it is 
overgrown by shrubs but it is really the drain that needs to be cleaned.  
They can work out something to say the drain is cleaned and get a man 
and cut off the shrubs (Interviewer interjected:  is that the drain by 
Park Grade88 High School?) I am not specifically calling a name, I am 
just talking about a drain in Southmore89, I am just talking about a drain 
(Interviewer: Ok, no problem).This is a drain (Interviewer: ok and 
laughter by interviewee). So you can get (someone) cut off the (shrub) 
at the embankment: both sides; but the drain is now cleaned.  But that 
drain is written up as a (special project)… They have somebody who 
comes and collect the money and they know how they dispose and do 
that. So the level of corruption and people see it’ (Interviewee 6/Cabinet 
minister/Policymaker). 
Lessmann and Markwardt  (2009) in a study on corruption in sixty four countries 
concluded that the level of corruption is found  to be lower in decentralized 
countries as decentralization has been assumed to be an appropriate 
instrument for tackling the issue. This  study also confirms previous literature on 
corruption  that effectiveness in monitoring bureaucrats’ behaviour is an 
important determinant of the relationship between decentralization and 
corruption. In another study  by (Fisman and Gatti 2002), looking at the cross-
country relationship between     fiscal decentralization and corruption suggests 
that     fiscal decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and 
significantly associated with lower levels of corruption when decentralization 
emanates out of the country’s legal system. 
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  Name	  changed	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 The views of two taxpayers concurred with some aspects of the findings of the 
study in Lessman and Markwardt, that there should be monitoring of 
bureaucrats’ behaviour under     fiscal decentralization.  Decentralization is 
therefore a  feasible instrument for reducing corruption if there’s  monitoring. 
Otherwise, if those institutions don’t work sufficiently well, decentralization can 
contribute to high levels of corruption. Studies have shown that in Russia in the 
absence of monitoring at the local level there was high scale corruption 
(Lessmann and Markwardt, 2009, Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000) as against 
other previous communist countries where there was  monitoring of local 
corruption was less. 
Jamaica is ranked 83rd   out of 176 countries with a score of 38 by 
Transparency International based (2012 index).   Jamaica with a score below 
50  suggests  that public institutions need to be more transparent and powerful 
officials more accountable.  The ranking of 83  confirms  some interviewees’ 
view  that local authorities, politicians and councillors need to be more 
transparent and accountable in their actions and a member of civil society’s 
view that there needs to be more transparency within the authorities.  
6.5	  	  	  Power,	  attitude	  	  of	  politicians,	  technocrats	  
Some participants believe that some politicians were in politics for power only 
and therefore issues that concerned their constituents were not their primary 
focus.  Interviewee 23  from civil society debated that some councillors’ sole 
purpose for being in politics was to have control, ‘all they are interested in, is 
power’ and not in  the improvement or welfare of the community. To 
demonstrate the point, interviewee 23 from civil society stated  that some work 
was taking place in his community without the prior knowledge of the sitting 
councillor, the interviewee said that he was accosted by  the said  councillor 
who stated  ‘nothing should happen in his division without his knowledge’. 
Interviewee 30, a taxpayer argued that it would be difficult to have local 
management of the property tax because councillors would be incapable of 
leading based on their level of  divisiveness in the PMC and their inability to 
negotiate suggesting a lack of cultural capital.  Interviewee 30 stated that they 
didn’t have the capacity to ‘even agree on simple things, they seem to just have 
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quarrels over there (PMC)’ attributing this type of attitude to the political culture 
(Edie 1985) and the composition of the council. This behaviour suggest an 
absence of cultural capital (Swartz 1997) inability to unite around a common 
cause which may be attributable to them being overpowered by the political 
culture of divisiveness or  loyalty to party above everything else (Edie 1985). 
Interviewee 30 further articulated  that even though the PMC was controlled by 
the ruling party- the PNP, it made no  difference in arriving at a consensus on 
any issue.  The participant taxpayer, interviewee 30 further debated that the 
political situation was worsened when members of the council and the members 
of parliament  in which the PMC falls were from opposing parties.   When this 
was the situation, this interviewee taxpayer stated that there were always 
political conflicts between the mayors and the members of parliament.  The 
interviewee reasoned that these actions and behaviour were not conducive to  
fiscal decentralization.  Furthermore this taxpayer, interviewee 30 questioned 
whether  any real benefits would be derived  from localization stating that  
benefits to any community  within the PMC was really determined by political 
affiliation as confirmed by (Edie 1985) or social network or social capital rather 
than from  revenues generated  by property tax: 
‘…how (your political representative)  is aligned to the party(in power)- 
the leadership politically, that will filter down to what the benefits that 
your community gets.  For example, the councillor, she was attached to 
French Town90, she came from our community.  She lived over the flat 
houses so she was able to get a road or two fixed for the community 
because it is her community too.  She was able to get a basic school, 
she was able to get a little park and she was able to get (these)… 
because  her party was in power, so we were able to get a little of the 
benefits because of where she was at in the community.  She moved 
from the community) and there went some of the little benefits’ (laughter 
by taxpayer)(Interviewee 30/Taxpayer). 
Interviewee 30 suggested  that the politician used her social capital through use 
of her  network; political and social  to garner support to obtain economic capital 
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for the community. Thus the benefits that accrued to the community were not as 
a result of property tax compliance.  In this case, it would seem that social 
capital was superior to the economic capital in bringing benefits to the 
community as suggested in the literature (Swartz 1997 136-137). 
Portmore is a diverse community articulated interviewee 10, a former mayor 
calling it the  ‘United States of Portmore’ arguing that communities may look 
and act differently because of their socioeconomic  conditions.  For example, 
the interviewee former mayor debated that one community may be willing to 
accept a community shop while others were unwilling to.  He perceived that 
those who were willing to accept may have done so because they didn’t have 
the convenience of a car, thus a community shop would be ideal for them to do 
small purchases.   Having realised the dynamics of the situation, interviewee 
10, former mayor stated that  attempts were made to rezone some of the 
communities in a standardised fashion.  The starting point was using council 
lands to make this a reality.  The former mayor, interviewee 10 argued that 
while he was in office, he was unable to do so as Melon91 owned no land ‘not 
even one piece’ but as soon as he demitted office ‘Melon had over twenty 
three pieces of land, the titles sitting in the council vault’. The interviewee 
stated that it was a miracle for him as to how these titles got to the vault so soon 
after he left office and thus  surmised that ‘(councillors) didn’t  want any cahoots 
to come to the mayor at the time’ (Interviewee 10/Former Mayor).  
The former mayor also related another incident in which a proposal was made 
for increased governance of the roadways in Melon by way of imposing a 
hoarding fee.  This fee was to regulate the use of roads as a storage and 
impromptu building construction sites.  The interviewee former mayor stated 
that the council was unable to reach a consensus on the issue as ‘councillors’ 
thoughts were not necessarily in making  (Melon) much better’ and further 
stated: 
‘Persons would quarrel eternally about that fee but yet when you look at 
the roadways, when you are done with construction, it would be filled 
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  protect	  identity	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  interviewee	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with concrete, (citizens) would have dug up the road way, the sidewalk 
would have had more materials lying on its side  with sand and gravel for 
many months; citizens who are passing there, would have to walk out in 
the middle of the road because of your inconsideration 
(Interviewee10/Former Mayor). 
These incidents confirmed the perception of a taxpayer, interviewee 30 that 
councillors voted along party lines.  They used the support of their party to act 
against the opposing party even in situations where the outcome would improve 
the welfare of the community.  Lack of consensus seemed to be used  by 
councillors as a source of power to frustrate the opposing party and to maintain 
their position in the field or on the other hand it could be that they  are 
conditioned not to give support to the opposing party thus this would be their 
natural response to the issues on hand  as confirmed in the literature (Edie 
1985).  
Interviewee 22 from civil society argued that an independent mayor without a 
vote with a majority of councillors from the opposing party was really a ‘one 
party system, a one party municipality, with the votes swinging towards the 
majority and the development (going with) what they want, (not) in the interest 
of the people.’ Interviewee 23 also from civil society debated that bi-partisan 
politics stood in the way of real and continuous development in Portmore92.    
The majority in the council used their powers to thwart the progress of the 
council by voting along party lines even though the decisions taken may not 
have worked to the benefit of the municipality.  These two incidents not only 
demonstrate how power can be captured by a local elite and used against the 
interest of the community which is particularly undesirable under   fiscal 
decentralization (Bahl and Wallace 2005). 
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  The	  Mayor	  at	  the	  time	  was	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  Labour	  Party	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6.5.1	   Political	  will	  	  
In terms of attitude, a former mayor, a government bureaucrat and a cabinet 
minister believed there ought to be a change of attitude at both the local and the 
central level before     fiscal decentralization can be achieved.  A former mayor, 
interviewee 10,  suggested, there was an absence of political will93 (Carbonetti 
et al, 2013) on the part of councillors within the PMC to seriously address the 
issues relating to     fiscal decentralization and its  implementation. The former 
mayor argued that whilst there were lively debates in the past within the council, 
there  appeared to be an  inability on the part of the PMC to arrive at a decision 
and the will to follow up.  Carbonetti et al argue that political will may be driven 
by people coming together to address the threats that face the community 
supported by the power of collaboration, social capital.  In the case of the PMC 
the councillors’  unwillingness  could be due to a number of reasons some of 
which may be that they didn’t see any  clear benefits of     fiscal decentralization 
or it could be a situation where they thought  that they would have to be more 
accountable to their constituents  because not making themselves accountable 
would be more advantageous for them  or they could see     fiscal 
decentralization as purely a political issue and not one being supported by their 
party, thus they have to go along with their party’s decision or it could be that 
managing locally falls outside of their intellectual depth or it could be that no one  
locally or nationally is championing the cause of     fiscal decentralization or for 
them it was just not a priority or it could be or as it was said by, a member of 
parliament/legislator, interviewee 8 they want the benefits of the property tax but 
do not want the responsibility of raising the revenues.  Additionally, a senior 
manager, interviewee 20A, from a local authority pointed out that     fiscal 
decentralization would only be a reality if all local authorities  within Jamaica 
lend their voices and lobbied for it; ‘you couldn’t isolate Portmore, as they say 
the sum of the parts is greater than the whole’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Political	  will	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘commitment	  by	  a	  political	  actor	  or	  group	  of	  actors	  to	  create	  and/or	  
implement	  a	  policy	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  that	  policy's	  implementation’	  by	  (Carbonetti	  et	  al	  2013)	  Overcoming	  
the	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  in	  small	  scale	  fisheries	  Marine	  Policy.	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6.5.2	  Dependency	  attitude	  towards	  fundraising	  	  
A cabinet minister, interviewee 6 expressed his unhappiness  with councillors’ 
mentality  towards fundraising, suggesting that their attitude was one of 
dependency on central government to provide funds for the council rather than  
an attitude of independence, inventing  new and creative ideas to raise the 
funds within the council.  He believed that the councillors needed  a 
reorientation of their attitude towards fundraising for the sustenance  of the 
municipality: one which demonstrated independence rather than dependence 
(Ruhling 2006).  The participant further stated that the  general mind-set of the 
council  as fundraisers was to make requests from the government for such 
funds  which he perceived to be  untenable:  
‘The council just sit and make resolution in council meetings to get 
money from the ministry. This is not how I think they should operate… 
(they) should be finding innovative ways to manage…whatever it is to 
ease the pressure on central government. It is central government who 
has to be finding money to help them to subsidize them…’94(Interviewee 
6/Cabinet minister/Policymaker). 
The opinion of a senior manager, interviewee 20A from a local authority 
confirmed the cabinet minister’s perception of the councillors’ attitude towards 
fundraising.   This interviewee’s outlook was that it was safer to stay in the 
ambit of central government, reasoning that this relationship  guaranteed deficit 
funding (Rühling 2006).  The participant’s fear was that 1sometimes Portmore 
would be unable to raise enough property tax to cover the designated services95 
and thus was unwilling to take the risk of local management.   With devolution, 
government wouldn’t finance budgetary gaps, thus the preference was for 
property tax to be managed centrally.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Since	  April	  1,	  2013	  there	  was	  a	  change	  in	  the	  property	  tax	  policy,	  which	  stopped	  transfers	  from	  central	  
government	  to	  local	  government.	  See	  (Wynter	  2014)	  Wielding	  power:	  property	  tax	  policy	  change	  in	  
Jamaica	  (unpublished	  paper)	  
95	  Subsequent	  to	  the	  this	  particular	  interview,	  property	  tax	  liabilities	  substantially	  increased	  with	  some	  
participants	  arguing	  that	  government	  will	  no	  longer	  subsidize	  the	  local	  authorities	  including	  the	  PMC.	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A member of parliament, interviewee 8  in supporting the cabinet minister’s view 
stated that the council had no desire  to be fiscally decentralized   but rather 
wanted the benefits of the property tax via the expenditure budget without 
responsibility of raising or imposing  the property tax.   The participant stated 
that politicians didn’t like to impose tax and thus the attitude of the councillors. 
However, a councillor, interviewee 12  refuted this claim stating  that the PMC 
would do a better job of managing the property tax.  This councillor, interviewee 
8 also suggested that the increased  compliance rate  in Portmore was largely 
due to the initiatives undertaken by the PMC in providing more ‘windows  and 
opportunities’ (Rühling 2006) to make taxpayers more compliant. This councillor 
therefore argued that the  council had no fear in managing the property tax, as it 
wasn’t  a new tax  debating that the citizens of Portmore were already 
accustomed to it (Hale 1985).  The councillor, interviewee 12 stated that it was  
the government  who was fearful  of devolving the tax to the local authorities 
because of its lack of confidence in the ability of the local authorities to manage.  
6.5.	  3	  Command	  and	  control	  of	  bureaucrats	  
Non-implementation of devolution  may  also be attributed to the attitude of 
technocrats  and politicians within central government wanting to retain their 
control and power at the centre   Conventionally, property tax is administered by 
the ministry of finance with some technocrats supporting  the continued 
arrangement but conceded  at times it should be localised according to a 
government bureaucrat, interviewee 2.   This interviewee stated that this 
problem was further  compounded by the difficulty of getting an existing 
administration to agree on the policy of localization (Bahl and Wallace 2005) as 
it was the practice by some newly elected politicians not to support local 
autonomy while others may just give it their lukewarm response.  The absence 
of established boundaries on the implementation process  in the form of a white 
paper led to personal and organizational conflicts (Hume et al 1999, Doyle, 
Hughes and Glaister 2009)  with personal goals succeeding.  
A senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 20A theorized that some 
bureaucrats at the centre wanted to have exclusive control over the funds and 
thus their unwillingness to let go of this power.   Another senior manager from a 
local authority, interviewee 20B stated that personnel within some ministries 
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didn’t  want to surrender their power  as retention of power facilitated or 
maintained their connections to the larger community. For example, the PMC 
not being fiscally decentralized would still afford them the opportunity to interact 
with developers and for them to retain their approval  status on developmental 
issues in Portmore without reference  to and consensus with the PMC.  
6.5.	  4	  Nonchalance	  of	  residents	  
Added to the lack of  agreement between local government and central 
government, was the level of apathy by some residents especially those who 
have tertiary level training contended a former mayor, interviewee 10. The 
former mayor interviewee argued that if the residents in the community showed 
more interest in Portmore then the  political administration under his tenure 
couldn’t  have gotten away with their ‘nonsensical behaviour’ also stating that if 
these community members displayed  more interest, then the councillors would  
be more accountable. 
Interviewee 10, a former mayor likened taxpayers in Portmore to ‘…5 pound 
millionaire(s): they are pretty much like you and me, a little bit of education, a 
nice little vehicle, a nice little house, not too much money in the bank and we 
have arrived, oh boy’but  reiterated that they had no interest in the governance 
of Portmore. 
Interviewee 23, from civil society confirmed the former mayor’s viewpoint of the 
disconnect of some citizens with  the community saying that residents get 
involved in the community only when issues affected them directly.  Interviewee 
26, a taxpayer  attributed this attitude to the practice and governance of 
community organizations being  structured around issues of the day not policy 
issues.  Additionally this taxpayer participant suggested that people in Portmore 
have lost their African tradition of community spirit and  had adopted the 
American way of life which was more individualistic.  However some taxpayers 
refuted these claims saying that their lack of interest stemmed from and was  
structured by the dormitory nature of the community leaving them little or no 
time to spend in the community so as  to interact with fellow taxpayers, 
participate in activities and lend their support to  the Portmore community (see 
section  7.2.6).  
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Despite this living situation, interviewee 25A a taxpayer said  he made every 
effort to vote and attend special events, stating that he wanted to know more 
about what was happening in Portmore.  This interviewee blamed the PMC for 
not interacting with the community bearing in mind the dormitory nature of the 
community.  He called for late night town hall meetings at which the PMC would 
inform people on how funds were spent.    
Taxpayers attitude may stem from the lack of awareness of the values of fiscal 
decentralization whether to improve national welfare or local welfare (Bird and 
Vaillancourt 1999). 
6.6	  Regulatory	  and	  legal	  framework	  	  
6.6.1	  Mayoral	  powers	  in	  PMC	  	  
Some interviewees believed that the current regulatory or legal framework in 
Portmore  was inadequate and required changes to make it more appropriate to 
the needs and operation of an autonomous  local authority. Portmore has a 
unique political situation, in that its directly elected mayor ‘has no power… is 
powerless…(without a )  vote’ argued interviewee 32, a developer.  The 
participant suggested  that     fiscal decentralization  cannot  survive under this 
type of governance in which the mayor has no vote within the council.    The 
developer interviewee also  stated  that the order to create the municipality was 
incomplete referring to  the framework  as ‘farcical’.  
A policymaker, interviewee 5 and also a cabinet minister, argued that in the 
present framework,  the councillors  did not regard the mayor as a councillor, so 
the success of the mayoral job and the PMC were largely dependent on the 
‘tactical’ ability of an incumbent mayor.  On the other hand, this interviewee 
debated that the mayor not being recognized as a councillor maybe politically 
expedient for the PMC in that the mayor cannot be ousted by his opponents 
because he is elected by the people.  The mayor, interviewee 9 whilst 
confirming his advantageous position nevertheless argued that the framework 
did not provide the mayoral office with any measure of autonomy to manage 
locally.  Furthermore, the mayor stated, that the framework did not provide a 
financial budget to undertake work and to facilitate direct report nor does it 
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empower the mayoral office to have  control over service providers in Portmore, 
like the police and fire brigade.  The mayor perceived that the  design of the 
regulatory framework creating this political anomaly was deliberate because 
bureaucrats were upset with Portmore becoming independent.  This is what the 
mayor said:  
 ‘Somehow when they created this thing, I think civil servants were so 
angry about Portmore being selected – that’s my own view – that they 
did everything not to support whatever was done.’ (Interviewee 9/Mayor). 
6.6.2	  	  Property	  tax	  laws	  within	  legal	  and	  governance	  framework	  
Interviewee 9, a mayor argued that the municipality still fell under the whole 
reins of the parish council archaic laws;  making it difficult for him and the 
council to have a new approach to doing things because ‘you are saddled by 
the same set of laws that govern the council that you’re trying to get away from’.  
The mayor was not hopeful in the local government reform process as he felt 
that it didn’t go far enough stating that if central government wants councils 
including the PMC to be effective, they should be given autonomy to do so. He 
recounted the following situation to highlight the lack of autonomy because of 
the present governance framework:   
‘For instance, I have a piece of land in Pellshire96 I want to sell, for a joint 
venture park; and when you write to the Permanent Secretary, he sends  
I think it’s about sixteen questions for you – so by the time you’ve 
finished answering, your term is finished... So it frustrates the efforts of 
local government. (Interviewee 9/Mayor).  
The mayor believed that the local reform is a farce which is reflected by the 
following comments:         
‘I told the minister … ‘You guys are joking. Because you talk one thing 
and the facts are if you send it to the Ministry, the people there are going 
to hold it… and ask things because they’re not certain themselves.’ They 
are not tuned in to business initiatives, and …so all they do is frustrate 
you’ (Interviewee 9/Mayor).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Name	  changed	  to	  preserve	  anonymity	  of	  interviewee.	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Interviewee 10, a former mayor speaking on the regulatory framework pointed 
out that  the PMC was not allowed to reap the financial rewards based on cost 
inputs arguing that ‘Portmore does the work; incur the charges but central 
government takes the money not (sic) putting in any work’. This assertion 
referred to the  specific situation of  taking  court action against citizens for 
breaches of the law.  He argued that the PMC  often expended   its own 
resources to have breaches  corrected but  on successful defence,  the 
monetary settlements were  collected by the central government.  The current 
legal framework lends itself to this anomaly and in the circumstances would 
need to be changed to support an environment of fiscal decentralization the 
interviewee debated. The former mayor, interviewee 10 also argued that if 
changes are made to the legal framework  and the PMC were responsible for 
managing  the  property tax with  the ‘responsibility to pay its way through’, it  
would be in the interest of the  PMC to go out and ‘make sure that these taxes 
are collected, and should in a case a citizen feels that the taxes ought not to be 
paid, it is in the interest of the PMC to take the citizen to court and seek the 
necessary remedies’.   Under devolution, he suggested that Portmore would 
make every effort to ensure that citizens were compliant. 
A cabinet minister, policymaker and interviewee 6 supported  the former 
mayor’s position that the legal framework needed  to be changed, adding that it 
should also consider empowering the PMC to raise other sources of revenues 
to complement property tax revenues.  A  government bureaucrat, interviewee 3  
in supporting this argued that the borrowing status of the PMC should be 
restored. This participant also articulated that the regulatory changes should be 
accompanied by training to develop the requisite skill sets to ensure 
implementation and maintenance of the laws.  
Finalizing local government reform along with the entrenchment process should 
change the  legal landscape of the PMC.    But as was previously mentioned, 
entrenchment doesn’t  guarantee     fiscal decentralization as demonstrated in 
Indonesia in 1974 (Smoke 2001).  Entrenchment alone would not suffice, there 
should also be changes in the  property tax laws making them more relevant to 
Portmore’s environment as seen in sections 5.3.5 & 5.3.6, for example, 
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extending the time of serving summonses to reflect the dormitory nature of the 
community.   
Tax administrators argued that changing some areas of the property tax  laws 
were critical for enforcement and compliance. They articulated that by virtue of 
the fact that Portmore is a dormitory town, a large percentage of Portmore 
residents were only  available on Sundays and or before 6am and after 6pm  
Mondays to Saturdays which did not allow for some enforcement activities on 
these residents, thus they believed that the law should be changed to reflect the 
realities of the new living arrangements. A senior tax administrator, interviewee 
14A  argued for changes to the property tax database suggesting that it should 
be updated to reflect taxpayers’ TRN, as linking taxpayers’ TRN to properties 
would facilitate enforcement  on taxpayers at say their workplaces’ lessening 
the challenges  of locating taxpayers.     
Secondly, a taxpayer, interviewee 24 argued that the laws should be changed  
making it compulsory for persons from the unplanned communities to pay 
property tax given that they  obtain services similar to those received by 
taxpaying citizens and  legitimate owners and occupiers of properties in 
Portmore.  
6.7	   Resource	  constraints	  	  
Fauget (2004; 867) drawing from studies  conducted by (Smith 1985; Crook and 
Sverrisson, 1999), posits the view  that local government’s lack of human, 
financial and technical resources or material capital  will prevent it from 
providing appropriate public services under decentralization, and thus power 
should remain at the centre. He however argues that although  these claims are  
made they have never  been extensively tested. But Smoke (2001, 16) provided 
evidence that decentralization was actually delayed  in Ethiopia because of 
capacity or capital constraints and in the case of Uganda, the process 
‘backtracked’  due to  poor performance by the local authorities. 
 Some participants were of the view that the PMC and other local authorities 
didn’t have the requisite skills, resources or capital to manage a fiscal 
decentralised system. Their concerns surrounded economic and cultural capital. 
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However, there was one participant, a former councillor, interviewee 11 who 
believed that the  requisite human resource skills or cultural capital resided 
within the local authorities   including the PMC making them ready to take on 
the challenge of managing a fiscally decentralised authority.  
6.7.1	   Leadership	  and	  soft	  skills	  	  
 Poor  leadership skills, absence of business  skills, paucity of intellect, limited 
educational background, lack of  tertiary training,   lack of vision and 
unwillingness to engage in lifelong learning were  some of the issues raised by 
participants.  Other matters relating to human resources   inadequacy included  
lack of technical capability of operational staff  and  a general shortage in 
personnel  to effectively manage if the PMC were to be fiscally decentralised.   
 A developer, interviewee 32 opined that the political directorate lacked 
leadership skills and as such they have nothing intellectually to offer to their 
local community.  The participant further stated that  councillors 'don’t read, are 
under-educated, making no effort to expand their horizons… and they can’t 
even work with basic technology’(Interviewee 32/Developer), thus the 
participant argued that even though councillors were elected to office,  in light of 
their  intellectual and technical deficiencies, he believed that they were 
incapable of providing effective and meaningful leadership to the PMC under     
fiscal decentralization.    
Similarly, a former mayor, interviewee 10 argued that  it was difficult for  
councillors  without higher education, business training or experience in 
business to be managers;  and  should the PMC  be given leadership under 
these conditions, it is like a ‘disaster waiting to happen’.  Another mayor, 
interviewee 9 expressed his   unhappiness with the  leadership limitations of the 
councillors in the PMC, citing poor  vision  and or a  lack of creativity resulting in 
their inability to generate new ideas or take  initiative in council matters. The 
quote reflects this perspective: :  
‘And one of the observations I recently made is that both political parties 
must try to encourage a higher level of personal councillors. People who 
not only think about the next contract,  but have some ability to plan and 
to think and to lead.  One of the issues is that you need people with a 
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better level so that they can bring something to the table in terms of 
governance…In the construct of a municipality, the directors are the 
councillors, and most of the issues and things are done in committee 
meetings (Interviewee 9/Mayor).  
Further commenting on the  leadership issues,  the mayor also expressed his 
disappointment at the  level of leadership from the  citizens’ representative arm-  
Portmore Citizen’s Advisory Council, the citizens’ watchdog on the council.  The 
interviewee argued that the group wasn’t  representative of the people and he 
perceived that:   
‘…their interests are more  narrow , than looking at the community in 
general. Right now we have too few people who are genuinely 
community people, and too many people who are professionals, who 
don’t have the contact or involvement with the community. And, as I say, 
that’s a problem (Interviewee 9/Mayor). 
According to (Swartz 1997),  actors need capital to enhance and retain their 
position within the field. In this case, interviewees were saying that there was a 
lack of cultural capital and social capital for the effective governance of a fiscally 
decentralised authority. Administrative and political staff who didn’t  possess 
cultural capital lacked the requisite dispositions or personality to be appreciative 
and understanding of this type of environment, thus making them incapable of 
leading (Swartz 1997, 76). The lack  of cultural capital will thus impact their 
management practices as they would be unaware of what decisions to be made 
for respective situations that may confront or face the authority from time to time 
and resulting in poor decisions which may ultimately be disastrous as stated by 
a former mayor ‘ a disaster waiting to happen.’   Furthermore when staff has 
cultural capital especially in the form of credentials it brings autonomy from the 
dominant patronage (Swartz 1997, 76) which is a  part of the Jamaican 
landscape (Edie 1989).  In other words this type of cultural capital would 
encourage meritocracy and for people to be less reliant on politicians for their 
economic livelihood and  that politicians would be more confident on their 
credentials and their leadership qualities rather than economic support and the 
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promise to provide economic support as a condition for re-election to office. 
This would change the political rules of the game.   
6.7.2	   Technical	  and	  professional	  skills	  	  
A mayor, interviewee 9 reflected that the shortage  of technical skills within the  
municipality was an inhibitor to effective governance, hampering localization.  
To bring home the seriousness of the situation,   he stated that the PMC had 
‘one and half building officers’  to police and monitor over fifty thousand houses, 
‘because one can do some things and the other can’t’ (Interviewee 9/Mayor). A 
senior tax administrator, a former politician and a legislator confirmed the 
mayor’s  viewpoint being evident in how ‘some things  fall through the cracks’ 
stated a senior tax administrator/interviewee 14B.    Whilst a government 
bureaucrat, interviewee 3 concurred that staffing may be an issue, he perceived  
that if there’s staff upgrading, changing or appointing  additional staff based on 
professional qualification, then the PMC should be able to meet the demands of 
managing a fiscally decentralised regime.  But, the government bureaucrat 
interviewee 3 emphasised that  the appointment of qualified staff should be 
independent and transparent , i.e.  without  ‘nepotism or bly’.  The staff upgrade 
and new appointments he argued should also be  supported by other resources 
in place: a proper computing system and an appropriate legal framework.  
Additionally,  staff training  should be given to develop the requisite 
competencies.  Following the simultaneous introduction of all these elements, 
he believed that fiscal decentralization should be introduced on a phased basis.   
Despite all of the foregoing views of limited or the absence of cultural capital, a 
former councillor, interviewee 11 firmly believed that localization of the property 
tax can be an instant  reality because the  requisite technical, administrative, 
legal and fiscal expertise – ‘improved management and administrative capacity’ 
(Bahl 2008, 23)97 already reside within the local authorities.98 The participant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  See	  (Bahl	  2008)	  Opportunities	  and	  risks	  of	  fiscal	  decentralization:	  A	  Developing	  Country	  perspective	  IN	  
Fiscal	  Decentralization	  and	  Land	  Policies	  (Ingram,	  Yu-­‐Hung	  Hong	  2008)	  (eds.)	  	  
98	   I	   interviewed	   four	   administrative/technical/financial	   staff	   from	   the	   PMC	   and	   three	   of	   the	   four	  
interviewees	  on	  the	  consent	  forms	  indicated	  that	  they	  had	  postgraduate	  qualifications.	  	  Additionally,	  a	  
former	   politician	   from	   the	   PMC	   disclosed	   that	   he	   was	   pursuing	   postgraduate	   studies	   in	   Public	  
Administration.	  	  This	  seemed	  to	  confirm	  the	  assertion	  by	  	  a	  former	  councillor	  that	  the	  councils	  including	  
the	  PMC	  were	  	  employing	  persons	  with	  professional	  training.	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stated that capacity building  training programmes were conducted by the World 
Bank within all local authorities and since that time local authorities have been 
employing better and trained personnel not only in  fiscal management  but in 
other areas  with expertise in  auditing, financial accounting, cost accounting 
and legal affairs. This former councillor interviewee however didn’t address the 
lack of cultural capital of councillors. 
The lack of economic capital hindered decentralization in  Ethiopia and Uganda  
(Smoke 2001).  
6.7.3	   Financial	  	  
Financial constraints or insufficient economic capital were mentioned  as a 
limiting factor  by  a few participants  which would prevent the PMC from gaining 
local management of the property tax. A mayor, interviewee 9 viewed the  
concept of localizing the property tax as laudable but was concerned about the 
lack of financial resources or economic capital to  both start up and administer 
the system under fiscal decentralization. The mayor was sceptical and doubtful.  
His scepticism  or mistrust was based on his past experience with the 
government.  He explained that  when Portmore received municipality status in 
2003, the government didn’t  fulfil its commitment to provide the promised start-
up capital for the municipality to hire staff, acquire new furniture or generally put 
the administrative structure in place.    Consequently, the newly formed 
municipality diverted financial resources earmarked for infrastructural 
development in Portmore to  use as start-up capital the mayor stated.    
‘And we had to take the money that we were getting to build roads, to 
buy the desks and chairs, because the first J$39 million dollars promised 
to us we never got – we never received it – and staff. So, although, yes 
we got the thing (municipality status), we didn’t get the sort of support’ 
(Interviewee 9/Mayor). 
Additionally, the mayor intimated that before he considered giving his support  
to have property tax localized, he would want to know the parameters for both 
energy (streetlight) and for solid waste.   In this regard, the mayor, interviewee 9 
argued, that a ‘due diligence study would have to be conducted on the two 
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major cost inputs of service delivery’.   Furthermore, the mayor stated that the 
PMC  had no interest in inheriting the present inefficient solid waste  system.   
Players at the central level didn’t provide the economic capital for the 
municipality start-up.  It could be that they were not ready to give autonomy to 
the PMC and wanted to continue their control and domination by the PMC being 
dependent on them for financing or giving municipality status was symbolic and 
not meant to pass on real power.  Furthermore the non-fulfilment of the promise 
lead to issues of distrust between the local authorities and central government.  
6.7.4	  	  Adequacy	  of	  property	  tax	  base	  	  
Some participants were concerned about the present unimproved tax base, its 
inadequacy to meet recurrent expenditures to cover services along with the 
present level of compliance, the administration would have a challenge 
supporting a paid administration (Bahl 1998).  In view of this, a developer, 
interviewee 32 suggested that the PMC should wait until Jamaica was in a more 
prosperous position. To supplement the base,  a cabinet minister, interviewee 7 
debated that  the  PMC would need to seek  ways and means of attracting new 
investment in Portmore to support it financially while another cabinet minister, 
interviewee 6 suggested that  other own source revenues should supplement 
the property tax.  
Inadequacy of  the tax base to support the activities of the local municipality has 
been debated in the literature.  Bird (2011)  articulates  that a desirable feature 
of a local tax is that it should be able to yield sufficient revenues to meet the 
local needs.  Brueckner (2009, 23) confirms Bird’s point by debating  that a lack 
of adequate tax capacity (especially at the local level) often prevents local 
governments from funding expenditures out of their own revenues.  It  is 
therefore desirable that if the property tax is to be localised then it should be 
able to raise adequate funds sufficient economic capital to cover the designated 
services, i.e. garbage collection, street lighting, administration and 
beautification.     Some participants in the study had doubts  whether the 
property tax  base in the PMC would be able to produce enough revenues to 
cover these services based on the unimproved base.  This is not unique to 
Portmore as a government bureaucrat, interviewee 4 confirmed that if everyone 
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in Jamaica were to be property tax compliant the revenues would  still be 
insufficient to cover the dedicated services 
A cabinet minister, interviewee 7  argued that  whilst it was good to be 
independent, expressed the concern that the PMC  may face a major challenge 
in that it might be unable to raise enough revenues.  He further pointed out  that  
expanding the property tax base to the level where enough revenues can be 
raised to support the services may not be such a good idea as this action may 
run counter to central government’s tax raising   policy (Brueckner, 2009) 
stating  ‘it’s the same pool of persons you are taxing’(Interviewee 7/Cabinet 
Minister/Policymaker). A senior manager, interviewee 20A from a local authority 
was similarly concerned  that the Portmore’s property tax base would be 
inadequate, stating ‘given the demand of what we pay, the property tax cannot 
fulfil the present needs’. Interviewee 20A also articulated that the property tax 
would have to be supported by another tax and this tax would have to be more 
‘significant’ than the property tax. A taxpayer, interviewee 30 also expressed the 
view that the municipality may need to have other revenue sources as she was 
doubtful whether the present property tax  base is enough to cover the 
designated services.  Interviewee 2, a government bureaucrat debated that if 
local authorities were allowed to be more involved in the  management of the 
tax, then they could apply indexation.  Interviewee 14A, a senior tax 
administrator believed that  the improved value was more appropriate for 
Portmore based on the physical nature of the community and the earning 
potential of most citizens.  Interviewee 5, cabinet minister and policymaker 
similarly shared this view.  
Not having enough economic resources both money and property to provide 
services would undermine the position of the municipality making the central 
government the dominant player in the field.    Not having the resources means 
that it would  be unable to provide services to taxpayers, thereby causing fall 
out with some taxpayers, losing their social capital.  If the municipality is given 
control of the tax, then it would give it the ability to raise the desired revenues  
through  rate setting and base  determination (DeCesare 2004).  Central 
government would not want to lose this control as it would lose its dominant 
position in the field in determining the amount of revenues, the type of services 
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to be offered, the rates and base to be used. Their underlying interest is to 
control the level of revenues that pass through the municipality.  
6.8	  Summary	  
This chapter presented the findings analysis and discussions in relation to  
Research Question Two: To what extent is non-localization of the property tax 
in Portmore influenced  by the  political dispositions  of players within the 
property tax field?  
The findings showed that fiscal decentralization was being pursued within the 
context of local government reform which had been going on for a long time.  
The findings  further revealed that although steps were being taken to entrench 
local government in the constitution and to change the regulatory framework, 
there was no guarantee that these changes  would bring about fiscal 
decentralization. Non-localisation seemed to be a complex issue and was 
influenced by a combination of issues.  Such issues included the lack of a 
clearly defined political path along with the absence of a white paper to give 
direction to the process. In the absence of these, government ministers and 
bureaucrats’ response to localization was based on their own belief system. 
Bureaucrats’ lukewarm response was out of fear that their powers would be 
whittled away. At the municipality level, the findings suggest that non-
localization was threatened by inadequate economic resources, that councillors 
lacked the  necessary cultural capital to lead, that they were not trusted by 
citizens due to their inability to work with people or politicians with different 
political ideologies, their lack of accountability to citizens, corruption on their 
part, their poor attitude towards local fund raising and  citizens’ failure to 
demand  accountability from councillors . 
Despite the challenges outlined above some participants believed that fiscal 
decentralization can be a reality  and would be critical vehicle to both improve 
tax morale and build compliance as confirmed in the literature (Guth, Levati and 
Sausgrubber 2005; MIkesell 2003, Ruhling 2006) which would result in 
increased revenues for local authorities. Without fiscal decentralisation, the tax 
continues to be centrally managed.   
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The following chapter presents the findings on the dimensions of compliance 
and non-compliance within the context of a centrally managed property tax 
regime. 
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Chapter	  	  7	  
7.0	   Dimensions	  of	  Property	  Tax	  Compliance	  
7.1	   Introduction	  
This chapter presents the findings and analyses in relation to the third research 
question.  Research Question Three: What are the dimensions of property tax 
compliance and non-compliance  in Jamaica?  How do taxpayers use their 
capital to influence their compliance practices? 
Objectives: 
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ indifference, alienation from the 
community and their lack of awareness of the property tax or cultural 
capital shape their compliance practices   
• To establish how property ownership or the lack thereof  influence 
compliance  
• To establish how some taxpayers use their economic and cultural capital 
to maintain and enhance their evasive practices 
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ disposition towards  public 
financial commitments and tax in particular  shape their attitude towards 
property tax compliance 
• To highlight those issues that motivate tax compliance 
• To establish how administrative and institutional practices  shape 
compliance practices 
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ attachment to property,  moral 
and social conditioning shape their compliance practices  
• To provide insights into how taxpayers’ perception of Jamaican 
politicians,  government departments (including the tax authority) and the 
local authorities influence tax compliance 
• To provide insights into how the media and taxpayers’ interaction with 
housing developers influence compliance 
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Section 7.2 discusses actors in the tax compliance field; section 7.2.1 discusses 
the attitude of taxpayers towards taxation; section  7.2.2 attitude of taxpayers 
towards the property tax; sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 discuss compliant and non-
compliant taxpayers respectively, sections 7.3 to 7.3.4 outline the main issues  
influencing taxpayers’ compliance.  Sections 7.4 and 7.5 discuss the main 
issues which tend to influence non-compliance with section 7.5 to 7.5.5 
discussing taxpayers’ perception and issues of trust with  government and 
politicians.  Section 7.6  concludes the chapter with a summary. 
7.2	   Actors	  in	  the	  compliance	  field	  
According to a tax administrator, there are approximately forty-two thousand 
seven hundred and ninety six  taxable properties in Portmore (National Land 
Agency 2012) and approximately  eight hundred thousand parcels in Jamaica. 
In Jamaica, the average property tax compliance rate was  50% with Portmore 
having a compliance rate of 49% at the end of the 2011/12 financial year, 
increasing to this rate from under 40% since the last several years according to 
a former mayor, interviewee 10. But interviewee 2, a government bureaucrat 
stated that in some parishes  the rate was less than 30%.  These statistics 
indicate that in Jamaica that on an average only one of every two taxpayers in 
pay their property  tax but in some parishes only  three of every ten taxpayers 
comply. According to the literature (Cowell 1999, Cummings et al 2004,1) this 
level of  tax evasion should not only be perceived as only a matter of taxpayers 
committing an offence against the law but it should also be been in light of the 
how the lost revenues limit government’s ability to provide services.  
Additionally evasion may encourage more evasion  (Traxler 2010).             
Portmore is a diverse community, described as the United States of Portmore 
by a former mayor, interviewee 10(see section 6.5). This interviewee attributed 
this to the migratory way some residents came to settle in Portmore from their 
old communities arguing that they  carried their  old cultures and lifestyle or 
habitus which he  believed contributed to the segregatory, divisiveness or 
fragmented nature of Portmore, thus his nomenclature of ‘The United States of 
Portmore’. Additionally, interviewee 10  stated that some persons who migrated 
to Portmore from inner city communities stepped out of a different kind of living 
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arrangement and  found it difficult to  disassociate their ‘minds’ from their 
previous living arrangements,99 making it  impossible for  them to live in an 
organized environment confirmed another mayor.  The mayor, interviewee 9 
also stated that  sometimes lower income people found themselves living 
alongside professionals.  The juxtaposition of different living situations i.e. living 
with people from divergent backgrounds  and different economic means caused 
a ‘culture shock’  to both parties stated the mayor, interviewee 9. According to 
the  mayor, those unaccustomed to organized living behaved outrageously,  
lacked civic pride, thus failing to preserve and maintain the community.  The 
interviewee mayor believed that it was this set of citizens who threw garbage in 
the drains and left cuttings on the road with the expectation they should be 
collected.  
Interviewee 10, a former mayor  also suggested that some taxpayers perceived 
Portmore as  ‘just as  place to kotch,’ with minimal involvement in the 
community despite Portmore having the highest level of tertiary trained 
graduates and professionals  confirmed  another mayor in Jamaica.  The former 
mayor, interviewee 10 stated that these graduates and professionals   didn’t  
make contact or get involved in the affairs of the  community as they were 
‘crowded out’ by the ‘lower participants’,  i.e. those persons who didn’t  have 
much to offer, nor much to lose.   
Interviewee 26, a taxpayer  who lived  in Portmore for sixteen years confirmed 
the former mayor’s perception that people were not as involved as they should. 
Interviewee 26 however attributed  lack of involvement to a  combination of 
issues:  economic, referring to the state of the economy; the lack of a nuclear 
family  structure in Portmore and the promotion of the individualistic lifestyle. 
Interviewee 26 stated that taxpayers particularly those who were single and 
headed households were stressed and pressed for time, having little or no time 
to devote themselves or get involved in community work. Rather they spent 
most of their time tending to the economic welfare of the family particularly in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Some	  people	  came	  from	  ghettos	  where	  they	  lived	  free,	  not	  paying	  tax	  and	  no	  utility	  bills	  as	  told	  by	  a	  
policy	  maker.	  Sometimes	  these	  communities	  determined	  their	  own	  governance	  system.	  See	  (Charles	  
and	  Beckford	  2012)	  The	  informal	  justice	  system	  in	  garrison	  communities	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light of the prevailing economic circumstances in Jamaica. Speaking of the 
individualistic lifestyle, this taxpayer, interviewee 26 suggested that this lifestyle 
contributed to the disconnect with the community.  Interviewee 26 stated that  
people in Portmore were adopting the “American system”  forgetting that their 
involvement was needed in the community.  The interviewee also argued that  
this individualism manifested itself in the action of the ‘rich  people in the 
community who will spend J$2m or J$3m on their homes yet are unwilling to 
spend J$5 on the community’(Interviewee 26/Taxpayer).   
Some taxpayers confirmed their lack of involvement and alienation from the 
community for a number of reasons. A taxpayer, interviewee 29, a tertiary 
trained graduate  and also a property owner confirmed that although she had 
been living in the Portmore community for almost eight years, stated she had no 
connection  with the community due to her present personal commitments of a  
fulltime job and part-time attendance at university as a graduate student during 
weekdays.  According to this taxpayer, interviewee 29 her weekends were 
dedicated to church activities and home chores. Furthermore, interviewee 29 
stated that the municipality’s seemingly lack of interest in the community was 
also a contributory factor.  
Interviewee 28, another taxpayer, pensioner, retiree and property owner who 
has lived in Portmore for forty years (although not a tertiary trained graduate) 
stated  that she was never involved in the community. This pensioner, retiree 
taxpayer stated that her  lack of involvement was as  a result of the combination 
of Portmore’s dormitory nature  and  her work dynamics.  The participant said: 
‘I never attended citizen’s association meetings, (it) was just from home 
to work, because sometimes it was night that took (me) home and the 
bus system was really bad in those days… You have to fight to get on to 
a bus…, fight your way out, rush out in the mornings, walk far distances 
to get the bus, you have to think of your chores…as most times when 
you get home it is night…I only went to church or attend a funeral  but 
nothing else (Interviewee 28/Taxpayer). 
Two taxpayers (interviewees 25A and 30) who are tertiary trained graduates 
and who lived and owned proeprty in Portmore in excess of twenty years 
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similarly confirmed that their  limited or lack of involvement with the community 
was a result of the dynamics of the dormitory nature of Portmore and their 
personal circumstances.  Interviewee 25A related that he spent long  hours 
commuting  to and from Portmore weekdays, getting home late at nights and 
leaving home  early the following morning, which left no time to get involved in 
community activities saying that he was ‘enslaved in this kind of routine’.   This 
taxpayer further stated that normally weekends were devoted to religious 
activities and  even then he had to be judicious about giving time for them  or 
else he may spend the entire week end sleeping due  to exhaustion from the 
extensive travel in and out of Portmore.   
Interviewee 30, taxpayer also a tertiary trained graduate and a former resident 
of Portmore for more than twenty years commented that while living in Portmore 
she had no involvement due to its dormitory nature and her work situation.   All 
her  activities were therefore centred in Kingston:  work, social club, church 
which left her no time to get involved in community activities in Portmore.  
Additionally, interviewee 30 stated that the location of her community in 
Portmore was nearer  to Kingston, thus it was  more convenient to attend to 
these activities in Kingston.  Moreover she claimed, she feared getting involved 
because Portmore appeared to be ‘too political’(Interviewee 30/Taxpayer).                           
Interviewee 23 from civil society, commenting on taxpayers’ disposition and 
their involvement in  Portmore attributed their disposition to Portmore being 
politically segregated . Interviewee 23 also stated that their lack of involvement 
was further  compounded by what he perceived  to be a ‘don’t care attitude’ by 
citizens in Portmore. Interviewee 23 further suggested that people in Portmore 
preferred to concentrate on going to work, attend to their personal affairs and 
only get involved in the community  when an issue directly affected them or 
when a matter ‘reach(sic) their doorsteps.’  The civil society participant 
reiterated, ‘they don’t basically care… So until something comes along the 
attitude is I don’t really care’ (Interviewee 23/Civil Society).  With regard to the  
political segregation, interviewee 23 debated that this was evident in the quality 
of the decisions that were  made concerning Portmore.  He debated  that even 
though Portmore boasted a wide cross section of professionals like teachers, 
police and other civil servants, he was disappointed,  in that people in Portmore 
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seemed unable  to make good judgments as to what is right and wrong due  to 
it being ‘colour coded100’(Interviewee 23/Civil Society). He expressed concern 
that  there seemed to be  a general inability of objectivity even when the issues 
were non-political.  Interviewee 23 called on the people of Portmore   to become 
politically mature.  This maturity he believed would increase their level of 
understanding of the various issues impacting the community purporting  that 
such issues had a greater impact on citizens than the politicians.   
Interviewee 24, a taxpayer  who lived in a gated community  confirmed the view 
that involvement was needs driven. This interviewee stated  that  he didn’t  get 
involved in the wider Portmore community as there was no need to. Interviewee 
24 also stated that  all the services and amenities that a local authority  would 
normally provide were provided by his  gated community, thus there was no 
need for involvement in the wider community as there was nothing to be gained 
from this  wider involvement.  Nevertheless this taxpayer, interviewee 24 
confirmed that members from his community paid their property tax.  
In relation to the property tax in Portmore, interviewee 19B, a senior manager 
from the municipality commented that there was a general lack of awareness 
amongst taxpayers in Portmore concerning the property tax.  This view was 
confirmed by interviewee 28, a taxpayer, resident of forty years in the 
community who suggested that  some people may act irresponsibly and not pay 
their property tax due to  the lack of tax education.  
 In Portmore, most occupiers of property were property owners: the rest  
consisted of  renters and squatters. With regards to the renters, a tax 
administrator, interviewee 17 stated that there was a  large rent population  with 
some of them  being non-compliant because of not wanting to pay or some with 
no economic means to pay and still others may not have passed on the notices 
to the owners  of the property for them to be aware of their obligation.    
According to this senior tax administrator/interviewee 17, some renters may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Colour	  coded	  refers	  to	  the	  people’s	  	  political	  affiliation	  parties,	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  Jamaica,	  the	  
Jamaica	  Labour	  Party	  (JLP)	  and	  the	  People’s	  National	  Party	  (PNP)	  and	  their	  undying	  loyalty	  as	  perceived	  
by	  the	  interviewee.	  The	  interviewee	  suggested	  that	  taxpayers	  	  blindly	  support	  their	  party,	  voting	  along	  
party	   lines	   without	   weighing	   the	   issues,	   	   even	   when	   such	   decisions	   may	   adversely	   affect	   their	  
community.	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also be occupying  properties because they were keeping house  on account of 
the migration of the owners or in other situations, some may be allowed to live 
rent free by relatives because they cannot afford to  pay rent.  There also tend 
to be cases of absentee owners who leave their homes unattended: another 
administrator, interviewee 14A  suggested  that some taxpayers migrate as 
soon as they purchase their  homes leaving their houses locked up.  
A government bureaucrat, interviewee 3 perceived that some people who live in 
Portmore shouldn’t  be living there, as they ‘can’t string together two cents’  i.e.  
they have no economic means or potential to support themselves, because they 
have ‘never worked and don’t plan to work’ and thus have not contributed to the 
development of Portmore.  Interviewee 3, a senior government bureaucrat 
stated  that it was these people who created havoc in Portmore calling  them 
the ‘grandfathers and grandmothers of delinquency that now exist in some 
communities in Portmore’. 
Residents from gated communities were  perceived to be more responsive to 
the authorities as they didn’t want to give the impression that they didn’t  have 
money to pay but rather  prefer the tax authority to think that they had  forgotten 
the tax bill according to a senior tax administrator, interviewee 17.  
The findings suggested that taxpayers in Portmore had many social problems 
which contributed to non-compliance. A senior tax administrator, interviewee 17 
stated that  in conducting their enforcement activities they have had ‘people 
telling me that they have this, that they have that…requiring them to ‘act as 
social workers, just listening to their problems’.  A compliance officer, 
interviewee 17A stated that whilst some taxpayers were cooperative,  other 
were  found to be ‘tedious, rude or angry’ which required them to be as 
‘professional as possible’. 
7.2.1	  Attitude	  of	  taxpayers	  towards	  taxation	  
‘There is a story been told to me once about a gentleman, I don’t remember the 
name of the country that he said he visited. But in the business establishment, 
there was a notice put up saying that I was a proud payer of my taxes, I pay my 
taxes or I am told to pay my taxes, something to that effect. I don’t think that in 
Jamaica we have that sort of culture’ Interviewee 23/Civil Society). Interviewee 
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23 continued, ‘persons are not really anxious to pay because they look at 
tax as a burden whether the tax is PAYE, anyone of them (author’s 
emphasis). 
The above quote came  from an interviewee from civil society who spoke of 
Jamaicans’ attitude towards the payment of tax as confirmed in the literature by 
(Bahl 2007). 	  
The findings revealed that  Jamaicans’ attitude towards the payment of tax  
influenced property tax compliance. According to a former mayor, interviewee 
10, Jamaicans have a  culture of not wanting to pay their tax. Interviewee 10 
debated that Jamaicans will prepare for every other expense including parties 
but will not make preparations for  paying their tax liability.   A number of 
suggestions was given for their attitude. According to a taxpayer, interviewee 
24, some people’s attitude towards  tax payment was that it was seen as an 
oppression and an unnecessary evil and non-compliance was  their way of 
registering their protest (Braithwaite 2009).  But this taxpayer, interviewee 24 
believed that ultimately these non-compliant  taxpayers will suffer the 
consequences.  Interviewee 24 argued that non-compliant taxpayers will have 
to pay the outstanding tax liability along with the associated legal fees for court 
action to bring about their compliance.   This taxpayer, interviewee 24 therefore 
believed  that it was pointless being non-compliant because eventually, ‘you 
have to pay’.    
A cabinet minister, policymaker, interviewee 5 suggested that it was in the 
psyche of people to evade and avoid tax and thus non-compliance was not 
unique to Jamaica.  In this regard, interviewee 5, a policymaker stated that 
there ought to be enforcement through imposition of fines,  prosecution and 
penalties  to ensure compliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) and at the same 
time implied that tax evasion was due to the ineffectiveness of  the tax authority 
was ineffective  (Silvani 1992)101 .   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  See	  (Silvani	  1992)	  Improving	  tax	  compliance	  In	  Improving	  Tax	  Administration	  in	  Developing	  countries	  
(Bird	  and	  Casanegra	  de	  Jantscher	  1992)	  eds.	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According to interviewee 14A, a senior tax administrator some Jamaicans 
perceived ‘taxation as a decree, not as an agreed way of funding social costs’.. 
And as such this senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A argued that this 
attitude towards the payment of tax was one of the biggest obstacles towards 
compliance, regardless of the extent of the tax liability, whether it was large or 
small and regardless of the tax type.  Irrespective of the  tax liability, the 
interviewee emphasised,  there will be no compliance.   To substantiate the 
point, the interviewee made the following assertion:  
‘A businessman that has a turnover with a pharmacy or retail 
hardware or whatever it is,  probably turning over J$100m (per 
year) is required to payJ$5000 (per year) for the business license, 
that’s the highest amount. And they still don’t pay…the tax will 
not be paid’ (Interviewee 14A/Senior Tax Administrator) (bold is 
author’s emphasis) 
Another senior tax administrator, interviewee 16 supported this view stating  
that on a whole ‘in Jamaica we don’t believe in paying tax…(Jamaicans) don’t 
like to pay tax’, their attitude is that they should receive everything free added 
another senior tax administrator. In the circumstances, voluntary compliance 
was ‘very, very, small,) stated this tax administrator, interviewee 16. This senior 
administrator suggested that the ratio of property tax voluntary compliance was 
2%, stating that  ‘only one out of maybe fifty taxpayers who   having not 
received their  assessment notices will voluntarily pay their property 
tax’(Interviewee 16/Senior Tax Administrator).  Not wanting to pay their tax, this 
tax administrator suggested that taxpayers often hide (Braithwaite 2002) forcing 
the tax authority to spend huge resources  to physically find them to enforce 
compliance which can be costly as confirmed by (Levi 1988).   
Interviewee 16 further pointed out that it gets so bad that even when court 
orders and notices were served on some taxpayers they remained 
unresponsive to the efforts of the tax authorities (Braithwaite 2002).  For 
example, interviewee 16, senior tax administrator stated that when notices 
which were  served at some  taxpayers’ homes and or at  their premises, 
taxpayers didn’t  normally respond. In other situations when court orders were 
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served on them to attend court,  they didn’t turn up, in which case the court 
issues a warrant for their arrest, one of the  most extreme measures in 
obtaining compliance (Braithwaite 2002). 
7.2.2	  Attitude	  towards	  property	  tax	  
Interviewee 5, cabinet minister and policymaker stated  that non-compliance of 
property tax in Jamaica  was not just about not paying property tax but  it was 
about  an attitude or a culture amongst some people of not honouring their 
financial commitments for public services.   To substantiate this point, this 
policymaker/cabinet minster, interviewee 6 stated that some people ‘pay 
nothing at all; ‘no light, no water…’. This view expressed by the cabinet 
minister, interviewee 5 was confirmed by interviewee 16, a senior tax 
administrator who said that some people in Jamaica liked the ‘freeness 
mentality’. With this attitude or disposition or habitus, property tax was thus 
another one of those items among a list of  public services for which no 
payments were made but  for which services are provided. This behaviour 
suggests  passive dismissive defiance, which totally ignores  efforts by the 
authorities to take control (Braithwaite 2009).   According to Braithwaite this 
behaviour is evident when people perceive that the authority has no right to 
interfere with their freedom (Brehm and Brehm 1981, Braithwaite 2009, 1). The 
taxpayers used  their culture of non-compliance to dominate the compliance 
field using their non-compliance as an means to communicate (Swartz 1997, 1) 
with the various institutions of government and politicians their dissatisfaction 
with them.  In this case it would be the providers of some public services in 
Jamaica where taxpayers refused to engage with them by not paying their 
obligations. This suggests disengagement with the authorities. Thus their non-
compliance of property tax would be them resisting (Swartz 1997) the 
authorities in a bid to dominate the compliance field 
In relation to property tax, interviewee 17C, a compliance officer suggested that  
taxpayers’ attitude toward the tax was fostered by the government’s lack of 
emphasis on this tax type.  Nevertheless, this compliance officer argued that 
there appeared to be a change in recent times because she ‘noticed that that 
everybody is  getting excited about it’ (Interviewee 17C/Compliance Officer)-
referring to the huge increases in property tax rates and change in policy which 
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became effective April 1, 2013. The compliance officer further stated that the 
government came to the realisation that some money can be raised from the 
property tax.  
A former councillor, interviewee 11 suggested that some people’s attitude 
towards the property tax was a part of their general attitude of  indifference  and 
lack of involvement in the community stating  ‘it is all about themselves’ 
confirming interviewees’ 26 and 23 perceptions. 
A senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 20B suggested that 
taxpayers’ perception of the property tax was that it was  meaningless because 
of the small liabilities ‘it is just J$400’   (meaning that it is nothing, it is small, it is 
not  a big thing). So  he reasoned that because of this mentality of smallness of 
the tax, taxpayers believed that they did not have to concern themselves with  it 
until it reached a stage where they were called upon to pay. When called upon 
to pay, they simply went in their  pockets and settled. This view was also 
confirmed by government bureaucrat, interviewee 3 who also argued that 
because the tax was perceived to be insignificant, some taxpayers forgo 
compliance up to four years at a time and even when penalties and interest  
were applied, the amounts still remained insignificant.  But another government 
bureaucrat, interviewee 1 stated that he hoped that the increased rates would  
change the attitude of some taxpayers towards the tax,  and eventually 
becoming  compliant. 
A former councillor, interviewee 11 suggested that some taxpayers’ attitude 
towards the property tax  was that  it was  a nuisance  and an inconvenience, 
albeit a necessary evil. He made special reference to taxpayers at the upper 
end  of the economic ladder, making mention of the very wealthy landowners 
who owned several types of well-developed, high-end properties. The former 
councillor, interviewee 11 debated that these wealthy landowners  wondered 
why they had to pay the tax particularly in light of the fact they paid for their own 
garbage services and thus not receiving     any value from the payment of the 
tax.   
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A member of civil society, interviewee 22 perceived that the property tax was an 
innovative way to take money from people without  the government earning it in 
that it wasn’t a tax on income.  
Finally, the findings revealed that the perception of the property tax by 
taxpayers was that it was unimportant. Commenting on the property tax in 
relation to the other taxes, a taxpayer, interviewee 30 stressed that the setup, 
design and structure of the tax system encouraged the taxpayers’ attitude of 
non-compliance as the tax system didn’t  seem to capture the property tax.  
Furthermore a member of parliament, interviewee 8 suggested that  no serious 
focus was placed on the property tax even though it could be an avenue to raise 
needed funds.   
7.2.3	  Compliant	  taxpayers	  
Interviewee 14A, a senior  tax administrator  pointed out that when there was 
property tax compliance, it tended to be from the  elderly  as confirmed by 
(McGee and Taylor  2006) and (Torgler 2006, 87-88) on fixed income.  The 
senior administrator, interviewee 14A suggested that older persons particularly 
those with  unregistered titles sought to comply using their property tax 
payments as the means to obtain property ownership via the adverse 
possession rule (National Land Policy 1996).  Another senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 15 expressed the view that older people voluntarily complied 
because they saw tax compliance as part of their civic responsibility being  
‘instilled’  in them from the older days. Interviewee 15 also stated that in the 
older days, people had respect for tax inspectors implying that they were 
socialized to both pay their tax and respect the tax inspector.  
Jamaican residents residing overseas were  also named  as another set  of 
compliant taxpayers by interviewee 14A, a senior tax administrator.   According 
interviewee 14A, a lot of these overseas residents sent their cheques at the 
beginning of each year to settle their property tax liability.  During  the interview, 
this senior administrator, interviewee 14A mentioned that the tax authority was 
presently processing some of those payments which  were already received 
from these overseas residents for the new tax year. Taxpayers who live 
overseas especially in the USA  may  have developed a new appreciation for 
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the property tax based on the environment (Traxler 2010), being re-socialized 
changed their habitus leading to a new practice of paying their property tax and 
even paying before it was due payable. Additionally it could be that they now 
have access to more economic capital because of change in their economic 
circumstances.  
7.2.4	   Non-­‐compliant	  taxpayers	  
 A senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 19B suggested that 
younger people tended not to pay their tax arguing that  young people in 
Jamaican society tended not to focus on certain things  property tax being one 
of them. However the senior manager perceived that engagement with them 
through community activities,  raising their awareness i.e. providing property tax 
education, like what the property tax does, should increase their compliance as 
confirmed by (Swartz 1997). According to a senior government bureaucrat, 
interviewee 4 non-compliance was rife among some taxpayers who have the 
economic means but used their intimate knowledge of the law and the property 
tax system to evade payment.  One such set of taxpayers was named as the 
large land barons (see section 5.3.3)  who  the senior government bureaucrat, 
interviewee 4 argued exploited loopholes in the property tax laws and ‘play 
around with the system’ or gaming playing as posited by Braithwaite (2002).  
A tax professional, interviewee 18 from the corporate world  whilst concurring 
that there was a high level of non-compliance in property tax, stated that ‘there 
is not a lot of enforcement either’. This tax professional perceived that 
compliance could be improved if the tax authority responded with enforcement 
(Braithwaite 2002).  The tax professional was puzzled as to why property tax 
evasion was so high particularly in light of the immobility of the property tax 
base emphasising that the property ‘cannot  migrate’. Contrary to what the tax 
professional thought, interviewee 16, a senior tax administrator suggested that 
even when notices were left at the property, taxpayers were unresponsive and 
in the circumstances there could be no enforcement until the taxpayer 
acknowledges the notice(s).  
A developer, interviewee 32 in contributing to the conversation suggested that 
Jamaicans for the  most part were  unaccustomed to obtaining good service 
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from both central and  local government,  thus,  paying property tax  and then 
demanding proper services  from the authorities wouldn’t  be something they 
would do.   Additionally, interviewee 32 claimed that some citizens had zero 
social responsibility with antisocial behavioural  traits that were viewed to be 
normal and  then there were others he stated who ‘don’t care’   or showed no 
interest in what was happening. The developer, interviewee 32 further stated 
that  Jamaica as a  nation was uneducated  with citizens having very little skill, 
which inhibited them from contributing  in any meaningful way to the structured 
and orderly development of the nation.  The developer interviewee suggested  
that on account of  the low educational level of some citizens, it  made it 
impossible for them  to hold their political representatives accountable.  The 
developer interviewee perceived that  their inability to reason out or rationalize 
the nature of their entitlements and needs made it impossible for them to ensure 
or require accountability.  He used this analogy to capture the attitude, 
education and behaviour of the Jamaican society: 
‘It’s no different from we have a whole set of bankers who know nothing 
about banking, because they grew up thinking that banking is buying 
government paper, not going in the field and engaging a man in 
production and saying ‘have you sold many?’ A whole nation of bankers  
haven’t got a single clue of how banks perform. It is a way of operating 
for such a long time that if you have some money, then you don’t need 
anything – you just buy paper’ (Interviewee 32/Developer). 
7.3	   Dimensions	  of	  compliance	  -­‐	  reasons	  for	  paying	  property	  tax	  	  
	  
The  following sections provides the key issues  that influence tax compliance:  
tax morale, fear of embarrassment; economic motivation and  fulfilling an 
administrative requirement.  
7.3.1	  	  	  Moral	  obligation	  and	  civic	  responsibility	  
	  
According to a pensioner taxpayer interviewee 28 she was compliant because 
she perceived that it was her duty or moral obligation  to pay (Kornhauser 
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2007). Interviewee 28 stated, ‘it was one’s duty to pay,’ and reaffirming this 
belief, she quoted  from the bible,  ‘what is due to Caesar, give unto Caesar…’. 
The pensioner taxpayer interviewee stated that the government declared that 
‘it’s your duty to pay’ and as such each citizen should pay not only property tax 
but whatever other tax they were asked to pay.  Additionally, interviewee 28 
indicated that she wanted her country to ‘run’ well and since the government 
had no other source except tax revenues, paying her tax was the means of 
showing her support for the government (Cullis and Lewis 1997).  Referring to 
her present personal economic circumstances, that of having a minimal 
pension,  interviewee 28 reiterated her belief  that once you have the mind-set 
to pay the tax, ‘regardless of your circumstances, you will pay the tax’.  This 
taxpayer, interviewee 28 has a worldview, that is, collectivist-oriented and or 
egalitarian view, looking out for the good of the nation rather than herself as 
confirmed in the literature (Kornhauser 2007). Interviewee 28 however 
confirmed that in the past, on one occasion (during the illness and subsequent 
death of her daughter) she was late with her property  tax payments.  She 
stated that she was reminded by the tax authority of the outstanding payment 
by way of a written notice.  The pensioner interviewee said she immediately 
made arrangements to pay and  since then, she has never allowed her property 
tax to fall in arrears.  
The pensioner, interviewee 28 pointed out that even though her pension was  
small and the property tax payments appeared to be unmanageable sometimes, 
she believed that God helped her to pay.  Additionally,  interviewee 28 stated  
that she was not on her own and thus depended on the Lord to give her the 
ability to pay her property tax whenever it became due (Grasmick, Bursik and 
Cochran 1984; Torgler 2006).     
A member of civil society, a minister of religion, interviewee 22 similarly 
confirmed  that paying tax was a moral and ethical obligation.  He stated that 
people who didn’t pay their tax were morally and religiously out of line.  Asked 
by the interviewer  whether  he thought that religious people who  didn’t  pay 
their property tax should serve on church boards; his response was that they 
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should not.  Then he suggested that if more people got saved102 (become 
Christians) they would pay their property tax. To substantiate his point, 
interviewee 22 quoted from the bible ‘render to  Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s’ as confirmed in the literature 
(Grasmick, Bursik and Cochran 1984; Torgler 2006).  
Another member of civil society, interviewee 23, stated that people should pay 
their tax as it is our obligation to do so (Kornhauser 2007).  Interviewee 23 
emphasized that even when there were increases in tax rates and taxpayers 
were in disagreement with the rate increases, they should not  withhold 
payment but rather  continue paying until a more equitable way was found  to 
resolve the disagreement.     
A government bureaucrat, interviewee 3 said he paid his tax because he 
regarded tax payment as  one of his financial commitments and thus the 
payment was the means to fulfil this obligation. This government bureaucrat 
suggested that payment or non-payment of his property tax was never 
motivated by whether or not services were provided in his community.    
‘As a matter of fact, back in the nineties coming up into the 2000s, your 
garbage was being collected I think something maybe like twice a week, 
routinely, and there was no miss up, and it never encouraged me to pay 
my property tax any more than it demotivated me from paying it.  
(Interviewee 3/Senior Government Bureaucrat) 
7.3.2	   Embarrassment	  	  mental	  relief	  and	  pride	  	  
Some taxpayers were compliant because they want to avoid public 
embarrassment and shame.  Two members of civil society, interviewees 22 and 
23 stated they were compliant because they feared embarrassment with 
interviewee 22 stating that he feared being posted as a delinquent.    A 
taxpayer, interviewee 24 suggested that people from the gated communities of 
which he was a member paid their property tax  to avoid embarrassment or 
shame (Kornhauser 2007). Interviewee 24 suggested that citizens from gated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Jamaica	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  highly	  religious	  country	  with	  the	  dominant	  religion	  being	  Christianity.	  See	  
(Mordecai	   and	   Mordecai	   2001,	   39-­‐54)	   Culture	   and	   Customs	   of	   Jamaica;	   and	   (Davis	   2011,	   32)	   The	  
Essential	  Guide	  to	  Customs	  and	  Culture:	  Jamaica	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communities  were of  the ‘status in society’ that they wouldn’t  want their 
names to be publicized for non-compliance.     This view was confirmed by 
another taxpayer, interviewee 25A from another gated community  who said he 
was compliant not because he knew how it was spent but rather  that he wanted 
to avoid embarrassment: ‘you don’t want to be caught in the dragnet and your 
reputation dragged in the public… I don’t know why apart from saving myself 
from embarrassment’ (Interviewee 25A/Taxpayer).  
These two taxpayers, interviewees 24 and 25A from the gated communities 
also said they paid their tax because of how they felt good about paying.  
Interviewee 25A stated that he  complied because it gave him that  ‘feeling of  
pride in knowing that  he had  accomplished a milestone  in life’ i.e. of owning a 
piece of property.  Compliance he stated was a way to express this 
accomplishment and pride. Similarly interviewee 24 also a businessman stated  
that being compliant brought  some measure of mental relief  to him, knowing 
that there was ‘no bill for tomorrow and nobody can come and ask you for it’. 
This businessman, taxpayer interviewee’s compliance served as a means of 
getting the liability  out of the way and policing himself into compliance. The 
interviewee stated:  
‘I pay all the tax at the beginning of  the year rather than quarterly as 
some people do.  When you pay quarterly you tend to forget and it 
becomes half yearly and sometimes no field officer comes out to check 
you and it sometimes when the next tax dues you realise that the tax isn’t 
not paid.  I pay the tax up front it is a mental relief because you know that 
it is out of the way (Interviewee 24/Taxpayer). 
Some people were compliant based on the level of services they obtained from 
the payment of their taxes stated a former mayor.  
7.3.3	   Deterrence	  and	  economic	  	  motivation	  	  
A government bureaucrat, interviewee 3 perceived that some people paid  their 
property tax out of fear of the penalties (Allingham and Sandmo 1972)  and also 
of not wanting to attend court. Attending court might be a lengthy and costly 
process for the taxpayer.  A  taxpayer, interviewee 25B confirmed that she had  
an outstanding balance and  was sent a summons to attend court. Not wanting 
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to attend court, this taxpayer interviewee stated that she sought legal advice 
from  an ombudsman residing in the community,  who advised that if payment 
was made, then  court attendance could be avoided.  This taxpayer, interviewee 
25B stated she paid the outstanding balance and avoided court attendance.  
The action of this participant was confirmed by a senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 17 who stated that some people were unwilling to pay the property 
tax but as soon as they were issued with a summons,  they tend to find the 
money to pay to avoid the court attendance. 
A government bureaucrat, interviewee 3 perceived that  some taxpayers were 
compliant based on the threats and fear of seizures for non-compliance.  
Additionally,  a member of civil society, interviewee 22 confirmed that some 
taxpayers,  particularly the poorer ones complied because of the threat of losing 
their property (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).  A taxpayer, interviewee 25A 
stated that he was compliant out of fear of being dragged through the courts.  
He stated that the law states that he should pay and as owner of the property if 
he declined to pay, then one day he may be taken to court or his children may 
be taken to court on his death. Another taxpayer and member of civil society, 
interviewee 22 said he was compliant because he was forced to.  This member 
of civil society stated that if he didn’t pay then there was the threat that the 
government may seize his  property although he was unconvinced that he was 
getting value for his property tax payments.  Interviewee 22 commented that 
‘poorer people’ tend to pay because they were afraid of the threat of losing their 
property. Another taxpayer, interviewee 30 was concerned that non-payment 
meant that a debt would be permanently tied to her property  and stated she 
wanted ‘no debt dragging’ her stating that  the ‘debt will not go anywhere’, i.e. it 
will never be written off and at the same time the debt will attract interest.  To 
avoid all of this,  taxpayer interviewee 23 stated that she complied.  
Interviewee 13, a former prime minister stated that some taxpayers paid their 
property tax to keep their land titles free and clear.  The former prime minister 
suggested that these taxpayers depended on the title of their properties  to 
conduct transactions  with financial institutions to obtain  loans and as such they 
complied to keep their titles free and clear of encumbrances.  Others he 
suggested paid  as a means to show or demonstrate ownership of the land and 
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as such, ownership of their property cannot be challenged, thus they will do 
nothing to prejudice this, hence the faithful compliance of the property tax (Land 
Use policy 1996;  Feder and Nishio 1999).  According to a former councillor, 
interviewee 11, poorer taxpayers tended to be faithful in their compliance of the 
property tax as they see the payment of the property tax as ‘ensuring that the 
property remains in the family, because they wouldn’t want any unscrupulous, 
preying, adverse possession of their land. So they guard it zealously, and every 
1st of April, if it is a working day, they are on to the tax office to pay…’. The 
interviewee pointed out that these taxpayers were compliant irrespective of their 
economic plight or circumstances emphasizing that  even ‘if they don’t eat, they 
pay their tax’(Interviewee 11/Former Councillor).  
Some squatters  paid property tax because they perceived that payment of the 
property tax may ultimately earn or gain them rights to the property or give them 
title for the property (National Land Policy, 1996; The  Registration Titles Act 
1889) according to a cabinet minister/policymaker, interviewee 7 and a squatter, 
interviewee 31A from an unplanned community. 
7.3.4	   Administrative	  or	  organization	  requirement	  
Interviewee 3, a government bureaucrat suggested that some taxpayers paid  
their property tax because of an organizational or administrative requirement.  
This interviewee suggested that purchasing houses in certain developments in 
Portmore and by extension other parts of Jamaica necessitated obtaining  
mortgages from external mortgage companies.103   These mortgagees this 
government bureaucrat interviewee stated required proof of property tax 
compliance  from mortgagors who financed with them.  According to the 
property tax law,  when property tax is not paid, the government has a first lien 
on the property.  Thus, it seemed that the mortgagees made this request to 
ensure that they had the first lien or rights to the property in case there was a 
default on the mortgage payments.   By fulfilling this condition with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  In	  certain	  developments	  in	  Jamaica,	  a	  house	  can	  be	  obtained	  through	  a	  government	  agency	  like	  the	  
National	  Housing	  Trust.	  When	  such	  properties	  are	  obtained	  via	  such	  institutions,	  the	  mortgage	  
requirements	  are	  less	  stringent	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  it	  takes	  years	  for	  taxpayers	  to	  receive	  their	  title	  in	  
order	  to	  commence	  payment	  of	  the	  property	  tax	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mortgagees, taxpayers were forced to be compliant with their property tax 
payments. 
A second area in fulfilling an administrative requirement was with developers. A 
developer, interviewee 32 explained that  developers of properties in Portmore  
(also applicable to other developments in Jamaica)  were  required to pay the 
developer property taxes for properties up to and including the time when 
developers handed over the titles for the respective subdivisions.  This 
interviewee developer pointed out that failure to show evidence of payment of 
the property tax, meant that the developer wouldn’t  receive final  payment or 
settlement for the development.  Additionally, a government bureaucrat, 
interviewee 1 stated that on completion of some developments,  it took an 
inordinately long time for some taxpayers to complete purchases. During the 
wait period, property tax would remain outstanding, thus to rectify this situation, 
developers were now placed on the property tax roll  to ensure compliance until  
the mortgage process was  completed.  The senior bureaucrat, interviewee 1 
stated that some developers were  unhappy with this new development but the 
government took this action to ensure compliance.  
7.4	   Dimensions	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  (1)	  	  
7.4.1	  Fiscal	  Exchange	  and	  distributive	  justice	  	  
The first and most frequent objection given by taxpayers for not paying their 
property tax  was that they didn’t feel that they were getting value for money. In 
some cases, some taxpayers believed the provision of services should precede 
property tax payment. A taxpayer, interviewee 26  argued that ‘there  must be a 
direct correlation between what we input (pay) and what you get out back’, 
referring to this as ‘basic incentive in a selfish society.’ Interviewee 26 believed 
that without this  basic incentive, then there will never be a high level of 
compliance or the desired compliance level will never be reached. He also 
debated that this incentive should be accompanied by some sort of   
deterrence, or some sort of consequence for not paying arguing that the 
penalties in Jamaica were very light but  emphasized  that those consequences 
should never include forfeitures as he viewed this  action as cruel (section 
5.3.1)  
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A senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B argued that non-compliers 
perceived that their property tax was not working for them- because ‘(they) don’t 
feel it’. Furthermore this senior tax administrator debated that  in instances 
where  taxpayers were compliant  and nothing was happening in their  
community then the taxpayer may become upset.  Thus, for taxpayers to 
comply, the senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B  argued, ‘they must feel it, 
they must sense it and they must be aware of it’.  In other words, they should be 
able to see the property tax at work in their community. 
A member of the political directorate, a mayor, interviewee 9 supported the view 
the tax administrator, interviewee 14B, arguing that some people had a problem 
complying or refused to comply  because they were not receiving  services in 
their community for the payment of their tax.    For example, the mayor stated 
that some taxpayers from Pimento Valley104 in Portmore refused to pay their 
property tax because  of the poor state of the  roads in their community.   The 
mayor clearly being sympathetic with his constituents, declared ‘now if I owned 
one of those mansions (in Pimento Valley) I wouldn’t pay my property tax if 
they’re not fixing the roads’ (Interviewee 9/Mayor). A councillor, interviewee 12 
from a local authority also confirmed that when services were not provided, it 
made it difficult for taxpayers to comply.  However, a cabinet minister, 
interviewee 7  was ambivalent towards the taxpayers’ claim of non-compliance 
due to poor road conditions in Pimento Valley stating that  withholding the 
property tax was ‘really neither here nor there’ because the property tax would 
be insufficient to cover the type of repairs that  were needed to fix the roads, 
thus their action of  withholding payment would be ‘symbolic at best’ 
(Interviewee 7/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker) 
A senior tax administrator, interviewee 16 on the other hand argued  that bad 
roads  have nothing to do with tax compliance.  This interviewee stated that  
failure to be compliant on the basis that  the roads were not being fixed and 
services not being provided were merely excuses  taxpayers made  in a bid not  
to comply.  This senior tax administrator  debated that what  taxpayers  ought to 
do was to pay their tax and then demand services based on the fulfilment of 
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their tax paying obligation. The interviewee then rhetorically asked the question.  
How are you not going to pay your taxes and then expect to get the road 
fixed?(Interviewee 16/Senior Tax Administrator).  Interviewee 16 acknowledged  
that whilst services must be tied to the tax opined that  if people didn’t  pay their 
tax then there can be no service. The belief by interviewee 16 is  that tax 
compliance should precede services to the community.  
A member of civil society, interviewee 22 suggested that the average taxpayer 
was dissatisfied with how the property tax was used thus their non-compliance.   
This member from civil society, interviewee 22 reasoned that in the first place 
taxpayers were ‘uncomfortable with the amount of good returns’  on the 
obligations of property tax.  Secondly, taxpayers were  frustrated with the level 
of service as they  didn’t see the property tax at work in their communities in 
that the results of the property tax were  not apparent  to them(Interviewee 
22/Civil Society).  
Another member of civil society, interviewee 23  suggested that the services 
were poor  and this was compounded by the fact that services  had deteriorated 
over the years in some instances.  Referring to garbage collection services in 
his community, interviewee 23 stated  that years ago, garbage was collected 
twice per week,  then it reduced to  once per week and currently (2013) it was 
collected once every two or three weeks.  Interviewee 23 drew a comparison 
with places like New York and Florida, saying that  although property taxes may 
appear to be high in these jurisdictions ‘at least the people get (sic) value for 
money’.  The interviewee concluded by stating that he believed that taxpayers 
in Jamaica will pay high taxes if they perceived that they receive  value for their 
money. This view was confirmed by two  squatters, interviewees 31A and 31C 
in Portmore (although they do not pay property tax). Interviewee 23, from civil 
society in expressing the extent of his dissatisfaction with public services finally 
stated  ‘payment of tax in Jamaica is similar to (when) your pocket is being 
picked’. 
Moving on to another issue, and mentioning the matter of street lights one of the 
services covered by the property tax, interviewee 23 stated that the property tax 
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seemed not to be  working for the community as whole  but  rather for the 
benefit of some politicians:   
‘When you talk about street lights, I know a councillor that lives in my 
community she has four consecutive light posts with light on it (sic) close 
to her house, but in the community we are asking the councillor to put a 
light somewhere else and he says he has no light to put there. But the 
councillor at her gate can have four light posts with street lamps on them.  
But, is our taxes working for us or is it working for the political arm of the 
council?  (Interviewee 23/Civil Society) 
Interviewee 23 emphasised that although these issues might appear to be ‘little 
things’ he didn’t see them as tokens, as they were very important in the 
taxpayers’ psyche which ultimately influenced their perception and their 
practice.  The interviewee concluded that whilst he couldn’t definitively state that 
the street lighting issues in his community  affected taxpayers’ compliance, he 
believed that taxpayers may negatively perceive this matter which may lead 
them to say that they were not getting the sort of benefit to which they are 
entitled.  So, in the circumstances he believed that when money was short, the 
taxpayer would treat property tax as a non-priority and may say ‘I am not paying 
this because I am not getting any benefit’(Interviewee 23/Civil Society). 
Yet another participant, interviewee 25A, a taxpayer stated that the nature, 
design and  development of communities in Portmore left  taxpayers’ properties 
unprotected particularly in the nights which may  influence taxpayers’ 
(non)compliance.    This taxpayer thought that the perception that one’s 
property  was unprotected may  lead to additional stress and fear on taxpayers, 
forcing taxpayers to spend additional money to secure their property.  This he 
believed  influenced taxpayers’ willingness to comply.  The following quote 
reflects the taxpayer’s thoughts:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘..there wasn’t much wisdom in developing Portmore that way or most of 
Portmore that way. I think that the developers went to the bank over and 
over and very happy, yes, but it has left a bitter taste in a lot of us mouths 
and in the governments’ of the past. I don’t think that there was a vision 
that even crime would reach Portmore and we would live in a nice little 
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utopia, you know and we could just park our property out on the 
roadside, go to bed and tomorrow morning you come back, and 
everybody would say good morning and you don’t have to worry about        
it.  That’s not the community we live in now. So when we pay our tax all 
that is on my  mind, I pay my property tax and I still have to worry 
about, where to put even my bike if I don’t have a car, even my bike.  
Maybe, I don’t have enough land to build a veranda or a bike porch 
(laugh) I have to be putting it in the kitchen,  it is a serious thing…There 
is nothing that we can do about it, but maybe the municipality can be 
honest with the citizens and in education, show that these ills are there, 
there is nothing we can do about it again, even to be apologetic so that 
we can be encouraged to pay our taxes (Interviewee 25A/Taxpayer). 
Some interviewees were also concerned with how public funds were spent by 
the municipality and the government (OECD 2010) .  According to a member of 
civil society, interviewee 22, the municipality spent approximately J$22m105 in 
2012 to clean  one earth drain106 in Portmore, an exorbitant amount to clean 
one drain.  Furthermore,  interviewee 22 believed that these drains were 
inappropriately constructed for Portmore needs, resulting in excessive  cleaning 
and maintenance costs.   On a wider scale, this interviewee suggested that 
there was cynicism from taxpayers about  how other tax revenues were being 
spent say  in hospitals and other government institutions.  Taxpayers he 
claimed were  also concerned about the lack of infrastructural development in 
many areas because of the large scale delinquency evidenced in public 
facilities.  Interviewee 23, from civil society  perceived that all these issues 
influenced property tax compliance. 
Taxpayers may also be influenced by the  efficiency of the service providers 
and how funds were allocated to local authorities from the ministry. A senior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  Equivalent	  of	  £147,000	  at	  an	  approximate	  exchange	  rate	  of	  £1=J$150	  when	  this	  activity	  took	  place.	  
106	  An	  earth	  drain	  is	  dirt	  gully	  or	  dirt	  drain	  than	  a	  drain	  made	  from	  deep	  concreted	  culverts.	  	  These	  
drains	  accumulate	  large	  amounts	  of	  silt	  and	  there	  tends	  to	  be	  rapid	  overgrowth	  in	  them	  and	  also	  the	  
accumulation	  of	  water	  if	  they	  are	  not	  properly	  maintained.	  
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/settings/hvchap5.pdf	  	  	  retrieved	  December	  22,	  
2014	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manager from a local authority, interviewee 20B stated that when taxpayers 
witnessed the  level of inefficiencies in the NSWMA, the garbage service 
provider, they were not  motivated to be compliant.   Another senior manager, 
interviewee 20A stated that the present system of pooling of resources may act 
as a demotivator in property tax compliance.  The quote reflects this: 
‘…if Portmore today starts to and be compliant a 100%, all that is going 
to happen is that Portmore’s money is going to be used to subsidise 
other parishes and we would still not see the benefits of a good garbage 
collection system (Interviewee 20A/Senior Manager, Local Authority) 
7.4.2	   Interaction	  of	  developers	  and	  PMC	  	  
A senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 20B explained that 
sometimes failure of developers to settle their outstanding  contractual issues in 
the Portmore community  ultimately influenced tax compliance.  According to 
the interviewee, when there were outstanding contractual obligations by the 
developers in the respective communities, the municipality refused to recognise 
the new community as a part of the municipality.  This lack of recognition  
meant that the municipality  refused to provide some basic services, for 
example,  regular road maintenance services and or other activities such as 
bushing which would maintain the general wellbeing, safety and health of the 
community. When this happened, the community retaliated  with non-
compliance. Citing an example, the senior manager made reference to a 
community in Portmore:  
‘Take a scheme like Pimento Valley107: it’s an upscale development in 
Portmore. The roads are non-existent. We haven’t taken it over. Most 
people in  Pimento Valley don’t pay (property) tax as a result, and I can’t 
disagree with them because they’re not getting any service because the 
developers haven’t made the road and we haven’t taken it over 
(Interviewee 20B/Senior Manager, Local Authority). 
The problem was exacerbated in that the developers left the community, 
refusing to return to complete their  contractual obligations, i.e. provide the 
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  Name	  of	  community	  changed	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roads as stated in their contract.  A mayor, interviewee 9 weighing in on the 
debate  stated  that although the obligations were outstanding,  the developers 
were freed of their obligations by the parish council  resulting in taxpayers 
receiving their titles, emphatically stating that the ‘parish council should never 
have released the titles’. If the titles weren’t  released then the developers’ 
contracts wouldn’t be signed off according to the mayor. In a pained voice, the 
mayor, interviewee 9 bemoaned this  action stating  that this occurred because 
we have a ‘loose system in Jamaica…an imperfect system…along with a level 
of corruption…’. 
According to the  mayor, interviewee 9  and a senior manager, interviewee 20B  
the developers being able to leave without  proper execution of their final 
obligations stemmed  from the  powers which the  Minster of Housing has under 
the Housing Act. The minister exercises  his  power without reference to the 
local authorities according to these interviewees.  The mayor suggested that the 
minster gave  permission to developers to construct developments without  
collaborating  with the local authorities and at the same time didn’t  ensure that 
the developers fulfilled their contractual obligations when the developments 
were ‘completed.’ Whenever  local authorities weren’t a part of the approval of 
development process,  it was perceived (by the political directorate and the 
technocrats in the local authorities) that invariably infrastructural developments 
in the new development were unsatisfactorily completed.  In the circumstances, 
the local authority refused to formally recognize the community.  This lack of 
recognition meant that the local authority  refused to take on the responsibility of 
providing  general municipal or local services like road repairs to the community 
as previously mentioned.   This was the situation in Pimento Valley in Portmore.   
This is what the mayor said: 
‘The Minister of Housing, when they go in the office, they build houses 
under the Housing Act, but they don’t come to the council first and get 
the proper specification. They’re building sub-standard housing and then 
they expect us to take it over; but that is why a number of houses in 
Portmore have not been taken over by the council – and all across 
Jamaica, because they allow the developers to walk away. They don’t 
come to us until after the fact, and so there is a problem with us taking 
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over, so we haven’t taken over some of the houses. And the Minister has 
that power, that he doesn’t come in your community and get permission 
for housing to be built… And you complain and they listen, but it doesn’t 
stop them. They want to have that power. Trust me. Don’t care what they 
talk (sic) they want to have that power…, do their own thing and cut their 
own deal (Interviewee 9/Mayor). 
The mayor also stated that the ministry’s justification of bypassing the local 
authorities was that they took too long to approve  developers’ applications. But 
a senior manager from the local authority, interviewee 20B justified the length of 
the approval process arguing that the local authorities  spent the time 
confirming and ensuring that the various  processes and procedures were 
fulfilled by the developers. Thus the mayor, interviewee 9 sarcastically stated 
‘between the two arguments lie the truth’. 
A cabinet minister, interviewee 7 believed that to remedy the situation, 
taxpayers should  take legal action against the developers.  However, the 
cabinet minister took note of the difficulty taxpayers are likely to face in 
exercising this option.  He therefore argued that the government should 
intervene, take over the new developments, make the necessary corrective 
actions, place sanctions against the developers by either barring them from 
future developments throughout the country or have them pay for the corrective 
work.  However, a senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 20B 
perceived that the government will never hold the developers accountable  as 
they cannot afford to fall out of favour with them.  The developers the senior 
manager argued were needed to provide shelter for the rapidly growing 
population and  the government  being unable to provide this service because 
of lack of financial resources cannot afford to rein them; reining them in he 
perceived will make them angry.  
Then, there was the other situation where the local authority was in direct 
contact with the developers and was responsible for the approval process.  In 
this situation if the local authority deemed that the development was 
unsatisfactorily completed, what the local authority did was to use its power by 
refusing to release the titles  for the new subdivisions within the new 
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development.  The non-release of titles meant that  the developer wouldn’t  
receive final payment for their work according to a developer and it was a 
strategy to  force the developer to fulfil its obligation according to a councillor.  
The problem created  here is that the taxpayers in that particular development 
were unable to pay their property tax because they had no titles for their   
property tax assessments.108  The researcher asked the councillor, interviewee 
12 ‘why do you use this method, when  it is your local authority who would lose 
the tax revenues?  This was the councillor’s response:  
‘…as I said before, when it is done, it is deliberately done…it is a 
deliberate thing.  This is the only weapon that we have to get them 
(developers) to comply with the standard’ (Interviewee 12/Councillor). 
A taxpayer, interviewee 30  from  Martin Park109 in Portmore confirmed that she  
lived in Martin Park, for close to twenty years without receiving her title and 
during this period, she nor other taxpayers in Martin Park paid any property tax. 
The taxpayer confirmed that although Martin Park received garbage and street 
lighting services, the roads were never maintained and were largely neglected 
throughout the twenty year period.  Interviewee 30 surmised that there were 
issues with the developer and the local authority  which led to the non-
recognition of Martin Park as being formally a part of the Portmore community.  
A senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A suggested that the entrance of the 
National Housing Trust, a government entity,  a new player into the developer 
market also contributed to the lack of  property tax compliance.    Prior to its  
entrance, taxpayers had to be property tax compliant with the major mortgagees 
as they insisted that this was a  condition for receiving a certificate to claim tax 
credit110. With the entrance of the National Housing Trust to the market, it took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  As	  noted	  in	  section	  7.3.4	  based	  on	  	  the	  new	  government	  directive,	  the	  developer	  is	  required	  to	  pay	  
the	  property	  tax	  until	  the	  titles	  are	  released	  to	  the	  respective	  taxpayers.	  	  However,	  a	  	  tax	  administrator	  
suggested	   that	   the	   amount	   paid	   would	   be	   less	   than	   the	   sum	   of	   the	   individual	   tax	   liabilities	   for	   the	  
respective	  subdivisions	  as	  the	  payment	  would	  reflect	  payment	  for	  the	  parent	  lot.	  
109	  Name	  of	  community	  changed	  
110	   The	   tax	   credit	   	   system	  was	   abandoned	   in	   Jamaica	   after	   1985	   Tax	   Reform	  Mendes.	   	   See	   (Mendes,	  
McLean	  and	  Wynter	  2013,	  25)	  Essentials	  of	  Jamaican	  Taxation	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years for some people to get their titles  as the National Housing Trust  didn’t  
finalize the subdivisions stated this administrator interviewee.  Interviewee 14A 
thus argued that new owners didn’t  know their property tax obligation and 
couldn’t  pay their tax. Not  having paid property tax for many years, the senior 
tax administrator perceived that  these new owners didn’t get in the ‘grove’ i.e. 
habit of paying property tax. 
7.4.3	   Property	  tax	  roll	  and	  titling	  issues	  
The findings revealed that some taxpayers weren’t  on the property tax roll.  A 
former mayor, interviewee 10 asserted that  approximately 30% of the 
properties in Portmore were affected. However a senior government bureaucrat, 
interviewee 1   refuted the former mayor’s claim saying he would ‘dismiss this 
outright’ but conceded that ‘there  might be one or two omissions’.  The 
bureaucrat interviewee 1 also stated that the law mandated  taxpayers who 
acquired new  properties and where such properties were omitted from the tax 
roll, the new owners  were obligated  to report this omission to the  tax authority 
or the National Land Agency.  But this senior bureaucrat, interviewee 1 stated 
that this didn’t necessarily happen as ‘Jamaica is a lawless county’.  
However, this seemed not to be the case as a senior manager from a local 
authority, interviewee 19A stated that they have had situations where taxpayers 
have come forward to say that they  weren’t  on the property tax roll and in 
some situations entire communities were omitted.  This senior manager 
attributed this to possible administrative bungling at the National Land Agency.  
The senior manager in trying to explain the process of getting on the tax roll 
stated that on satisfactory completion of new developments in Portmore,  and 
where the developments received final approval  from the municipality,  the  
normal practice of the municipality was to send copies of the new subdivisions 
to the relevant government agencies including the National Land Agency  which 
served as the catalyst for the National Land Agency  to place the new properties 
on the tax roll to enable property tax payment.  But in some situations, 
interviewee 19A, stated ‘this didn’t  happen so you might have a community, 
and that community is not on the system paying taxes’(Senior Manager, Local 
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Authority).  Subsequent to the interview a Jamaican newspaper article 
confirmed  the senior manager/interviewee 20A’s claim.111 
A taxpayer, interviewee 30  who previously mentioned that she didn’t pay 
property tax for close to twenty years, revealed that when she discovered that 
she wasn’t on the tax roll, she made no attempt to advise the tax authority  
because she perceived that it would be an exercise in  futility as  the tax 
authority wouldn’t  know how to assist her.   
The findings suggested that the process of getting new subdivisions on the tax 
roll may be an arduous one and probably explained why some taxpayers didn’t 
make attempts to notify the tax authority or the National Land Agency on the 
acquisition of property. A government bureaucrat, interviewee 3 wearing the 
taxpayer’s ‘hat’ stated that years ago he bought land, made several attempts to 
get it on the tax roll, for which he never succeeded.  Out of frustration, he said  
he abandoned the process and to date at the time of the interview (March/April 
2013) the matter remained unresolved.  The literature confirms this to be a 
problem in Jamaica (National Land Policy 1996).  
On the matter of  the taxpayers being unable to pay  their tax because of the 
absence of titles,  a senior tax administrator, interviewee 14 commented that 
some taxpayers gave this as an excuse in order not to comply.  This  senior 
administrator argued that not having a title  didn’t  prevent anyone from paying 
property tax suggesting that they should pay their property tax and seek to 
obtain a title112. However as previously suggested by another senior 
administrator, interviewee 14 this wasn’t  so straightforward especially with new 
subdivisions.  This administrator argued that it was the presence of the title that 
provided the basis of assessment for the payment of the tax. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Error-­‐robbing-­‐Portmore-­‐council-­‐of-­‐property-­‐
tax_14518909	  	  retrieved	  June	  16,	  2014	  	  
	  	  	  
112	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  this	  administrator	  referred	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  tax	  related	  to	  only	  one	  
parcel	  or	  a	  few	  parcels.	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7.4.4	  	  Economic	  issues	  	  	  
Some participants stated that some taxpayers were unable to pay their property 
tax because of lack of economic means.  A former politician, interviewee 13 
suggested that Jamaica is a very poor society, the poorest society in the 
Caribbean apart from Haiti and as such people have very low incomes, thus 
they will avoid or evade the tax because they just cannot afford it.    Speaking 
specifically of Portmore, a taxpayer, interviewee 30 argued that low salaries and  
high unemployment in Portmore may contribute to the non-compliance but this 
was contradicted by interviewee 13, the former politician’s perception that 
employment in Portmore was high. This taxpayer, interviewee 30 debated that  
the competing bills for workers’ low income placed property tax in the  
taxpayers’  non-priority list. A senior tax administrator, interviewee 15 stated 
that that she wouldn’t blame the taxpayers for taking this route. Knowing that 
nothing will happen if the property tax  wasn’t  paid, taxpayers resorted to 
paying all other bills leaving the property tax behind argued another taxpayer, 
interviewee 25A. This taxpayer  reasoned, ‘if you don’t pay your cable, light or 
water they will be disconnected, but when you don’t pay property tax, nothing 
happens, your garbage will still be collected’ (Interviewee 25A/Taxpayer) 
Interviewee 13, a former politician suggested that in situations where some 
taxpayers owned large tracts of land and where large estates were 
unproductive, the owners may be non-compliant because the  properties 
weren’t  generating income therefore, these owners  would evade.	  This view 
was confirmed by a member of civil society, interviewee 22 who stated that 
some properties remained  undeveloped and landowners weren’t  encouraged 
to develop their properties and thus they were unable to pay their property tax.   
It was noted that there were large acreages of  newly undeveloped properties in 
some parts of Jamaica by two senior tax administrators – interviewees 14A & 
14B.  Interviewee 14A suggested that the changing macro-economic policy of 
the country may have led to the abandonment of  these properties leaving 
owners without the ability to pay their property tax.  Specific reference  was 
made of its impact on the dairy and beef industry in south west Jamaica based 
on  the following excerpt how this situation impacted property tax compliance:  
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‘…when you go rural, (we) drove there (Montego Bay to Middle 
Quarters)113, the first week of the year (2013) coming from Montego Bay, 
and all of the cow pastures  that we used to see around there, most of 
them is just bush… they no longer have them as rearing cattle… we 
killed our milk industry… we also killed our beef industry because we say 
our beef was too tough… so there was a time when farmers couldn’t sell 
their animals so they got out of it… and when you put that into the 
database we have 150 acres… unoccupied parcels… if you have the lots 
and you are not able to identify the owners…you can’t collect 
(Interviewees 14A & 14B/Senior Tax Administrators). 
A business operator, interviewee 24 confirmed that the property tax for 
commercial property can be excessive particularly when the properties were not 
in use. Or there might be situations where taxpayers may have inherited large 
tracts of land, failed to develop them, and in these cases affordability of the tax 
became an issue suggested a senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A in 
which case there was  a lack of alignment between  land, wealth and income 
(Bird and Slack 2006).  
While in the field (February to April 2013), there was an announcement of an 
intended increase in the property tax rates.  Some interviewees expressed 
concern about the increases while others commented on the actual increases.  
Interviewee 22 from civil society expressed concern  about taxpayers’ ability to 
pay the increases  particularly  those in rural Jamaica.  He argued that their 
economic circumstances would  make the new property tax payments 
unaffordable.  The interviewee suggested that the government should have 
imposed new taxes on goods and services like  cigarettes, white rum  and 
motor vehicles which can better absorb tax increases. The interviewee 22 was 
adamant  that ‘little people’ cannot afford to pay the increased  property tax.  A 
taxpayer, interviewee 28 not knowing the extent of the increase, said if it were 
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exorbitant she would  have to seek assistance from relatives in paying the tax. 
Another taxpayer, interviewee 24 believed that if the rates were huge, taxpayers 
might have difficulty paying  the new property tax rates as taxpayers’ wages in 
both public and private sector would be unable to absorb on any additional 
costs (Wynter and Oats unpublished paper) 
Another member from civil society, interviewee 23 argued that  taxpayers 
especially from the public sector  may decide not to pay the  property tax in light 
of the wage restraints imposed on them because they cannot afford the new 
rates.  The interviewee suggested it was unfair to have a restraint on income 
but yet imposed huge the property tax increases.  Then he asked a rhetorical 
question, ‘how will I survive?’(Interviewee 23/Civil Society).   
Prior to the increases, property tax payments for some properties were 
relatively small with some taxpayers finding it a disincentive to pay the small 
amounts especially when the payment stations were far distances from their 
residences or work places. According to a cabinet minister, interviewee 5 
sometimes transportation costs were more than the actual property tax 
payments and taxpayers faced  with this situation evaded because it was 
uneconomical for them to comply.  The cabinet minister stated  that this was  a 
problem for some people who lived in deep rural parishes far away from the 
payment stations.  According to former councillor, interviewee 11, some 
taxpayers didn’t comply because  their  tax liability was too ‘infinitesimal’ and as 
such  these taxpayers regarded it as a  waste of their time and money to go and 
pay such small amounts.  Additionally, the former councillor suggested that 
some taxpayers found the  queues at the tax offices  too long causing them to 
be spend inordinately long periods at times in excess of two-and-half hours to 
these pay small amounts.  The former councillor  perceived that these 
taxpayers had  the intention to pay but because they were  turned off by the 
long lines at that particular time they left and  they may never return to pay. A 
policymaker/cabinet minister, interviewee 5 also believed that the wait time in 
the queue was too long which he said influenced some taxpayers’ decision to 
evade. He felt that the tax authority should take corrective action to improve the 
situation. 
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A taxpayer, interviewee 30 confirmed the long wait times in the line and  
asserted that she found it  challenging to wait in the line  ‘just to pay a small 
amount of J$3,000114. This taxpayer stated  that although the notices give 
taxpayers the option to pay in two or in quarterly  instalments, she would never 
consider utilizing this option, as she thought  it was a waste of her  time to pay 
anything less than the full amount.   
7.4.	  5	  Exploiting	  legislative	  loopholes	  	  
Although it’s perceived that it’s difficult to evade property tax liability, some 
taxpayers do evade by manipulating loopholes with the law: firstly by the  
statute bar  and secondly, based on provisions of  the Quit Rent’s Act which 
speaks to forfeiture on non-payment of the property tax (see section 5.3.1- 
5.3.3)  
Based  on  the statute bar, taxpayers are required only to  pay a total of six 
years of their outstanding property tax payments regardless of the outstanding 
number of years. So in situations where a taxpayer may have had ten or twenty 
years outstanding liability; by law, all the liability is written off excepting the last 
six years. A senior government bureaucrat, interviewee 2 argued that  the 
statute bar created a loophole by serving as an  ‘incentive’ for taxpayers to 
evade  and also preventing the tax authority from enforcing liabilities  in excess 
of six years.  This was confirmed by a  taxpayer, interviewee 29 who told the 
interviewer that some taxpayers took advantage of this facility. Taxpayer, 
interviewee 29 stated that she overheard one of her work colleagues boasting in 
the office that he didn’t  pay his property tax for a very long time i.e. more than 
seven years and that when he decided to pay, he would only pay for six years.  
  A senior tax administrator, interviewee 17 suggested that the bar should be 
opened to facilitate increased compliance. However these opinions were not 
shared by a former councillor, interviewee 11 who stated that the statute bar 
was a means of providing some balance to the adverse possession rule.  The 
former councillor, interviewee 11 stated that without the statute bar some 
taxpayers ‘can through the drop of a hat use the loophole of adverse 
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possession to own property’. The former councillor further argued that the law 
anticipated the likelihood of this happening and thus its inclusion.   
A cabinet minister/policymaker, interviewee 7 justified the  statute bar  
suggesting that it served as an accounting function  because debt that was 
outstanding for more than six years was  unlikely to  be collected.  A tax 
administrator, interviewee 17 confirmed the cabinet minister’s position,  stating 
that in Portmore, there was a greater degree of  difficulty collecting property tax 
liability which was outstanding for more than three years.  
Another means through which some taxpayers evaded the  property tax was 
through manipulation of the forfeiture rule as outlined in the Quit Rents Acts.  
Taxpayers should not sell property with outstanding property tax debt but some 
taxpayers particularly those with huge economic resources or economic capital 
and  a good understanding of how the property tax laws and processes work or 
cultural capital use the Quit Rents Act to their advantage (see section 5.3.3).  
7.4.6	   Property	  tax	  awareness	  	  	  	  
A senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 19B suggested that public 
awareness or cultural capital was lacking in Jamaica and it needed to be 
addressed.   This interviewee also argued that this lack of cultural capital 
sometimes led to non-compliance. The senior manger stated that in interacting 
with some taxpayers, the realization was brought home to bear that they  didn’t  
pay the property tax due to ignorance (Bahl 2009) especially amongst new 
property owners.  Drawing from   her personal experience, this senior manager 
stated: 
‘The whole matter of property tax does not resonate with you until you 
hear something that you need to pay. I’ve had a personal experience. I 
lived in an apartment complex and I lived there for years and thing I own 
this place, and I never paid property tax. And even although I heard 
these things on the radio and whatever, it never occurred to me that I 
needed to do something. And I had to do something with my property at 
some point in time, and it was there and then that I understood the 
importance of paying the property tax. And for me it was ignorance, and I 
find that that happens. So public education in these areas, like in a new 
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development, can help to an extent and I think, as far as the council is 
concerned, we can take that input (Interviewee 19B/Senior Manager, 
Local Authority). 
Some interviewees  confirmed that they had little  knowledge of the property tax 
and or the property tax system although these taxpayers didn’t confirm that their 
lack of knowledge led them to being non-compliant. These are some short 
responses from three taxpayers:  
‘…my knowledge is superficial and is limited to the receipt of the 
assessment notice and the payment of the tax’ (Interviewee 
26/Taxpayer)  
‘…except for the little that I am expected to pay, I don’t know much’ 
(Interviewee 27/Taxpayer).   
‘I don’t know nothing much about the tax per se’ (Interviewee 
30/Taxpayer). 
 Equally, another interviewee a member of parliament, interviewee 8 when 
asked to share his knowledge of the property tax system stated the following: 
‘But generally what it is, is that each parcel of land has a valuation and 
there is a tax rate that is a set rate of tax per acre or per area that is 
charged to each parcel. So the larger the property, the larger the tax, and 
the smaller the property…Different valuation at different tax rate.  Now, 
the tax rate is on the unimproved value of the property (Interviewee 
8/Legislator).  
The above quotes suggest a lack of fiscal  consciousness of the tax  or cultural 
capital by some stakeholders in the field which may contribute to non-
compliance (Cullis and Lewis 1997).  A member of civil society, interviewee 22 
debated that   ‘compliance is kind of contagious and if people are taught social 
obligation and responsibility, they will pay their tax’. This interviewee stated that 
even though there were advertisements on the radio, he believed that these 
were insufficient as more information should be given on how the property tax 
works and what it does. 
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A taxpayer, interviewee 25A bemoaned  the lack of education across the nation 
stating that free communication was unavailable to ordinary citizens, thus 
making them  unaware of current issues including property tax.  This taxpayer in 
arguing for  increased awareness of the taxpayer suggested that such 
education should be  the type which  builds a ‘value system’,  expressing the 
view that the inculcation of a  value system should involve patriotism and the 
payment of tax.  The taxpayer interviewee 25A further stated  ‘I am thinking it 
must go beyond examination purposes; the education that I’m thinking of,  is for 
the person to develop a value system’. Jamaicans  he debated, should be 
taught that they are important to their community and country and on how the 
property tax is used.  The taxpayer drew a comparison with the Americans, 
stating that Americans were patriotic to the point where they were willing to die 
for their country.  This is the sort of patriotism that he suggested should be 
inculcated through the education system.    
Taxpayer interviewee 25A also argued that the  oversight ministry for property 
tax should have a  permanent promotions department with the job of  educating 
taxpayers on the benefits of  the property tax, the respective property tax laws, 
why taxpayers ought to pay their tax, how the tax is used, how it benefits the 
respective communities and where the tax goes.  This sort of education on the 
property tax  should be embedded in the education system particularly in light of 
the  changing structure of the economy  with a shift toward entrepreneurship he 
argued and should be continuous not confined to times of amnesty. Another 
taxpayer, interviewee 30 suggested, it should be done in the context where 
connections can be made with payment and services, that is, ‘it is	  peg(ged) to 
something that they can see what the property tax is used for and if they are not 
paying and the consequence of that (sic)’. 
Tax administrators on the other hand suggested that  taxpayers should be 
educated about the cost of services and the impact that non-compliance has on 
their fellow taxpayers.  One senior tax administrator, interviewee 14A argued 
that  if taxpayers knew  the cost  of providing services particularly with the new 
increases in the property tax rates, then it would increase compliance. This 
administrator perceived that  knowledge of the cost of services  by taxpayers 
will possibly lead to more buy-in enabling them to make the connection between 
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their payment and the benefits they receive as previously argued by taxpayer 
26. Another  senior tax administrator, interviewee 17  suggested that if 
taxpayers  were educated and their awareness increased then they would know 
how   non-compliance affected ‘their own brothers and sisters’ and that non-
compliance was not    an act of  ‘spiting the government ’. With this knowledge 
of the impact of non-compliance, senior tax administrator, interviewee 17,  
believed that taxpayers  would be more cooperative resulting in the tax burden 
being more evenly shared  and the possibility of more taxpayers paying lesser 
amounts. 
Finally, another taxpayer, interviewee 26 also perceived that lack of  
understanding of the property laws may have  contributed to the lack of buy-in 
of the law resulting in non-compliance.   
According to (Kornhauser 2007, 619) norms and morality come through a 
process of socialization, and education can strengthen norms that are positively 
correlated with tax compliance such as honesty, morality, national pride, 
concern for others as suggested by a tax administrator above (Kornhauser 
2007, 619). The views expressed by these interviewees of building a value 
system and teaching civil responsibility  with the intention of building compliance 
culture are in keeping with what is in the literature.   
7.5	   Dimensions	   of	   Non-­‐Compliance	   (II)-­‐	   Perception	   of	  
politicians	  and	  government	  institutions	  
7.5.1	   Councillors	  	  
According to a cabinet minister/policymaker, interviewee 6, councillors should 
be the first point of call for taxpayers within their respective constituencies 
acting as ‘mothers and fathers’ of the community,  always available and 
accessible  to  taxpayers to receive complaints and make representations on 
their behalf.  But this policymaker suggested that councillors’ unavailability to 
interact with the taxpayers, resulted in an absence of a relationship with the 
taxpayers which he perceived is critical to property tax compliance.  Councillors 
he stated should be on the ground to take taxpayers’ complaints concerning 
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deficiencies in services in their communities and to represent them to have 
these services fixed. This is what the interviewee said to substantiate his point: 
‘I walk into a place like Boatview115- they say everybody over there have 
(sic) at least a first degree, all of them are professionals.  When they 
open their doors, everybody says ‘yes sir’ and I would say to them, when 
was the last time your councillor came here?  And they would say 
councillor, what councillor? People don’t know them.	  You have a street 
light and they say you must call the councillor if the streetlight is not 
working.  If you call Jamaica Public Service, they will say to you, ‘did you 
talk to your councillor’ it is a channel.  You cannot see the councillor to 
tell him’ (Interviewee 6/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker). 
The policymaker/interviewee 6 appeared to be in pain in discussing the (non) 
performance of councillors and their critical role in the community in ensuring 
the provision and maintenance of services which he believed influence 
compliance.  Their unsatisfactory performance in the community may affect not 
only property tax compliance but also how taxpayers perceived their members 
of parliament which he argued was  fundamental to the political process. (At this 
point in the interview, the politician stopped and expressed concern about how 
his views would be treated in my study if he were to fully air or vent his feelings.  
He thereon read aloud the relevant section of the Informed Consent Form a 
number of times ‘I understand that my responses will be dealt with ethically and 
responsibly in this study’ (Interviewee 6/Policymaker/Cabinet minister).  Having 
felt satisfied that his views would be dealt with responsibly and ethically, he 
proceeded). 
The  system of providing services to the community has a channel of 
communication with  councillors as the conduit through which this 
communication takes place. So according to the cabinet minister, interviewee 6, 
the  councillors’ interaction with citizens was critical to the provision of services 
which influenced compliance and also for how citizens perceived members of 
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parliament as they help to sell the image of their members of parliament 
emphasizing that ‘if the councillors work well, you are alright.’ 
The cabinet minister, interviewee 6 suggested that councillors rather than 
maintaining and establishing contacts with citizens in the community used their 
elected positions for  personal gain: citing their career and economic 
advancement  only. The policymaker perceived  councillors  vied for and 
accepted the election of serving as councillors solely  for the personal and 
economic benefits along with the status that the position offered.  In this 
regarded he stated:  
‘It is almost like a profile, you get that on your profile, and you also get a 
concession of 20%, so you are going to get a Prado.  You have a nice 
job, you have the council thing and you get a money(sic). And you can 
have benefits thereafter’	  (Interviewee 6/Cabinet Minister). 
Thus, interviewee 6, cabinet minister/policymaker debated that  the idea of 
being elected to the post  of councillors wasn’t  about representing  taxpayers 
but rather maximizing the position for their personal advantage.   The politician’s 
claim of the lack of interaction between citizens and community was confirmed  
by citizens from an unplanned community and also from a gated community.   
Citizens from an unplanned community in Portmore  complained that since the 
last local government elections (2012) they  hadn’t  seen their councillor after a 
long while.  This group of citizens lived on leased land in some cases upwards 
of thirty years for which they  hadn’t paid property tax. Their hope was that their 
councillor(s) would have piloted their request for them to purchase the land 
which they occupy and obtain titles, so that they can begin to pay property tax 
and to access better services.  They wanted their current councillor to take their 
request to the municipality  and thereon advancing the issue to the attention of 
the  central government.  But their hopes may have been dashed as they stated 
that their current councillor didn’t visit or interact with them in order to represent 
them.  
But a senior tax administrator, interviewee 14B  debated that the position of 
councillor was nebulous based on the  lack of institutionalism of local 
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government unlike  what obtained in the civil service in central government.  
The senior tax administrator interviewee 14B, therefore surmised  that a 
councillor’s performance or what he practiced was a function of his personality, 
dynamism, knowledge of those issues or cultural capital affecting the 
community and his willingness to deal with them rather than following a set of 
procedures that would be  detailed in a job, say in the civil service. Furthermore, 
the interviewee 14B stated that the local authorities didn’t   have a strong public 
servant support so the service was really dependent on the politicians and the 
politics of the day.  
A taxpayer, interviewee 25A from a gated community also confirmed that he  
rarely interacted with his councillor stating that he saw his councillor two weeks 
before local government elections116, then another time when he came back 
with a truck of water after the hurricane.   
Councillors may  also influence property tax compliance by being exemplary in 
their community by paying their property tax with a senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 17 stating that a councillor’s compliance  influences  constituents’ 
compliance (Kornhauser 2007) implying that this sends a signal to constituents.     
But the senior tax administrator, interviewee 17 suggested that sometimes 
‘these very councillors are the ones who are non-compliant’.   The senior 
administrator stated that on occasions associates of councillors and councillors 
themselves may say,  ‘I am the councillor or a friend of the councillor so I don’t 
have to pay’ (interviewee 17/Senior Tax Administrator). Thus interviewee 17, 
senior tax administrator stated that if everyone were to cooperate and join 
forces,  then collections would improve’.  
7.5.2	   National	  politicians	  and	  the	  media	  	  
A cabinet minister, interviewee 6 perceived that the media contributed a lot of  
anti-government  sentiment ( Hasseldine and Hite 2003)  which ultimately 
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influenced property tax compliance. The cabinet minister stated that  both 
political parties were guilty of  using the media as a tool to spread anti-
government sentiment when their respective parties weren’t  in power. But the 
cabinet minister/policymaker debated  that the media should play a balancing 
act by investigating and providing the facts to the public i.e. providing education 
to build awareness (Kornhauser 2007). This cabinet minister debated  that the 
anti-government talk placed a lot of pressure on the sitting government, making 
it rather challenging to do tax collections because high anti-government 
sentiment made it difficult to get  buy-in from taxpayers and in motivating them 
into being tax compliant. To substantiate his view point, the policymaker 
referred to a  particular incident which  took media attention for a long time.   
This issue he said concerned the spending of J$60M by the ruling government 
(PNP) to purchase motor vehicles for newly elected ministers of government.  
The cabinet minister, interviewee 6 viewed the incident as being  untimely 
because it happened during a period of time when the  government was asking 
people to ‘hold strain’ based on the prevailing economic conditions and at the 
same time trying to increase the collection of tax revenues.  This is what the 
cabinet minister said:  
‘And that went on and on, every station that you turned on and it sells 
government in a bad light.  Here, is it that we are trying to collect taxes 
and you take J$60m to buy sports utility and they keep emphasising 
SUV… But it is not something; you could not have bought anything less.  
That is how it is casted…’ (Interviewee 6/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker). 
The policymaker further pointed out that the government will never get 
everything right  particularly in light of Jamaicans’ perception of politicians and 
their operations due to taxpayers’  lack of understanding of what the politicians 
do, their role,  their functions and their entitlements. 
To support his viewpoint, the interviewee stated:  
‘I heard a woman on the radio said, all these people (politicians) do is get 
fat.  Some of them come in as paupers (laughter of interviewee). It is 
hard, it is hard to listen. Why you (sic) think that somebody would say 
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that (laughter again).  They come in as pauper, who now, oh God in 
these times, don’t do that’ (Interviewee 6/Cabinet Minister/Policymaker). 
There seemed to be lack of trust in the politicians and credibility in both the 
politicians and the government, resulting in no legitimacy to collect tax. Their 
lack of legitimacy was framed by the media. 
7.5.3	  Government	  ministries	  and	  governing	  party	  
Some interviewees in the study expressed awareness of Jamaica’s economic 
plight,  the strain which this caused the government and ultimately the nation.  
However, they feel that in all of this the government should be honest  with the 
nation, in order for them  be trustworthy,   for the establishment, creation and 
development  of goodwill in the society. 
A taxpayer, interviewee 25A expressed the view that the government was under 
great strain,  but said the politicians (ruling)  were ‘unable to talk straight’ 
suggesting  that they were not forthright and honest in informing the Jamaican 
public of  the extent of the economic strain the country was undergoing.  This 
taxpayer, interviewee 25A expressed awareness of the daily  increase in the 
national debt, and the country’s lack of productivity suggesting  that    ‘the 
government was really in a bind’..  With a sympathetic tone taxpayer 
interviewee 25A said  ‘I would not want to be in their shoes’.  This taxpayer 
suggested that the withholding of information by the government and its 
dishonesty with the nation was because it feared  the public ‘s reaction to such 
bad news.   Clearly unhappy with the government’s performance and with its 
interaction  with the public, the interviewee expressed the view that should he 
receive the opportunity to reform property tax, he would dismiss  all the 
technocrats in the ministry of local government as they were not educating and 
communicating with taxpayers concerning property tax.  Taxpayer interviewee 
25A stated that he wouldn’t  ‘touch’ the tax authority ‘not the tax authority as the 
tax authority receives instructions from central government’. He argued that  his 
decision is based on his perception that the technocrats have become  
hardened in their positions and were accustomed to doing things the same way 
and therefore they couldn’t  change, hence he would fire all of them.  Then he 
declared: 
262	  
	  
‘Can you imagine in this time in Jamaica, you have approximately 80% of 
property owners not paying tax and 20% running the country and the 
Government is running all over the place trying to  raise money and (the) 
IMF is at them and they would want to, to double tax as a ‘soda bottle’, 
on the 20%. You don’t see that something is wrong, something is 
seriously wrong? (Interviewee 25A/Taxpayer).   
Taxpayer interviewee 25A also made  reference to the government’s failure   in 
not making  developers accountable in fulfilling their contractual obligations to 
taxpayers particularly in communities in Portmore.  This view was also 
supported by a senior manager from a local authority, interviewee 20B and by a 
mayor, interviewee 9.  The taxpayer, interviewee 25A quipped developers were 
‘smiling all the way to the bank’..  
Another taxpayer, interviewee 24 suggested that  the government of the day 
was unresponsive  or unable to respond to the real needs of  the country in any 
practical way and that it abused its powers in parliament.  For example, this 
taxpayer, interviewee 24 pointed out that even though the government had a 
very large majority in parliament and didn’t  need the support of the opposition 
in passing legislation for formulating policies, the government seemed to be 
abusing this position by doing  ‘whatever it feels like doing’ and thus he believed 
that its actions were not in the national interest.   
A member of civil society, interviewee 22 speaking of the government said if the 
government performed well, and used the country’s financial resources 
judiciously and correctly, this would lead to the creation of goodwill in the 
communities. This interviewee repeatedly expressed the view that the 
government mismanaged tax revenues. Goodwill in the community, this 
interviewee argued   promotes a spirit of volunteerism where citizens give back 
to the community.  This member of civil society, further argued that goodwill 
creates less strain on public funds,  releasing funds that can be used in other 
areas.  Furthermore, interviewee 22  stated that community volunteerism lowers 
the crime rate as people were more compliant.  This interviewee believed that in 
situations where the  government  didn’t  use the tax revenues prudently,  then 
people were demotivated resulting in  property tax  non-compliance. 
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Despite interviewees 24, 25A’s perception that the government was dishonest,  
demanded no accountability from some actors in the property tax field,  that 
actors in the ministry responsible for property tax were unresponsive,  that it 
abused its powers in parliament, that they were putting undue strain on 
compliant taxpayers,  they remained compliant.  Both of these taxpayers were 
compliant because of the emotional fulfilment as previously mentioned.  Both 
taxpayers feared embarrassment and both these taxpayers were from the gated 
communities where the expectation is that they are all tax compliant, therefore 
in a bid to remain a part of this group they complied.  
7.5.4	   Portmore	  Municipal	  Council	  (PMC)	  
Three taxpayers(interviewees 24, 27, 30) suggested that they saw evidence of 
improvement in the services offered by the municipality with one taxpayer 
stating that quite a number of things were done promptly like drain clearance 
and road maintenance. Interviewee 24 suggested that for a long time many of 
the arterial roads in Portmore were in a bad state but since the last parish 
council elections (2012), he saw some improvements. Another taxpayer, 
interviewee 30 suggested that services in Portmore improved since the council 
received municipality  status in 2003.  
However one taxpayer, interviewee 25A suggested  that the municipality didn’t  
seem to have any sort of control  over services and service providers in the 
Portmore community.  Additionally,  this taxpayer suggested that there seemed 
to be no communication between the service providers and the PMC.  Citing an 
example, the taxpayer said if he should have a water leak in his community, he 
should be able to call the municipality, with the municipality having the power or 
authority  to insist and also ensuring that  the Water Commission rectified the 
leak.  But the interviewee stated, that as it stood, the entities including the 
Water Commission seemed to act on their own without reference to the 
municipality. The taxpayer stated paying one’s property tax, he believe that this 
was one service that the municipality should offer taxpayers.  The taxpayer, 
interviewee 25A further argued that the municipality  should be that ‘middle 
man’ or play the coordinating or supporting role to ensure that services were 
satisfactorily delivered to taxpayers and that taxpayers’ complaints were 
resolved.    
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In responding to the issue concerning the  municipality’s lack  of authority over 
service providers, a mayor, interviewee 9 stated that  the municipality’s 
institutional structure didn’t   facilitate this kind of governance.  The mayor 
further stated that the current structure  didn’t   give the kind autonomy for  it to 
manage its  own affairs.  This was exacerbated by an acute shortage of staff.  
The mayor also suggested that the municipality laws fell under the old archaic 
parish council system which stymied, the approach of a new municipality, 
stating:  
‘You know, for instance, I think as a mayor I should have a dialogue with 
the police that I can call them up and say ‘do this’, ‘do that’. They don’t 
want to talk to me because there’s no link between the police force and 
me...no link between the fire station and me…they come voluntarily 
because you call them…’ (Interviewee 9/Mayor). 
The interviewee mayor further  expressed the view  that whilst the  municipality 
made some impact, it could be more effective had it received the necessary 
financial support from the  government at its inception along with a budget for 
the mayoral office. A member of parliament, interviewee 8 confirmed  that the 
municipality could do many innovative things but was hampered by the lack of 
financial resources.    The mayor also suggested that the municipality would 
have liked to work with service providers in ‘public private partnership’ 
arrangements but technocrats at the central level were not accustomed to this 
way of thinking, thus their efforts were often thwarted, frustrating the efforts of 
the municipality. Additionally, the mayor, interviewee 9 believed  that the 
municipality could have greater  impact if there was a better working 
relationship with and better representation from the citizen’s umbrella group the 
PCAC.  He believed that the interest groups within the PCAC, generally  didn’t  
look at community issues but were  rather focused on the narrow interests of 
their  respective groups. 
A manager, interviewee 21 from an hereditament in Portmore when asked to 
share her perception of the municipality preceded her response with  a sigh.  
The hereditament manager then stated that there were issues with the delivery 
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of some services within the community for which the municipality failed to 
accept responsibility although such services were covered by the property tax.    
For example,  the interviewee stated: 
‘…really we can’t call on them when we have a garbage problem.  Even 
if you tell them, they are sending you to (NSWMA). They are telling you 
to call (NSWMA) because they are saying that garbage is not for the 
municipality (Interviewee 2/Manager, Housing 
Cooperative/Hereditament).    
This manager further explained that the municipality didn’t  accept complaints 
about street lights, it was the community who had to follow-up with the Jamaica 
Public Service to have this corrected. The interviewee also suggested that the 
municipality staff was unresponsive to issues or took very a long time to 
address matters  concerning the maintenance of the character and nature of the 
community.  For example, the hereditament manager stated that issues such as 
vending, operation of commercial businesses such as bars and shops in 
residential areas were only addressed by the municipality if the community was 
persistent in its call for them to be dealt with along with written requests for the 
mayor’s intervention.  
Added to this, a member of civil society, interviewee 23 suggested that the 
municipality was inept in enforcing the municipal regulations such as parking, 
building covenants and the maintenance of the swales117 stating that  the 
‘councillors in the municipality are on a paid holiday’. This interviewee in making 
reference to  the poor physical state of some swales   suggested that residents 
were in contravention of the law.  To highlight the point about the municipality’s 
ineptitude, he related a particular incident.  The interviewee from civil society 
stated that he brought to the attention of a councillor the unkempt swale in a 
particular section of a community in Portmore stating that the councillor’s 
response was that ‘some time ago he attempted to clean a particular swale but 
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  Swales	  are	  used	  to	  slow	  down	  and	  capture	  runoff	  water.	  http://www.susdrain.org/delivering-­‐
suds/using-­‐suds/suds-­‐components/swales-­‐and-­‐conveyance-­‐channels/swales.html	  	  retrieved	  December	  
22,	  2014	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the people almost  nyam him (ate him alive)’. But  the interviewee argued that 
he was not impressed by the councillor’s response.  He debated that the laws 
were to be upheld and as such the enforcement arm of the council should have 
taken action against those taxpayers. The civil society interviewee also pointed 
out that there were other breaches of the law  within Portmore which were not  
corrected by the municipality enforcement team and when they were corrected 
they took an inordinately long time.  Reference was made to another incident 
where the municipality failed to apply the law to correct a  breach. According to 
the interviewee: 
‘In Sines118,  over there you have some buses being parked in the 
community and the residents and the owner for the buses are at logger 
heads right now.  And the battle line is drawn; machetes are drawn and 
when you go to the municipality, you heard that the enforcement person 
is telling the residents that they need  to live good.  Yes they need  to live 
good but that’s not it. They are supposed to do what they are supposed 
to do.  If the covenant is that they should not be parked there, then you 
should enforce law (Interviewee 23/Civil Society). 
Referring to other breaches in a number of communities in Portmore, 
interviewee 24 from civil society stated that should fellow residents attempt to 
have the situations resolved themselves, then they do so at the expense of 
endangering their lives, thus, the municipality should seek to have the breaches 
corrected.  
In another situation, the interviewee also stated  that the municipality was 
unprincipled in its operation and supported illegal activities.  This is what he 
said:    
‘Out of  context, the next one is that there is a report of a gentleman who 
rears dogs in a particular community and what he does he take the mess 
from the dogs and go and dump it in the NWC sewer plant which is 
wrong.  This man has access to the plant,  he has a key to open the 
gate’(Interviewee 23/Civil Society). 
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  Name	  of	  community	  	  changed.	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The interviewee surmised that the municipality was soft on breaches because 
councillors feared that if they were insistent in having people obey the law, they 
might not be re-elected. This interviewee stated that the municipality should 
address the breaches as the citizens have nowhere else  to turn except to the 
municipality.   The interviewee also stated that the municipality was  there to 
protect the rights of the taxpayers but believed that it hadn’t  done so, leaving 
the aggrieved taxpayer to the mercy of those who flout and breach the law. The 
interviewee stated  that whilst  he couldn’t  definitively state the extent to which 
the municipality’s performance influenced property tax compliance he  
nevertheless believed that taxpayers will view the neglect of the municipality 
negatively and in situations where money or economic capital was short they 
would  opt to evade. 
7.5.5	   Tax	  Administration	  Jamaica	  
An interviewee from civil society, interviewee 22 speaking of the tax authority  
poured scorn on it and stated  ‘the management of it lacks both the stature of a 
person and the kind of both the entity that seemingly command the respect to 
pay my taxes’. There were some taxpayers who perceived that the tax authority 
was not serious about tax enforcement and had no confidence in its ability to 
enforce compliance.  For example, as previously mentioned, a taxpayer, 
interviewee 25A commented that there was no strict enforcement of property 
tax and thus taxpayers treated the property tax as if it weren’t  an annual 
obligation.    Even tax administrators were aware of some the public’s poor 
perception of them and how they performed. A senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 17 stated that she overhead taxpayers ridiculing the tax authority 
proclaiming: ‘…nobody is coming to look for (them) …they  have never paid 
property tax and they have never seen anybody come to them…every day they 
going to send summons’.  But the response of this administrator to this derision 
was that the tax authority will get around to them eventually. Another 
administrator, interviewee 17C stated that taxpayers  treated the tax authority 
with contempt because they knew ‘we are weak’, i.e. taxpayers know of the 
resource limitations. However, interviewee 25A a taxpayer  expressed  sorrow 
and sympathy for the tax authority saying it functioned the way it did  because it 
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had to follow the directives  and instructions of central government as previously 
mentioned.   
Yet, another taxpayer, interviewee 28 and pensioner spoke glowingly of the tax 
authority, saying it  didn’t  really pressure the taxpayer, charging only a penalty 
when payments were late (Elkins 2009; OECD 2010). The taxpayer pensioner 
interviewee also pointed out that the tax authority was very accommodating 
accepting any amount of money towards the taxpayer’s property tax liability 
giving the taxpayer  time to settle the outstanding liability.  This was confirmed 
by a senior tax administrator, interviewee 16 who stated that they tried  to 
facilitate  and support all taxpayers in a bid to get them to comply.  Speaking of 
settling arrears this is what  the interviewee said:  
‘You (have) many options and we can accommodate you, whatever you 
have, you can come in and pay each month.  So, if you want to divide 
into twelve parts. We are willing to accommodate you.  We work out a 
payment plan with you in case your arrears are so much you cannot pay 
it one time.  We sit down with you and work out an agreement and then 
overtime within reasonable time you pay off your balance.’ (Interviewee 
16/Senior Tax Administrator). 
Some  administrators stated that they tried to be pleasant, understanding,  
giving proper service, to be accurate, to advise taxpayers of their rights,  coach 
taxpayers on new tax rates and inform them of the benefits to which they are 
entitled. For example, informing them of applicable exemptions and sometimes 
even applying for exemptions on their behalf.  A senior tax administrator, 
interviewee 17 pointed out that conducting outstations within the community 
was one  way of accommodating the taxpayers by making  it more convenient 
and cheaper for them to comply. But in all this this senior tax administrator 
stated, ‘we have to be aggressive because if we are not aggressive, ‘we will not 
going (sic) to get the money’ (Interviewee 17). 
Despite the tax administrators’ talk of being professional, a taxpayer, 
interviewee 30  saw the tax authority in a different light.  This taxpayer 
suggested that Jamaica’s tax system was backward expressing  the view that  
the government didn’t treat tax seriously therefore taxpayers  didn’t  pay much 
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regard to the government when it came to tax issues.  Evidence of the lack of 
seriousness on the part of the government about tax was the non-receipt of 
property tax assessment notices within her community- Martin Park119 in 
Portmore for close to twenty years, the interviewee stated. The taxpayer, 
interviewee 30 also stated matter of fact (without prompting from the 
researcher) ‘property tax is not  something that one does voluntarily’ suggesting 
that a taxpayer wouldn’t  bother to seek to pay seeing that the liability was 
unknown confirming a tax administrator’s perception that only a few taxpayers 
will pay their property tax without an assessment. The taxpayer, interviewee 30,  
further referenced another incident in which she interacted with the tax office 
when dealing with her income tax, in which she stated that she filed an appeal, 
but the tax authority was unresponsive to her appeal,  writing off the incident as 
a ‘waste of time’ . However, the taxpayer hinted that maybe if she had  known 
someone in the office, then her case probably would have been treated 
differently or the outcome would have been different ‘(be)cause you know in 
Jamaica, we have to still depend on who you know’ (Interviewee 30/Taxpayer) 
as discussed by (Edie 1989). 
A member of parliament, interviewee 8 in referring to the tax authority 
suggested that the tax administrators seemed to have difficulty taking decisions 
or shied  away from taking decisions.  The researcher questioned the 
interviewee as to why this may be the case, to which  the interviewee 
responded by saying that  they have no confidence in  their decision making  
capabilities so they rather not take any actions ‘if you do nothing, nobody can 
say you do anything wrong’ (Interviewee 8/Legislator) as confirmed in (Mills and 
Roberts 1974). 
7.6	  Summary	  
This chapter presented the findings and discussions on Research Question 
Number Three: What are the dimensions of property tax compliance and non-
compliance  in Jamaica?  How do taxpayers use their capital to influence their 
compliance practices? 
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The findings suggest that compliance was driven by different sets of 
motivations. Firstly economic motivation, the fear of losing property and the 
associated actions that might accompany non-compliance, losing use of their 
property,  payment of penalties and fines and  property being tied up in debt. 
Secondly, some were motivated to comply  based on their moral and or 
Christian and or civic duty  (7.3.1).  Thirdly, compliance for some was an 
emotional event in that they feared embarrassment and the social stigmatization 
(Grasmick and Scott 1982, Taylor 2002) of being called an evader (section 
7.3.2). Fourthly, for some taxpayers, compliance was an event of personal  
fulfilment or signified a milestone event.  For them compliance signified a proud 
achievement – land and property ownership a goal for every Jamaican. Finally, 
compliance was a means to fulfil an expectation by being a member of a certain 
community, for example the gated communities. 
For evaders the findings revealed that non-compliance was based on a number 
of issues.  Firstly, it stemmed from a  culture of indifference and taxpayers’ 
disconnect with the community, alienation from their community and lack of 
awareness of the property tax itself and tax in general. Secondly, non-
compliance may be  influenced by poor performance of politicians and 
government institutions and dissatisfaction with how tax revenues are used.  
Thirdly, evasion for some was opportunistic. For example the long queues at 
the collecting stations, technical glitches in online system, non-receipt of 
assessment notices, poor (un)related property tax services, loopholes within the 
law or the institutional and organizational weaknesses of the tax authority. 
Fourthly, institutional issues such as the non-capture of new property owners on 
the property tax roll or occupiers, like renters and squatters.  The following 
chapter gives the conclusions to the findings. 
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Chapter	  8	  
8.0	   Conclusions	  
8.1	  	   Introduction	  
As outlined in Chapter One, this study is concerned with gaining an in depth 
understanding of property tax administration in practice; investigating the 
underlying relations that shape these practices, highlighting how such actions 
shape property tax practice in Jamaica. The research shows how players use 
their cultural, political, social and  economic capital as resources to maintain, 
dominate or enhance their position within the field ultimately shaping the 
practices. The amount of capital and how they  use their capital is influenced by 
their habitus or disposition. The study extends the tax scholarship by providing 
evidence that tax practice is a social construction. It demonstrates that the tax 
authority and the policymakers influence enforcement practices and that the 
property tax field was often used as a site of struggle. It also shows the extent 
to which players use their political capital to influence the non-localization of the 
property tax. Additionally, evidence from the findings suggest that tax 
compliance goes beyond the deterrence model. Finally, the literature is 
extended by the use of Bourdieusian theory as the lens through which the 
findings are interpreted. Empirically, this study focuses on the players of an 
urbanized municipality in Jamaica.  The main research question: How do the 
three dimensions of property tax; administration, politics and taxpayer 
compliance play out in practice? was broken out in three sub-questions as 
follows:  
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Research Question One:	  What are the main property tax enforcement practices 
and how  do the tax authority and policymakers use their capital to shape these 
practices?   
Research Question Two:  To what extent is non-localization of the property tax 
in Portmore influenced  by the  political dispositions  of players within the 
property tax field?  
Research Question Three: What are the dimensions of property tax compliance 
and non-compliance  in Jamaica and how do taxpayers use their capital to 
influence compliance practices? 
8.2	   Findings	  and	  implications	  
The main findings and implications which are drawn from the major themes are 
presented here. 
The tax authority seemed to be unable to maintain that critical balance between 
evasion and compliance.  This in  itself is a problem in that it may have 
conveyed the  message to the community that compliance is optional; property 
tax isn’t  necessarily an obligation (5.2.1) and also that the tax isn’t  important. 
Secondly, the tax authority practiced selective  enforcement (section 5.3.2) 
which may have brought home the issue of unfairness in field.  Here, it’s implied 
that the authority  expected only a selected set of taxpayers to carry the tax 
burden while  evading taxpayers enjoyed the tax benefits at the expense of 
compliant taxpayers. The tax authority functioned in an environment of resource 
constraints (5.2.3), absence of a comprehensive compliance and risk strategy,  
cultural issues and ambiguous legislation.  Tax administrators’ choice of 
enforcement strategies was conditioned by their disposition and their bid to use 
their capital to dominate or maintain their position in the field.  Sometimes the 
field was the site of struggle as they used the strategies as a means to resist  
and struggle with the policymakers as demonstrated in sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 
and 5.3.6. However, in some situations the tax authority used a strategy to give 
its tacit support to some policy like the reminder system, but simultaneously 
used it as a  means to extract additional enforcement and compliance resources 
from the government.  The tax authority also used the reminder system (section 
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5.3.5) to strategically increase its visibility, dominance and legitimacy within the 
property tax field. 
Whilst the lack of enforcement resources may have inhibited the authority’s 
enforcement capability as seen in section 5.2.3 and confirmed by Lange 2002 
and Bird 2004: the tax authority acted opportunistically, working as practical 
strategists  through their habitus (Swartz 1997, 99-100).  They used the 
opportunity to  concentrate their enforcement activities on smaller taxpayers 
preying on their fear of  losing their property through non-compliance but chose 
not to enforce on renters because they believed the laws for renters were 
ambiguous or that cultural issues prevented them from enforcing on them. But 
they  supported the reminder system which gave precedence to collections over 
compliance (McKerchar and Evans 2009) giving the impression that they are 
supporting government policy but it was an opportunity to  extract additional 
resources from the government (Policy 1993).  Furthermore, the system was 
used  to establish  and reinforce their dominance,  visibility and build their 
legitimacy within the field.  The property tax enforcement field was therefore 
shaped by their actions. 
Policymakers should understand that enforcement is fundamental in 
encouraging voluntary compliance and to let citizens know that non-compliance 
is unacceptable (Silvani 1992). They should understand that a system devoid of 
voluntary compliance is unsustainable due to its costliness (Levi 1988; Cullis 
and Lewis 1997). Secondly, they should be aware  that weak and or selective 
enforcement imply that tax administrators aren’t  carrying out their mandate to 
maximize revenue collection and to minimize tax evasion. In this regard, they 
should understand that widespread evasion may breed more evasion through 
social interaction (Traxler 2010). Furthermore, they need to understand  that 
there’s an interconnection between evasion and fiscal policy (Cowell 1999, 
Cummings et al 2004) as evasion influences government’s ability to provide 
services. Additionally, weak enforcement effectively redefines  the enforcement 
field, changing the enforcement rules and at the same time  brings to the fore 
the issue of retributive fairness, that is, some people are punished  for  evasion 
while others aren’t (Elkins 2009; OECD 2010).  If weak and selective 
enforcement continue,  the unimportance of the property tax and its role to 
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provide revenues which are critical to the provision of services in the 
communities may ultimately become a part of the doxa.  
In terms of the law,  policymakers ought to be aware that the law provides the 
boundaries for the operation of tax administrators.  In situations where 
administrators deem the law to be ambiguous, this creates problems for them 
by virtue of the many choices (Hume et al 1999, Doyle, Hughes and Glaister 
2009) creating the path to make opportunistic choices based on their habitus 
conditioned by their environment (Nerre 2008; Oats and Sadler 2011).   
Policymakers should be aware that fiscal decentralization has the potential to  
increase  participation of local taxpayers (Faguet 2012, 2014), increase 
transparency and accountability (Bird and Vaillancourt 1999; Smoke 2001; 
McCluskey and Franzsen 2005).  Importantly, it can be used as a means to 
increase tax morale (Guth, Levati and Sausgrubber 2005) build a compliance 
tradition (Mikesell 2003, Rühling 2006) and increase property tax revenues in 
the process which this study is about. Policymakers should also be aware that 
fiscal decentralization provides the opportunity for taxpayers to be more 
involved in the political process creating the opportunities for them to influence 
the property tax rates, the property tax laws and rules of the property tax game 
by virtue of their involvement at the local level (Feld and Frey 2002). They 
should be aware that this type of involvement amplifies taxpayers’ view of civic 
responsibility  making them more compliant building tax morale (Feld and Frey 
2002). Despite these perceived benefits, most players in the field seemed less 
than eager to embrace a localized system for  a combination of reasons.   
The  absence of a clear policy direction (Bird and Slack 2002; Bahl and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Bahl and Cyan 2011) and a white paper which 
verbalises the policy, processes, expectations of players; institutional practices, 
and organisation structure (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006) seemed to 
indirectly influence participants’ perspectives.  As indicated in the background 
chapter (section 2.7) and confirmed in some of  the findings (sections 6.4; 6.4.1; 
6.4.2; 6.4.3), the matter of mistrust or distrust is a deep seated issue in the 
Jamaican psyche. It can be argued that the absence  of a clear policy direction 
and a written document containing formal reference points somehow 
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heightened  these dispositions. The local authorities a large part of the  social 
space along with actors in central government acted as conduits of information 
about what fiscal decentralization would possibly be like if accepted. Thus, 
participants based on these past experiences and flows of information raised 
issues such as of lack of accountability (6.4.3); perceived corruption (6.4.4), 
power struggles  political divisiveness and the absence of political will ( section 
6.5.1), lack of capitals (economic and cultural) (6.5.2; 6.7.1 & 6.7.3); lack of 
transparency, absence of an enabling legal framework (6.6.2 and 6.6.3) and 
citizens’ refusal to make politicians accountable (6.5.4)  as barriers to 
localization.  
Policymakers should be aware that localization is a policy decision (Bird and 
Slack 2002; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Bahl and Cyan 2011) and thus 
there should be a clearly defined and written policy path for both policymakers 
and other players in the field.  Furthermore, having a written document would 
not only be symbolic but it would help to create some sort of legitimacy and 
credibility to the localization process (Levi 1988; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 
2006), serving as a reference point on all issues regarding localization and 
helping to alleviate some of the anxieties and fears that actors raised about 
localizing the property tax.  
Whilst a written document in itself may not totally alleviate say corruption, 
policymakers should be aware that a written document with guidelines and 
policies in place to monitor behaviours may increase accountability and 
transparency thus  reducing corruption (Lessman and Markwardt 2009). 
Corruption was perceived as embedded in the  culture. Despite this perception, 
policymakers should understand that this can change through prolonged 
education and resocialization (Swartz 1997). Added to this, education can be 
used as a means to resocialize taxpayers with the intent of increasing their 
awareness of corruption and how to make their political representatives more 
accountable (Fauget 2012, 2014) within a localized environment. Policymakers 
also should be aware that due to the nature of the ‘tight coupling’ of the 
subfields within the property tax field, whatever happens in a subfield will 
influence outcomes in other subfields (Swartz 1997).  Thus, if fiscal 
decentralization is to be a reality then the actors both within the local authorities,  
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and the wider field require resocialization (themselves) (Swartz 1997) with the 
intent to transmit positive messages about themselves, their actions and 
localization.  
Portmore’s property compliance rate approximates to Jamaica’s national 
property tax compliance rate of 50%. This rate is less than ideal for an area 
based on its potential earning capacity and a spatial area not saddled by the old 
informal land tenure practices120. The findings suggest that whilst some 
taxpayers complied because of economic motivations  (Allingham and Sandmo 
1972) other complied for reasons beyond the deterrence model.  For example,  
some taxpayers viewed compliance as their moral or Christian and or civic duty  
(7.3.1).  Secondly, compliance for some taxpayers was as an emotional event in 
that they feared embarrassment and social stigmatization (Grasmick and Scott 
1982, Taylor 2002) of being called  evaders (section 7.3.2). Thirdly, compliance 
was a personal  gratification or milestone event, a proud achievement for some 
taxpayers, i.e. land and property ownership which seems to be a priority in the 
Jamaican environment. Finally, compliance was also conditioned by social 
norms (Traxler 2010) a means to fulfil a group  expectation.  
For evaders (sections 7.4;7.4.5; 7.5.1-7.5.6) the findings revealed that non-
compliance was based on a number of issues.  Firstly, it stemmed from a  
culture of indifference and taxpayers’ disconnect, alienation from their 
community and a lack of awareness of the property tax. Secondly, evasion for  
some was opportunistic. Long queues at some collecting stations, technical 
glitches in the online payment system, non-receipt of assessment notices, poor 
(un)related property tax services, loopholes within the law or the institutional 
and organizational weaknesses of the tax authority all served as opportunities 
for taxpayers to evade. Thirdly, an institutional frame which doesn’t capture new 
property owners nor occupiers, like renters and squatters also contributed to 
evasion (sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3). Regardless of the reasons given, evaders  
succeeded in their evasion based on their available capital and past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Most	  of	  Portmore	  is	  planned	  development,	  thus	  these	  parcels	  should	  be	  on	  the	  cadastre	  and	  
assessable	  for	  property	  tax	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experiences (Swartz 1990, 106) of the property tax field. They pursued evasion 
knowing there would be little or no consequences (Swartz 1997) to their actions. 
It is imperative for policymakers to understand what drives both evasion and 
compliance.  They should have knowledge of those ‘internalized schemes which 
guide  taxpayers’ behaviour’ (Madsen and Dezalay 200, Oats and Gracia 2012, 
115) taxpayers’ actions and interactions making them (non)compliant. They 
should be aware of those institutional structures and opportunities that 
encourage non-compliance. For evaders, policymakers should be aware that 
these internalized schemes can change through prolonged education and 
resocialzation (Swartz 1997).  Knowledge of these internalized schemes, 
taxpayers actions and interactions, institutional structures and opportunistic 
events should guide policymakers in the design of enforcement and compliance 
strategies (sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.6). Policymakers should also be aware that 
when taxpayers have strong connections to groups and become identifiable to 
such groups, they become more collectively oriented and are more likely to 
forego immediate self-interest for the sake of the public good which builds tax 
morale (Kornhauser 2007). They should also be aware that when politicians 
emphasize compliance and demonstrate that they are compliant, this increases 
compliance.  On the other hand, policymakers should be aware that politicians’ 
non-compliance increases non-compliance. It’s imperative therefore for them to 
rethink what signals they send to taxpayers about their compliance. 
8.3	   Contribution	  
This research comes at a time when there’s a call for  more tax research due to 
its under representation (Lamb et al 2005; Oats 2012). Responding to this call 
dispels the notion that tax as a field of enquiry is adequately dealt with when it’s 
not (Lamb et al 2005).  My research contributes to the tax scholarship by 
demonstrating that tax is not a technical subject (Boden et al 2010) but rather 
that it’s both a social and  institutional practice (Oats 2012) in other words it’s a 
social construction.  This study also contributes to the tax scholarship by 
demonstrating that taxation is not  based on economic theory only but it’s an 
interdisciplinary subject encompassing management, practice and politics 
(Lamb et al 2005).  This thesis adds to knowledge by providing a better 
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understanding of why the field of tax practice is different from what obtains in 
legislation and policy.  It provides an improved understanding of how culture 
and other resources in the field when used as capital, influence or shape tax 
practices. Furthermore, it increases our understanding of the  contextual nature 
of property tax confirming that the ‘one size fits all doesn’t work’ (Bird and Slack 
2006; Bahl 2009). It also adds to the scholarship by providing an in depth  
understanding of taxpayers’ compliance motivations compliance; that these 
motivations go beyond the deterrence level.   
In addition to the above and the findings, this study makes a number of other 
important contributions to knowledge both empirical and conceptual.  
Empirically, this study involved the interviewing of a wide-cross section of 
players in the property tax field.  These players include those who formulate the 
property tax laws and policies such as legislators, cabinet ministers, 
policymakers which included a former prime minister and minister of finance; 
those responsible for  implementing the policies or maintaining the boundaries- 
ministers of government and parliamentarians, senior government technocrats, 
senior local government officers, mayors, councillors and senior tax 
administrators; and the compliers, residential and  commercial.  There were 
other players who didn’t  neatly fit into the foregoing classifications but for which 
their work influenced property tax practice in all these areas and played a 
critical role on the tax field.  These include developers and members of civil 
society. Gaining access to some  interviewees like the politicians, senior tax 
administrators and senior technocrats government technocrats was significant 
and the insights gained were extraordinary.  
As outlined in Chapter 4, the interpretive methodological approach used for this 
study provides rich insights and an in depth understanding of property tax 
practice, and also gives additional perspectives of property tax practice in 
Jamaica which  emphasizes the limitations of quantitative methodology (section 
4.4.1). 
Conceptually, the study advances a theoretical framework for property tax 
practice as described in Chapter 4.  This chapter provides a thorough 
description of the property tax field, the arena in which property tax practice 
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takes place and also links the actions of the  power brokers of the various levels 
in the field. The framework pulls together the levels and the actors by using the 
three main strands of the literature: tax administration, fiscal decentralization 
and Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  Furthermore the framework gave me the 
ability to interpret and explain the findings as evidenced in Chapters 5 to 7 
inclusive.  
For example the framework provides an understanding that property tax 
administration is more than a technical issue.  The framework allowed me to 
interpret why the legal framework and administrative framework differ from what 
happens in practice; property tax practice is shaped by the actions and 
interactions of players in the field making it a social construction; that players 
use their power to influence property tax practice (Swartz 1997); that players 
actions are conditioned by their background (Swartz 1997).  
Although my research is domestically focused it carries international policy 
implications.  There is a growing phenomenon that populations are moving or 
migrating to urban centres.  With this migration, increased demands are made 
on governments to provide services such as garbage, street lights, parks etc.  
The findings support the literature that property tax can be a significant source 
of revenue to fund these services to the satisfaction of taxpayers (Bird and 
Slack 2006; Domingos 2011) and that it can also be used to  shape the physical 
nature of communities (Bird and Slack 2007). In light of the foregoing, it’s critical 
for policymakers to have an increased understanding and awareness of how 
this tax works, they should  be aware of those enablers and inhibitors of 
enforcement, local management and compliance of the tax which is useful for 
policy development, a contribution of this study.  
Secondly, the property tax can be used as a means to catch those taxpayers 
who might fall outside of the ‘regular’ tax net and if locally managed can be 
used to build a compliance tradition and increase tax morale (Guth, Levati and 
Sausgrubber 2005; Mikesell 2003, Rühling 2006). This is particularly instructive 
for Jamaica  and other developing countries which may have large informal 
economies which contribute minimally to say, personal income tax. Property tax 
can be used as a tax that pulls this set of taxpayers into the tax net. Property 
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tax is also useful in the development of  a more effective tax administration 
(Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). This could be facilitated through up-to-date 
cadastres, regular revaluations, enabling laws, provision of adequate resources, 
localization of the tax along with the use of strategies that go beyond the 
deterrence model.   The study therefore provides the opportunity for 
policymakers to rethink on these issues particularly the role that  fiscal 
decentralization can play in building tax compliance a perennial problem 
particularly in developing countries. 
Thirdly, the study provides the platform for policymakers to rethink the issue of 
how property as wealth is taxed, that it might be significantly under taxed, and 
that this in itself is a source of injustice or unfairness in the society.  Fourthly, 
policymakers should recognize that property tax can assist in state building, 
building synergies in urban centres and that it can be used as an instrument to 
meet socioeconomic goals (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008) as well meeting a 
revenue goal of  predictable revenues flows for which the property tax is ideal. 
Fifthly, policymakers should understand the impact of group involvement of 
people and how identifiable connections to a group may make taxpayers more 
oriented to public interest rather than their own specific interest. Countries 
which face financial crises are faced with financial challenges that limit their 
ability to provide public services based on taxpayers’ expectations.  This study 
provides the opportunity for policymakers to rethink how they can build tax 
compliance through taxpayer involvement through mediating structures. 
Finally, as populations migrate to urban areas with increased demand for 
services, this study brings awareness that fiscal decentralization provides the 
opportunity to reinforce local governance  (Shah 1994,  McCluskey and 
Franzsen 2005) in the provision and delivery of demanded services. 
Furthermore, governments can use fiscal decentralization to develop  the 
property tax into an independent source of revenue for local authorities 
(Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011).  Having this independent source of 
revenue would somehow help to relieve the pressure on central governments 
for the provision of funds a challenge often faced by developing nations and in 
particular Jamaica.  Having this independent, predictable and sufficient source 
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of funds would probably reduce costly international funding which could possibly 
allow governments to retain their sovereignty which may  be threatened through 
the use of conditionalities imposed from these international financial institutions 
(Bullock 1986; Stewart 2003; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). 
	  8.4	   Future	  research	  
The study focused on three main areas: tax enforcement practices, political 
manoeuvrings in the localization of the property tax and dimensions of tax 
(non)-compliance and have opened up a number of opportunities for future 
studies. The study took place at a critical juncture in the property tax field when 
there was a major shift in the property tax policy.  The study along with the 
policy change have opened up new avenues for further research, one area of 
research could be the extent to which the new property tax policy is successful. 
Property tax in Jamaica  doesn’t seem to be working, therefore a closer look 
should be given to the tax to determine its role and function particularly in light 
of Jamaica’s changing demographics and its changing socioeconomic 
environment.  
Tax morale in Jamaica is low, and it’s not only associated with property tax.  It 
seemed to be engrained in the psyche of the citizens, clearly this situation 
demands attention. Continuation of low tax morale  will not only compromise the 
government’s ability to provide public services but will also force the country to 
continuously seek aid and loans which may keep Jamaica in a perpetual debt 
and dependency trap, one which  threatens its sovereignty based on its 
exposure to the use of conditionalities that are attendant with aid and loan 
funds. It is therefore critical for policymakers to break this cycle and build a 
compliance tradition. Property tax can be the avenue to do this. This study 
therefore opens up an opportunity to investigate and explore how property tax 
can be used to build tax morale and a compliance tradition.  
The tax authority plays a fundamental role in enforcement and compliance.  The 
findings suggest that property tax enforcement is weak, when enforced, it’s 
selective and in most situations enforcement strategies used seemed to be 
conditioned by tax administrators’ capital and habitus. The time seems 
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opportune to conduct further study into the attitudes and behaviour of tax 
administrators in Jamaica.   
Tax compliance is complex and still remains a ‘black box issue’ carrying a 
number of dimensions. Some dimensions are not yet fully explored and 
understood.  For example, the issue of the emotions or ‘matters of the heart’ 
because of taxpayers’ emotional attachment to land or property  as found in the 
findings seems to be inadequately explored in the literature, this could be the 
subject of further study.  Fred and Frey (2002) mention emotional ties in the 
context of developing incentives for taxpayers when designing compliance 
strategies but the authors do not really explain taxpayers’ motivations. 
Additionally, the literature normally deals with cognitive matters, what goes on in 
the head, rather than what goes on in the heart. This could be an area for future 
research. 
Fifthly, the impact of group involvement of people and how identifiable 
connections to a group may make them more oriented to public interest rather 
than their own specific interest.  Research could be carried out on the role of 
mediating structures within the communities, investigating taxpayers’ tax morale 
within these groups as against those who are not involved in such mediating 
structures. 
 Sixthly, property tax is not yet localized and the process is a continual one  and 
has been for many decades as suggested in the literature and confirmed in the 
findings.  It would be worthwhile to conduct research on the change 
management process in government. This study would not be tax scholarship 
per se but it would contribute to scholarship in organizational studies but at the 
same time it would  provide insights into how legislative and policy changes 
take place within a tax policy environment.  
Finally, good laws are important for tax enforcement.  Some of the struggles 
within the enforcement field related to tax administrators’ dissatisfaction with the 
laws.  They believed that the laws carried loopholes, didn’t  give them enough 
scope to function and also that the property tax laws didn’t reflect the present 
living arrangements which ultimately affected their ability to enforce.  A study 
and review of all property tax laws in relation to other relevant legislation could 
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be the subject of further study.  Having such a study would identify those laws 
that are irrelevant to the existing enforcement environment and those that need 
to change to fit in with the changes in the society. 
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Appendix	  1:	  Final	  codes	  developed	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  NVivo	  
Main codes     Secondary codes 
Enforcement (non) practices  Weak enforcement 
      Selective enforcement 
      Resource constraints 
      Non-profiling of taxpayers 
      Reminder system 
      Judicial system 
Fiscal decentralization   Local  government reform 
& constitutional entrenchment 
 
Policy & political issues  
 
Trust &  accountability 
	  
      Political will 
      Transparency and corruption 
      Abuse of power 
Attitude of players (dependency, 
nonchalance, command and control 
Resource constraints 
Dimensions of (non) compliance  Demographic profile of taxpayers 
      Attitude of taxpayers towards taxation 
      Attitude of taxpayers towards PT 
      Tax morale & moral obligation 
      Embarrassment, pride, mental relief  
      Administrative issues 
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      Economic motivations 
      Deterrence and debt 
      Fiscal exchange 
      Private stakeholders’ influence 
      Loopholes in law 
      Education & property tax awareness 
Public stakeholders’ influence 
(government institutions and 
politicians) 
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Appendix	  2:	  PRELIMINARY	  INTERVIEW	  GUIDE	  
	  
First of all I introduced myself, thanked them for agreeing to the interviewee. I 
then explained the purpose of the study and the nature of the interview. In 
explaining the nature of the interview, the following were done:  
1. I requested  permission to audio record interview and showed them the 
recording devices 
2. I advised interviewees of the ethical component of the study: 
a.  that their identities  will be kept anonymous 
b. that data obtained from the interview will be used for academic 
purposes only 
c. that participation was voluntary and that they may withdraw at any 
time during the interview 
d. that all information will be kept confidentially and  that that their 
views would  not be not represented or presented in my findings 
so as to be attributable directly to them so as to identify them. 
  
After explaining/discussing the above, I  presented the informed consent form in 
duplicate explaining that the above are included in the form along with my 
contact and my supervisor’s contact should they need to make contact in the 
future.   I then invited the interviewees to read the form giving them sometime to 
do the same and then sign if they were in agreement. The interviewees were 
invited to keep a copy for their record. 
	  
The following are some examples of questions posed to participants, thus the 
list is not exhaustive.  
	  
General questions to all participants 
1. Can you tell me about your work, your job, what you do? 
 
2. Tell me what you know about the property tax, property tax system- how 
it is managed, organized, who is involved? 
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3. What are your views of the property tax laws? 
 
4. How do you feel about the local management of the property tax? 
 
5. Is there anything else that you want to tell me about the property tax?   
	  
The first question in the interview was  designed to get the parties settled, 
comfortable and to set the tone and pace of the interviews.  In some situations, 
interviewees after answering this question, provided data that answered 
questions I had intended to ask them later in the interview, thus my job thereon 
was  to seek clarification and ask them to expand on some issues. Also the final 
question was designed to allow the participant to give me any data which they 
thought was important but which I may have missed. 
	  
Specific questions to Bureaucrats 
1. Please give me a brief summary of the property tax administrative 
process 
 
2. What are the various laws that govern property tax administration? 
   
3. The NAC report suggested that Local Councils should play a more direct 
role in managing the property tax as  this would significantly improve 
compliance. What is the current status of this? 
	  
4. Which organization has complete oversight of property tax 
administration? 
 
5. A taxpayer advised me that she did not pay property tax for almost 
twenty years, what could have accounted for this situation? 
 
6. It is reported that almost 35% of the housing units in Portmore were not 
on the property tax roll? Can you shed some light on this? 
	  
Specific questions to legislators and policymakers 
1. What is the role/ purpose/objective of the property tax? 
 
2. In your position as policymaker, you recommend what goes into the 
legislation, you make the legislation, you make the  policy concerning 
property tax and you also involved to some extent in the implementation 
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of such policy -  describe the tensions  that may arise from time to time 
by virtue of you being in this position. 
3. What are your views on the statement that  the mind-set of the political 
directorate   is centri-focal? 
4. What are your views on the municipality/local authorities being fiscally 
decentralised? What would be the likely benefits that would come with  
local management of the property tax? 
5. There is a statute bar on property tax, so you can only pay up to seven 
years, regardless of the number of years they have not paid. I 
understand that there are some taxpayers who take advantage of this. 
What can be done to change that situation?  
6. ‘… Can you me tell me what role you  play in developing civil 
responsibility in citizens…? 
 
7. Why don’t the authorities practice forfeitures…? 
 
8. What are the issues with the developers and how can they be resolved? 
	  
Specific questions to taxpayers 
1. What are the reasons for you paying your   property tax? 
2. What are your views on the government?   
3. How involved are you in your community? 
4. Where and when do you pay your property tax? 
 
Specific questions to tax administrators and tax professionals 
1. What is the role of the TAJ? 
2. How do you know  whether taxpayers   receive their  assessments? 
3. How does tax policy impact property tax enforcement?  
4. What is the relationship between the local authority/PMC and the TAJ? 
5. What are some of the issues that influence property tax compliance? 
6. What  strategies do you normally use to encourage taxpayers to pay their 
property tax? 
7. It is reported that some taxpayers with large properties do not pay 
property tax, why is this so?   
8. Who are the main compliers of property tax? 
9. What role should voluntary organizations play in property tax 
enforcement? 
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10. Explain whether you think, localizing property tax would  increase tax 
compliance. 
	  
Specific questions to developer and civil society 
 
1. What is the relationship between (the developers) and the Portmore 
Municipality? What is the current relationship? Or can you describe the 
relationship? 
2. How do you see government’s action impacting taxpayers, especially 
property taxpayers? 
3. Why is there a reluctance on the part of the government to enforce the 
law? 
4. What are your views on the Portmore Municipality managing the property 
tax? 
5. Suppose an member of your organization evades property tax, what 
would you do? 
Specific questions to mayors, councillors and past councillors 
 
1. What is the Municipality’s relationship with the Minister of Local 
Government? 
2. If Portmore, had the opportunity to raise tax – say the property tax is 
handed to you and you have to determine the policy, determine the rates, 
the valuation base, the collection and whatever, would you jump to take, 
to seize that opportunity at this point in time? Are you ready for it? 
3. What are some of the issues that the taxpayers would raise as to why 
they don’t pay their property tax? 
4. What are your views on fiscal decentralization? 
5. To what extent do you think the local authority/PMC is ready to 
administer their own financial affairs in terms of handling the property tax, 
determining the policy – set the rates, do the collections, spend the 
money…? 
6. How involved is the local authority in the property tax budget process? 
7. Describe the typical taxpayer in your division/constituency. 
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Appendix	  3	  :	  Informed	  consent	  form	  
 
Dear  
 
Informed Consent 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview on property tax.  I would 
be happy if you would read the items below and if you are in agreement, I ask 
that you sign this consent form. 
 
1. I hereby give my consent for the interview to be audio recorded. 
2. I understand that my participation is purely voluntary and that I have the 
option to withdraw from the interview at any time. 
3. I agree that data from this interview  will be used for academic purposes 
only 
4. I understand that my identity will not be disclosed and that my responses 
will not be attributed to me by the final reader of this work. 
5. I understand that my responses will be dealt with ethically and 
responsibly in this study. 
6. Should there be any questions or issues arising subsequent to this 
interview, I will contact the interviewer, Carlene Wynter or the Professor Lynne 
Oats L.M.Oats@exeter.ac.uk, supervisor of the interviewer for clarification. 
 
Yours truly  
 
 
Carlene 
Carlene B Wynter 
Doctoral Researcher in Taxation 
Department of Accounting  
University of Exeter Business School 
Streatham Court 
Rennes Drive 
Exeter, EX4 4PU 
UK 
Email: cbw204@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Signed:________________________________Date:____________________ 
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Appendix	  4:	  	  Interview	  request	  form	  
Mr/Miss/Ms XXX 
Title of position 
Name and address of organization 
 
Date 
Dear Mr  
INTERVIEW REQUEST 
 
 
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom and my 
research interest covers Property tax in Portmore, Jamaica. Whilst there has 
been some amount of research on the structure of the property tax in Jamaica, 
there is no research which addresses the property tax system in a self-
governed urbanized community. The aim of this research is to gain a greater 
understanding of the property tax system at work in Portmore, how it is 
managed, its compliance strategies, how property tax is raised and used and to 
see whether the system can be improved so as to increase revenue flows. 
 
Considering your intimate knowledge of and involvement in the Portmore area 
and or of property tax systems, it is my opinion that your views will significantly 
contribute to my thesis development. I would therefore be happy if you would 
agree to be interviewed. Confidentiality is protected during all stages of the 
process and your views will not be divulged in a way that may be linked to you.  
Furthermore, data will only be used for academic purposes. 
 
Please feel free to contact me at cbw204@exeter.ac.uk or 07825485473 for 
further information. 
 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Carlene B Wynter 
PhD researcher 
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Appendix	  5:	  Profile	  of	  interviewees	  	  
Interviewee 
Labels 
Interviewee status Positions Affiliation 
Interviewees
1, 2, 3 & 4 
Senior Government 
Bureaucrats  
Directors & 
Senior 
Consultant 
Ministry of Local 
Government and 
Community 
Development; 
National Land 
Agency;  
NSWMA  
Interviewees 
5, 6 & 7 
  
Policymaker/cabinet 
minister/politician   
Ministers of 
Government & 
cabinet 
members 
Ministry of Local 
Government & 
Community 
Development; 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign 
Trade 
Interviewee 
8 
Legislator/politician Member of 
Parliament 
Governing party 
Interviewee 
9 
Mayor/politician Mayor Government 
party 
Interviewee 
10 
Former 
Mayor/former 
politician 
Entrepreneur Previous 
government 
Interviewee 
11 
Former 
councillor/former 
politician 
Consultant Governing party 
Interviewee 
12 
Councillor/politician Local Authority Governing party 
Interviewee 
13 
Former prime 
minister 
Former 
politician 
Previous 
government 
Interviewees 
14A, 14B, 
15, 16 &17 
Senior Tax 
Administrators  
Property Tax 
Coordinator; 
Property Tax 
Regional 
Managers; 
Commissioner 
General; 
Former 
Director, 
Internal 
Revenue 
Tax 
Administration 
Jamaica 
Interviewee 
17A, 17B, 
17C, 17D, & 
17E 
Compliance Officers  Field workers Tax 
Administration 
Jamaica 
Interviewee 
18 
Tax professional Tax 
Accountant 
Corporate 
Work/Banking 
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Industry 
Interviewees
19A, 19B, 
20A & 20B 
Senior Managers Director, 
Finance & 
Corporate 
Services; 
Engineer; 
Chief 
Administrative 
Officer; 
Manager 
Commercial 
Services       
Local authority 
Interviewee 
21 
Manager Housing 
Cooperative/ 
Hereditament 
Private 
 Interviewees 
22 & 23 
Civil Society Chairman;  
Member of civil 
organization  
Portmore  
Citizen’s Advisory 
Council (PCAC) 
Interviewee 
24 
 
Taxpayer Resident &  
Business 
owner 
Caribbean 
Estates-Portmore 
Gated community 
Interviewees
25A & 25B 
Taxpayers Residents/ 
Property 
owners 
Hellshire Heights- 
Portmore- Gated 
Community 
Interviewee 
26 
Taxpayer Resident/ 
Property 
owner 
Greater Portmore 
Interviewee 
27 
Taxpayer Resident/ 
Property 
owner 
Greater 
Portmore-  
Interviewee 
28 
Taxpayer Resident/ 
Property 
owner 
Portmore 
Passage Fort 
Interviewee 
29 
Taxpayer Resident/ 
Property 
owner 
 
Portmore 
Westport 
Interviewee 
30 
Taxpayer Former 
resident of 
Portmore 
Property 
owner 
Former resident  
Gregory 
Park/Hamilton 
Gardens 
Interviewees
31A-31F 
Squatters Residents 
(non-property 
owners) 
Portmore 
community 
Interviewee 
32 
Developer Corporate 
Director 
Housing 
Developer 
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List of persons interviewed in Jamaica 
Compiled by author 
September 2014 
Source: interview data 
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Appendix	  6:	  Properties	  exempted	  from	  property	  tax	  	  
Lands in Jamaica Exempted from Property Tax Payment 
Exempted lands 
from property tax in Jamaica 
Land immediately attached to buildings held in trusts exclusively for public 
worship or religious worship and for classroom and also those used as 
church yards or burial grounds 
Land solely used for charitable or educational purposes and supported 
solely by charitable or missionary funds 
Land belonging to and used by the University of the West Indies 
Lands belonging to primary schools, inspected by an inspector from the 
Ministry of Education or to Agricultural Industrial or Vocational Schools 
approved by the Minister, or endowed schools specified in the second 
schedule to the Act 
Lands belonging to secondary schools, receiving payment out of the 
Consolidated funds 
Lands belonging to secondary schools, commercial schools or 
preparatory schools with not less than twelve scholars in average 
attendance, and each must be certified by Minister of Education 
All unoccupied property belonging to, and all property belonging to and in 
the actual occupation of the Crown, the government of Jamaica, or any 
parish council or the Kingston and St Andrew Corporation 
All freehold property vested in the Commissioner of Lands and in the 
actual occupation of the Crown, the government of Jamaica, or the 
Kingston and St Andrew Corporation or the holder of a public office by 
virtue of his employment 
All lands belonging to and used by the Council on Legal Education 
All lands immediately owned and those not in excess of one acre and are 
attached to any church which are used rectories, caretaker cottages or 
church halls 
All lands belonging and to and used solely for the purposes of an private 
hospital approved by the Minister 
All lands belong to any social, charitable or cultural organization approved 
by the Minister and used solely for the purposes of such organization 
 
 
Lands exempted from property tax in Jamaica 
Source: S10(1) (a)-(l) of Property Tax Act 1903 
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